RODRIGUEZ v. TIRADO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

______________________________

ANGEL L. RODRIGUEZ, :

:

Plaintiff. : Civ. No. 22-1376 (RMB-MJS)

:

v. :

: OPINION

OFFICER TIRADO, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

______________________________ :

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, District Judge

Plaintiff Angel L. Rodriguez, a pretrial detainee confined in Cumberland

County Jail in Bridgeton, New Jersey, filed this civil rights action on March 14, 2022.

(Compl., Docket No. 1.) Plaintiff supplemented his complaint by writing four letters

to the Court. (Suppl. Compl., Docket Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5.) Any further attempts to amend

or supplement the complaint must be filed in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15, keeping in mind that “liberal construction of a pro se amended

complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.” In

other words, if an amended complaint is filed without incorporating the claims from a

previous complaint, the previous complaint is superseded and of no effect.

This Court has received Plaintiff’s properly completed application to proceed

without prepayment of the filing fee ((“in forma pauperis” or “IFP”), which establishes

his financial eligibility to proceed with installment payments of the filing fee, when

available in his prison trust account statement.

I. Sua Sponte Dismissal

When a prisoner is granted IFP status, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires courts

to review the complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are (1) frivolous or

malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts, however, must

liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, “a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A pleading

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x

120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)

Legal conclusions, together with threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, do not suffice to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556.)

Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by

identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled

to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. “While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If a

complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss the

complaint with prejudice but must permit the amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State

Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint (Docket Nos. 1-5),

which are accepted as true for the purpose of screening the complaint for dismissal.

Plaintiff was housed in the D-Pod of Cumberland County Jail for 13 consecutive days,

including on March 1, 2022. Plaintiff was in his cell, with the door open, waiting for

his opportunity to have dinner and a shower. Plaintiff could hear Officer Tirado

“exchange words” with another inmate. The inmate then went to his cell and

committed suicide, in Plaintiff’s plain view. Plaintiff observed officers struggling to

carry a large machine up a flight of stairs to resuscitate the inmate, so he ran to help

them. Plaintiff fell while carrying the machine, which caused him to suffer bruises

and lacerations on the right side of his body, and abnormal feelings in his left arm

and two fingers on his left hand. After the incident, Plaintiff did not receive his

dinner and shower break, and he was not treated for his injuries until four days

later due to insufficient medical staff. On his first visit with Nurse April Munson,

she was rude and provided him only with Motrin. Plaintiff then saw Dr. Sigel, who

gave him sleeping pills and Motrin for three days. Plaintiff was traumatized from

viewing the suicide and continues to suffer nightmares and anxiety.

Warden Caldwell promised to pay Plaintiff’s medical bills arising from the

incident, and when Plaintiff complained to him that his medical request slips went

unanswered, the warden directed Plaintiff to address his medical requests to Denise,

the head of CFG. Approximately 30 days after the injury, Nurse Munson continued

to treat Plaintiff with Motrin; the x-rays had not shown any injury; and Denise of CFG

told Plaintiff she would not recommend an MRI. On April 12, 2022, Plaintiff was still

waiting for Dr. James Neil to evaluate his arm and finger pain, which was unbearable.

The defendants to this action are Officer Tirado and Nurse April Munson.1

Plaintiff alleges Officer Tirado constantly denied Plaintiff time out of his cell, allowing

him out of his cell for only two 30-minute shower and activity breaks per week, which

increased to 45 minute breaks after the suicide. Plaintiff also seeks to hold Officer

1 The Court construes these § 1983 claims for money damages against the defendants

in their individual capacities. See Hafer v. Malo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1991) (explaining

difference between individual and official capacities in Section 1983 actions).

Tirado liable for the fact that Plaintiff witnessed another inmate’s suicide, which

Plaintiff directly attributes to Officer Tirado not letting the inmate out of his cell.

Furthermore, Plaintiff seeks to hold Nurse April Munson liable for her failure to fully

evaluate his injuries, and for treating him only with Motrin. In his supplemental letters,

Plaintiff complains of continued ineffective medical treatment for pain in his left arm

and fingers by Nurse Munson and others, although he did not name any additional

defendants.

B. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of

his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress ....

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that

the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of

state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250,

1255–56 (3d Cir. 1994).

1. Claims Against Officer Tirado

This Court construes Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Tirado as alleging

unconstitutional punishment of a pretrial detainee in violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)

(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial

detainees from conditions that amount to “punishment.”) Whether a condition of

confinement amounts to unconstitutional punishment requires a showing by the

plaintiff of both objective and subjective components. Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62,

68 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he objective component requires an inquiry into whether ‘the

deprivation [was] sufficiently serious’ and the subjective component asks whether ‘the

officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]’ ” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68

(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The subjective component requires

a showing of an express intent to punish or, alternatively, that the condition is not

rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or is excessive. Stevenson, 495

F.3d at 68; Camps v. Giorla, 843 F. App'x 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2021). To determine whether

conditions of confinement amount to punishment, courts must consider the totality of

the circumstances, and keeping in mind that conditions generally do not violate the

Constitution unless inmates are required to endure “genuine privations and hardship

over an extended period of time.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)

(internal quotations omitted).

It is not clear from the complaint whether Officer Tirado, when he denied

Plaintiff’s requests to leave his cell, was merely enforcing an institutional policy, for

example, restrictions imposed to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The complaint does

not clearly allege that Officer Tirado himself imposed restrictions that were excessive

to any legitimate purpose or that Officer Tirado acted solely with the intent to cause

mental suffering. Without additional information, this Court is unable to determine

whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff was subjected to

unconstitutional punishment based on the time spent locked in his cell for thirteen

days with only two 30-minute breaks. See, Johnson v. Russell, No. 21-CV-4821, 2022

WL 742734, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2022) (finding “generalized allegation that [the

plaintiff] was facing ‘excessive[,] overly aggressive restrictive lockdown measures’ is

insufficient to plausibly allege that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions”);

Chapolini v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 22-284, 2022 WL 815444 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17,

2022) (stating that “without additional details about the lockdown measures, the court

cannot assess the objective and subjective components of the alleged punishment.”)

The claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

In his supplemental letters, Plaintiff alleges verbal harassment by Officer Tirado.

Verbal harassment of a pretrial detainee typically does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See, Ledcke v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 655 F. App'x 886, 888–

89 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding pretrial detainee’s claims of verbal harassment “fail as a

matter of law” (citing McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A]cts

or omissions resulting in an inmate being subjected to nothing more than threats and

verbal taunts do not violate the Eighth Amendment.”) This Court will dismiss the

claim concerning harassment without prejudice.

2. Claim Against Nurse April Munson

Pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment claims of inadequate medical care

are analyzed under the same standard as similar claims brought by convicted and

sentenced prisoners. Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.

2003). “Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of

action under s 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)). Allegations of

negligence are insufficient; “[i]n order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must

allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference

where a prison official:

(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but

intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary

medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3)

prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended

medical treatment. See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 68 (citing

Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834

F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir.1987)). We also have found

“deliberate indifference” to exist where the prison official

persists in a particular course of treatment “in the face of

resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” Napoleon, 897

F.2d at 109–11 (holding that allegations of several instances

of flawed medical treatment state a claim under Eighth

Amendment).

Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff’s claim that Nurse April Munson failed to prescribe a new medication

when Motrin was ineffective to reduce his severe and chronic pain may proceed. See,

Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 F. App'x 681, 686 (3d Cir. 2015) (allegations of failure to

respond to requests for stronger pain medication for excruciating pain from jaw

fracture two weeks after injury were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim).

Plaintiff has not named any other medical professionals as defendants in this matter.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will proceed the complaint in part and

dismiss it in part.

An appropriate Order follows.

DATE: April 28, 2022

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

United States District Judge