TRAORE v. EDWARDS

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SOULEYMANE TRAORE, a.k.a.,

NGANIFO DONZO,

Petitioner, Civil Action No.: 19-12842 (ES)

v. OPINION

TOM RIDGE, et al.,

Respondents.

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

It appearing that:

1. Petitioner Souleymane Traore, also known as Nganifo Donzo, is a native of Guinea.

(See D.E. No. 5 (“Petition”) ¶ 1). He entered the United States on or about April 29, 2007, at the

John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens, New York seeking admission as a refugee. (Id.

¶ 8).

2. Thereafter, officials initiated removal proceedings, and an immigration judge

denied his claim for relief from removal on January 8, 2008. (Id.). Petitioner appealed to the

Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”), but the Board affirmed on April 16, 2008. (Id.).

3. On or about March 12, 2009, officials released Petitioner from detention on the

condition that he comply with the terms of an Order of Supervision. (Id. ¶ 9). Petitioner

subsequently resided in Bronx, New York for approximately a decade without incident. (Id. ¶¶ 7

& 9).

4. In early 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained Petitioner

at the Bergen County Correctional Facility in Hackensack, New Jersey to effectuate the then

eleven-year-old removal order. (Id. ¶ 8).

5. On May 23, 2019, Petitioner, through counsel, initiated this action by filing a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by DHS.

(See D.E. No. 1). The Court screened the Petition and ordered Respondents to answer. (See D.E.

No. 4).

6. Thereafter, Petitioner submitted an amended petition on June 17, 2019. (See

Petition). The Petition seeks as relief a bond hearing, Petitioner’s immediate release from

detention, costs and attorneys’ fees, and “such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.”

(See id.).

7. On July 11, 2019, Respondents informed the Court that officials removed Petitioner

from the United States on July 8, 2019. (D.E. No. 6). Respondents requested, therefore, that the

Court dismiss the matter as moot. (Id.). On July 30, 2019, Petitioner submitted an opposition to

Respondents’ request for dismissal. (D.E. No. 7). Respondents replied to Petitioner’s opposition

on August 1, 2019. (D.E. No. 8). Accordingly, the matter is ripe for determination.

8. “Though federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the

jurisdiction given them,’ Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judiciary’s authority to

exercise its ‘judicial Power’ to resolving ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hamilton v. Bromley, 862

F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). Courts enforce this case-or-controversy

limitation “‘through the several justiciability doctrines . . . ,’ including ‘standing, ripeness,

mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition on advisory opinions.’” Id. at 334–

35.

9. The mootness doctrine requires that a case or controversy continues through all

stages of federal judicial proceedings. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477

(1990). “This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be

threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.’” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). It is not enough that a case or

controversy existed when the suit was filed. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477–78. In the context of federal

habeas corpus petitions brought by immigration detainees, the deportation or removal of an

undocumented person renders an immigration habeas petition challenging the legality or duration

of detention moot. See Lindaastuty v. Attorney General, 186 F. App’x 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2006)

(holding that habeas petition challenging immigration detention became moot due to deportation

from the United States).

10. Nevertheless, “[e]ven when a litigant is unable to meet the requirements of the

general mootness inquiry, the litigant may invoke an exception to the mootness doctrine to gain

judicial review.” Chong v. Dist. Dir. INS, 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2001). For example, “a

habeas petitioner may obtain judicial review of the petition by showing that ‘secondary or

“collateral injuries” survive after resolution of the primary injury.’” Vasquez v. Aviles, 639 F.

App’x 898, 902 (3d Cir. 2016). Where an immigration detainee challenges only the legality or

duration of his or her detention, however, the alleged collateral consequence must arise from the

detention. See Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that release from

custody mooted habeas petition where the only collateral consequences arose from the removal

order rather than detention); Barragan v. Holder, No. 13-0715, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99920, at

*9 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2013) (concluding that an immigration petition presented no case or

controversy because officials released the petitioner, and the petitioner did not allege any collateral

consequences arising from his detention).

11. Here, Respondents assert that the Court should dismiss the Petition as moot

pursuant to Lindaastuty in light of Petitioner’s removal. (D.E. No. 6). In his opposition, Petitioner

contends that the matter is factually distinct from Lindaastuty because, here, “DHS abused and

assaulted the Petitioner” while removing him from the United States in that “Petitioner’s feet and

hands were shackled on the plane while two DHS officers restrained him with their knees on his

chest while he was on the plane.” (D.E. No. 7). Petitioner also argues that the matter is legally

distinct from Lindaastuty because, in this matter, “[t]here are ‘sufficient collateral consequences

stemming from’ the Petitioner’s removal to render the Petition ‘justiciable.’” (Id.). For example,

Petitioner alleges that, because of the removal, Petitioner will not be able to reenter the United

States for ten years after his deportation and cannot comfort and assist his ailing wife who resides

in the United States while Petitioner awaits the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

to process his adjustment application. (Id.).

12. Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that the Petition no

longer presents a case or controversy. Because Petitioner has been removed from the United

States, the Petition is not redressable by a favorable judicial decision. See Lindaastuty, 186 F.

App’x at 298. Although Petitioner argues that Lindaastuty is factually distinguishable from this

matter because DHS allegedly assaulted Petitioner while removing him, Petitioner fails to

demonstrate or explain why this difference is material or relevant. Moreover, although Petitioner

invokes the collateral consequences exception, Petitioner’s inability to reenter the United States

and assist his ailing wife is a collateral consequence of his removal order, not the challenged

detention. See Ferry, 457 F.3d at 1132. And Petitioner has never challenged the removal order in

this action. Nor could he, for the Court would lack jurisdiction over such a challenge. Id. Thus,

the collateral consequences exception does not apply to this matter.

13. For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES the Petition without prejudice

as moot. An appropriate Order follows.

“a

Dated: July 11, 2022 fe —

Mon. sther Salas, U.S.D.J.