The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAQUAR STOKES,
Civil Action No, 21-18035 (KMW)
Petitioner, :
Vv. MEMORANDUM OPINION
DEPARTMENT OF :
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Respondents. :
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s response (ECF Nos. 6-7)! to the Court’s
Order to Show Cause. (ECF No. 4) Having considered Petitioner’s response, this Court will
dismiss his petition for lack of exhaustion.
As this Court previously explained to Petitioner,
this Court is required to screen his petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which is applicable to § 2241
petitions through Rule 1{b), and determine whether it “plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Under this Rule, this Court is
“authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears
legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,
856 (1994),
In addition to his two letters which form his response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause,
Petitioner also submitted a third letter expressing his distaste with the progress of his habeas
petition. (ECF No. 9.) While the Court understands that Petitioner is frustrated with the
circumstances of his current confinement, that frustration dees not excuse Petitioner’s decision to
make vague threats of future, potentially racially motivated violence, nor his choice to lay the
blame for this proposed future “bloodshed” at the foot of this Court. (See ECF No. 9 at 2.) Even
vaguely expressed, such threats of violence could form a basis for further criminal prosecution
under federal law. See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (mailing of threat of violence against another to a
United States Judge carries up to a ten-year prison sentence). Should Plaintiff to choose to engage
in any further threatening conduct, he will be referred to the appropriate authorities for potential
prosecution,
Initially, the Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas petition is
not properly brought pursuant to § 2241.[7] In Coady v. Vaughn,
251 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit held that state
prisoners seeking to attack a parole decision made by a state parole
board may not do so through a § 2241 petition, but must instead
proceed under the more specific rubric of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which
governs habeas petitions challenging state judgments, including
parole revocations. Coady, 251 F.3d at 484-85; see also Neri v. Mid
State, No, 13-4555, 2014 WL 575458, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2014).
In this matter, although Petitioner contends he is being held beyond
the expiration of his sentence, his current period of detention which
he seeks to challenge is the result of a parole revocation, (See ECF
No. | at 2.) As such, his habeas claims must be raised via § 2254
rather than § 2241.
While Petitioner’s ... challenge to his parole revocation is a
potentially valid habeas claim, Petitioner may not pursue a habeas
petition based on such a claim unless and until he fully exhausts that
claim in state court proceedings, a requirement of which Petitioner
is certainly aware. See Stokes v, N.J, Dep’t of Corr., No. 20-2906,
2021 WL 1904707, at *3 (D.N.J. May 12, 2021) (dismissing
Petitioner’s previous chalienge to a parole revocation for lack of
exhaustion); see also Mallory v. Bickell, 563 F. App’x 212, 215 Gd
Cir. 2014) (a § 2254 habeas proceeding “cannot proceed unless all
meritorious claims have been exhausted in state court”), To
properly exhaust his parole revocation challenge, Petitioner is
required not only to file administrative appeals, but also to appeal
any adverse administrative decision to the New Jersey Appellate
Division, and in turn the New Jersey Supreme Court. Stokes, 2021
WL 1904707 at *3; Ragland v. Barnes, No. 14-7924, 2015 WL
1035428, at *1-3 (D.N.J. March 10, 2015). According to the
petition, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal of his revocation
proceedings to the New Jersey State Parole Board, but that appeal
remains pending at this time. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) Petitioner does
* In one of the letters he submitted following the Court’s order to show cause (ECF No. 7),
Petitioner attempts to argue that Coady does not apply because that is a Pennsylvania case and
because he believes his parole revocation does not arise out of a state court judgment. To the
extent Petitioner believes Coady applies only in Pennsylvania, he is mistaken. See Neri, 2014 WL
575458, at *2. Likewise, as Petitioner’s parole revocation arises out of his criminal sentence,
including the five year mandatory parole supervision term, he is also mistaken in believing that his
current detention is not related to a state court judgment. As Petitioner is clearly challenging a
parole revocation decision, his claim must be brought under § 2254. Jd.
not contend that he has appealed to the state appellate courts, and it
therefore appears that his revocation claim is unexhausted at this
time.
(ECF No. 4 at 1-3.)
In his response to the Court’s order to show cause, Petitioner essentially admits that his
claims are unexhausted, but contends that to “require [him] to exhaust his claims at the state level
... would be completely asinine” because he believes that the Parole Board and state courts lack
jurisdiction over his claims, an assertion based on his belief that the Parole Board had no
jurisdiction to revoke his parole as he had already completed his custodial sentence. (ECF No. 6
at 2.) Petitioner’s assertion, however, ignores the plain fact that in addition to his custodial
sentence term, he was also sentenced to a five-year period of mandatory parole supervision as part
of his criminal sentence, which has not yet been completed, (See ECF No. 6 at 7.) Regardless,
even if Petitioner were correct that the Parole Board had no authority to revoke his parole
supervision term, that is precisely the sort of claim the state court appellate process exists to
address. In any event, even “likely futility on the merits does not excuse a failure to exhaust a
claim in state court,” Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 63 Gd Cir. 2005), so Petitioner’s assertion
that he believes state court proceedings to be asinine is based on his misunderstanding of the
exhaustion requirements. Petitioner is required to exhaust his claims in state court before he can
resort to a habeas petition, He has not done so. His petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a petitioner may not appeal from a final order in a habeas
proceeding where that petitioner’s detention arises out of his state court conviction unless he has
“made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution
of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude that the issues presented here are adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v, Cockrell, 537 U.S, 322, 327 (2003).
“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [Certificate of Appealability] should issue when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000). Because jurists of reason could not disagree with this Court’s conclusion that
Petitioner’s petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed without prejudice as such, Petitioner’s
habeas petition is inadequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further at this time, and
Petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability.
In conclusion, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as unexhausted, and Petitioner is DENEED a certificate of appealability. An
appropriate order follows.
wns □□□ A Sage ee ee
doa Karen M. Williams,
United States District Judge