The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
STEPHANIE LITTLE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 23-3626 (KMW) (SAK)
□ OPINION
CUMBERLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
WILLIAMS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiff's
complaint (ECF No. 1) and the Court’s review of Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma
pauperis. CECF No. 4.) Having reviewed the application, this Court finds that leave to proceed in
forma pauperis is warranted in this matter, and Plaintiffs application will be granted. Because
Plaintiff will be granted in forma patiperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen her
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice.
L BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is state prisoner currently detained by the Cumberland County Department of
Corrections, (ECF No, | at 1-2.) According to her complaint, while confined, she has suffered
from an unspecified pre-existing illness which has gone untreated, U/d.) She also alleges that she
has some kind of “untreated wound.” (/d@. at 1.) Plaintiff characterizes her lack of treatment as
“medical negligence,” but does not specify who exactly has ignored her medical conditions, nor
how any named Defendant is liable for that negligence. (Ud. at 1-2.) Plaintiff also alleges that
three specific officers — Defendants T. Evans Johnson, Officer Johnson, and T. Walker Brown —
are “very disrespectful” to inmates by “sit{ting] on the phone all day.” (/d. at 3.) Plaintiff does
not allege that these officers did anything to her specifically, nor does she allege how she believes
this alleged lack of respect violates her civil rights. (/d.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff will be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen
her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Jd. “The
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C, §
1915(e)(2)(B)id is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F, App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah vy.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is
required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v, Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), A
complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “’naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S, at 556). A complaint that provides facts
“merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at
557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se
litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
Ill, DISCUSSION
In this matter, Plaintiff primarily seeks to raise a claim against unspecified persons
employed by the Cumberland County Department of Corrections for an alleged lack of medical
care. To successfully plead a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights arising out of deficient
medical care, Plaintiff must do more than plead mere medical negligence, however — she must
plead that she had a serious medical need and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
that need. See Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003).
Deliberate indifference is a “subjective standard of liability consistent with recklessness” which
will be fond only where the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety.” Jd. at 582 (internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference therefore “requires
more than inadequate medical attention or incomplete medical treatment,” see King v. Cnty. of
Gloucester, 302 F. App’x 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2008), and a plaintiff who demonstrates conduct
amounting to only negligence or medical malpractice will fail to make out a claim for relief under
§ 1983. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 Gd Cir. 1999),
Plaintiff in her complaint does not detail what her preexisting condition or untreated wound
are, and it is thus not clear that she has pled a sufficiently serious medical need. Even if this Court
were to assume her wound was sufficiently serious, however, Plaintiff has not pled how any
specific defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need. She pleads no facts alleging who she
told about her condition, or how she sought treatment, or who refused to provide any such
treatment. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plead deliberate indifference sufficient to state a claim
against any of the named Defendants. Indeed, Plaintiff herself characterizes her situation as one
of medical negligence, which is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under federal civil
rights law. Therefore, Plaintiff's medical claims! are dismissed without prejudice.
In her final claim, Plaintiff alleges that three guards — Johnson, Johnson, and Brown — have
been “disrespectful” and that she believes this violates her rights. However, mere disrespect, does
not amount to a federal civil rights violation. Indeed, even the use of reprehensible language
including insult and racial slurs are generally insufficient on their own to amount to a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Trafion v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443-44 (D.N.J. 2011).
Plaintiff's complaint, which pleads no more than “disrespect,” thus fails to state a plausible claim
' This court does not construe Plaintiff as raising a state law claim for medical malpractice. If
Plaintiff did intend to raise such a claim, however, she has not pled sufficient facts to show that
any specific Defendant was actually medically negligent as she has not pled any facts regarding
how her condition was brought to the attention of jail staff, nor how they failed or refused to treat
her. Should Plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, she should clarify whether she is
attempting to plead a state law medical negligence/malpractice claim, and against whom she is
raising that claim.
for relief based on alleged mistreatment by these three officers. Plaintiffs claims against them are
therefore dismissed without prejudice. Because all of Plaintiff's claims fail to state a plausible
claim for relief, Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety for failure
to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
No. 4) shall be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) shall be DISMISSED -
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
\
PA Qi
Hon.Maren M. Williams,
United States District Judge