JANE DOE v. PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 20-1928 (SDW) (AME)

v. OPINION

PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC., et al.,

June 27, 2022

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court are Defendants Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. (“Pioneer”) and New York

Higher Education Services Corp.’s (“HESC” or “NYSHESC”) (collectively, “Defendants”)

Motions to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Jane Doe’s (“Plaintiff”)1, 2 Amended Complaint (D.E. 19

(“AC”))3. HESC moves to dismiss the counts against it and its employees for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1), and for failure

to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (D.E. 42.) Pioneer moves to dismiss the counts against

it for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (D.E. 43, 44.) Also before this Court are

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Serve and Seal a Subpoena and Motion to Expand the Record. (D.E.

45, 52.) This Opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons stated

herein, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED.

1 On February 25, 2020, this Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in this case anonymously. (D.E. 5.)

2 While Plaintiff is pro se, she has completed law school and passed the New York Bar Exam, and she was awaiting

bar admission at the time she filed her briefs. (See D.E. 47 at 18 n.2.)

3 An identical copy of the Amended Complaint was filed at D.E. 7.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff has student loans with the U.S. Department of Education through HESC, “a New

York State agency created to administer New York State’s financial aid and loan programs.” (AC

¶ 11; see AC ¶¶ 2, 14.) Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled and stopped making timely payments

on these loans as her condition worsened. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 22.) As a result, Plaintiff defaulted on her

student loans and HESC placed the loans with Pioneer for collection. (Id. ¶ 15.) This lawsuit

arises from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants “garnished” her Social Security disability

benefits in an attempt to collect on her defaulted student loans. (Id. ¶ 29; see id. ¶¶ 28–41.)

Plaintiff filed the instant suit in this Court on February 24, 2020, and filed her Amended

Complaint on March 16, 2020. (D.E. 1, 7, 19.) Notably, the Amended Complaint does not

explicitly identify HESC as a defendant, but asserts six counts against Pioneer and HESC’s

“[o]fficers, [a]gents, [e]mployees and/or [s]uccessors”: (1) violations of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (Count I); (2) conversion (Count II); (3) abuse

of process (Count III); (4) intentional and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)

(Count IV); (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) (Count V); and (6) negligence

(Count VI). (AC ¶¶ 12, 58–98.)

HESC subsequently moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (D.E. 42.) Plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a

cross-motion to serve and seal a subpoena. (D.E. 45.) HESC filed a reply brief in support of its

motion and in opposition to Plaintiff’s cross-motion. (D.E. 49.) Pioneer also moved to dismiss

the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. (D.E. 43, 44.) Plaintiff opposed this motion

and Pioneer filed a reply. (D.E. 47, 48.) After these motions were fully briefed, on March 10,

2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to expand the record. (D.E. 52.) Defendants filed separate briefs in

opposition to the motion and Plaintiff filed separate reply briefs. (D.E. 53, 55, 56, 57.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Subject matter jurisdiction establishes a court’s “very power to hear the case.” Mortensen

v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A district court has subject

matter jurisdiction to hear claims “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) by challenging jurisdiction facially or

factually. Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). “A facial attack

contests the sufficiency of the complaint because of a defect on its face, whereas a factual attack

asserts that the factual underpinnings of the basis for jurisdiction fails to comport with the

jurisdictional prerequisites.” Halabi v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Civ. No. 17-1712, 2018 WL

706483, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). When a

defendant challenges the court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden

of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion. See Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Hous. &

Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

An adequate complaint must be “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cty.

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather

than a blanket assertion, of an entitlement to relief”).

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept all factual

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine

whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing the Iqbal standard). Determining whether the

allegations in a complaint are “plausible” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the “well-

pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the

complaint should be dismissed for failing to “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” as

required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id. While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, “pro se litigants

still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . [and] they cannot flout

procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to other litigants.” Mala v. Crown

Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Pioneer’s Motion to Dismiss

Pioneer moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it on the basis that it has no federal

authority or means to garnish Plaintiff’s Social Security disability benefits, and that any allegations

Pioneer did so are implausible on their face. Upon reviewing the applicable statutes and the

exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,4 this Court agrees.

Plaintiff obtained her student loans through the Federal Family Education Loan Program,

which issues loans guaranteed by private non-profit organizations and state agencies—here,

HESC. (See AC at Ex. A); 20 U.S.C. § 1078. If a borrower defaults on repaying the loan, the

guarantor pays on the claim to the holder of the loan and ownership of the loan vests with the

guarantor. (See AC at Exs. A, B); 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b); 34 C.F.R. § 682.401(b)(9). The guarantor

may then try to collect the loan balance from the borrower. See generally 34 C.F.R. § 682.400 et

seq. One way a guarantor can pursue a defaulted student loan account balance is to certify the

account with the Treasury Offset Program, which is run by the United States Department of

Treasury (“DOT”) and regulated by the United States Department of Education (“DOE”). See 20

U.S.C. § 1095a; 31 U.S.C. §§ 3716, et seq.; 34 C.F.R. §§ 30.20 et seq. Under these regulations,

any federal benefits (including tax refunds and social security benefits) can be offset and applied

to the student loan debt. See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 145–46 (2005); 20 U.S.C.

§ 1095a; 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(A)(i)(I). Thus, the offset process is initiated by the guarantor and

conducted by the DOT pursuant to DOE regulations.

Here, HESC certified Plaintiff’s defaulted account with the Treasury Offset Program and

the DOT offset Plaintiff’s Social Security disability benefits accordingly, before paying the

remainder to Plaintiff. (See AC at Exs. C, D, E, and H.) No factual allegation in Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint and nothing in the attached exhibits supports a plausible inference that

Pioneer initiated the offset process, conducted the offsets, possesses Plaintiff’s Social Security

4 On a motion to dismiss, courts may consider “the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the

complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196

(3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

benefits, or otherwise “garnished” them. (Id. ¶ 29; see id. ¶¶ 28–41.) As Plaintiff’s claims against

Pioneer for conversion, abuse of process, IIED, NIED, and negligence (Counts II – VI) are

generally based on Pioneer’s alleged garnishment of her benefits, (see AC ¶¶ 74–98; D.E. 47 at

12–17), these claims will be dismissed with prejudice as to Pioneer.5

Separate from the alleged garnishment, Plaintiff alleges that Pioneer violated the FDCPA

in attempting to collect her debt. (See AC ¶¶ 65–73.) However, the allegations in her pleading

are merely “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Amended Complaint does not contain any factual

allegations as to how Pioneer misrepresented the amount or character of her debt or used unfair or

deceptive practices to collect her debt, either in collection letters or in other communications to

Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff attempts to add factual allegations in her opposition brief, (see D.E.

47 at 9–10), “it is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to

a motion to dismiss,” Com. of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir.

1988) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Accordingly, this Court will

dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim without prejudice.

B. HESC’s Motion to Dismiss

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests federal courts of their

subject matter jurisdiction to hear suits brought against non-consenting states by private citizens.

See U.S. Const. amend. XI; Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984). “[A]rms of the state—including

agencies, departments, and officials—are [also] entitled to the protection of the Eleventh

5 To the extent that Plaintiff’s IIED or NIED claims against Pioneer are based on Pioneer’s collections letters, this

Court notes that Plaintiff offers no factual allegations or case citations that are able to support such claims here. (See

AC ¶¶ 85–94; D.E. 47 at 14 (citing to Weiss v. McElwee, Civ. No. 14-18588, 2015 WL 364727 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2015),

an FDCPA case in which the plaintiff did not assert IIED or NIED claims).)

Amendment immunity from suit when the state is the real party in interest.” Trapp v. New Jersey,

Civ. No. 17-10709, 2018 WL 4489680, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2018); see also Bowers v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 545 (3d Cir. 2007); Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc.

v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).

Multiple federal courts have held that HESC is protected by Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See, e.g., Kozaczek v. New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 503 F. App’x 60, 62 (2d

Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of all claims against HESC on Eleventh Amendment grounds);

Harper v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 152 F.3d 918, 918 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding

that “HESC, a state agency, is entitled to claim the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity”);

Oliver Sch. Inc. v. Foley, 930 F.2d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing “all claims against HESC

. . . for the Eleventh Amendment plainly deprives the federal court of jurisdiction over those

claims”); N’Jai v. United States Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 19-2712, 2021 WL 1209281, at *4

(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2021) (“Courts have [] consistently concluded that, as a state agency, New York

Higher Education Services is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”)

(compiling cases); Minier v. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., Civ. No. 09-1682, 2009 WL 10706353,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s claim against HESC is clearly barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and must be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).”).

Plaintiff does not dispute HESC’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Instead, she argues

that she is not suing HESC itself, but its officers, agents, employees, and successors (collectively,

the unidentified “HESC Individual Defendants”) in their personal capacities. (AC ¶ 12.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that HESC does not have standing to file its instant motion to dismiss.

(See D.E. 45-1 at 3.) However, although HESC is not listed as a party to this suit in the Amended

Complaint, both Plaintiff and Magistrate Judge André M. Espinosa have acknowledged the reality

that HESC is a party to this case. (See D.E. 30 at 1–2; D.E. 41 at 19.)6 Even if HESC were a non-

party, it would still have at least third-party standing to file the instant motion because it has “a

close relationship” with the HESC Individual Defendants, who are “hind[ered]” from “protect[ing

their] own interests” since they have not yet been identified or served in this matter. Kowalski v.

Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the

parties agree that Plaintiff is either not asserting claims against HESC or cannot sustain claims

against HESC in this action, this Court will proceed to address Plaintiff’s allegations against the

HESC Individual Defendants.7

HESC argues that this Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims

against the unidentified HESC Individual Defendants pursuant to the Colorado River, Younger,

and Burford doctrines of abstention. (See D.E. 42-1 at 8–15 (citing Colorado River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);

Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)).) Without addressing the applicability of the other

abstention doctrines, this Court will abstain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the

claims against the HESC Individual Defendants because Colorado River abstention applies.8

Although a federal court has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise its jurisdiction,

it may dismiss a case in favor of a “concurrent state proceeding” in “exceptional” circumstances,

based on considerations of “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial

6 In a letter to Magistrate Judge Leda D. Wettre on April 5, 2021, Plaintiff stated that “NYSHESC is well aware of

this Action and the fact that it is named as a Defendant,” and added that “NYSHESC was also notified that it is a

Defendant in this Action in my Claim against it in the New York Court of Claims.” (D.E. 30 at 1–2.) In a telephone

conference with the parties on September 30, 2021, Magistrate Judge André M. Espinosa stated to HESC’s General

Counsel, “You’re a party in the case now. You should bring a motion, if you determine one’s appropriate.” (D.E. 41

(Hearing Transcript) at 19.)

7 For the avoidance of doubt, this Court holds that any lawsuit against HESC in this Court is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

8 This Court would sua sponte abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against the HESC Individual

Defendants if HESC did not have standing to file its motion to dismiss those claims.

resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817–18

(quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). To

determine whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate, this Court must first determine

whether the federal and state proceedings are “parallel.” Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 196 (3d

Cir. 1997). “Cases are parallel if they involve . . . ‘substantially identical’ claims, raising ‘nearly

identical allegations and issues.’” Timoney v. Upper Merion Twp., 66 F. App’x 403, 405 (3d Cir.

2003) (quoting Trent v. Dial Med. of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1994)). However, the

Third Circuit has “never required complete identity of parties for abstention.” IFC Interconsult,

AG v. Safeguard Int’l Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

“[P]arallel proceedings are those that are truly duplicative, that is, when the parties and the claims

are identical, or at least effectively the same.” Kelly v. Maxum Specialty Ins. Grp., 868 F.3d 274,

285 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff stated in her Amended Complaint that she “will file against NYSHESC in

the New York Court of Claims.” (AC ¶ 11.) She subsequently did so, alleging identical claims

for violations of the FDCPA, conversion, abuse of process, IIED, NIED, and negligence. See

Verified Claim ¶¶ 2(g) and 5, Jane Doe v. State of New York, Claim No. 135692 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Dec.

1, 2020) (alleging that HESC “unlawfully garnish[ed] monies from [her] Social Security Disability

Benefits”).9 Notably, under New York law, the New York Court of Claims is the appropriate

forum for Plaintiff’s claims against HESC as it is the only court where New York has “agreed to

be sued.” Harper, 152 F.3d at 918 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 653(4)); see also Bell v. New York

Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 526 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317–19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987), aff’d, 533

N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). Although Plaintiff’s claims in this action are against

9 This Court has modified the caption of Plaintiff’s New York Court of Claims case to preserve her anonymity.

HESC’s employees in their personal capacities and not against HESC, the parties are effectively

the same, as the HESC Individual Defendants are thus far fictitious, have not been served, and

cannot be identified without discovery from HESC (and in fact, Plaintiff moves to obtain discovery

from HESC in this case, as discussed below). Moreover, HESC is the real party in interest in this

case because it will be legally required to defend and indemnify its employees in this action unless

they acted outside the scope of their employment, which Plaintiff does not allege. See N.Y. Pub.

Off. Law § 17. Accordingly, this Court finds that the two actions are parallel.

Second, this Court must determine whether abstention is appropriate by weighing the six

factors set forth in Colorado River and its progeny. See Timoney, 66 F. App’x at 406. Those

factors are: “(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over property; (2) the inconvenience of the

federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which

jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether federal or state law controls; and (6) whether the state court

will adequately protect the interests of the parties.” Id. (quoting Spring City Corp. v. Am. Bldgs.

Co., 193 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 1999)). “No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully

considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the

combination of factors counselling against that exercise is required.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at

818–19 (citation omitted). The factors must be “applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a

view to the realities of the case at hand.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,

460 U.S. 1, 21 (1983).

Here, the first factor is inapplicable and the remaining factors generally weigh in favor of

abstention. New York’s Court of Claims is convenient to Plaintiff since she sued HESC there, and

it is more convenient to HESC’s unidentified employees who are presumably based in New York.

The desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation weighs heavily in favor of abstention, as it would

be an unfair burden on HESC to litigate the claims against it in one court while engaging in

discovery, defending its employees, and indemnifying them against judgment on identical claims

in another court. Although this Court obtained jurisdiction first, this matter is still at the pleading

stage and the HESC Individual Defendants have not even been identified. In contrast, Plaintiff’s

state court case is well into discovery and Plaintiff even asks this Court to consider documents that

she obtained in discovery from HESC in the state court action, as part of her Motion to Expand

the Record in this case. (See D.E. 52-1 at 1.) With respect to the applicable law, Plaintiff’s FDCPA

claim is governed by federal law, but her remaining five claims are governed by state law. Finally,

New York’s state court is more familiar with borrowers’ claims against HESC and its employees,

and the court will be adequately capable of protecting Plaintiff’s rights. Accordingly, abstention

in this case would be “[w]ise judicial administration,” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, and

Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual HESC Defendants will be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff’s Motions

While arguing that HESC is not a party to this action, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to

HESC’s Motion to Dismiss, asking this Court to “Direct the U.S. Marshal’s Service to Serve (the

Unredacted Version of the Annexed Proposed) Rule 45 Third-Party Subpoena” on HESC “Prior

to a Rule 26(f) Conference; and to File the . . . Subpoena Under Seal.” (D.E. 45-1 at 1

(capitalization in original).) Plaintiff seeks to subpoena the HESC Individual Defendants’ names

and addresses from HESC. (Id. at 9.) However, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment protects states and

their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the kind of relief sought.”

Simrin v. Corr. Med. Servs., Civ. No. 05-2223, 2006 WL 469677, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2006)

(citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100). “Because the Eleventh Amendment provides HESC with

immunity from orders issued by a federal court, this Court has no jurisdiction to grant the requested

relief . . . .” Kozaczek v. New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., Civ. No. 10-107, 2011 WL 3687379,

at *4 (D. Vt. Aug. 23, 2011), aff’d, 503 F. App’x 60 (2d Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s cross-motion will

therefore be denied. Plaintiff may pursue her claims and the discovery she desires in her pending

suit in the New York Court of Claims.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Expand the Record asks this Court to consider additional documents

in deciding the pending Motions to Dismiss, including documents that Plaintiff obtained through

discovery in her pending suit against HESC in the New York Court of Claims. (See D.E. 52-1 at

1.) This Court has reviewed the documents, and, despite Plaintiff’s contentions, they do not change

this Court’s findings that Pioneer had no control over the Treasury offsets, that HESC is entitled

to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that abstention is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s claims

against the HESC Individual Defendants. Plaintiff’s Motion to Expand the Record was

unnecessary and gives the impression that it was filed to give Plaintiff an opportunity to file three

additional briefs. Accordingly, this Court will deny the motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against Pioneer is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Serve and Seal a Subpoena and Motion to

Expand the Record are DENIED. Plaintiff may amend her FDCPA claim against Pioneer only

within 30 days if she can plead sufficient factual allegations in support of the claim. An appropriate

order follows.

/s/ Susan D. Wigenton

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: André M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J.

Parties