MELEIKA v. CITY OF BAYONNE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN MELEIKA,

Civ. No. 21-11394 (KM)(JBC)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

CITY OF BAYONNE,

BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT,

BAYONNE MEDICAL CENTER

Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

Steven Meleika, alleging injuries to himself, has filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended, naming the City of Bayonne and

the Bayonne Police Department as defendants. He has been granted in forma

pauperis status. For the reasons expressed below, I will dismiss Meleika’s

Second Amended Complaint on initial screening with prejudice.

I. Summary

Steven Meleika, pro se, filed an initial complaint in this action, naming

the City of Bayonne as defendant on May 18, 2021. (DE 1.)1 I dismissed the

original complaint without prejudice for failure to pay the required fees or apply

to proceed in forma pauperis. (DE 4.)

1 “DE” refers to the docket entry number in this case. Citations to page numbers

refer to the page numbers assigned through the Electronic Court Filing system, unless

otherwise indicated.

On August 2, 2021, Meleika submitted his in forma pauperis application

(DE 5), which I granted, relieving Meleika of the obligation to tender the filing

fee. (DE 9.) I dismissed the complaint upon initial screening, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e), because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. (DE 7, 8.)

Meleika filed an amended complaint against the City of Bayonne, the

Bayonne Police Department (“BPD”), and the Bayonne Medical Center on

September 8, 2021. (DE 11.) On October 21, 2021, I dismissed the amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), for failure to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted. (DE 17, 18). The dismissal of the amended

complaint was without prejudice to the filing, within 30 days, of a second

amended complaint.

On November 8, 2021, Meleika filed what appears to be his Second

Amended Complaint, titled “Amended Brief.” (DE 19.) Thereafter, Melieka filed

a series of three submissions: (1) a letter titled “Change of [V]enue,” which

requests that further filings be assigned to another judge because I have a

“conflict of interest” (DE 20); and (2) two letters requesting that the Court

award him damages for alleged constitutional violations. (DE 21, 22.)

Considering Meleika’s pro se status, the Court will construe the documents

together as the 2AC.

II. Standard

Because this court has granted in forma pauperis status, it is obligated to

screen the allegations of the 2AC to determine whether it

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

[T]he provisions of § 1915(e) apply to all in forma pauperis

complaints, not simply those filed by prisoners. See, e.g., Grayson

v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 n. 19 (3d Cir. 2002)

(non-prisoner indigent plaintiffs are “clearly within the scope of §

1915(e)(2)”). See also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.

2000) ( § 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not

just those filed by prisoners).

Atamian v. Burns, 236 F. App'x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Johnson v.

Rihanna, No. CV 18-448, 2018 WL 3244630, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2018),

report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 18-448, 2018 WL 3239819 (W.D.

Pa. July 2, 2018).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v.

Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d

220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as

explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To

survive the court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must

allege ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible. See

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,

308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers

‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay

Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. Factual Allegations

Meleika is a serial filer of lawsuits against the State of New Jersey, the

Cities of Bayonne and Jersey City, and other parties.2 The original complaint in

this action, dismissed on screening, alleged as follows:

Welfare check swatting

False call

Police went into the House

3rd Amendment No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in

any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war

[unintelligible]

(DE 1 at 4.)

The amended complaint, also dismissed, added that the events took

place at Meleika’s address of record in Bayonne. However, the amended

2 A recent survey of the docket yielded the following cases in which Mr. Meleika is

named as plaintiff:

2:17-cv-01958-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

filed 03/22/17 closed 05/07/20

2:17-cv-01959-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

filed 03/22/17 closed 01/31/19

2:17-cv-01960-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

CENTER et al filed 03/22/17

2:17-cv-05759-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. JERSEY CITY MEDICAL CENTER et al

filed 08/04/17 closed 11/16/20

2:19-cv-20916-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al filed

12/02/19

2:21-cv-11394-KM-JBC MELEIKA v. CITY OF BAYONNE filed 05/18/21

2:21-cv-16720-KM-CLW MELEIKA v. INSTAGRAM filed 09/09/21 closed

09/13/21

2:21-cv-18221-KM-CLW MELEIKA v. CITY OF BAYONNE filed 10/07/21

closed 10/14/21

2:21-cv-19242-KM-CLW MELEIKA v. BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

filed 10/22/21 closed 12/07/21

2:21-cv-20794-KM-JBC MELEIKA v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT filed

12/29/21 closed 06/23/22

2:21-cv-20795-KM-LDW MELEIKA v. US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT filed

12/29/21 closed 06/23/22

complaint did not allege new facts, but merely expanded the legal grounds for

relief:

Malice Prosecution

Violation of 4th amendment right and

5th amendment Due Process right and

6th amendment speedy trial right and effective assistance

False arrest.

(DE 11 at 4.)

The 2AC alleges that Meleika was the victim of a “swatting” incident. (DE

19 at 1.)3 The statement of facts, entitled “Brief,” reads in its entirety as

follows:

The plaintiff sues the city of Bayonne because the police were

called to the house on a welfare check. The police entered the

house and found nobody to be injured so they left. The welfare

check resulted from the sounds of gunfire on a video game or

firecrackers. Nobody was injured. The plaintiff was swatted by a

caller allegedly these claims that were false. Nobody was injured.

The plaintiff sues the police and the city for violating his third

amendment right, his 4th amendment right, his 14th amendment

right, and for false arrest and Malicious prosecution.

(DE 19 at 1.)

Meleika also submitted a series of filings requesting that this case be

assigned “to another judge to protect his right to a fair trial” (DE 20) and that

the Court award him damages based on (1) my October 21, 2021 opinion

dismissing the amended complaint, which supposedly found that the City of

Bayonne “violated … the 4th Amendment” and (2) a purported “settlement

recommendation” from the New Jersey Intergovernmental Insurance Fund

(“NJIIF”). (DE 21, 22.)

3 “Swat” is defined as the action of “mak[ing] a false report of an ongoing serious

crime in order to elicit a response from law enforcement (such as the dispatch of a

SWAT unit).” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/swat

IV. Discussion: The 2AC

Mr. Meleika appears to be bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

That statute provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim under section 1983, Meleika must allege: (1) the

violation of a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2)

that the person acting under color of state law committed or cause the alleged

deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennyslvania,

36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Ross v. Graf, No. 19CV20534NLHMJS,

2021 WL 4452651, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2021).

Certain claims, such as the Third Amendment claim, malicious

prosecution, false arrest, or violation of due process, may be disposed of

summarily. The 2AC, like the amended complaint, fails to allege any facts

suggesting that (1) troops were quartered in Meleika’s home; (2) any

prosecution was initiated against Meleika; (3) Meleika was arrested; or (4) any

violations of due process occurred. Construing the 2AC very liberally, the

allegation that BPD “entered [his] house and found nobody to be injured so

they left,” might implicate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. I therefore

address that claim as asserted against the City of Bayonne and BPD.

A. Bayonne Police Department

The 2AC must be dismissed against BPD. As previously stated, a New

Jersey police department is not a separate legal entity, but a department of the

municipality. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A-14-118 (municipal police department is “an

executive and enforcement function of municipal government”); see also Padilla

v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 Fed. Appx. 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004); Mitchell v. City of

Jersey City, No. 15-CV-6907 (KM), 2016 WL 1381379, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Apr. 7,

2016).

Accordingly, the proper defendant is the City of Bayonne. The Complaint

is dismissed as against BPD.

B. City of Bayonne

The original complaint, amended complaint, and the 2AC, read in

combination, appear to allege that Meleika was the victim of “swatting” and

that, because of this false call, BPD conducted a “welfare check” and “entered”

his home. The 2AC adds that the while conducting the welfare check, BPD did

not observe anyone to be “injured” and subsequently left the residence. (DE 19

at 1.)

In dismissing the amended complaint, the Court stated that it was

“unclear how a cause of action based on ‘swatting’ would implicate a claim of

wrongdoing against the police.” (DE 17 at 7.) The 2AC fails to address that

concern. Meleika alleges that an unknown individual made a false emergency

call (“The plaintiff was swatted by a caller allegedly these claims that were

false.”) (DE 19 at 1) He suggests that the call was based on the misimpression

that firecrackers or the sound effects of a video game were actual gunfire. What

is missing is any allegation that the BPD knew the call was false or committed

any wrongdoing in responding to it.

Further, the 2AC (like the amended complaint) is bereft of facts

suggesting that any hypothetical wrongdoing by officers of the BPD would give

rise to municipal liability. As already established, a municipality cannot be

liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a

theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978). Section 1983 requires facts suggesting an unconstitutional municipal

policy, practice, or custom. See id. at 690-91. A policy exists “when a decision-

maker with final authority issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.”

Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 221 (D.N.J. 2015) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, a “custom” can be “established by

showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or

authorized by law is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute

law.” Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).

To plausibly plead a Monell claim, Meleika must identify the

unconstitutional policy or custom, attribute it to the City of Bayonne itself, and

show a causal link between the execution of that policy and a violation of his

constitutional rights. See Ross v. Graf, No. 19CV20534NLHMJS, 2021 WL

4452651, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2021); Harley v. City of New Jersey City, No.

16-5135, 2017 WL 2779466, at *7-8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2017).4 A Monell claim

can also be premised on a municipality’s failure to train, supervise, and

discipline. A plaintiff pleading a claim based on a failure to train, supervise,

and/or discipline is required to “demonstrate that a city’s failure to train its

employees ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.’” Id. at 798-800 (quoting

Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)).

For the reasons articulated in my prior opinion, Meleika does not

plausibly allege a Monell claim against the City of Bayonne. The 2AC does not

identify any policy or custom enacted by the City of Bayonne that resulted in

the alleged constitutional harms. I therefore dismiss the 2AC’s Monell claim

against the City of Bayonne.

4 A Monell claim can also be premised on a municipality’s failure to train,

supervise, and discipline. A plaintiff pleading a claim based on a failure to train,

supervise, and/or discipline is required to “demonstrate that a city’s failure to train its

employees ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.’” Id. at 798-800 (quoting Brown v.

Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)).

Deliberate indifference is plausibly pled by allegations that “(1) municipal policy

makers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation

involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong

choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. at

798 (quoting Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal

brackets omitted)).

C. The 2AC is Dismissed with Prejudice

Dismissal will be granted without prejudice unless there is “bad faith or

dilatory motive, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure

deficiency by amendment previously allowed or futility of amendment.” Lundy

v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted). Dismissal with prejudice is “appropriate if amendment would be

inequitable or futile.” Hilton v. Whitman, No. 04-6420, 2006 WL 1307900, at *2

(D.N.J. May 10, 2006).

The Court finds that the dismissal of the 2AC with prejudice is

appropriate. Mr. Meleika has had two opportunities to cure the deficiencies of

the original complaint. Despite these opportunities, Meleika has still failed to

describe what actually happened, state when and where the incident occurred,

or coherently articulate why Defendants’ response to an emergency call was

unconstitutional. No further amendments will be permitted.

V. Motion to Recuse

Meleika has also filed a document that I construe as a motion for my

recusal under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455.5 Meleika submits that

he has filed “many cases” before this Court and “for some[ ] reason they all

have been assigned to Judge McNulty.” (DE 20 at 1.) Because no action before

me “has resulted in a settlement,” which is Meleika’s desired outcome, he

argues that a “conflict of interest” has been created with respect to “further

filings” before me. Accordingly, Meleika requests that further filings be assigned

“to another judge to protect his right to a fair trial.” (Id.)

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge or magistrate judge

of the United States shall disqualify himself in an proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Under this provision, “it is not

the case that a judge should recuse himself where, in his opinion, sitting would

5 Though the request is for “Change of [V]enue,” the clear sense is that Meleika

asks for another judge to handle this matter and future actions he may file in this

District.

be inappropriate.” United States v. Balice, No. 14-CV-3937-KM-JBC, 2018 WL

2357750, at *4 (D.N.J. May 23, 2018). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether

the judge’s impartiality has been reasonably questioned. Karas v. Robbins, No.

8–cv–5264, 2009 WL 5174654, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2009).

The other recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, states that “[w]henever a

party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and

sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,

such judge shall proceed no further therein.” If that motion is made pursuant

to Section 144, another judge must rule on the recusal motion so long as the

supporting affidavit satisfies the “sufficiency test.” Karas, 2009 WL 5174654, at

*1 (citing In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003)). The

Third Circuit has stated that the challenged judge must determine only the

sufficiency of the affidavit, and not the truth of the assertions. Mims v. Shapp,

541 F.3d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976). Moreover, this Circuit has also held that the

allegations in the affidavit must convince a reasonable person of the judge’s

impartiality. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 870 F.3d 113, 125 (3d Cir.

2017).

Judicial rulings, however, are rarely if ever the basis for recusal.

“[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events

occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do

not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-

seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

Extra-judicial bias is not alleged here, and intra-judicial bias is quite

difficult to establish. It is of course a judge’s job to form an opinion based on

the facts and evidence placed before the court. “[T]he judge is not thereby

recusable for bias or prejudice, since [the judge’s] knowledge and the opinion it

produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the

proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to

completion of the judge's task.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551. Therefore, “judicial

rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality

motion.” Id. at 555.

The Court finds that recusal is not appropriate under either 28 U.S.C. §

455 or 28 U.S.C. § 144. To be clear, I play no part in the assignment of cases,

which is done by the clerk’s office. I have never expressed, or felt, any personal

bias for or against either side of this litigation. I have no extrajudicial

knowledge of the facts or any relation to the parties. Mr. Meleika objects that I

have not yet ruled in his favor in his lawsuits, citing such adverse rulings as

evidence of my lack of impartiality. However, “a party’s disagreement with a

Court’s ruling is not a basis for recusal.” Karas, 2009 WL 5174654, at *2

(citing In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 728 (3d Cir. 1999)). Meleika has never set

forth a legal basis for challenging my prior rulings or prevailed on appeal from

such rulings. My rulings, embodied in written decisions, are based on my

assessment that Mr. Meleika has failed to set forth facts entitling him to relief

under applicable law.

Similarly, recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 is not appropriate. As stated,

that section requires an affidavit of fact that must convince a reasonable

person of the Judge’s lack of impartiality. NLRB, 870 F.3d at 125. Meleika,

however, has not submitted such an affidavit. His submission is not factual

but conclusory, simply positing that a judge who rules against him must be

biased. See Smith v. Vidonish, 210 Fed. App’x152, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2006)

(holding that conclusory statements in a recusal affidavit need not be credited).

Because Meleika has not met the requirements of either 28 U.S.C. § 455

or 28 U.S.C. § 144, the Court finds that his motion for recusal is denied.

VI. Motion to Award Damages

Finally, Meleika submits two filings requesting that the Court award him

damages for alleged constitutional violations. In the first filing, Meleika asserts

that he “has an opinion that says [that] the defendants [C]ity of Bayonne

violated the plaintiff[’s] 4th Amendment” rights and thus requests that this

Court award him damages. (DE 21.) Meleika cites to, and attaches, the October

21, 2021 opinion dismissing the amended complaint on initial screening. (Id.)

And in the second filing, Meleika realleges that “he has an opinion” finding that

the City has violated his 4th Amendment rights, and additionally alleges that

he “has a settlement recommendation” from the NJIIF. (DE 22.)

“[T]he basic purpose of a [Section] 1983 damages award should be to

compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional

rights.” See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978); see also Calhoun v.

Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 216 F.3d 338, 347 (3rd Cir. 2000).” At this

juncture, however, Meleika has not plausibly alleged that Defendants have

violated his constitutional rights, let alone any damages therefrom. See MacRae

v. AfroAm. Co., 274 F.2d 287, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1960) (“Compensatory damages,

as the name implies, may be awarded against the defendant to compensate the

plaintiff for actual harm the plaintiff has suffered.”)

First, the Court’s prior opinion did not find that the City of Bayonne

violated Meleika’s Fourth Amendment rights. Rather, it dismissed the prior

amended complaint’s Monell claim for failing to “plausibly allege[ ] that the City

… enacted a policy or custom that might have resulted in his alleged harms.”

(DE 17 at 8.)6 Nonetheless, the Court entered the dismissal without prejudice,

explaining that the separate submissions filed with the amended complaint

might suggest that a second amended complaint “could survive screening.” (DE

17 at 8-9.) Specifically, the Court highlighted Meleika’s allegations that (1) BPD

conducted a welfare check in response to sounds of gunfire and shouting,

6 The Court also expressed that a Monell Claim is not sufficiently pled “by merely

alleging that the City of Bayonne employed the police officers.” DE 17 at 8.

apparently from a video game, resulting in the purported violation of his

constitutional rights and (2) BPD unlawfully “seized and assisted in

transport[ing]” him to a hospital,7 which Meleika suggests was related to a

suspicion that he had COVID. (DE 17 at 9.)

To say that a complaint might be amended to state a claim is not to say

that it does state a claim. The 2AC as filed, does not build on the earlier

allegations to the point that they state a claim. It, too, lacks the requisite

factual support to survive dismissal on initial screening, and it, too, has been

dismissed.

As for the NJIIF’s alleged “settlement recommendation,” a review of the

attached NJIIF agendas and meeting minutes reveals no such thing. The

submitted September 27, 2018 NJIIF “Closed Session Motion,” relating to

“matters involving litigation or potential litigation or contract matters,” merely

states that the NJIIF discussed coverage recommendations with respect to

“Meleika, Steven II v. City of Bayonne.” (DE 22 at 12.)8 Meleika does not

explain, nor does the Court understand, how the NJIIF’s discussion of

Defendants’ insurance coverage constitutes a “settlement recommendation.”

Further, a settlement is a contract, requiring agreement of the parties. Even if

the NJIIF had recommended that the Defendants settle with Meleika, the Court

could not award damages unless, at a minimum, the parties actually entered

into such a settlement agreement.9 That is not alleged here.

The Court therefore declines Meleika’s request to award damages.

7 Apparently a separate incident, and the subject of other litigation.

8 The Court notes that the creation of this document precedes the filing of this

action, so the reference must be to one of Mr. Meleika’s other litigations.

9 See Bistricer v. Bistricer, 555 A.2d 45, 47 (N.J. Ch. 1987) (stating that a

settlement “should not be enforced ‘where there appears to have been an absence of

mutuality of accord between the parties or their attorneys in some substantial

particulars, or the stipulated agreement is incomplete in some of its material and

essential terms”) (citation omitted).

VII. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the 2AC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

upon initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). An appropriate order

accompanies this opinion.

Dated: June 29, 2022

/s/ Kevin McNulty

____________________________________

Kevin McNulty

United States District Judge