The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ARTHUR D. SEALE,
Petitioner, Civil Action No. 19-21016 (MAS)
‘ MEMORANDUM ORDER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Arthur D. Seale’s letter request for a
certificate of appealability so that he may appeal this Court’s denial of his request for a full
resentencing following the vacation of his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (ECF No. 22.)
The Government filed a response to the request (ECF No. 27), to which Petitioner replied (ECF
No. 28). For the reasons expressed herein, the Court denies Petitioner’s request.
By way of background, Petitioner pled guilty to a seven-count indictment in the early
1990s. The indictment included charges of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, Hobbs Act
extortion, mailing of threats, making threatening phone calls, traveling in interstate commerce to
further an extortion scheme, and the knowing and willful carrying and use of a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (See ECF No. 20 at 2.)
Petitioner received a 95-year sentence. (/d.) Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Davis, 139 8. Ct. 2319 (2019), Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his conviction under
§ 924(c) in December 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner also sought a full resentencing in the event
his motion was granted. (/d.)
On December 30, 2022, this Court entered an opinion and order which granted the motion
solely to the extent Petitioner sought to have his § 924(c) conviction vacated, but which denied
Petitioner a full resentencing as there was no valid basis for providing one under applicable law.
(ECF Nos, 20-21.) As this Court explained,
Petitioner argues that, in light of the vacation of his § 924(c)
conviction, he should receive an entirely new sentencing on ail of
his offenses under the sentencing package doctrine. District courts
have “broad and flexible power” in determining the proper course
“following a successful § 2255 motion” which results in the vacation
of one count of a petitioner’s conviction. United States v. Davis,
112 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 1997). Under the sentencing package
doctrine, where a petitioner has been “found guilty on a multicount
indictment” and “fone or more of the component counts is vacated”
a district judge is “free” to resentence the petitioner on all the
remaining counts if such an action is necessary to “accurately reflect
the [sentencing] judge’s original intent regarding the appropriate
punishment for a defendant convicted of multiple offenses and to
reflect the gravity of the crime.” Jd. at 122-23. The thrust of the
doctrine, then, is that, in the face of a vacated conviction, a court
may resentence a petitioner on all counts where the sentence on the
vacated count was interdependent with the sentence on the
remaining counts and such a resentencing is necessary to reflect the
sentencing judge’s ultimate plan and to take account for the
seriousness of the remaining offenses, whose sentences may have
been discounted to account for the now vacated count of the
conviction. /d. at 123. The ultimate purpose of the doctrine, then,
is to permit a court to resentence the defendant with any guidelines
enhancements which the court was prevented from applying by the
now vacated conviction or to permit the court to increase the
sentence on the remaining counts where necessary to effect the total
sentencing package intended by the sentencing judge. See United
States v. Smith, 467 F.3d 785, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A full
resentencing .. . is therefore inappropriate where the sentencing
judge already imposed “the highest sentence available” on the
remaining counts of the conviction, indicating that the vacatur of a
consecutive § 924(c) conviction does not unravel the package
imposed. fd. at 790.
This Court need not guess at Judge Brown’s intentions in
sentencing Petitioner. At the sentencing hearing, Judge Brown
made it abundantly clear that his “intent [wa]s that [Petitioner] never
be free” and that the Court intended to impose a sentence that
ensured that Petitioner would be “imprisoned for the rest of [his] life
without parole.” (Sent. Tr. at 91.) Judge Brown therefore imposed
the applicable statutory maximum sentence on each count of the
indictment, and ran those counts consecutive to one another. (/d. at
91-92.) As with the Defendant in Smith, Petitioner received on his
remaining convictions “the highest sentence available” in the form
of the applicable statutory maximum sentences run consecutively,
and as such the vacatur of the § 924(c) sentence alone does not
“unravel” an interdependent sentencing plan. As the applicable
maximums were imposed, this Court has no opportunity to impose
a harsher sentence on the remaining counts in order to rebalance
Petitioner’s sentence, and the increased guidelines range which
would result from the inapplicability of § 924(c) could have no
effect on Petitioner. The only possible outcome of a full
resentencing for Petitioner would be either the sentence Petitioner
already has minus the five years for the vacated count, or a windfall
in the form of a lesser sentence on Petitioner’s remaining counts.
Such a windfall would not “accurately reflect’ Judge Brown’s
sentencing intentions, nor would it allow the restoration of a
package plan disturbed by a vacated count. The sentencing package
doctrine is thus inapplicable — Petitioner’s statutory maximum
sentences were not interdependent with the consecutive § 924(c)
conviction, and there is no occasion in this matter to rebalance
Petitioner’s remaining sentences to better reflect the sentencing
court’s intentions. This Court thus concludes that a full resentencing
is inappropriate, and must be denied as such. This Court will
therefore grant Petitioner’s motion to the extent he seeks the
vacation of his § 924(c) conviction, vacate the five-year consecutive
sentence imposed on that count, and leave Petitioner’s remaining
sentences intact.
(ECF No. 20 at 10-12.)
Petitioner’s letter request asks the Court to grant Petitioner a certificate of appealability so
that he may now appeal the denial of his request for a full resentencing. (ECF No. 22.) In essence,
Petitioner contends that he should be granted a certificate of appealability because he showed his
entitlement to relief under Davis, notwithstanding the fact that he does not intend to appeal the
decision vacating his conviction, and because in any event the “denial of a full resentencing hearing
arguably violated” Petitioner’s Due Process rights. (Ud. at 1.) The Government opposes this
request. (ECF No. 27.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner in a § 2255 proceeding may not appeal from
the final order in that proceeding unless he makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason
could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could
conclude that the issues presented here are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). The requirement for a certificate of appealability
applies not only to denials of § 2255 motions on the merits, but also to cases in which an appellant
seeks to appeal a corrected sentence which resulted from a granted § 2255 motion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Walker, No. 18-3580, 2019 WL 11093774, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 2019); United
States v. Williams, 158 F.3d 736, 740 (3d Cir. 1998),
Although Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a certificate of appealability because this
Court granted him relief on his Davis claim, that contention is incorrect. Petitioner does not
disagree with the vacation of his § 924(c) claim, nor does he seek to appeal that issue. Instead,
Petitioner seeks to appeal only the denial of a full resentence. Petitioner must therefore make a
substantial showing that the court’s denial of a resentencing amounted to the denial of a
constitutional right. See, e.g., Williams v. Untied States, 150 F.3d 639, 639-41 (7th Cir. 1998).
Contrary to Petitioner’s contention that the denial of a full resentencing “arguably” impacted his
Due Process rights, however, there is no constitutional obligation that a full resentencing occur
following the vacation of a single count of a conviction.’ Id; see also Davis, 112 F.3d at 122-23.
Indeed, as this Court explained in detail to Petitioner in denying him a resentencing, this Court has
considerable discretion in determining whether a resentencing is required. Furthermore, the Court
is under no obligation to provide a prisoner in Petitioner’s circumstances the windfall of a
' Petitioner resists this conclusion by citing to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Paige, No. 21-13920, 2022 WL 17455186, at *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 6, 2022). Although the Eleventh
Circuit found a certificate warranted in that case because the panel felt it “debatable” whether a
constitutional right was involved in the denial of a resentencing, the panel ultimate concluded that
the denial of a resentencing was entirely proper where no rebalancing was needed to adjust a
sentence under the sentencing package doctrine. Thus, the granting of a certificate in that case
aside, Paige’s ultimate conclusion is entirely in line with this Court decision denying a certificate
of appealability.
resentencing where no such resentencing is necessary to rebalance the remaining counts and the
intentions of the original sentencing judge were abundantly clear. (See ECF No. 20 at 10-12.)
Petitioner has thus failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and
the Court finds good cause to deny his request for a certificate of appealability.
IT IS THEREFORE on this 21st day of July, 2023, ORDERED that:
1. The Clerk of the Court shall re-open this matter for the purposes of this Order only;
2. Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability (ECF No. 22) is DENIED; and
3. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon the parties electronically
and shall CLOSE the file.
s/ Michael A. Shipp
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE