J. A. v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

J.A. and J.A., individually No. 1:18-cv-09580-NLH-MJS

and on behalf of their minor

child J.A.; C.M.,

individually and on behalf of OPINION

her minor child L.S.; CH.M.

and J.M., individually and on

behalf of their minor child

R.M.; K.K-M., individually

and as Kinship Legal

Guardian of the minor

children RAC.M. and A.W.;

M.D. and S.H., individually

and on behalf of their

minor child L.D.; and on

behalf of ALL OTHERS

SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION; LAMONT

REPOLLET, Commissioner of

Education; NEW JERSEY

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW; JEFFREY R. WILSON,

Administrative Law Judge and

DOES 1 – 250 SIMILARLY

SITUATED ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW JUDGES,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

ROBERT CRAIG THURSTON

Thurston Law Offices LLC

100 Springdale Road A3

PMB 287

Cherry Hill, NJ 08003

On behalf of Plaintiffs.

LAURIE LEE FICHERA

KERRY SORANNO

CAROLINE GENETT JONES

State of New Jersey

Office of the Attorney General

25 Market Street

PO Box 112

Trenton, NJ 08625

On behalf of State Defendants.

HILLMAN, District Judge

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate four

cases that involve claims arising from New Jersey’s

administrative process for adjudicating special education

disputes. These matters are J.A., et al, v. NJDOE, et al., No.

1:18-cv-09580-NLH-MJS (“J.A. 1”), J.A. et. al. v. Monroe Twp.

Bd. of Ed., et. al., No. 1:20-CV-09498-NLH-MJS (“J.A. 2”),

Joanna A. et. al. v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Ed., et. al., No. 1:21-

CV-06283-NLH-MJS (“J.A. 3”); and M.D., et. al. v. Vineland City

Bd. of Ed., et. al., No. 1:19-CV-12154-NLH-MJS (the “M.D.

Matter”). For the reasons expressed below, the motion to

consolidate will be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs in J.A. 1 filed a motion to consolidate the

instant matter with three other cases raising similar claims.

(J.A. 1, ECF 76). Plaintiffs argue that consolidation is

appropriate because “[t]he cases proposed to be consolidated

herein undeniably and substantially overlap both factually and

legally.” (Id. at 11). They argue that because all of the cases

are “likely to seek discovery from [the New Jersey Department of

Education (“NJDOE”)] and the [New Jersey Office of

Administrative Law (“OAL”)]” and because “all plaintiffs [are]

likely to seek expansive access, subject to an appropriate

protective order, to documents relating to the conduct of

specific special education due process hearings going back for

several years and if those same procedures were erroneously used

in the individual cases.” (Id. at 11-12).

J.A. 1 is a class action filed in 2018, which alleges

violations by the NJDOE such as systemic violation of the 45-day

rule and systemic violation of the hearing officer

qualifications, violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C.

§1983, and seeks a declaratory judgment and determination of

federal preemption. (See J.A. 1, ECF 31). The defendants in

J.A. 1 are the NJDOE, OAL, and various individuals who work for

the entities sued in their official capacities (together, the

“State Defendants”). (Id.) In June 2020, the Court denied the

motion to dismiss by the defendants in J.A. 1. (J.A. 1, ECF

62).

J.A. 2 is an individual action filed in 2020 against the

Monroe Township Board of Education and various State Defendants.

(See J.A. 2, ECF 1). The claims in J.A. 2 hinge on the specific

handling of one of J.A.’s cases. (Id.) In addition to alleging

counts similar to those in J.A. 1, J.A. 2 also contains claims

for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, error by

the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) handling J.A.’s case,

and specific counts aimed at the Monroe Township Board of

Education. (Id.) Currently, fully briefed motions to dismiss

filed by the State Defendants are pending before the Court and

discovery is well under way for the Monroe Township Board of

Education.

J.A. 3 is a separate individual action filed by J.A. in

2021 against the Monroe Township Board of Education and various

State Defendants. (J.A. 3, ECF 1). J.A. 3 pleads similar

claims to those in J.A. 2 but relate to a different incident of

handling J.A.’s special education needs. (Id.) Further, J.A. 3

presents unique claims against the Monroe Township Board of

Education in particular, such as malicious abuse of process as

well as intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress. (Id.) Currently, a motion to dismiss by the State

Defendants has been briefed before the Court and discovery for

the Monroe Township Board of Education has been stayed pending

the resolution of the motion to dismiss by the State Defendants.

(See J.A. 3, ECF 38).1

The last case for which Plaintiffs seek consolidation, the

M.D. Matter, was filed in 2019 and involved the alleged

mishandling of L.D.’s special education needs by the Vineland

City Public Schools and later the State Defendants. (See M.D.

Matter, ECF 26). The M.D. Matter includes some claims based on

the same laws in J.A. 1, J.A. 2, and J.A. 3, but involve a

different child’s time at a different school. (Id.) The M.D.

Matter currently has a motion to dismiss by the State Defendants

pending and discovery is underway with the Vineland City Public

Schools.

The Monroe Township Board of Education and the State

Defendants each filed oppositions to Plaintiffs’ motion to

consolidate, arguing that the variation in parties, underlying

facts, legal claims, and procedural postures of the four cases

made it inappropriate to consolidate them. (J.A. 1, ECF 85,

86). Plaintiffs filed a reply in further support of their

motion to consolidate, arguing that the issues are much more

similar than the Monroe Township Board of Education and the

1 J.A. 2 and J.A. 3 are brought by the same Plaintiffs and allege

claims against the Monroe Township Board of Education, but

regarding different time periods. J.A. 1 is a putative class

action, and the named Plaintiffs in J.A. 1 are the same as the

Plaintiffs in J.A. 2 and J.A. 3. However, the Monroe Township

Board of Education is not a defendant in J.A. 1.

State Defendants make them out to be in their opposition briefs.2

(J.A. 1, ECF 87 at 4-9). The Court rules on the motion to

consolidate against the backdrop of these submissions.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)(2) provides in

relevant part, “[i]f actions before the court involve a common

question of law or fact, the court may ... consolidate the

actions.” (emphasis added). “‘[C]onsolidation is permitted as a

matter of convenience and economy in administration.’” In re

Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 298 (3d Cir.

2005)(quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496–97

(1933)). “While the existence of common issues is a

prerequisite for consolidation, their mere presence does not

compel consolidation.... [W]hen exercising its discretion on a

consolidation motion, a court should weigh the interests of

judicial economy against the potential for new delays, expense,

confusion, or prejudice.” Margolis v. Hydroxatone, LLC, 2013 WL

875987, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2013)(internal citations and

quotations omitted). It is a matter of a court’s discretion

2 Plaintiffs also argue that the Monroe Township Board of

Education’s filing of an opposition was improper as it is not a

party to J.A. 1. (J.A. 1, ECF 87 at 9). Regardless, the Court

does not base its decision to deny the motion to consolidate on

the Monroe Township Board of Education’s filing but on its own

independent view of the four cases that Plaintiffs seek to

consolidate.

whether consolidation is appropriate. In re Consol. Parlodel

Litig., 182 F.R.D. 441, 444 (D.N.J. 1998) (“Once a common

question has been established, the decision to consolidate rests

in the sound discretion of the district court.”)

Ultimately, the key question is whether the court believes

that the most efficient way to handle the issues before it would

be to consolidate cases. Durigon v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2017

WL 6388954, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2017) (“The Court finds the

most efficient way to resolve these questions is by

consolidating these actions. The Court does not find any

specific risks of prejudice or confusion.”)

“Even where cases involve some common issues of law or

fact, consolidation may be inappropriate where individual issues

predominate.” In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 444.

Further, “a court may deny consolidation when one case is

further into the discovery process.” Liberty Lincoln-Mercury,

Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 2007 WL 9725164, at *2 (D.N.J. July 26,

2007).

The Court here finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden

to show that common issues of fact or law run through all four

of the cases that it seeks to consolidate. Specifically, all

four deal with New Jersey’s administrative procedures for

handling due process complaints for students who believe that

they were not provided the proper special education requirements

as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20

U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (J.A. 1, ECF 31; J.A. 2, ECF 1; J.A. 3,

ECF 1; M.D. Matter, ECF 26). Therefore, it falls to the Court

to weigh whether consolidation is appropriate in light of

considerations such as judicial economy, potential for delay,

confusion, and prejudice.

On balance, the Court finds that consolidation only

partially appropriate. J.A. 2 and J.A. 3 state similar claims

against by the same Plaintiffs against largely the same

defendants. Indeed, the only real difference appears to be the

time-period for which claims are brought and the particular ALJs

whose decisions are being challenged. Given that the custodians

of information for discoverable material likely overlap, the

Court finds that consolidation of those two matters together

would greatly streamline litigation. Further, were J.A. 2 and

J.A. 3 to go to trial, the main difference in issues would only

be which school year that claims accrued. It would be a better

use of judicial resources to consolidate those two cases.

The Court comes to a different conclusion regarding J.A. 1

and M.D. J.A. 1 is a class action to which the Monroe Township

Board of Education is not a party. Combining the class action

with J.A. 2 and J.A. 3 likely would not streamline discovery as

the scope of issues could turn out to be different. Schueneman

v. Arena Pharms., Inc., 2011 WL 3475380, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug.

8, 2011) (holding that even where it might not be improper to

consolidate class actions with an individual actions, if

judicial economy would not be served, the court could properly

deny a motion for consolidation).

In addition, regarding trial, it would be unwieldy to

manage the cases together. Similarly, the Court does not see

much benefit to consolidating M.D. with any of the other cases.

M.D. has a different local school district defendant than in

J.A. 2 and J.A. 3, such that discovery requests would not be

simplified by uniting those cases. In addition, the M.D. Matter

raises the specific issue of whether the ALJ assigned to the

case applied the incorrect standard in L.D.’s specific case.

(See M.D. Matter, ECF 26). That issue is purely unique to the

M.D. Matter. M.D. is an individual action that stands alone in

that respect in comparison to the other cases.

With the number of varying claims and disparate facts

before the Court in J.A. 1 and M.D., as compared to J.A. 2 and

J.A. 3, omnibus consolidation “would result in one massive and

unwieldly consolidated suit involving complex issues[.]” Blue

Gentian, LLC v. Tristar Prod., Inc., 2017 WL 1362024, at *5

(D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017). Indeed, Plaintiffs, themselves note in

their motion to consolidate that the issues and discovery in the

among the cases at bar relate to certain particular issues that

may not completely overlap among the four cases (J.A. 1, ECF 76

at 11-12). While the Court holds that any such differences

would be miniscule, or at least manageable, among the J.A. 2 and

J.A. 3 matters, the procedural hurdles of J.A. 1, as a class

action, and M.D., dealing with a completely different school

district, make the latter two cases inappropriate for

consolidation.

Finally, the Court will note that the risk of inconsistent

rulings or delay to the Court by not consolidating all of these

cases is minimal as they are all already pending before the

undersigned and Magistrate Judge Matthew J. Skahill and thus can

be resolved efficiently and will be proceeding apace.

Notwithstanding the above, the partial denial of

Plaintiff’s motion will be without prejudice. In this or any

related matter in which a motion to dismiss is denied or no such

motion is filed, Plaintiffs may move to consolidate such matters

- for purposes of discovery only - to ensure the full and

efficient disclosure of relevant information by all parties.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff’s motion to

consolidate (J.A. 1, ECF 76) will be granted in part and denied

in part without prejudice.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: March 21, 2022 s/ Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.