Opinion

SOMERSET v. UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Jun 24, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JERRY SOMERSET,

Civ. Nos. 22-1021 (KM) (CLW)

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND

DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

Jerry Somerset filed this action initially in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of New York. (DE 1.) It was quickly transferred to

this Court. (DE 4.)1 Mr. Somerset alleges that he lost his eyesight as a result of

the actions of the defendant in 2004, well outside the statute of limitations

period. I have granted Mr. Somerset’s motion to be granted in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) status (DE 6) but now dismiss his complaint upon initial screening

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

I. The Applicable Standard

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110

Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review

complaints in those civil actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding IFP. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The provisions of § 1915(e) apply to all IFP complaints,

not only those filed by prisoners. See, e.g., Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

293 F.3d 103, 114 n. 19 (3d Cir. 2002) (non-prisoner indigent plaintiffs are

1 Mr. Somerset has filed four other cases in this District. All were dismissed, two

of them at the initial screening stage. Somerset v. The State of New Jersey et al, 17-cv-

00993-KM-JBC; Somerset v. Partners Pharmacy LLC, et al, 19-cv-19707-KM-JBC;

Somerset v. City of East Orange New Jersey et al, 21-cv-12486-KM-ESK; Somerset v.

Partners Pharmacy, LLC, 20-cv-02297-KM-ESK.

“clearly within the scope of § 1915(e)(2)”). The PLRA directs district courts to

sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v.

Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d

220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as

explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To

survive the court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must

allege ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible. See

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,

308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers

‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay

Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “While a

litigant’s pro se status requires a court to construe the allegations in the

complaint liberally, a litigant is not absolved from complying with Twombly and

the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro se.”

Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

II. Background

The complaint alleges that in 2004, Mr. Somerset underwent LASIK

surgery on his right eye at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New

Jersey's Ophthalmology Department. This procedure, he alleges, left him blind

in his right eye. (DE 1 at 4.) He asserts claims under some combination of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). (Id. at 4.) I also construe

his complaint liberally as asserting a state law claim of medical malpractice.

Mr. Somerset seeks $40,000,000 in compensation for “the cover up that

caused me stress, mental strain, vision Issues, searching for answers.” (Id. at

3-4.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations and Private Right of Action

Mr. Somerset’s claims were filed well outside the statute of limitations

period for ADA and medical malpractice claims. In addition, HIPAA does not

provide a private right of action. Mr. Somerset’s claims must therefore be

dismissed upon initial screening.

I may dismiss a claim under 12(b)(6) when there is a time bar, so long as

“the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has

not been brought within the statute of limitations.” Muha v. Rutgers, State Univ.

of New Jersey, No. CIV. A. 08-2142 FLW, 2009 WL 689738, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar.

11, 2009) (quoting Bethel v. Jendoco Const. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir.

1978)).

Because the ADA does not contain a statute of limitations, courts

generally apply a state’s personal injury statute of limitations. Foster v. Morris,

208 F. App'x 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006). The New Jersey statute of limitations for

personal injury cases, and thus for ADA claims, is two years. Muha, 2009 WL

689738, at *4. The face of Mr. Somerset’s complaint, filed on February 14,

2022, reveals that it is concerned with events that took place in 2004,

approximately 18 years ago. Mr. Somerset’s claims are therefore time-barred

and must be dismissed.

Medical malpractice actions, too, must be commenced within two years

after the cause of action accrued. Fearon v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. A-4686-

07T3, 2009 WL 395473, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 19, 2009) (citing

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2). The statute of limitations in medical malpractice can be

tolled by the “discovery rule.” In short, the rule “provides that in an appropriate

case a cause of action will be held not to accrue until the injured party

discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should

have discovered that he [or she] may have a basis for an actionable claim.”

Szczuvelek v. Harborside Healthcare Woods Edge, 182 N.J. 275, 281 (2005)

(quoting Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973)). As discussed in the previous

paragraph, Mr. Somerset’s claims were clearly filed far more than two years

after his allegedly failed LASIK surgery. In addition, there is no indication that

he did not discover his blindness until February 14, 2020, i.e., two years before

filing this case. The complaint indicates that his vision never returned after the

surgery, so he was must have been aware of his injury within a few months at

most. (DE 1 at 4.) What is more, Mr. Somerset’s blindness has featured

prominently in lawsuits he filed in this court dating back to 2017. (See, e.g.,

Somerset v. State of New Jersey, 17-cv-00993-KM-JBC, docket entry 1 at 5.) It

is undisputed that Mr. Somerset discovered his blindness by 2017 at the very

latest and thus this action is untimely and must be dismissed.

Finally, it is well-established that HIPAA does not provide a private right

of action for patients. Baum v. Keystone Mercy Health Plan, 826 F. Supp. 2d

718, 721 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th

Cir.2010); Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th

Cir.2007); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir.2006)). Mr. Somerset cannot,

therefore, maintain a cause of action under HIPAA.

As Mr. Somerset cannot maintain a cause of action under any of his

three claims, his complaint must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, on screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e),

the complaint is DISMISSED. Because this is an initial complaint, and because

it is distinct from the allegations in the prior lawsuits, this dismissal is entered

without prejudice to amendment within 30 days.

Dated: June 24, 2022

/s/ Kevin McNulty

_____________________________

HON. KEVIN MCNULTY

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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