Opinion

WESLEY v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
May 17, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.6%

The opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KATHY WESLEY, ALESIA CHARLES,

DANIELLE D’ANDREA, DAVID MARK

EDMONDSON, NIKILYN GRIMSLEY, PAUL

LIND, JO PEACOCK, and THERESA Civil Action No. 20-18629

SIMPSON, individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated,

OPINION

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

This case returns to the Court on Defendant Samsung Electronics America Inc.’s

(“Samsung”) motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. D.E. 85. The Court

reviewed the submissions in support and in opposition,1 and considered the motions without oral

argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated below,

Samsung’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

1 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, D.E. 76, will be referred to as “TAC”; Defendant’s brief

in support of its motion to dismiss, D.E. 85-1, will be referred to as “Def. Br.”; Plaintiffs’ brief in

opposition, D.E. 88, will be referred to as “Plfs. Opp.”; and Defendant’s reply brief, D.E. 89, will

be referred to as “Def. Reply.”

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that they purchased Samsung gas and electric

ranges from various authorized resellers, such as BestBuy, Sears, Wayfair, Lowes, and Home

Depot. TAC ¶¶ 19, 29, 42, 53, 63, 73, 86, 96. Plaintiffs reviewed Samsung marketing materials

and were aware that their ranges were covered by a Samsung warranty, which was included in the

user manual that came with the range. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 30-31, 42-43, 54-55, 64-65, 74-75, 87-88, 97-

98. This warranty covers manufacturing defects in materials and workmanship for one year. Id.

¶¶ 21, 31, 43, 55, 65, 75, 88, 98. After purchasing the ranges, Plaintiffs began to experience

problems with the temperature settings of the ovens, as the ovens would not maintain the set

temperature.3 Id. ¶¶ 23, 33, 46, 57, 67, 77, 90, 100. Plaintiffs attempted to contact Samsung to

have the ranges repaired, but the repairs were either unsuccessful or Plaintiffs were unable to obtain

repair services. Id. ¶¶ 25, 35-36, 48, 59, 69,78-80, 92, 102. Plaintiffs Wesley, Peacock, D’Andrea,

Lind, Simpson, Grimsley, and Edmondson have since used replacement appliances. Id. ¶¶ 39, 50,

60, 70, 83, 93, 103.

Plaintiffs allege that at least 87 Samsung gas and electric range models (the “Class

Ranges”) “fail to properly cook food on account of a defect in the Samsung oven temperature

sensor bearing component model number DG32-00002B and the Range’s control board.” ¶¶ 118,

2 The factual background is taken from Plaintiffs’ TAC, D.E. 76. When reviewing a motion to

dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

3 Six of the named Plaintiffs allege that their ovens consistently underheat: for Plaintiff Simpson,

by approximately 50 degrees; for Plaintiff Charles and Plaintiff Wesley, by approximately 75

degrees; and for Plaintiff Peacock, Plaintiff D’Andrea, and Plaintiff Grimsley, by approximately

100 degrees. TAC ¶¶ 24, 34, 47, 58, 81, 91. Plaintiff Lind alleges that her oven consistently

overheats by at least 25 degrees, and Plaintiff Edmondson alleges that his oven both “underheat[s]

or overheat[s].” Id. ¶¶ 68, 101.

144. Plaintiffs define the alleged defect as a “distort[ion] of information received by the control

board, which in turn causes the oven to deviate from the user-selected temperature (the ‘Defect’).”

Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs explain that the temperature sensor “measures the internal oven temperature and

communicates it to the oven’s control board by varying the amount of resistance in the conducting

material.” Id. ¶ 121. Plaintiffs continue that “[r]esistance is a measurement of how easily the

electrical current can pass through the conducting material;” thus, “changes in resistance affect the

rate at which electrical current flows through the conducting material and into the oven’s control

board.” Id. ¶ 122. According to Plaintiffs, when the electrical current flows into the control board,

it is converted into voltage, and that voltage powers the control board’s switching relays, which

open and close the circuits that lead to the oven’s heat supply.4 Id. ¶ 124. In other words, the

“control board tells the[] [heating] elements when to turn on or off,” “by converting the current

that flows from the temperature sensor into voltage that powers the mechanical switching relays

that open and close the circuits leading to those heating elements.” Id.

Plaintiffs allege that when the Defect manifests, the temperature sensor fails to correctly

regulate resistance in the metal conducting material that connects to the control board. Id. ¶ 1. As

a result, the control board “receives inaccurate electrical information and does not deliver the

correct amount of voltage to the mechanical switches that regulate the oven’s heating supply.” Id.

In turn, the switching relays either (1) remain closed and fail to open the circuits that signal the

heating supply to turn on; or (2) remain open and fail to signal the heating supply to turn off. Id.

¶ 125. This causes the ovens to deviate from the user-selected temperature, becoming “either far

too hot, posing a safety risk, or barely warm at all.” Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs further allege that Samsung

4 In electric ranges, the heat supply consists of an electric heating coil; in gas ranges, the heat

supply consists of an oven burner, the gas valve, and the ignitor. TAC ¶ 120.

knew of, and failed to disclose the Defect, and continues to manufacture and sell ranges with the

defective sensor. Id. ¶¶ 133-38. Had Plaintiffs known of the Defect, they would not have

purchased their ranges or would have paid a significantly lower price. Id. ¶ 146.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on December 9, 2020, D.E. 1, and filed the First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 3, 2021. D.E. 15. Samsung moved to dismiss, D.E. 16,

and on December 3, 2021, the Court granted the motion in part and afforded Plaintiffs 30 days to

file an amended complaint. 5 D.E. 44, D.E. 45. On April 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”),6 and Samsung moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, moved to

strike the class allegations. D.E. 57, 57-1. Plaintiffs opposed and filed a cross-motion for leave

to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). D.E. 58, 58-1, 59, 62. On October 28, 2022, the

Court granted in part and denied in part Samsung’s motion to dismiss and to strike (granting the

motion to dismiss without prejudice, and denying the motion to strike), and denied Plaintiffs’

cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint. D.E. 72, 73. Nevertheless, because Plaintiffs

were granted leave to amend to cure the deficiencies in the SAC, the Court noted that, should

Plaintiffs file an amended pleading, they may add the new Plaintiffs that they sought to join in the

cross-motion. D.E. 72 at 2 n.2.

5 Based on an amended scheduling order, the deadline for the SAC was extended to April 5, 2022.

D.E. 47. One day before the deadline, the parties submitted a joint stipulation indicating that

Plaintiffs intended to file a motion for leave to amend their complaint to add new plaintiffs and

requesting that the Court extend Plaintiffs’ SAC deadline until after Plaintiffs could file, and the

Court could decide, Plaintiffs’ planned motion for leave to amend. D.E. 49. The Court did not

approve the stipulation. D.E. 50.

6 The SAC omitted a fraud claim, a warranty claim, most of the state consumer protection claims,

and some of the express and implied warranty claims that were raised in the FAC. D.E. 52. As a

result, those claims were dismissed with prejudice.

On November 28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the TAC. D.E. 76. The TAC includes eight

Plaintiffs who bring allegations individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated: Kathy

Wesley (Florida), Alesia Charles (California), Danielle D’Andrea (New Jersey),7 David Mark

Edmondson (Washington), Nikilyn Grimsley (Virginia), Paula Lind (Illinois), Theresa Simpson

(Pennsylvania), and Jo Peacock (Florida). The TAC asserts claims for breach of express warranty

on behalf of the New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington subclasses

(Count I), breach of implied warranty of merchantability on behalf of the New Jersey, Florida,

Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington subclasses (Count II), and violations of the Song-Beverly

Consumer Warranty Act and California Consumers Legal Remedies Act on behalf of the

California subclasses (Count III and Count IV, respectively).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under the rule, it

must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a

plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover

proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and

legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements

7 Danielle D’Andrea, as Administrator of the Estate of Joseph D’Andrea, was substituted as a

Plaintiff in this action in place of Joseph D’Andrea on October 13, 2022, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 25(a). D.E. 69.

of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, not entitled to a presumption of

truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however,

“must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true[,]” and give the plaintiff the benefit

of all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Even if plausibly pled,

however, a complaint will not withstand a motion to dismiss if the facts alleged do not state “a

legally cognizable cause of action.” Turner v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 14-7148, 2015 WL

12826480, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2015).

IV. ANALYSIS

Samsung raises numerous grounds for dismissal, arguing first that dismissal is warranted

because Plaintiffs still fail to plausibly allege a “defect” in their ranges. Def. Br. at 10-14. The

Court agrees. In its October 28, 2022 Opinion, the Court observed that there appears to be a split

in authority as to the level of factual allegations necessary to plausibly plead a defect. D.E. 72 at

7-8. While some courts have found that alleging a defect, along with the effects of the defect, is

sufficient, others, like the DeCoteau court, take a more nuanced approach. See id. (collecting

cases). To briefly recap, the DeCoteau matter concerned allegations about defective transmissions

in certain vehicles. DeCoteau v. FCA US LLC , No. 15-00020, 2015 WL 6951296, at *1 (E.D.

Cal. Nov. 10, 2015). The plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed because while the FAC alleged the

effects of the defective transmission, it failed to indicate what was actually defective in the

transmission. Id. at *3. The DeCoteau court reasoned that the “level of specificity required” to

state a defect claim will “directly correlate to the complexity of the machinery in question,” and

that because the transmissions are “complicated systems,” they “demand more detailed factual

allegations in order to identify a plausible defect.” Id. (citations omitted). This Court found such

reasoning persuasive and determined that, given the complexity of the Range, Plaintiffs failed to

plausibly plead a defect.8 D.E. 72 at 9.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court addressed the shortcomings of Plaintiffs’ SAC. The

SAC named the alleged defective component (the oven temperature sensor), described the sensor’s

role (regulating the amount of resistance in the electrical circuits linked to the control board), and

explained that the Ranges contain a “latent defect” in the sensor, which

“causes the [] control boards to fail, which in turn causes the [] Range’s oven and burner

temperatures to deviate from the user-selected temperature settings.” D.E. 72 at 6-7 (quoting SAC

¶¶ 1-2, 69-70). But critically, the SAC “fail[]ed to allege specifically what is defective about the

[sensor].” Id. at 6. It also was ambiguous as to the severity of the temperature fluctuation for the

named Plaintiffs. Id. at 7. Critically, the Court also found that numerous factual allegations

undercut the Plaintiffs’ claim that it was the sensor that was defective because such allegations

attributed the Defect, in whole or in part, to the many other components responsible for measuring

and regulating oven temperature. Id. at 6-7. For example, the SAC alleged that certain technicians

indicated that the cause of the problem was attributable to both the sensors and control boards. Id.

The SAC also cited to online consumer complaints that attributed the problem to other components

such as the control board and the heating element. Id. at 7.

8 Notwithstanding the Court’s decision to follow the DeCoteau approach, Plaintiffs attempt to

relitigate the appropriate standard for the Court to apply, arguing that “[c]ourts have upheld similar

allegations in cases involving complex systems.” Plfs. Opp. at 7-8. In support, Plaintiffs cite many

of the cases relied on in Plaintiffs’ prior opposition brief to argue that alleging a defect, along with

the effects, is sufficient. Compare D.E. 58-1 at 7, 8 n.2; Plfs. Opp. at 7-8. But the Court already

considered this argument and determined that the approach set forth in DeCoteau is appropriate

given the factual allegations in this matter. D.E. 72 at 8-9. The Court’s conclusion is buttressed

by the fact that, as discussed, Plaintiffs appear to contribute other components to the heating

malfunction. At the same time, the Court can also envision circumstances in which the level of

pleading required by DeCoteau is not necessary, for example, in a case in which res ipsa loquitur

would apply.

The Court again finds that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead a defect even though the TAC

is much closer to meeting the requisite pleading threshold. The TAC provides greater context

about the role of the various components involved in the oven’s heating system. See, e.g., TAC

¶¶ 1, 120-130. For example, Plaintiffs explain that the oven’s heat regulation system consists of

the sensor, the control board, and the heat supply (which is an electric heating coil in an electric

oven or an oven burner, gas valve, and ignitor in a gas oven). Id. ¶ 120. Plaintiffs explain that the

sensor is responsible for measuring the internal oven temperature and communicating it to the

control board by varying the amount of resistance in the conducting material (a metal wire that

links the sensor to the control board). Id. ¶ 121. Plaintiffs continue that the amount of resistance

affects the rate at which the electrical current flows into the control board, and that the control

board then converts the electrical current into the voltage needed to power the control board’s

switching relays, which open and close the circuits that lead to the heating elements to signal to

them when to turn on and off. Id. ¶¶ 122, 124-26. Plaintiffs add that “[a]ll of these elements must

work correctly and in close coordination for an oven to properly heat and maintain the selected

temperature,” and that the Defect results from a “malfunction in the electrical interaction of the

sensor and the control board.” Id. ¶ 120.

As to the sensor-specific defect allegations, the TAC indicates the defective component—

the sensor. The TAC also alleges how the sensor is defective. It states that the sensor “fails to

correctly regulate resistance in the conducting material connected to the control board,” which

distorts the electrical current received by the control board. TAC ¶¶ 125-26.9 And the TAC

9 This allegation is stated similarly in other paragraphs of the TAC. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 123 (alleging

that the sensor is “unreliable and prone to erratic and incorrect regulation of resistance,” which

“causes an incorrect amount of current to flow to the control board.”).

continues, as the SAC did, that this causes “circuit failure mode” in the control board, meaning

that the control board is unable “to consistently open and close the [switching] relays,” and thus

“signal the heating supply to turn” on and off, id. ¶ 125, the cause of the defect.10 Finally, the TAC

indicates the result of the defect, that is, the heating temperatures are materially deficient—whether

it be too low a temperature or one that is too high.

But Plaintiffs’ other allegations cause the Court to question whether Plaintiffs allege that

only the sensor is defective—as opposed to some other component or combination or

components.11 At times, Plaintiffs appear to allege that both the sensor and the control board are

defective. See, e.g., id. ¶ 118 (“Plaintiffs’ Class Ranges fail to properly cook food on account of

the defect in the Samsung oven temperature sensor bearing component model number DG32-

00002B and the Range’s control board. Each Class Range contains this sensor and a control

board.” (emphases added); see also Plfs. Opp. at 9 (“[T]he defect is present in both the temperature

sensor and the Range’s control board as it is the result of a malfunction in the electrical interaction

between the sensor and the control board.”). And at other times, the alleged defect is amorphous,

“inher[ing] somewhere in the electrical and mechanical connections within the Range’s heating

system,” and “distort[ing] the information received by the control board.” TAC ¶ 1; see also Plfs.

Opp. at 11 (explaining that the range’s “failures result from a malfunction in the electrical

connection between” the sensor and the control board). Plaintiffs’ other allegations suggest that

10 The TAC describes how the sensor is defective but does not indicate why it is. While the Court

would have appreciated the why as well as the how, the Court does not find this omission to be

fatal.

11 The Court understands that to properly diagnose a defect in a range, counsel will most often

have to employ an expert in the area. Armed with such expert insight, counsel may well conclude

that more than one component of the range is defective and a contributing cause. However, this

precision is lacking in the TAC.

the switching relays may be failing (and in turn, not communicating properly with the heat supply)

not because of a sequence of upstream events involving the sensor and control board, but because

the relays’ contacts themselves have welded together or eroded. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 125 n.5 (“[A]

relay is said to have failed when its contacts fail to operate (often because they weld together) or

when contact material erosion results in an unacceptable high path resistance.”). Similarly,

Plaintiffs assert that the Defect is “difficult” to diagnose because the “unreliable operation of the

switching relays” results in “intermittent heating failures.” Plfs. Opp. at 4, 7; see also TAC ¶ 127.

This allegation is at odds with Plaintiffs’ allegations that suggest that the ovens “consistently” fail

to maintain a set temperature. TAC ¶¶ 24, 34, 39, 47, 58, 68, 81, 82.

The allegations further indicate that repair technicians continue to attribute the Defect, in

whole or in part, to other components. For example, unnamed technicians, at unnamed times, have

observed problems in the field with both “the sensors and control boards.” Id. ¶ 131. As to the

named Plaintiffs, technicians determined that the range’s ignitors were the cause of the problem

for Plaintiff Charles and Plaintiff Grimsley. TAC ¶¶ 26, 92. For Plaintiff Wesley, a technician

first replaced the range’s control board, and later, the temperature sensors. Id. ¶¶ 35, 38. And for

Plaintiff Simpson, the range’s control board was replaced twice. Id. ¶¶ 78-79. None of these

repairs cured the problem. Id. ¶¶ 26, 35, 80, 92. The TAC also cites to a handful of online customer

reviews that attribute the heating problem to other causes, further undermining Plaintiffs’

allegations. Id. ¶ 136. According to one consumer, whose lower oven would only heat when the

upper oven was also in use, the technician first replaced the “motherboard,” but when this resulted

in a different heating issue (the oven overheating), the technician concluded that the “sister board”

needed to be replaced. Id. For another consumer whose oven was not reaching the set temperature,

the technician replaced the control board twice, the fan, and the thermostat, none of which resolved

the problem. Id.

However, the TAC has addressed the technicians’ competing views. Plaintiffs contend that

the technicians are misdiagnosing the problem, therefore these allegations as to the technicians do

not undercut the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 129 (“[I]f the ignitor is not

receiving a signal to ignite due to the circuit failure caused by the defective sensor, a technician

may conclude that the ignitor itself is faulty rather than correcting attributing the problem to the

control board’s circuit failure that the defective sensor caused.”).12 The TAC clarifies that while

technicians have attributed the Range’s problems to different causes, Plaintiffs do not do so.

In sum, the TAC adds more detail to the alleged defective sensor and also makes clear that

Plaintiffs are not adopting the technicians’ diagnoses as their own. Yet, the TAC still falls short

of plausibly pleading a defect in light of other specific allegations which appear to attribute the

defect to other components.13

In the SAC Opinion, the Court stated that it was “the last time that the Court will grant

Plaintiffs’ leave to amend.” D.E. 72 at 25. But because Plaintiffs’ allegations have improved

dramatically, the Court will provide one more opportunity to adequately plead a defect.

12 Plaintiffs also allege that when technicians do replace the temperature sensor, this does not fix

the problem because technicians use the same defective sensor as a replacement part. TAC ¶ 129

(“Even if a repair is performed, the Class Range remains substantially certain to fail because

Samsung and its authorized technicians use the same defective DG32-00002B sensor as a

replacement part, or replace the control board and leave the defective sensor in place.”).

13 Samsung also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ express and implied warranty claims on additional

grounds, and to dismiss certain claims for lack of standing, but because Plaintiffs have not

adequately alleged a defect, the Court need not address these arguments. See Def. Br. at 15-25;

Plfs. Opp. at 18-28; Def. Reply at 10-15.

V. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs have thirty (30) days to file

another amended complaint, if it so chooses, consistent with this Opinion. If Plaintiffs fail to file

a fourth amended complaint, the dismissal will be with prejudice. This is the last time that the

Court will grant Plaintiffs’ leave to amend. An appropriate Order accompanies this opinion.

Dated: May 17, 2023 ~ \he -

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.DJ. □

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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