WILLIAMS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LATANYA WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

Civ. No. 20-12254 (KM)

v.

OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

Plaintiff Latayna Williams brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claim to Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Upon reviewing and weighing

certain evidence, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that Williams

was not disabled from February 15, 2017, the date of William’s application for

SSI, through September 12, 2019, the date of decision.

The issue presented is whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. For the reasons stated below, the decision is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND1

Williams applied for SSI pursuant to section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social

Security Act on February 15, 2017, alleging disability beginning as of June 16,

2015. (R. 15.) Her application was denied initially and on Reconsideration. (R.

15, 118–122, 124–126.) She requested a hearing before an ALJ to review her

1 Citations to the record are abbreviated as follows:

DE = docket entry

R. _ = Administrative Record (DE 9) (the cited page numbers correspond to the

number found in the bottom right corner of the page for all DE 9 attachments)

Pl. Br. = Williams’s Moving Brief (DE 12)

application de novo. (R. 127–129.) A hearing was held on June 25, 2019, before

ALJ Douglass Alvarado, who issued a decision on September 12, 2019. ALJ

Alvarado denied disability at step five of the sequential evaluation, ruling that

Williams is capable of performing sedentary work that accommodates her

limitations and exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 24–

25.)2

Williams requested Appeals Council Review of ALJ Alvarado’s decision,

but her request was denied on June 15, 2020. This denial rendered ALJ

Alvarado’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1–6.) Williams

now appeals that decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

II. DECISION FOR REVIEW

A. The Five-Step Process and this Court’s Standard of Review

The Social Security Administration uses a five-step evaluation process for

determining whether a claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920. In the first step, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant

has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset date of the alleged

disability. Id. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, the Commissioner moves to

step two to determine if the claimant’s alleged impairment, or combination of

impairments, is “severe.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant has a

severe impairment, the Commissioner inquires at step three as to whether the

impairment meets or equals the criteria of any impairment found in the Listing

of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. A. If so, the claimant is

automatically eligible to receive benefits (and the analysis ends); if not, the

Commissioner moves on to step four. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). In the

fourth step, the Commissioner decides whether, despite any severe

impairment, the claimant retains the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to

perform past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(e)–(f), 416.920(e)–(f). The claimant

bears the burden of proof at each of these first four steps. At step five, the

2 The ALJ also found that Williams had no “past relevant work” experience. (R.

24.)

burden shifts to the Social Security Administration to demonstrate that the

claimant is capable of performing other jobs that exist in significant numbers

in the national economy in light of the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); see Poulos v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91–92 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

For the purpose of this appeal, the Court’s review of legal issues is

plenary. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.

1999). Factual findings are reviewed “only to determine whether the

administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings.”

Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “less

than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v.

Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. When substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s factual

findings, this Court must abide by the ALJ’s determinations. See id. (citing 42

U.S.C. § 405(g)).

B. The ALJ’s Decision

ALJ Alvarado undertook the five-step inquiry. His conclusions are

summarized as follows:

Step 1

ALJ Alvarado concluded that Williams had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since February 15, 2017, the date of her application for SSI. (R.

17.)

Step 2

The ALJ found that Williams had the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease of bilateral knees and right

ankle, asthma, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, depression, and posttraumatic

stress disorder (“PTSD”). (R. 17.) Because the ALJ found that Williams suffered

from several severe impairments, he proceeded to step three.

Step 3

With respect to her severe impairments, the ALJ determined that

Williams did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or medically equaled the severity of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 17.) The ALJ paid particular attention to

Listings 1.02 (Major Dysfunction of a Joint), 1.04 (Disorders of the Spine), 3.03

(Asthma), 12.04 (Depressive, Bipolar, and Related Disorders), and 12.15

(Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorders). The ALJ also considered whether

obesity, in combination with Williams’s other impairments, met or equaled any

of the listed impairments.

First, ALJ Alvarado declined to find that Williams met the criteria for

Listing 1.02 (Major Dysfunction of a Joint), because the record did “not

document gross anatomical deformity and chronic joint pain and stiffness with

signs of limitation of other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s), and

findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing,

bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joint(s).” (R. 18.) The record also

failed to “document involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint

(ie., hip, knee, or ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate effectively; nor

involvement of one major peripheral joint in each upper extremity (i.e.,

shoulder, elbow, or wrist-hand), resulting in inability to perform fine and gross

movements effectively.” (R. 18.)

Second, ALJ Alvarado found that Williams did not meet the requirements

of Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the Spine), because the record did “not document

nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain,

spinal arachnoiditis, nor lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in

pseudoclaudication.” (R. 18.)

Third, ALJ Alvarado found that Williams did not meet the requirements

for Listing 3.03 (Asthma), because the record did “not document exacerbations

or complications from asthma requiring 3 hospitalizations within a 12-month

period and at least 30 days apart.” (R. 18.)

Fourth, ALJ Alvarado noted that although there is no listing for obesity,

pursuant to Social Security Ruling 19-2p, “an obesity impairment, alone or in

combination with another impairment may medically equal a listing.” (R. 18.)

The ALJ found that even when obesity was considered in combination with

Williams’s other impairments, she did not “meet or equal any of the listings[.]”

(R. 18.)

Fifth, the ALJ determined that Williams’s mental impairments, both

individually and in combination, did not meet the criteria of Listings 12.04

(Depressive, Bipolar, and Related Disorders) and 12.15 (Trauma and Stressor-

Related Disorders). (R. 18.) Specifically, the “paragraph B” criteria were not

satisfied. To satisfy “paragraph B” criteria, a claimant’s mental impairments

“must result in at least one extreme or two marked limitations in a broad area

of functioning which are: understanding, remembering, or applying

information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining

pace; or adapting or managing themselves.” (R. 18.)3 The ALJ found that the

3 A claimant's affective disorder meets or medically equals listing 12.04

(Depressive, bipolar and related disorders) when it either satisfies both the paragraph

A and paragraph B criteria, or the paragraph A and paragraph C criteria. 20 C.F.R. Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.04.

To satisfy the paragraph A criteria, a claimant must, in essence, medically

document the persistence of depressive or bipolar syndrome. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt.

P, App’x 1, § 12.04. To satisfy the Paragraph B criteria of listing 12.04, a claimant

must demonstrate that his affective disorder results in “extreme limitation of one, or

marked limitation of two” of the following areas of mental functioning:

1. Understand, remember, or apply information.

2. Interact with others.

3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace.

4. Adapt or manage oneself.

Id.

“‘Marked’ as a standard for measuring the degree of limitation … means more

than moderate but less than extreme.” Id. § 12.00.

Listing 12.04, Paragraph C states:

record demonstrates that Williams had only moderate limitation in the areas of

“understanding, remembering, or applying information”; “interacting with

others”; “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace”; and “adapting or

managing oneself.” (R. 18–19.)

The ALJ also found that the evidence failed “to establish the presence of

the ‘paragraph C’ criteria because medical treatment diminishes the signs of

claimant’s medical disorders, and the claimant has more than minimal

capacity to adapt to changes in her environment.” (R. 19.) Moreover, the ALJ

determined that the record did not show: (1) “such marginal adjustment that

the claimant has minimal capacity to adapt to changes in the environment or

some new demands” and that (2) “simple changes or increased demands have

led to a deterioration of the claimant’s functioning or inability to function

outside the home.” (R. 19.)

Finally, the ALJ considered Williams’s degree of mental limitation when

determining her RFC.

Your mental disorder in this listing category is

“serious and persistent;” that is, you have a medically

documented history of the existence of the disorder over a

period of at least 2 years, and there is evidence of both: (1)

Medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial

support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing

and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your

mental disorder (see 12.00G2b); and (2) Marginal

adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to adapt to

changes in your environment or to demands that are not

already part of your daily life (see 12.00G2c).

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04(C). See generally Trzeciak v. Colvin, No. CV

15-6333 (KM), 2016 WL 4769731, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2016).

To meet or medically equal Listing 12.15 (Trauma and Stressor-Related

Disorders), a claimant must medically document: (1) exposure to actual or threatened

death, serious injury or violence; (2) subsequent involuntary re-reexperiencing of the

of the traumatic event; (3) avoidance of external reminders of the event; (4)

disturbance in mood and behavior; and (5) increases in arousal and reactivity.

Additionally, the claimant must also demonstrate that his affective disorder results in

either the same “Paragraph B” or “Paragraph C” criteria as for medical listing 12.04,

supra. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.06; see also

https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/12.00-MentalDisorders-

Adult.htm.

RFC and Step 4

Next, ALJ Alvarado defined Williams’s RFC:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) except

she is able to stand and stretch at the workstation after 30

minutes of sitting; is able to sit for 1-5 minutes at the workstation

after 30 minutes of standing or walking; and must be able to use a

handheld assistive device when standing or walking. She can

occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can never climb ladders,

ropes, and scaffolds; and can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch, and crawl. She can never be exposed to unprotected

heights, hazardous moving mechanical parts, or operate a motor

vehicle. She can have occasional exposure to humidity, wetness,

dust , odors, fumes, pulmonary irritants, extreme cold, and

extreme heat. The claimant is able to understand, remember, and

carry out simple instructions with only occasional changes to

essential job functions; and is able to make simple work-related

decisions. She can occasionally interact with supervisors,

coworkers, and the public; and is able to work in an environment

where productivity is judged at the end of the day rather than the

middle of the day.

(R. 20.)

ALJ Alvarado began his RFC analysis by laying out the prescribed two-

step process. First, he was required to determine whether Williams had an

underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment “that can be

shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques—

that would reasonably be expected to produce [Williams’s] pain or other

symptoms.” (R. 20.) Second, the ALJ was required to “evaluate the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of [Williams’s] symptoms to determine the

extent to which they limit [her] functional limitations.” (R. 25.) This evaluation

required him to look to objective medical evidence, or to the entire case record,

where objective medical evidence does not substantiate Williams’s statements

about “the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of claimant’s symptoms.”

(R. 20.)

ALJ Alvarado concluded that Williams’s medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms but

found that the “claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence in the record.” (R. 21.)

Step 5

At step five, ALJ Alvarado explained that “[c]onsidering the claimant’s

age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the

claimant can perform.” (R. 24.) The ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational

expert, who testified that Williams would still be able to perform the following

representative occupations: Document Preparer (Dictionary of Occupational

Titles (“DOT”)) 249.587-018; Charge Account Clerk, (DOT) 205.367-014, and

Table Worker, (DOT) 739.687-182. (R. 25.) All three occupations are classified

as sedentary and unskilled, and there are between 3,000 and 47,000 positions

in these three occupations in the United States. (R. 25.)

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Williams was not disabled at any

time during the relevant period. (R. 25.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ’s Step Three Evaluation

The ALJ found that Williams does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one

of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 1. (R. 17–19.)

Williams asserts that the ALJ erred at step three because: (1) the ALJ

improperly evaluated the medical evidence resulting in findings that are not

supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the ALJ failed to meaningfully

consider the effects of her obesity on her other impairments and her general

ability to work. (Pl. Br. 16-28.)

Step three, it should be remembered, is a screening process that permits

an award of benefits without further analysis; a negative finding at step three

simply means that the remaining steps must be performed and the applicant’s

capacity for work evaluated. At step three, the Third Circuit “requires the ALJ

to set forth the reasons for his decision.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220

F.3d 112, 119 (3d. Cir. 2000). However, the ALJ is “not require[d] to use

particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his

analysis.” Holley v. Colvin, 975 F. Supp. 2d 467, 476-77 (D.N.J. 2013) (internal

citations omitted), aff’d, 590 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir. 2014). Rather, the “ALJ

satisfies this standard by ‘clearly evaluating the available medical evidence in

the record and then setting forth that evaluation in an opinion, even where the

ALJ did not identify or analyze the most relevant listing.’” Id. at

120 (citing Scatorchia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 137 Fed. Appx. 468, 471 (3d Cir.

2005).

Listing 1.02 (Major Dysfunction of a Joint)

Here, the ALJ found that the record does not document “gross

anatomical deformity and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of

limitation of motion or other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s) and

findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing,

bony destruction or ankylosis of the affected joint(s).” (R. 18.) The ALJ also

stated that the “record does not document involvement of one major peripheral

weight-bearing joint (i.e., hip, knee, or ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate

effectively; nor involvement of one major peripheral joint in each upper

extremity (i.e., shoulder, elbow, or wrist-hand), resulting in inability to perform

fine and gross movements effectively.” (R. 18.)

It is true that the ALJ’s step three findings were somewhat conclusory in

relation to Listing 1.02, but substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination. Assessing the medical evidence, albeit in connection with

Williams’s residual functional capacity,4 the ALJ acknowledges that Williams

4 The Third Circuit has held that an ALJ’s step-three determination is supported

by substantial evidence where the medical evidence informing that determination is

discussed with respect to the claimant’s residual functional capacity. Cop v. Comm'r of

underwent surgery for torn cartilage in her right knee (R. 22, 380), along with

suffering from a “complex tear of medial meniscus, moderate join effusion, and

popliteal cyst” in the same knee. (R. 22, B7F at 18.) With respect to her left

knee, Williams exhibited a “complex tear of lateral meniscus, large joint

effusion, and ovoid lesion consistent with enchondroma.” (R. 22, 432.)

On the other hand, the ALJ found that by April 2017, Williams exhibited

both (1) a “normal range of motion in her bilateral lower extremities without

joint crepitus or instability” and suffered from “no tenderness to palpation in

joint or limb.” (R. 22, 376.) By August 2017, while Williams “presented with

moderate tenderness to palpation of the right knee,” she exhibited a “normal

range of motion with normal strength and stability.” (R. 22, 392.) And in an

April 18, 2019 examination, the treatment notes indicated that Williams

exhibited “normal gait, normal range of motion in upper and lower extremities,

and the ability to stand without difficulty.” (R. 24. citing 508–509.)

Accordingly, the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Williams did not

meet the requirements of Listing 1.02.

Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the Spine)

Here, the ALJ found that although Williams suffers from spinal

problems, “the record does not document nerve root compression characterized

by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, spinal arachnoiditis, nor lumbar spinal

stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication.” (R. 18.) Williams argues that the ALJ

erred because “[i]t is clear that [Williams’s] herniated nuclear pulposus caused

severe stenosis with acute left L5 radiculopathy,” and that although

“pseudoclaudication” is not described in the medical evidence, Williams

suffered from that condition. (Pl. Br. 19.) In support of that assertion, Williams

only cites medical evidence dating from April 4, 2013 through March 18, 2014.

These reports, however, were prepared before the disability onset date of June

Soc. Sec., 226 F. App'x 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2007). The same evidence need not

necessarily be repeated, as long as it is clear that the ALJ considered it appropriately.

16, 2015, and the date of her February 15, 2017 application.5 Consequently,

Williams has failed to demonstrate that her impairment meets “all of the

specified medical criteria” of Listing 1.04. See Barnhart, 364 F.3d at 504

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Likewise, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that

Williams did not meet Listing 1.04’s requirements. The ALJ acknowledges that

following Williams’s motor vehicle accident on April 3, 2013, she suffered from

“tenderness and restricted range of motion in her cervical and lumbar spine,”

which persisted though 2015. (R. 21, 458–505.) However, by 2017, Williams

presented with “normal gait and was able to stand without difficulty.” (R. 21,

380–381.) Further, Dr. Alexander Hoffman’s August 10, 2017 medical report

indicates that Williams “walked without a cane and had no difficulty getting on

and off the examining table.” (R. 21, 380-381.)

Consequently, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding.

Discussion of Obesity

With respect to obesity, the ALJ found that “even when obesity is

considered in combination with … [Williams’s] other impairments, the claimant

does not meet or equal any of the listings in Appendix 1, Subpart P,

Regulations No. 4. (R. 18.) Williams asserts that the ALJ “failed to properly

assess [her] obesity as required by [Social Security Ruling “SSR”] 02-1p.” (Pl.

Br. 19.) As an initial matter, SSR 19-2p, and not SSR 02-1p, applies to

Williams’s appeal.6

5 The relevant period for an SSI claim begins with the application date and runs

through the date of the ALJ’s decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (claimant is not

eligible for SSI until, among other factors, the date on which he or she files an

application for SSI benefits); 20 C.F.R. § 416.501 (claimant may not be paid for SSI for

any time period that predates the first month he or she satisfies the eligibility

requirements, which cannot predate the date on which an application was filed).

6 SSR 19-2p applies to all Social Security applications filed on or after May 20,

2019, and as applicable to Williams’s appeal, all claims pending before the agency on

or after that date. SSR 19-2p, 2019 WL 2374244, at *5 n.14 (May 20, 2019). As

Williams’s application was still pending as of May 15, 2019, SSR 19-2p applies to this

appeal.

Pursuant to SSR 19-2p, while obesity is no longer a separate listing, it

can be a medically determinable impairment (“MDI”) when it is established by

objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source. SSR 19-2p.

Obesity can also be classified as a severe impairment “if the person’s obesity,

alone or in combination with another impairment(s), significantly limits his or

her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. Under SSR 19-2p,

the ALJ “will not make general assumption about the severity or functional

effects of obesity combined with another impairment(s).” Id. However, the

ruling also notes that “[o]besity in combination with another impairment(s) may

or may not increase the severity or functional limitations of the other

impairment” and that the ALJ will “evaluate each case based on the

information in the case record.” Id.

At step two, the ALJ found that Williams’s obesity was a severe

impairment. (R. 17.) Then at step three, pursuant to SSR 19-2p, the ALJ found

that “even when obesity is considered in combination with the claimant’s other

impairments, the claimant does not meet or equal any of the listings[.]” (R. 18.)

The ALJ’s step-three discussion of obesity fails to sufficiently address whether

Williams’s obesity compounds her other impairments.

The Third Circuit has held that “an ALJ must meaningfully consider the

effects of a claimant’s obesity, individually and in combination with her

impairments, on her workplace function at step three and at every subsequent

step.” Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009). In Diaz,

while the ALJ found that the claimant’s obesity was a severe impairment, the

Third Circuit noted that the ALJ “failed to consider its impact, in combination

with her other impairments, at step three, as required.” Id. at 503.7 Therefore,

the Court held that “absent analysis of the cumulative impact of [the

7 The ALJ relied on SSR 00-3p, which provides that a claimant’s obesity should

be considered on an individualized basis, with a focus “on the combined effect of

obesity and other sever impairments afflicting the claimant.” Diaz, 577 F.3d at 503

(quoting SSR 00-3p).

claimant’s] obesity and other impairments on her functional capabilities,” the

Court cannot adequately review the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 504.

Here, as in Diaz, the ALJ committed error due to the ALJ’s failure to

explicitly discuss Williams’s obesity—either alone or in combination with other

impairments. I conclude, however, that the ALJ’s error was harmless and does

not necessitate remand. Although Diaz instructs the ALJ to meaningfully

consider the effects of a claimant’s obesity, it does not alleviate Williams from

meeting “her burden of demonstrating that the ALJ’s failure to discuss obesity

was a harmful error.” Slader v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 19-10198 (ES),

2021 WL 141335, at *7 n.9 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2021) (citing Rutherford v.

Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005)).

The ALJ did carefully consider Williams’s actual physical limitations, as

evidenced by the subsequent steps of the analysis. Williams fails to make any

argument concerning how her obesity would have changed the outcome of ALJ

Alvarado’s analysis at the screening stage of step three. Williams’s failure to

“affirmatively point[ ] to specific evidence that demonstrates [s]he would

succeed at step three” is fatal to her appeal. Woodson v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 661

F. App'x 762, 766 (3d Cir. 2016)

Therefore, I find that although the ALJ erred in his failure to discuss

obesity alone or in combination with Williams’s other impairments, this error

was harmless.

Listing 3.03 (Asthma)

Here, the ALJ found that “the record does not document exacerbations or

complications from asthma requiring 3 hospitalizations within a 12-month

period and at least 30 days apart.” Williams argues that she has “breathing

treatments at her [doctor’s] office and an albuterol pump,” and that she has

gone for a treatment “[i]n the last six months.” (Pl. Br. 20.)

“For a claimant to show [her] impairment matches a listing, it must meet

all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of

those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Jones, 364 F.3d at

504 (citation omitted). Williams’s failure to demonstrate that she has suffered

from “exacerbations or complications requiring three hospitalizations within a

12-month period and at least 30 days apart” is fatal to her appeal. Accordingly,

the ALJ did not err in finding that Williams did not meet the requirements of

Listing 3.03.

Mental Impairments

ALJ Alvarado found that Williams did “not meet or medically equal the

criteria of listings 12.04 and 12.15” after considering whether “paragraph B”

was satisfied. (R. at 18.) On appeal, Williams does not dispute the ALJ’s

finding, but instead argues that her impairments meet the “paragraph C”

criteria. (Pl. Br. 20–22.) Williams also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to

discuss her impairments under Listing 12.08 (Personality and Impulse-Control

Disorders). (Pl. Br. 23.)

Here, the ALJ analyzed Williams’s mental impairments in the context of

listings 12.04 (Depressive, Bipolar, and Related Disorders) and 12.15 (Trauma

and Stressor-Related Disorders). Appendix 1 contains three lists of criteria,

known as Paragraphs A, B, and C. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, §§

12.04, 12.06. The claimant must either (1) satisfy paragraphs A and B; or (2)

satisfy paragraphs A and C.

ALJ Alvarado omitted any discussion of paragraph A and focused solely

on whether paragraph B was satisfied, a finding supported by substantial

evidence. Even assuming that Williams satisfied all the required paragraph A

criteria, I will sustain the ALJ’s original finding because Williams has failed to

establish the presence of the requisite paragraph C criteria.

Paragraph C requires that the asserted mental disorder be “serious and

persistent” with “a medically documented history of the existence of the

disorder over a period of at least 2 years” and evidence of both: (1) “[m]edical

treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly

structured setting(s)”; and (2) “[m]arginal adjustment,” defined as “the minimal

capacity to adapt to changes in [the claimant’s] environment or to demands

that are not already part of [her] daily life.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1 ,

§ 12.04(C); see also § 12.15 (C).

Williams offers no medical evidence in support of her assertion that she

satisfies paragraph C. Moreover, there is substantial evidence to support a

finding that paragraph C was not satisfied. Dr. Paul Fulford’s September 10,

2017 report states that while Williams “was diagnosed with adjustment

disorder with depressed features,” she exhibited “good mental control and

concentration” and that her “[m]otivation and level of effort appeared good.” (R.

23, 385–386.) Further, Dr. Locke indicated that Williams “has no limitations in

social interactions and adaptation and moderate limitations in understanding

and memory and sustaining concentration and persistence.” (R. 23, 1-3.)

Similarly, I also find that Williams has not demonstrated that she

satisfies the criteria for Listing 12.08, and substantial evidence supports such

a finding. Listing 12.08, which addresses personality and impulse-control

disorders, requires that a claimant’s impairments satisfy the criteria of both

paragraphs A and B. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.08. As an initial

matter, paragraphs B of Listing 12.04 and 12.15 are identical to paragraph B

in Listing 12.08. Compare id. at §§ 12.04 and 12.15 with id. at §

12.08. Therefore, to the extent Williams accepts the ALJ’s analysis of the

criteria of paragraph B in Listings 12.04 and 12.15, that same analysis would

apply to Listing 12.08.8

Moreover, with respect to paragraph B, Williams does not explicitly state

whether she exhibits one extreme limitation or two marked limitations, nor

generally set forth a coherent argument of how she satisfies the requisite

8 See id.; cf. Dercole v. Saul, No. 2:18-CV-12887, 2021 WL 1399861, at *11

(D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2021) (“Paragraph B of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 are identical to

Paragraph B in Listing 12.08.”); Thomas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:14-0627, 2015

WL 5921515, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2015) (noting that the criteria of paragraphs B

and C of Listings 12.03 and 12.04 are identical and that “[t]he ALJ's finding that the

criteria of Listing 12.04 were not satisfied would necessitate a similar finding as to

Listing 12.03”).

criteria. Therefore, any error made by the ALJ in failing to address the criteria

of Listing 12.08, in addition to those of Listing 12.04 and 12.15, was harmless.

B. The ALJ’s RFC Determination

Williams also argues that ALJ Alvarado failed to properly assess

Williams’s RFC because the ALJ’s “assessment is simply conclusory and does

not contain any rationale or reference to the supporting evidence, as required

by SSR 96-8p.” (Pl. Br. 29.)

A plaintiff’s RFC sets forth the most that a plaintiff can do despite her

limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). When making an RFC determination, the

ALJ is required to consider all evidence. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. The ALJ

need not, however, rehash or discuss “every tidbit of evidence included in the

record,” Hur v. Barnhart, 94 Fed. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004), so long as “the

ALJ’s decision, read as a whole, illustrates that the ALJ considered the

appropriate factors” in reaching his conclusions. Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.

ALJ Alvarado determined that Williams had the RFC to perform

sedentary work with certain accommodations. Contrary to Williams’s

assertions, the ALJ’s RFC assessment references the record evidence in detail,

citing disability and function reports, Williams’s testimony, treatment records,

and numerous medical opinions. (R. 20–23.) After considering this evidence,

however, the ALJ concluded that even though Williams’s “medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms,” her statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence” and other

record evidence. (R. 21.)

The ALJ noted that in Williams’s disability report, she claimed that she

suffered from “neck pain, back pain, knee problems, a right ankle problem, and

a sleep disorder.” (R. 20, 274.) Additionally, the ALJ cited arguably plaintiff-

favorable medical evidence, such as the 2013 and 2014 medical reports

documenting Williams’s knee, ankle, and back impairments following her April

3, 2013 automobile accident. (See R. 20–21, 416–418.) Finally, the ALJ makes

numerous references to Williams’s own testimony about her impairments,

subjective pain, and physical and mental capabilities due to her alleged

disability. (R. 21.)

On the other hand, the ALJ also cited contrary medical evidence in the

record. For example, the ALJ cited medical records that indicated that Williams

“strength, sensation and reflexes were intact,” as well as exhibiting “normal

gait and [being] able to stand without difficulty.” (R. 21, 380–381.) Further, ALJ

Alvarado stated that medical reports indicated that by April 2017, Williams

“had a normal range of motion in her bilateral lower extremities without joint

crepitus or instability” (R. 22, 376), by August 10, 2017, Williams could walk

“without a cane and had no difficulty getting on and off the examining table”

(R.21, 380–381), and by 2018, Williams had normal gait and “strength … in her

bilateral upper and lower extremities.” (R. 21, 508–509.)

In addition to the objective medical opinion, the ALJ considered medical

opinions and explained the weight he accorded to each. (R. 23–24); see Fargnoli

v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although the ALJ may weigh the

credibility of the evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence that he

rejects and his reason(s) for discounting that evidence.”) (citing Burnett, 220

F.3d at 121). The ALJ’s analysis was deliberative, balanced, and well-reasoned.

For example, the ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Simpkin’s finding that the

medical evidence “was insufficient to establish a severe physical impairment”

because: (1) Dr. Simpkins did not “have the opportunity to examine the

claimant or review the evidence received after the file was complete”; and (2)

the evidence established that Williams indeed suffered from severe physical

impairments. (R. 23, 93–99.) Moreover, the ALJ adequately stated his reasons

for giving some, but only partial weight, to Dr. Sobelman’s opinion. That report

found that Williams “can perform light work with postural and environmental

limitations.” (R. 23, 101–115.) Dr. Kahf’s opinion was “not given great weight”

because it was not fully supported by the treatment notes and was rendered

under the standards of a different program. (R. 24, 506–513, 541–544.)

ALJ Alvarado concluded that his RFC assessment was “supported by the

objective medical evidence, opinion evidence, and hearing testimony.” (R. 24.) I

agree and find that his analysis was supported by substantial evidence. The

Court cannot reweigh evidence and declines the invitation by Williams to do so.

Thomas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 19-13990 (ES), 2021 WL 870745, at *10

(D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2021)

Finally, the Court affirms the ALJ’s finding that that “there are jobs that

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can

perform.” (R. 24.) Those jobs, the vocational expert testified and the ALJ found,

are: Document Preparer (DOT) 249.587-018; Charge Account Clerk, (DOT)

205.367-014, and Table Worker, (DOT) 739.687-182. (R. 25.) According to the

DOT, there are between 3,000 and 47,000 positions in these three occupations

in the United States. (R. 25.)

Williams argues that the ALJ failed to properly analyze whether this is a

significant number of jobs and had the ALJ performed “the proper analysis,” he

would have found that “these jobs did not result in a significant number of jobs

in the national economy.” (Pl. Br. 32.) For example, Williams argues that the

job of document preparer which has 47,000 jobs in the national economy,

would only “leave 940 jobs in New Jersey” which is not a significant number.

(Pl. Br. 32-33.)

Even assuming, for purposes of her hypothetical, that these jobs are

evenly distributed among the fifty states, Williams’s argument is unavailing.

Notably, the Third Circuit has found that as few as 200 and 569 jobs

nationwide to be “significant,” which is far fewer than the jobs available for

Williams’s representative occupations. See Craigie v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 58

(3d Cir. 1987); Ahmad v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App'x 275, 278 (3d Cir.

2013) (holding, based on Craig, supra, that “the ALJ did not err by concluding

that the 569 jobs available as a surveillance system monitor [in Pennsylvania]

was evidence of other work in significant numbers in the national economy”);

see also Benton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-CV-09478-NLH, 2019 WL

2285490, at *7 (D.N.J. May 29, 2019) (holding that 1,940 jobs available

nationally was significant).

Therefore, the ALJ’s determination that Williams’s RFC enabled him to

work in the above occupations is supported by substantial evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

A separate order will issue.

Dated: January 31, 2022

/s/ Kevin McNulty

___________________________________

Hon. Kevin McNulty

United States District Judge