The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN FAKLA, Civ. No. 22-04126 (KM) (ESK)
Plaintiff, OPINION
v.
THE BOROUGH OF MIDDLESEX,
et al.,
Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendant
Middlesex County for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c) (DE 32).1 For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
In June 2022, plaintiff John Fakla commenced this action against a long
list of various government agencies and actors. (DE 1.) The gist of the
complaint is that Fakla was maliciously prosecuted and denied his due process
rights by, primarily, several officers of the Middlesex Borough Police
Department and employees of the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office. Fakla
also alleges that Middlesex Borough Police officers used excessive force against
him during a traffic stop. These claims are brought pursuant to federal and
New Jersey law.
1 Certain citations to the record will be abbreviated as follows:
DE = Docket entry in this matter
Compl. = Complaint (DE 1)
Opp. = Fakla’s brief in opposition to the County’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (DE 36)
In October 2022, defendant Middlesex County (“the County”) moved for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (DE 32.) Fakla
filed a brief in opposition to the motion (DE 36), and the County filed a brief in
reply (DE 37).
II. Legal standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides for judgment on the
pleadings after the pleadings have been closed. A motion for judgment on the
pleadings will be granted “if, on the basis of the pleadings, the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court will accept the complaint's
well-pleaded allegations as true, and construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, but will not accept unsupported conclusory
statements.” DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262-263 (3d Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted). For present purposes, the standards governing a
Rule 12(c) motion and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion are similar. See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Court must dismiss a complaint pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has
been stated. Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d
462, 469 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011). Although a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
(requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief”). Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a
plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, demonstrating that it is
“plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Umland v.
PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion
As a preliminary matter, it is not entirely clear from the complaint what
claims, if any, Fakla is asserting against the County. None of the ten counts
raised in the complaint allege any conduct on the part of the County
specifically. The only counts that can plausibly be read as pleading a cause of
action against the County are Counts 7 and 9, as they do not name any
defendant in particular but instead refer to “Defendants” as a group. I will
therefore focus on whether Counts 7 and 9 state a claim against the County on
the basis of the facts alleged.
A. Count 7
Count 7 is brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”),
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1 et seq. The NJCRA provides remedies to individuals for
violations of substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the New
Jersey Constitution and New Jersey statutes.
The complaint does not clearly state the specific violations that are
alleged to have been committed by the County. Fakla argues in his opposition
brief that the County is liable for depriving Fakla of his liberty pursuant to a
malicious prosecution, as the County administered the pretrial services
program in his criminal case and operates the jail where he was incarcerated
pending resolution of the case. (Opp. 3-4.)
Fakla points to the following facts alleged in the complaint as support for
this claim: After an arrest in July 2019, Fakla was released with an ankle
monitor, which remained on him until it unexpectedly broke in December
2019; Fakla called pretrial services when the monitor broke, and they
proceeded to detain him, strip him naked, and leave him for days in Middlesex
County Jail; while there, he was given medication that was detrimental to his
health; and neither the nurses nor the social worker assisted Fakla in
addressing this situation. (Compl. ¶¶68-81.) In January 2020, a hearing was
held in regard to the breaking of the ankle monitor, during which a pretrial
services representative testified without any evidentiary basis that Fakla
tampered with the monitor and took it off. (Id. ¶82.) After a subsequent hearing
later that month, Fakla was ordered detained pending further psychological
evaluation. (Id. ¶¶85.)
Fakla also points to allegations concerning the County prosecutor in his
case (Opp. 5-6), Martha McKinney, but he does not appear to argue that the
County is vicariously liable for McKinney’s conduct. Nor could he successfully
make this argument, as it is well-established that when county prosecutors act
in a law enforcement capacity, they act as agents of the State, not the County.
Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir. 1996). The allegations
concerning McKinney relate to her involvement in the criminal case against
Fakla and thus are not a basis for County liability.
By contrast, individuals employed by the County’s pretrial services
program and by the Middlesex County Jail may be presumed, at least at this
procedural stage, to have acted as agents of the County. But under the NJCRA,
the County cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior. Instead,
“a municipality can be held liable only if it causes harm through ‘the
implementation of official municipal policy.’” Winberry Realty P'ship v. Borough
of Rutherford, 253 A.3d 636, 650 (N.J. 2021) (citing Lozman v. City of Riviera
Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2018)).
Official municipal policy can take the form of an actual ordinance or
regulation adopted by municipal officers, a widespread custom or practice that
has not received formal approval, or a failure or inadequacy of the municipality
that “reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93,
105 (3d Cir. 2019). See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). In all cases, “there must be a direct causal link
between the municipality's custom, policy, or practice and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Est. of Yearby v. Middlesex Cnty, No. A-1974-20,
2022 WL 1714534, at *15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 27, 2022), cert.
denied, 284 A.3d 444 (N.J. 2022). See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 385 (1989).
Here, the complaint contains no allegations that would give rise to
municipal (i.e., County) liability. Fakla does not allege that these pretrial
services or County jail employees were acting pursuant to a County policy,
custom or practice. He also does not allege that their actions are tied to
wrongful conduct by the County, such as a failure to train or supervise its
employees.2 Lacking any such factual allegations, Fakla cannot maintain a
cause of action against the County under the NJCRA.
Even setting aside this dispositive this issue, I also note that Fakla’s
theory of liability—deprivation of liberty pursuant to a malicious prosecution—
lacks clarity. Fakla appears to be making a claim that is distinct from
malicious prosecution, and rightly so, as a malicious prosecution claim cannot
be raised under the NJCRA. See Evans v. City of Newark, No.
CV1400120KMMAH, 2023 WL 2535283, at *15 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2023)
(explaining that a malicious prosecution claim “is grounded in a denial of due
process,” whereas the NJCRA provides remedies only for the violation of
substantive rights) (emphasis added). Beyond that, a plaintiff seeking to assert
a malicious prosecution claim under New Jersey common law must
demonstrate, among other things, that the defendant initiated a criminal
proceeding against the plaintiff. Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269
F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2001). In addition to a prosecutor, a police officer may
be liable for malicious prosecution if the officer “influenced or participated in
the decision to institute criminal proceedings.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273,
297 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09, 317 (6th
Cir. 2010)). I am not aware of any precedent, however, that would support such
2 Fakla argues in his opposition brief that the County “engaged in behavior that
was likely the result of a pattern and practice of abuse of individuals who might have
been cast by their malicious prosecutors as someone deserving of such treatment,
when in reality the person should not have ever been held in that manner in the first
place.” (Opp. 10.) Yet, the complaint is devoid of factual allegations to support this
conclusion.
a claim against a pretrial services or County jail employee.3 And even setting
aside this lack of precedent, Fakla does not allege any facts that would tend to
suggest that the pretrial services or County jail employees had anything to do
with initiating a criminal proceeding against him.
Assuming that Fakla is making a claim that is distinct from malicious
prosecution, his complaint does not clearly state what that claim is. Fakla may
file a motion to amend his complaint if he so chooses, but any such motion
must be accompanied by a proposed amended complaint that clearly states the
nature of his claim against the County, and alleges facts to support such a
claim. Those facts must identify a County policy, practice or custom, or a
failure or inadequacy on the part of the County, that is connected to his claim.
Count 7 is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
B. Count 9
Count 9 raises a claim of official misconduct pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:30-2. That is a criminal statute, not a civil one.
If the relief sought is prosecution of another, there is not cause of action
available. “Courts have long held that a civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief
in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal prosecution of
some third parties.” Gittens v. Scholtz, No. CV182519RBKKMW, 2019 WL
3417091, at *11 (D.N.J. July 29, 2019) (citations omitted).
If the relief sought is civil damages, this statute nevertheless does not
“give rise to a private cause of action.” Yoder v. MacMain Law Grp., LLC, 691 F.
App'x 59, 60–61 (3d Cir. 2017). See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (refusing to infer a private cause of
action from a “bare criminal statute”); Zanetich v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., No.
1:22-CV-05387, 2023 WL 3644813, at *4 (D.N.J. May 25, 2023) (“As a general
principle, a plaintiff cannot bring claims to enforce a statute if it does not have
a private right of action.”) It is true that a statute may carry with it an implied
3 The police officer defendants named in this matter are employees of Middlesex
Borough, not the County.
cause of action. See Zanetich, supra (“Both the United States Supreme Court
and [the New Jersey Supreme] Court have held that a statute that does not
expressly create a private cause of action may, nonetheless, implicitly create
one.”) I find no authority for the proposition that this statute gives rise to such
a private cause of action, and the presumption is to the contrary. Should Mr.
Fakla file a motion to amend, he may include in his brief whatever authorities
may exist for finding such an implied cause of action here.
Count 9 is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the County’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (DE 32) is GRANTED.
The dismissal is without prejudice, however, to Fakla’s submission of a
properly supported motion to amend his complaint, including a proposed
amended complaint, within 60 days after the entry of this opinion and the
accompanying order.
Dated: June 27, 2023
/s/ Kevin McNulty
____________________________________
Kevin McNulty
United States District Judge