LEJON-TWIN EL v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY-JOHN JAY HOFFMAN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Moorish-American Moslem ERWIN LEJON- Civil Action No.: 15-8136

TWIN EL, in propria persona, sui juris,

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY – JOHN JAY

HOFFMAN, ACTING ATTORNEY

GENERAL, et al.

Defendants.

CECCHI, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on seven motions to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Erwin

Lejon-Twin El’s (“Plaintiff”) Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 203 (“FAC”)): (1)

Defendants Kristin M. Corrado and Passaic County’s (collectively, the “Passaic County

Defendants”) motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

(ECF No. 214); (2) Defendant Andrea I. Bazer’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF

No. 216); (3) Defendants Christine Giordano Hanlon, Andrea I. Bazer, and Monmouth County’s

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 217); (4) Defendant Middlesex County’s

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 218); (5) Defendants Joanne

Rajoppi and Union County’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No.

219); (6) Defendant Elaine Flynn’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

(ECF No. 220); and (7) Defendants Jeff Parrott and Sussex County’s motion to dismiss pursuant

to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 221).1 Plaintiff opposed the motions (ECF Nos. 223 and

1 Corrado, Bazer, Hanlon, Rajoppi, Flynn, and Parrott are collectively known as “Individual

Defendants.” Passaic County, Monmouth County, Middlesex County, Union County, and Sussex

County are collectively known as “County Defendants.” Individual Defendants and County

Defendants collectively are hereinafter referred to as “Defendants.”

237) and Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 224, 226, 234, 235). The Court decides this matter without

oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ motions to dismiss is GRANTED.2

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of Plaintiff’s submission of purportedly recordable documents to

offices of county clerks throughout New Jersey and Defendants’ subsequent refusal to record

Plaintiff’s documents. Plaintiff submitted several documents for recording to various county

clerk’s offices, including multiple versions of a “Proclamation of Nationality and Free National

Name,” which appears to be a request from Plaintiff to legally change his name and nationality on

behalf of his religious organization, the Moorish Science Temple of America # 10. See ECF No.

1 at Exs. A and F; see also FAC at Exs. 4C and 4E. Defendants denied all of Plaintiff’s alleged

recordation requests. FAC ¶¶ 18, 41, 62, 86, 107. In Passaic County, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Corrado summoned armed gunmen to forcibly remove him after the clerk refused to

record Plaintiff’s documents. Id. ¶ 77.

Plaintiff claims that, in denying his requests for recordation, Defendants, “willfully and

intentionally deprived” him of his “constitutionally protected right[s]” under “color of New Jersey

law.” See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 16, 39, 61, 88, 106. On October 5, 2015, Plaintiff spoke with Robert

Barry, Union County’s counsel, who informed Plaintiff that the county clerk had no obligation to

2 State of New Jersey – John Jay Hoffman as Acting Attorney General, Robert Barry, Scott M.

Colabella, John C. Sahradnik, and Andrea I. Bazer, while named as defendants in Plaintiff’s prior

complaint (see ECF No. 150), are not named in Plaintiff’s FAC, and any allegations against them

have been removed. See ECF Nos. 204, 205, 206, 216. Therefore, the Court dismisses them from

this action. See Townsend v. Calderone No. 09–3303, 2010 WL 1999588, at *1 n. 1 (D.N.J. May

18, 2010) (dismissing parties from an action because they were “named as defendants in Plaintiff’s

Complaint, [but] were not named in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.”).

record Plaintiff’s written instruments and that Plaintiff’s best recourse was to ask the Court to force

recordation via a writ of mandamus. Id. ¶ 23. The instant action followed.

On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff instituted this suit wherein he sought, inter alia, a writ of

mandamus requiring Defendants to record his written instruments. ECF No. 1. In response to

Defendants’ initial motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 6, 20, 24), this Court directed Plaintiff to file an

Amended Complaint to address numerous deficiencies in his pleading. ECF No. 76. Plaintiff filed

his First Amended Complaint on August 23, 2016 (ECF No. 77), and Defendants again moved to

dismiss (ECF Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81, 88, 94, 95). This Court permitted Plaintiff to submit a second

amended complaint (ECF No. 108), which Plaintiff filed on October 5, 2017. ECF No. 128.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint was dismissed on April 4, 2018, and this Court permitted

Plaintiff to file a third amended complaint. ECF No. 146. On October 3, 2018, Plaintiff’s third

amended complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with the pleading

requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. ECF No. 193.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint now asserts violations of: 1) the Full Faith and

Credit Clause to the United States Constitution by all Defendants; 2) the Supremacy Clause to the

United States Constitution by the Individual Defendants; 3) the Establishment Clause to the United

States Constitution by the Individual Defendants; and (4) the Due Process Clause to the United

States Constitution by all Defendants. See FAC. Defendants moved to dismiss (ECF Nos. 214,

216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221), Plaintiff opposed (ECF Nos. 223, 237), and Defendants replied in

support of their motions. ECF Nos. 224, 226, 234, 235.3

3 On June 1 and June 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed letter applications seeking leave to file sur-replies.

ECF Nos. 251. 253, 256. The Court has reviewed these submissions despite their procedural

defects and finds that they do not offer any basis to save the FAC from dismissal.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For a complaint to survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions . . . will not do.’ Nor

does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all

of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

Thus, when reviewing complaints for failure to state a claim, district courts should engage in a

two-part analysis: “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated . . . .

Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his filings are entitled to a liberal construction and his

complaint is held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Dluhos v.

Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir.2003). However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient

facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–

45 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, the Court acknowledges Defendants’ challenges to its subject

matter jurisdiction. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. §

1331 (federal question), or 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,

546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). While Plaintiff here claims diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 as a

resident of “New Jersey state Republic at Morocco,” it appears that Plaintiff, like all Defendants,

resides in New Jersey. FAC at p. 1–3; id. ¶¶ 1–11. Consequently, this Court lacks diversity

jurisdiction. The Court finds, however, that it maintains federal question subject matter

jurisdiction over this dispute. “A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 [federal question] jurisdiction

when he pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 501. Plaintiff’s claims arise under the United States Constitution in that he

alleges that Defendants breached four independent constitutional provisions in violation of his

rights – the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Establishment Clause, and

the Due Process Clause. See generally FAC. It is not dispositive that pro se Plaintiff couches his

claims under § 1332, because this Court has “an independent obligation to determine whether

subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh,

546 U.S. at 501; see also Bell v. Pleasantville Hous. Auth., 443 F. App’x 731, 734–35 (3d Cir.

2011) (determining that, liberally construed, pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint contained

allegations sufficient for the Court to maintain federal question jurisdiction despite plaintiff’s

amended complaint premising subject matter jurisdiction on § 1332). Accordingly, because

Plaintiff’s claims arise under the U.S. Constitution, this Court maintains subject matter jurisdiction

over this dispute.

While Plaintiff has not identified the statutory authority that permits him to bring his

constitutional claims, the Court liberally construes the FAC as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, which provides a private right of action for violations of a constitutionally or legally

protected right “under color of state law.” Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing

Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996)) (“[t]o establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of

the United States that was committed by a person acting under the color of state law”). Plaintiff

repeatedly asserts Defendants violated his constitutional rights under color of state law. See, e.g.,

FAC ¶¶ 16, 39, 61, 88, 106. Thus, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded

facts establishing violations of his Constitutional rights pursuant to: (1) the Full Faith and Credit

Clause against all Defendants under Counts 1, 5, 9, 13, and 17; (2) the Supremacy Clause against

the Individual Defendants under Counts 2, 6, 10, 14, and 18; (3) the Establishment Clause against

the Individual Defendants under Counts 3, 7, 11, 15, and 19; and (4) the Due Process Clause

against all Defendants under Counts 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20. See FAC.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish any

constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s pleading, even given the liberal construction afforded a pro se

plaintiff, falls woefully short of stating a colorable Constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court

dismisses Plaintiff’s FAC. Moreover, “[d]ismissal of ... a complaint with prejudice is appropriate

if amendment would be ... futile.” Bankwell Bank v. Bray Entertainment, Inc., et al., No. 20-49,

2021 WL 211583, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2021). Amendment is “futile” if the claims are “frivolous”

or “legally insufficient” on the face of the pleading. Lombreglia v. Sunbeam Prod., Inc., No. 20-

0332, 2021 WL 118932, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2021). Here, the Court has given Plaintiff multiple

chances to cure his pleading and state valid Constitutional claims. See ECF Nos. 76, 126, 146,

193. At each opportunity, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts giving rise to potential

Constitutional violations. Upon review of the FAC, the Court cannot find any basis for Plaintiff’s

legally insufficient claims to proceed. Accordingly, further amendment would be futile and

Plaintiff’s FAC is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.

a) Full Faith and Credit Clause (Counts 1, 5, 9, 13, and 17)

In Counts 1, 5, 9, 13, and 17 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the Full

Faith and Credit Clause to the Constitution by declining to record his documents. FAC ¶¶ 12–23,

35–45, 57–66, 79–89, 101–110. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants deprived him of his

“constitutionally protected right to credit the [] County, New Jersey state Republic public record.”

Id. at ¶¶ 16, 39, 61, 85, 106. Article IV of the Constitution states, in part, that “Full Faith and

Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every

other State.” U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1. Plaintiff’s reliance on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is

misplaced. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff would need to demonstrate that Defendants failed

to recognize or apply the law of another state or the federal government in denying his recordation

request. Plaintiff’s claim fails, as it does not involve any acts, records, or judicial proceedings

relating to another state or the federal government. Moreover, there is nothing in the FAC that

would allow this Court to credit any other record or judgment concerning Plaintiff’s recordation

requests. Plaintiff does not support his repeated references to the “state Republic public record”

with sufficient factual allegations, and thus cannot implicate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts 1, 5, 9, 13, and 17 for failure to state a claim.4

4 It appears that Plaintiff also attempts to assert claims under the Full Faith and Credit Clause

against the Defendants for violations of unnamed state statutes (FAC ¶¶ 19, 42, 63, 87, 108), and

against the Individual Defendants for breach of “oath of office” and “fiduciary duty” to the public

trust (id. at ¶¶ 21, 44, 65, 89, 110). Given that Plaintiff alleges no facts, nor points to any law to

support these claims as independent causes of action, the Court considers these allegations as part

of Plaintiff’s full faith and credit claim. Therefore, these allegations are dismissed along with the

entirety of Plaintiff’s claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

b) Supremacy Clause (Counts 2, 6, 10, 14, and 18)

In Counts 2, 6, 10, 14, and 18 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the

Supremacy Clause under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution when they refused to record his

written instruments in violation of his fundamental right to contract and enter into agreements.

FAC ¶¶ 24–25, 46–47, 67–68, 90–91, 111–12. In support of these claims, Plaintiff appears to

challenge N.J.S.A. 22A:4-4.1 and N.J.S.A. 46:16-1 et seq. on the basis that federal law preempts

these statutes. FAC ¶¶ 26, 48, 69, 92, 113. The Supremacy Clause provides that “when federal

and state law conflict, federal law prevails and state law is preempted.” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018). However, the Supremacy Clause does not provide

for a private cause of action and thus Plaintiff may not pursue his claims in this fashion. See

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause

is not the source of any federal rights, and certainly does not create a cause of action.”) (internal

quotations omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court considers whether any federal law preempts N.J.S.A. 22A:4–4.1

(concerning the fees applicable to county clerk recording services) or N.J.S.A. 46:16–1 et seq.

(concerning the recording of written instruments pertaining to real property).5 To prove

preemption under the Supremacy Clause, there must first be a conflict between the applicable

federal and state laws. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476–80. The FAC appears to allege that the “1787

– Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Morocco and the United States, still-in-force, 1836”

preempts the New Jersey statutes. See FAC ¶¶ 25, 47, 68, 91, 112. However, Plaintiff fails to

allege, and the Court is not aware of any conflict between this treaty and New Jersey law, and thus

5 Neither statute cited by Plaintiff provides that county clerks are authorized or required to record

a document whereby an individual seeks to change his or her name or nationality. It appears that

these statutes solely concern recording of real property-related instruments.

preemption is inapplicable. Plaintiff similarly fails to establish how any alleged preemption

amounts to a violation of his constitutional right to contract. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Supremacy

Clause claim is meritless and Counts 2, 6, 10, 14, and 18 are dismissed.

c) Establishment Clause (Counts 3, 7, 11, 15, and 19)

In Counts 3, 7, 11, 15, and 19 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges the Individual Defendants

violated the Establishment Clause by “harm[ing] Plaintiff’s fundamental right to establish a

religion and freely exercise therein.” FAC ¶¶ 28, 50, 71, 94, 115. Specifically, Plaintiff argues

that the Individual Defendants utilized the county clerks’ offices to promote a religious agenda in

violation of his rights. Id. ¶¶ 29, 51, 72, 95, 116. The Establishment Clause to the First

Amendment of the Constitution “mandates governmental neutrality between … religion and

nonreligion.” McCreary Cnty. V. Amer. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)

(citation omitted). The promotion of one religious agenda over another violates that neutrality and

gives rise to a claim under the Establishment Clause. Id. (stating that “[w]hen the government acts

with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central

Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the

government's ostensible object is to take sides”). While Plaintiff claims Defendants infringed upon

his religion as a “Moorish-American Moslem,” the FAC does not allege any facts to suggest that

Defendants acted with the purpose of advancing any other religion over Plaintiff’s. Moreover,

there are no facts suggesting any religious motivation whatsoever underlying Defendants’ decision

not to record the documents. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the

Establishment Clause and Counts 3, 7, 11, 15, and 19 are dismissed.

d) Due Process Clause (Counts 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20)

In Counts 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause to the Constitution by declining to record his documents in

deprivation of his “fundamental right to life, liberty and property without due process of law.”

FAC ¶¶ 33, 55, 76, 99, 120. Additionally, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant Corrado

violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by involuntarily removing him from the office of the Passaic

County Clerk, which caused Plaintiff “tremendous duress.” Id. ¶ 77. “The Fifth Amendment’s

protections apply to the federal government and are applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Small v. Rahway Bd. of Educ., No. 17-1963, 2018 WL 2455923, at *4 (D.N.J. June

1, 2018) (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)). Defendants here are not federal actors.

“Therefore, to the extent the [FAC] asserts a claim solely based on the Fifth Amendment, it is

dismissed . . . because the Fifth Amendment alone does not apply to Defendants.” Id.

Insofar as Plaintiff brings claims against state actors for due process violations under the

Fourteenth Amendment, those claims are similarly dismissed. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause has both “a procedural component,

requiring the state to afford an adequate level of process . . . before depriving persons of a protected

interest” and a substantive component which “‘limits what government may do regardless of the

fairness of procedures that it employs, and covers government conduct in both legislative and

executive capacities.’” Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169

(3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Although Plaintiff does not make clear whether he brings claims

under the procedural or substantive due process framework, the Court considers each in turn.

Procedural due process “guarantee[s] a fair procedure in connection with any deprivation

of life, liberty, or property by a State.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125

(1992). “To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff

must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the

Fourteenth Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available

to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34

(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff repeatedly

alleges that Defendants deprived him of a “protected right,” but Plaintiff fails to identify any

specific liberty or property interest on which to base this claim. Moreover, Plaintiff does not assert

that Defendants failed to follow appropriate procedures and, therefore, deprived him of due

process. New Jersey state statutes and Court Rules explicitly provide that name change requests

be made via an application to the Superior Court, not the county clerks offices. See N.J.S.A.

2A:52–1; New Jersey Court Rule 4:72–1, et seq. Plaintiff may renounce his nationality, if he so

desires, pursuant to the Federal Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. See

ECF No. 221 at 15–17. Nowhere does that federal statute provide that a state’s county clerks are

authorized or required to record a document purporting to change a person’s U.S. nationality.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process

rights.

Substantive due process “protects individual liberty against certain government actions

regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Collins, 503 U.S. at 125

(internal quotation omitted). To succeed on a substantive due process claim, Plaintiff “must

establish as a threshold matter that he has a protected property interest to which the Fourteenth

Amendment's due process protection applies.” Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139–40

(3d Cir. 2000). “Whether a property interest is protected for purposes of substantive due process

is a question that is not answered by reference to state law. Rather, for a property interest to be

protected for purposes of substantive due process, it must be ‘fundamental’ under the United States

Constitution.” Hill, 455 F.3d at 235 n.12. As with Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, the

pleadings do not make clear what fundamental protected interest Plaintiff’s substantive due

process claim is based upon. Rather, Plaintiff relies entirely on unspecified and conclusory

allegations that Defendants deprived him of unspecified due process rights.6 Because plaintiff fails

to identify a valid fundamental interest under the Due Process Clause, he cannot assert that

Defendants deprived him of any protected, substantive right. Accordingly, the Court dismisses

Plaintiff’s due process claims under Counts 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20.

IV. CONCLUSION7

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 214, 216, 217,

218, 219, 220, 221) are granted. All counts are dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order

follows this Opinion.

Date: June 28, 2022

s/ Claire C. Cecchi

HON. CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.

6 While Plaintiff may claim that Defendant Corrado caused him to be “fearful for his life and

liberty” (ECF No. 223–1, ¶ 4), Plaintiff does not support this argument with any reference to

deprivation of his fundamental rights.

7 Having found that Plaintiff wholly fails to state a claim for a violation of his Constitutional rights,

the Court need not consider the Passaic County Defendants’ assertions that the Individual

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity or that the County Defendants are immune from

vicarious liability under § 1983. See ECF No. 214 at 15–20.