ADESANYA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAROLINE A.,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 20-9742 (ZNQ)

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

QURAISHI, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Caroline A.’s (“Plaintiff”)1 appeal from

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (the “Commissioner”) final decision,

which denied Plaintiff’s request for supplemental security income benefits. (ECF No. 1.) The

Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) and reaches its

decision without oral argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule

78.1. For the reasons below, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

In this appeal, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s three alleged errors warranting a remand or

reversal of the Commissioner’s final decision: First, did the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

commit error at Step Two by finding Plaintiff’s shortness of breath, headaches, and anxiety to be

1 The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only. See D.N.J. Standing Order

2021-10.

non-severe? Second, did the ALJ’s mistaken belief that Plaintiff can walk up to two miles, instead

of .2 miles, create harmful error? Third, does substantial evidence support the ALJ’s evaluation of

Dr. Sukhwinder Hundle’s medical opinion? The Court begins with a brief background of the

procedural posture and decision by the ALJ.2

A. Procedural Posture

Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income benefits on May 5, 2016,

alleging a disability onset date of March 13, 2016. (AR 159-64.) The Social Security

Administration (the “Administration”) denied the request both initially and on reconsideration. (Id.

at 79-103.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing (id. at 121-23), and the ALJ held that hearing

on February 12, 2019 (id. at 28-55). The ALJ issued a decision in March 2019, finding Plaintiff

was not disabled. (Id. at 15-25.) Plaintiff appealed, and the Administration’s Appeals Council

affirmed the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff then initiated an appeal to this Court. (ECF No.

1.) Plaintiff filed her opening brief on May 10, 2021 (ECF No. 13); the Commissioner filed an

opposition brief on June 24, 2021 (ECF No. 14); and Plaintiff filed a reply brief on July 9, 2021

(ECF No. 16).

B. The ALJ’s Decision

In his March 6, 2019 opinion, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the

prevailing Administration regulations. (See generally AR 15-25.) The ALJ set forth the five-step

process for determining whether an individual is disabled. (Id. at 16-17 (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)).) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not “engaged in substantial gainful

activity” since the disability onset date. (Id. at 17 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.971 et seq.).) At step two,

2 The Administrative Record (“Record” or “AR”) is available at ECF No. 8-1 through 8-10. The

Court will reference the relevant page numbers in the Record and will not reference corresponding

ECF page numbers within those files.

the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe impairments, including “lumbar

degenerative disc disease with history of compression fracture and myofascial pain syndrome.”

(Id. at 18-19 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)).) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did

not have “an impairment or combination of impairments” that qualified under the Administration’s

listed impairments. (Id. at 19-20 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926).) Before

proceeding to step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC)

to “perform light work” as the regulations define that term, with the added requirement of an option

to wear a back brace. (Id. at 20-23 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b)).) At the fourth step, the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff “is capable of performing past relevant work as a nurse supervisor.” (Id.

at 23 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.965).) As a result, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled

and did not proceed to step five. (Id. at 24 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f)).)

This appeal concerns the ALJ’s step-two and step-four determinations, as well as whether

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Hundle’s medical opinions. As to step

two, the ALJ considered evidence of Plaintiff’s impairments from headaches, anxiety, and

shortness of breath, and concluded that those impairments were non-severe. First, in evaluating

headaches and shortness of breath as physical impairments, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff

denied headaches until 2018 before complaining of headaches for “the past 25 years,” and

concluded that they did not rise to a severity of being a medically determinable impairment. (AR

18.) Similarly with shortness of breath, the ALJ found it to be a relatively recent symptom of an

unknown impairment with no evidence that it is expected to continue in the future. (Id.)

As to the mental impairment of anxiety, the ALJ assessed four criteria (the “paragraph B”

criteria): (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others;

(3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. (Id. at 19

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(d)). The ALJ found that Plaintiff either had no limitation or suffered

from a mild limitation in each area. (AR 19.) In doing so, the ALJ considered the evidence

presented by Plaintiff and the entire record. With respect to understanding, remembering, and

applying information, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff secured a graduate degree after her alleged onset

date. (Id.) Regarding interacting with others, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff presented no evidence

that she had conflicts with others. (Id.) For the third factor of concentrating, persisting, or

maintaining pace, in finding no limitation the ALJ noted that there is no coherent documentation

outside of Plaintiff’s self-reported complaints and no evidence that such symptoms are not merely

side effects from her medication. (Id.) Finally, in discussing adapting or managing, the ALJ found

mild limitations based on Plaintiff’s difficulty in managing her mood during ongoing lumbar pain.

(Id.)

Next, in the RFC analysis prior to step-four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could

“perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. [§] 416.967(b)” with some exceptions and the option

to wear a back brace. (Id. at 18.) As part of that finding, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported being

(i) unable to go upstairs in her home or care for herself, (ii) able to walk two miles before needing

rest, and (iii) unable to lift any objects.3 (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff also testified to using a back brace

eight hours per day. (Id. at 21.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s spinal impairments could

reasonably cause many of her self-reported statements but that the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of her impairment were not consistent with the medical evidence. (Id.) Further, the

ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony was “inconsistent, exaggerated, not forthcoming, and ultimately

3 As the Commissioner concedes, the ALJ was mistaken in believing Plaintiff reported being able

to walk two miles. (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 7, ECF No. 14 (“While the ALJ noted that Plaintiff indicated

that she could walk two miles on a function report, it does appear that Plaintiff wrote .2 miles.”

(citing AR 20, 206)).)

unpersuasive.” (Id. at 23.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that after her initial March 2016 hospital

visit, Plaintiff retained normal lower extremity strength and sensation, was advised to “wean off

her brace,” and showed “significant improvement since her injury” by June 2016. (Id. at 21 (citing

Exs. 3F, 5F, 6F).) Even after Plaintiff’s purported fall in December 2016, the ALJ noted that she

continued to receive treatment that reduced pain, improved physical capabilities, and built body

strength. (Id. at 21-22.) In evaluating Plaintiff’s complaints that her medication impaired her ability

to work, the ALJ rejected this notion because the January 2018 records indicated Plaintiff denied

decreased concentration and she also denied medication side effects in October 2018. (Id. at 23

(citing Exs. 16F, 17F).) The ALJ gave significant weight to the Administration’s state agency

medical consultants, who based their opinion on an in-depth review of the longitudinal record.

(Id.)

Also relevant to this appeal, the ALJ found Dr. Hundle’s medical evaluations unpersuasive.

(Id.) For one, the ALJ noted that Dr. Hundle had sporadic and limited treatment of Plaintiff before

reaching his conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of less-than-sedentary exertion. (Id.) Further,

the ALJ found the record contradicted many of Dr. Hundle’s opinions, which the ALJ noted were

memorialized in scant treatment records. (Id.) As to the content of Dr. Hundle’s medical opinions,

the ALJ stressed that they were largely based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Id.) Finally,

the ALJ found Dr. Hundle unpersuasive because his opinions were contradicted by the state agency

medical consultants. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

On appeal from the final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power

to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001).

To survive judicial review, the Commissioner’s decision must be supported by substantial

evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310,

316 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402

U.S. at 401 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Said another way,

substantial evidence “‘may be somewhat less than a preponderance’ of the evidence.” Ginsburg v.

Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3d Cir. 1971) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642

(4th Cir. 1966)).

In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the court “may not ‘weigh the evidence

or substitute [its own] conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d

546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)). Even

if the court would have decided differently, it is bound by the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.

2001). The court must “review the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence

supports a factual finding.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Schaudeck

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Since it is apparent that the

ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, an explanation from the ALJ of

the reason why probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can

determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706-

07 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).

B. Establishing Eligibility for Supplemental Security Income

To be eligible for supplemental security income, claimants must be unable to “engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Under the

statute, claimants are disabled only if their physical or mental impairments are “of such severity

that [they are] not only unable to do [their] previous work but cannot, considering [their] age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

in the national economy.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). A physical or mental impairment is one “that

results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).

Administration regulations provide a five-step evaluation procedure to determine whether

an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. For the first step, claimants must establish that

they have not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the onset of their alleged disabilities.

Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). For the second step, claimants must establish that they suffer from a

“severe . . . impairment” or “combination of impairments.” Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Claimants bear

the burden of establishing the first two requirements, and failure to satisfy either one results in a

denial of benefits. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The third step requires that

claimants provide evidence that their impairments are equal to at least one of the impairments

listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If claimants demonstrate

that they suffer from a listed impairment or that their severe impairment is equal to a listed

impairment, they are presumed to be disabled and entitled to social security income benefits. Id.

If they cannot so demonstrate, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four. The fourth step of the

analysis requires the ALJ to determine whether claimants’ RFC permit them to resume previous

employment. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If claimants’ RFC permits previous employment, claimants

are not “disabled” and not entitled to social security income benefits. Id. § 416.920(f). The burden

of persuasion rests with claimants in the first four steps. Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 F.

App’x 761, 763 (3d Cir. 2009). At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to

demonstrate that claimants can perform other work consistent with their medical impairments, age,

education, past work experience, and RFC. Id. If the Commissioner cannot satisfy this burden,

claimants will receive social security income benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff appeals the Administration’s Appeals Council’s affirmance of the ALJ’s decision

raising three alleged errors. (See generally Pl.’s Appeals Br., ECF No. 13.) The core of Plaintiff’s

argument is that the ALJ erred at steps two and four, and by discounting Dr. Hundle’s medical

opinions. The Court considers each issue in turn.

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Plaintiff’s Headaches, Shortness of Breath,

and Anxiety Non-Severe at Step Two.

First, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s step-two findings that her headaches, shortness of

breath, and anxiety are non-severe. (Pl.’s Appeal Br. 24-26.) In doing so, Plaintiff highlights Dr.

Hundle’s medical opinion that these impairments would limit her ability to work, require

medication that limits work performance, and necessitates Plaintiff being off task for a portion of

the workday. (Id. at 25-26.) Considering that the step-two inquiry is a “de minimis screening device

to dispose of groundless claims,” Plaintiff avers that the ALJ erred in failing to find these

impairments impacted her ability to work. (Id. at 25 (citing Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347

F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003)).) Further, Plaintiff argues that even if the ALJ made the correct

determination at step two, she still had to consider Plaintiff’s non-severe impairments in

calculating the RFC, which Plaintiff alleges the ALJ did not do. (Id. at 26.) Like any other finding

of fact, the Court examines the ALJ’s severity findings by determining whether they are supported

by substantial evidence in the record. See Brown v. Colvin, No. 16-1123, 2017 WL 6606903, at *6

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2017) (“While we acknowledge that a claimant’s burden at [s]tep [two] is not

an exacting one, with respect to this question we are also mindful of the fact that our review of the

ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by

substantial evidence in the record.”). After a thorough review of the record, the Court concludes

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-two non-severity determination.

As a preliminary matter, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff credible, which undermined many

of her self-reported impairments. (AR 23 (finding Plaintiff “exaggerated” her symptoms and was

“not forthcoming”).) The ALJ therefore examined each of Plaintiff’s listed impairments with an

eye towards the medical record and objective evidence that may support her allegations. (Id. at

18-19.) What’s more, the ALJ discussed each impairment separately and detailed her findings

while applying the correct criteria for assessing Plaintiff’s anxiety. (Id. (applying paragraph B

criteria and evaluating all four areas of mental functioning).) Thus, Plaintiff cannot allege that the

ALJ failed to consider any of her reported impairments; instead, given the Court’s limited review,

she must show that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings as to headaches,

shortness of breath, and anxiety. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting the

ALJ’s responsibility to explain findings for meaningful judicial review of substantial evidence).

Starting with headaches, the ALJ reviewed the medical record and found that Plaintiff

repeatedly denied headaches in April 2016 and then again in January 2018. (AR 18 (citing Exs.

15F, 17F).) In addition, Plaintiff’s 2016 head computed tomography scan “revealed normality.”

(Id. (citing Ex. 17F).) But just a few months after the January 2018 medical visit, Plaintiff changed

course and alleged that she suffered from migraine headaches for 25 years. (Id.) Given the stark

inconsistencies, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s “intermittent

complaints” alone are not supported by the treatment record and are therefore non-severe. (Id.)

Moreover, the ALJ notes elsewhere in her written decision that Plaintiff worked until 2012 when

she was discharged for non-medical reasons and later went on to obtain her doctorate degree in

2016. (Id. at 21.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, therefore, to find that even if

Plaintiff had headaches dating back decades, they were not “a severe medically determinable

impairment.” (Id.)

Next, as to shortness of breath, the ALJ concluded that the symptom’s recent onset and

lack of medical diagnosis warranted a conclusion of non-severity. (Id.) To this point, the ALJ noted

that the record did not support a determination that shortness of breath would continue long term

and that Plaintiff was prescribed supplemental oxygen to treat this symptom. (Id.) Indeed, the only

evidence supporting that shortness of breath impacted Plaintiff’s ability to work came from her

own testimony and Dr. Hundle.4 (Id.) And contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to

consider any of her non-severe impairments in the RFC calculation (Pl.’s Appeal Br. 26), the ALJ’s

written decision unambiguously factors shortness of breath into Plaintiff’s capabilities by limiting

her to “light exertion” only. (Id.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination.

Last, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s anxiety “symptoms appear to have been sporadically

reported” and “the record fails to document any significant associated treatment.” (AR 19.) The

ALJ noted that Plaintiff occasionally mentioned her anxiety during certain medical appointments

for her spinal injury. (Id.) Nonetheless, the ALJ still gave specific reasons as to why she found no

limitation or a mild limitation for each of the “paragraph B” criteria. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1); see Miller v. Saul, No. 19-1775, 2020 WL 7129310, at *8 (M.D. Pa.

Dec. 4, 2020).) The ALJ found no limitation as to understanding, remembering, or applying

4 As discussed supra, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff credible and discounted her testimony that was

not otherwise supported by objective medical evidence. (E.g., AR 23.) Nor did the ALJ find Dr.

Hundle persuasive for reasons discussed infra.

information based on the record and Plaintiff’s ability to “secure a graduate degree after her alleged

onset date.” (Id.) Similarly, the ALJ found no limitation as to Plaintiff’s ability to interact with

others because the record lacked evidence that she had conflicts with people. (Id.) Again finding

no limitation, as to the third functional area of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s self-reported difficulties are not clearly documented, and she fails

to distinguish whether the medication or impairment are the cause. (Id.) Indeed, Plaintiff denied

an inability to concentrate on numerous occasions.5 (AR 23.) For the fourth functional area, the

ALJ found a mild limitation as to Plaintiff’s ability to manage herself, reasoning that her ongoing

“lumbar pain may result in some difficulties managing her mood.” (Id.) The Court finds that there

is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s anxiety is non-severe.

In sum, the Court finds the ALJ’s step-two conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence and, further, that the ALJ considered the non-severe impairments as part of the RFC

calculation. Although Plaintiff may wish for the Court to reweigh the evidence, that is not the

correct standard on appeal. See, e.g., Martinez v. Astrue, No. 10-5863, 2011 WL 4974445, at *6

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2011) (Noting that “the [c]ourt’s scope of review is ‘limited to determining

whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record, as a whole,

contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s findings of fact.’ Whether the [c]ourt

would have reached a different conclusion is of no moment.” (quoting Gilmore v. Barnhart, 356

F. Supp. 2d 509, 511 (E.D. Pa. 2005))).

5 Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ ignored her mental health impairments in calculating RFC again

falls short and is patently contradicted by the ALJ’s written decision. (Pl.’s Appeal Br. 26.) As part

of the ALJ’s RFC calculation, she noted that Plaintiff reported an “inability to concentrate” and

“pervasive medication side effects” but found the complaints “inconsistent with January 2018

records that noted denial of decreased concentration . . . and her October 2018 denial of medication

side effects.” (Id. at 23 (citing Exs. 16F, 17F).)

B. The ALJ Did Not Commit Harmful Error in Misreading How Far Plaintiff

Can Walk.

Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversable error because she mistakenly

noted that Plaintiff can walk one or two miles without rest when Plaintiff testified that she could

walk only .1 to .2 miles. (Pl.’s Appeal Br. 20-24.) To be sure, Plaintiff argues that this error is

severe because “the ALJ relies[] almost exclusively on [this] one misread statement to find

Plaintiff is capable of a full range of light work.” (Id. at 22.) Entangled with this alleged error,

Plaintiff trudges forward to make a broader attack on the RFC in claiming that the medical record

supports a finding that Plaintiff can perform only sedentary work. (Pl.’s Appeal Br. 23.)

The Court disagrees that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. Even though

the Commissioner concedes that the ALJ erred, Plaintiff must show that the error was harmful,

meaning it impacted the ALJ’s RFC determination. See Myatt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 251 F.

App’x 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming notwithstanding that ALJ misread one fact in the record

because the error was harmless). That is, misinterpreting Plaintiff’s statement of activities she can

perform “amounts to nothing more than harmless error where, as here, [the ALJ’s] credibility

assessment is amply supported by other substantial evidence.” Barringer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

358 F. Supp. 2d 67, 82 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding harmless the ALJ’s misreading of the record

regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform activities).

First, the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s walking capabilities (and the evidence the ALJ is

charged with misinterpreting) is derived from Plaintiff’s own subjective testimony. (See Pl.’s

Appeal Br. 24 (“The ALJ’s reliance on this mistaken reading of the claimant’s own statement is

clear error.” (emphasis added)). As discussed above, the ALJ found Plaintiff not forthcoming and

her statements exaggerated. (AR 23.) Although the ALJ must give Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

serious consideration, inconsistencies between the medical record and Plaintiff’s self-reported

impairments may be “strong evidence weighing against Plaintiff’s credibility.” McLaughlin v.

Astrue, No. 11-687, 2011 WL 7472435, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011) (finding no error where

“the ALJ’s decision to accord [plaintiff’s] subjective complaints less weight was properly

supported”). On appeal, Plaintiff is unable to show that even if the ALJ correctly noted how far

Plaintiff says she could walk, that the ALJ would have believed her. Indeed, the ALJ spends

significant effort going through a timeline of Plaintiff’s treatment and rehabilitation for her spinal

injuries that demonstrated she retained muscular strength and her symptoms improved over time.

(AR 20-23.) The misalignment between the medical record and Plaintiff’s testimony reveals why

the ALJ ultimately found her allegations to be inconsistent with the medical evidence. (AR 23.) It

is likely the ALJ would have discounted Plaintiff’s assertion that she can hardly walk without

resting.

Second, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ “almost exclusively” relied on

Plaintiff’s walking ability in determining that she can perform light work. (Pl.’s Appeal Br. 22.) A

plain reading of the ALJ’s written decision undercuts this theory. (See AR 20-24.) The ALJ, in

analyzing Plaintiff’s RFC, made one reference to her self-reported ability to walk. (Id. at 20

(“While she could walk two miles before needing to rest, she denied lifting any objects.”).)

Elsewhere, the written decision provides a detailed timeline of Plaintiff’s medical history,

physician examinations, treatment plans, and medical testing from 2016 to 2018. (Id. at 20-23.)

Nothing in the written decision suggests that the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony on how far she

could walk dispositive in calculating her RFC.

Third, as to the RFC determination generally, the Court finds substantial evidence that

Plaintiff can perform light work. The ALJ relied on (1) Plaintiff’s testimony before the ALJ (id. at

21 (Plaintiff testified that “[b]ranch block injections have reportedly relieved her radicular

symptoms”), 22 (Plaintiff pursued her Ph.D. in nursing after alleged onset date)), (2) Plaintiff’s

statements to her physicians (e.g., id. at 18 (Plaintiff denied headaches and several months later

reported suffering from headaches for 25 years)), (3) medical evaluations (e.g., id. at 21 (“Lumbar

range of motion was decreased, but her gait remained normal as did her extremity strength.”)),

(4) medical testing (e.g., id. (“a lumbar CT demonstrated no compression fractures, but

degenerative joint disease was present . . . with notable stenosis.”) (citing Ex. 15F)), and

(5) treatment (e.g., id. at 22 (“In November, she reported temporary relief from physical therapy

with full strength and sensation, normal gait, mild lumbar tenderness, and negative straight leg

raising.” (citing Ex. 16F))). The ALJ found persuasive Plaintiff’s favorable clinical findings as to

her normal gait and strength in her lower extremities, while also noting that Plaintiff’s treatment

since 2016 has shown positive improvements in her functioning and pain management. (Id. at

21-22.) Moreover, the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the state agency medical consultants’

opinions based on their experience and review of the longitudinal records. (Id. at 23.)

The Court therefore finds that “substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s ultimate

determination” that Plaintiff can do light work because she “pointed to the medical evidence” and

parts of the record that support such a finding.6 Brunson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 704 F. App’x 56,

60 (3d Cir. 2017).

C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Dr. Hundle’s Medical Opinions

Unpersuasive.

Third, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in her treatment of Dr. Hundle’s medical

opinions. (Pl.’s Appeal Br. 26-30.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s written decision

6 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to consider any of her non-severe

impairments in calculating RFC. In any event, even if true, “the ALJ was entitled to not include

‘minimal or negligible’ deficiencies in the RFC.” Makowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-1656,

2017 WL 3151243, at *7 (D.N.J. July 24, 2017) (citation omitted).

was conclusory and dismissed Dr. Hundle’s opinions erroneously, particularly given that he was a

treating physician. (Id. at 28.) According to Plaintiff, the ALJ “failed to point to a significant piece

of conflicting evidence” in limiting the weight of Dr. Hundle’s opinions. (Id. at 29.) The Court

disagrees.

The ALJ’s review of Dr. Hundle’s medical opinions is as follows:

I have given little weight to the opinions of Dr. Hundle (Exhibits

13F, 18F) who, based upon a limited and sporadic treatment history,

opined limitation to less than sedentary exertion. This opinion is

contradicted by the State agency medical consultants, whose

opinions were based upon a review of a significant portion of the

longitudinal record. Dr. Hundle’s opinions were not clearly

supported by objective findings and instead appear to have been

largely based upon the claimant’s subjective complaints. In fact, the

record appears to contain little to no treatment records from Dr.

Hundle despite being referenced as her primary care physician.

(AR 23.) Further, even a treating source is not entitled to heightened significance if the record and

objective evidence contradicts that source’s opinion. Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc.Sec., 529 F.3d

198, 202 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]reating source’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight only when

it is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is

not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record. . . .’” (alteration

in original) (quoting Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43)). Put differently, “contradictory medical evidence”

can defeat a treating source’s opinion. Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1988).

A full reading of the written decision lends credence to the ALJ’s findings regarding Dr.

Hundle. Sejeck v. Berryhill, No. 18-16734, 2019 WL 7207506, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 2019)

(“[W]hile an ALJ must consider the opinions of treating physicians, [t]he law is clear . . . that the

opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ where it is not well supported or there is

contradictory evidence.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

As a preliminary matter, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff exaggerated her symptoms carries over

to Dr. Hundle’s recitation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (AR 23.) “An ALJ is entitled to give

less weight to the opinion of a treating doctor where the doctor’s opinion is based largely on the

plaintiff’s subjective complaints rather than on objective medical evidence.” Rosa v. Astrue, 708

F. Supp. 2d 941, 950 (E.D. Mo. 2010). Indeed, the ALJ noted that Dr. Hundle’s medical

assessments contained very few independent medical assessments rather than survey-like

questions for which Plaintiff supplied answers. (AR 23 (citing, among other records, Ex. 18F).) If

a treating physician’s “continu[ed] observation of the patient’s condition over a prolonged period

of time” warrants “great weight,” the ALJ appropriately observed that the record “contain[ed] little

to no treatment records” from Dr. Hundle. Morales, 225 F.3d at 317. Further, the ALJ may properly

discount medical opinions lacking objective support. Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d

198, 202 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that a treating source’s opinion without medically acceptable

clinical or laboratory diagnostic support that is inconsistent with other substantial evidence may

be assigned lesser weight).

Putting aside the dearth of Dr. Hundle’s treatment records, the ALJ found his medical

opinions were unsupported and inconsistent with other evidence in the record. For example, the

ALJ compared Dr. Hundle’s medical opinions with that of the state agency consultants and gave

greater weight to the latter.7 Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (“Where . . . the opinion of a treating

7 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ committed reversable error in finding Plaintiff slightly less limited

than the state agency consultants. (Pl.’s Appeal Reply Br. 6, ECF No. 16.) But the ALJ explained

that, in examining the medical evidence, Plaintiff’s normal gait, in addition to a back brace,

allowed her the ambulatory capabilities to perform light exertion. (AR 23 (citing Exs. 1A, 3A).)

Indeed, the ALJ’s slight deviation with the state agency consultants boils down to Plaintiff’s ability

to stand or walk six hours in the workday compared to four. (Compare id. at 23 (ambulatory

capabilities of light exertion, which requires six hours of standing or walking), with id. at 65 (stand

and/or walk for a total of four hours).) The Court will not reweigh the evidence or “substitute its

conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).

Instead, the Court finds the ALJ met the “not high” burden of showing substantial evidence.

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose

whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.’” (quoting

Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429)). Significantly, the ALJ rejected Dr. Hundle’s medical opinions

because they were inconsistent with the longitudinal record, which the ALJ summarized at length

elsewhere in her written opinion. (See AR 20-23.) The Court is therefore satisfied that the ALJ did

not “reject [Dr. Hundle’s] evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186

F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Rather, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Hundle’s

medical assessment comprised largely of Plaintiff’s self-reported complaints. See id. (citing

Stewart v. Sec’y of H.E.W., 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983)). To be sure, the ALJ’s detailed

review of Plaintiff’s medical history buttresses her evaluation of Dr. Hundle’s report.

The Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to disregard Dr. Hundle’s

medical opinions.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the Record as a whole, the Court affirms the affirmance of the ALJ’s

decision by the Administration’s Appeals Council. The Court will issue an order consistent with

this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: May 31, 2022

s/ Zahid N. Quraishi

ZAHID N. QURAISHI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE