MELEIKA v. CITY OF BAYONNE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN MELEIKA,

Civ. No. 21-11394 (KM)(JBC)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

CITY OF BAYONNE,

BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT,

BAYONNE MEDICAL CENTER

Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

Steven Meleika, alleging injuries to himself, has filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended, naming the City of Bayonne,

Bayonne Police Department and Bayonne Medical Center as defendants. He

has been granted in forma pauperis status. For the reasons expressed below, I

will dismiss Meleika’s amended complaint on initial screening. The complaint is

therefore dismissed without prejudice.

I. Summary

On May 18, 2021, Steven Meleika, pro se, filed an initial complaint in

this action, naming the City of Bayonne as defendant. (DE 1.)1 I dismissed the

1 “DE” refers to the docket entry number in this case. Citations to page numbers

refer to the page numbers assigned through the Electronic Court Filing system, unless

otherwise indicated.

complaint without prejudice for failure to pay the required fees or apply to

proceed in forma pauperis. (DE 4.)

On August 2, 2021, Mr. Meleika submitted his in forma pauperis

application (DE 5), which I granted, relieving Meleika of the obligation to tender

the filing fee (DE 9.) The next day, I dismissed the complaint upon initial

screening, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), because it failed to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. (DE 7, 8.) My dismissal of the complaint

was without prejudice to the filing, within 30 days, of an amended complaint.

On September 8, 2021, Meleika filed an amended complaint against the

City of Bayonne, the Bayonne Police Department, and the Bayonne Medical

Center. (DE 11.) The filing was a few days late, a defect which I excuse.2

II. Standard

Because this court has granted in forma pauperis status, it is obligated to

screen the allegations of the amended complaint to determine whether it

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

[T]he provisions of § 1915(e) apply to all in forma pauperis

complaints, not simply those filed by prisoners. See, e.g., Grayson

v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 n. 19 (3d Cir. 2002)

(non-prisoner indigent plaintiffs are “clearly within the scope of §

1915(e)(2)”). See also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.

2 Thereafter, he filed miscellaneous documents (DE 13), a Brief (DE 15), and a

letter seeking a default judgment (DE 16), discussed herein.

In a one line letter (DE 16), Mr. Meleika seeks a default judgment against the

City of Bayonne. The original complaint, however, was dismissed, and the time to

answer had not expired when the default motion/letter was filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(a). No default was sought or entered by the clerk. And finally, I am herein

dismissing the first amended complaint as against the City of Bayonne at the

screening stage, so no obligation to answer is triggered. For all of these reasons, the

letter application for a default judgment is denied.

2000)( § 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not

just those filed by prisoners).

Atamian v. Burns, 236 F. App'x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Johnson v.

Rihanna, No. CV 18-448, 2018 WL 3244630, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2018),

report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 18-448, 2018 WL 3239819 (W.D.

Pa. July 2, 2018).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v.

Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d

220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as

explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To

survive the court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must

allege ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible. See

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,

308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers

‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay

Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. Factual Allegations

Mr. Meleika is a serial filer of lawsuits against the State of New Jersey,

the Cities of Bayonne and Jersey City, and other parties.3 The original

complaint in this action, dismissed on screening, alleged as follows:

Welfare check swatting

False call

Police went into the House

3rd Amendment No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in

any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war

[unintelligible]

(DE 1 at 4.)

The amended complaint adds that the events took place at the plaintiff’s

address of record in Bayonne. It contains no new facts, but only expanded the

legal grounds for relief:

Malice Prosecution

Violation of 4th amendment right and

5th amendment Due Process right and

6th amendment speedy trial right and effective assistance

False arrest.

3 The court’s docket lists the following cases in which Mr. Meleika is named as

plaintiff:

2:17-cv-01958-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

filed 03/22/17 closed 05/07/20

2:17-cv-01959-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

filed 03/22/17 closed 01/31/19

2:17-cv-01960-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

CENTER et al filed 03/22/17

2:17-cv-05759-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. JERSEY CITY MEDICAL CENTER et al

filed 08/04/17 closed 11/16/20

2:19-cv-20916-KM-MAH MELEIKA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al filed

12/02/19

2:21-cv-11394-KM-JBC MELEIKA v. CITY OF BAYONNE filed 05/18/21

2:21-cv-16720-KM-CLW MELEIKA v. INSTAGRAM filed 09/09/21 closed

09/13/21

2:21-cv-18221-KM-CLW MELEIKA v. CITY OF BAYONNE filed 10/07/21

closed 10/14/21

(DE 11 at 4.) Attached to the amended complaint is a “Home Medication List”

that appears to be a record of Bayonne Medical Center. The medications are

Cossar, Depekote, Klonopin, Risperdal, Tricor, and Tranadol. The list of

“Injuries” in the amended complaint refers to side effects of mental health

medication, and states that Meleika does not consent to such medication. Also

attached is what appears to be a photograph. (DE 11-1.)

IV. Discussion: The Amended Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute

provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1)

the violation of a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States; and

(2) that the person acting under color of state law committed or cause the

alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v.

Pennyslvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Ross v. Graf, No.

19CV20534NLHMJS, 2021 WL 4452651, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2021).

Before discussing the defendants individually, I make the following

general observations about the factual allegations of violation of a

constitutional right. Taking the original and amended complaints together, no

issue of quartering of troops is stated; no prosecution, malicious or otherwise,

is alleged; no arrest, false or otherwise, is alleged; no violation of due process is

alleged; and the rights to a speedy trial or effective assistance of counsel do not

apply outside the context of a criminal prosecution, which is not alleged. At

best, the allegation that the “police went into the house” might implicate the

Fourth Amendment.

A. Bayonne Medical Center

I must dismiss the amended complaint against the Bayonne Medical

Center as a matter of law. Section 1983 only permits claims against those

acting under color of state law. Thus, a section 1983 claim can be brought

against a private hospital, such as Bayonne Medical Center, only if sufficient

facts are pled showing that the hospital acted under color of law in allegedly

depriving Meleika of his constitutional rights. See Turner v. Children's Hosp. of

Philadelphia, 378 F. App'x 124, 126 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing West, 487 U.S. at 48-

49; Demby v. New Jersey State Prison Dep't of Med. Staff, No.

CV20247MASLHG, 2021 WL 2221399, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021).

Meleika has not alleged any facts demonstrating that Bayonne Medical

Center’s infringement of his federal rights was “fairly attributable to the State.”

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Therefore, I will

dismiss Meleika’s section 1983 claim against Bayonne Medical Center.

B. Bayonne Police Department

The amended complaint must also be dismissed against the Bayonne

Police Department. A New Jersey police department is not a separate legal

entity, but a department of the municipality. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A-14-118

(municipal police department is “an executive and enforcement function of

municipal government”); see also Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 Fed. Appx.

272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004); Mitchell v. City of Jersey City, No. 15-CV-6907 (KM),

2016 WL 1381379, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2016).

Therefore, for claims against the Bayonne Police Department, the proper

defendant is the City of Bayonne itself. The Complaint is dismissed as against

the Bayonne Police Department.

C. City of Bayonne

The only remaining defendant is the City of Bayonne. The original and

amended complaints in combination, very liberally construed, appear to be

alleging that Mr. Meleika was the victim of “swatting,” i.e., a false call to the

police or emergency services for the purpose of harassment. It might be

surmised that the police were conducting a “welfare check” on Mr. Meleika, and

in doing so, entered his apartment. This is not, however, clearly alleged.

It is unclear how a cause of action based on “swatting” would implicate a

claim of wrongdoing against the police. Mr. Meleika seems to be theorizing that

some unknown person made a false complaint or emergency call. He does not

connect that to any wrongdoing by the police, whose job it is to investigate

complaints. Although it is possible that the police knowingly investigated a

false claim or overstepped the Fourth Amendment in doing so, this is not

alleged factually.

Nor does the amended complaint allege facts suggesting that any

wrongdoing by the police would be attributable to the City. A municipality

cannot be liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of its

employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Section 1983 would require facts suggesting an

unconstitutional municipal policy, practice, or custom. See id. at 690-91. A

policy exists “when a decision-maker with final authority issues an official

proclamation, policy, or edict.” Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208,

221 (D.N.J. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, a “

[c]ustom may be established by showing that a given course of conduct,

although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law is so well-settled and

permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (internal quotation and citations

omitted).

For Meleika to plausibly plead a Monell claim, he must identify the

unconstitutional policy or custom, attribute it to the City of Bayonne itself, and

show a causal link between the execution of that policy and a violation of

Meleika’s constitutional rights. See Ross v. Graf, No. 19CV20534NLHMJS,

2021 WL 4452651, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2021); Harley v. City of New Jersey

City, No. 16-5135, 2017 WL 2779466, at *7-8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2017). At the

pleading stage, this burden is sometimes met by allegations of a formal policy,

or else by allegations that policymakers were aware of similar unlawful conduct

but that their policies failed to guard against future violations. See Est. of

Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v.

Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)).

A Monell claim may also be premised on a municipality’s failure to train,

supervise, and discipline. A plaintiff pleading a claim based on a failure to

train, supervise, and/or discipline is required to “demonstrate that a city’s

failure to train its employees ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.’” Id. at

798-800 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir.

2001)). Deliberate indifference is plausibly pled by allegations that “(1)

municipal policy makers know that employees will confront a particular

situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees

mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. at 798 (quoting Doe v. Luzerne County,

660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal brackets omitted)).

The amended complaint fails to state a Monell claim against the City of

Bayonne. Meleika has not plausibly alleged that the City of Bayonne enacted a

policy or custom that might have resulted in his alleged harms. To the extent

Meleika believes that a Monell claim is sufficiently pled by merely alleging that

the City of Bayonne employed the police officers, he is incorrect.

The amended complaint is therefore dismissed against the City of

Bayonne.

V. Separate Submissions Suggest That Second Amended Complaint

Might Not Be Futile

After filing his amended complaint, Mr. Meleika filed two other

documents. (DE 13, 15.) These documents, and their relation to the amended

complaint, are difficult to interpret. They do suggest, however, that Mr. Meleika

might be able to assemble his allegations into a second amended complaint

that could survive screening.

“Documents” (DE 13). In this submission, Mr. Meleika states that

sounds of gunfire and shouting, apparently from a video game, led to the police

conducting a “welfare check.” They entered the home, he says, in violation of

his constitutional rights.4 No dates or other particulars are given, and there is

no allegation that the police knew the report of gunfire or shouting was false.

“Brief” (DE 15). Mr. Meleika has also filed a “Brief.” (DE 15) In this Brief,

Mr. Meleika explains that he was a victim of “swatting and false calls.” It

describes what is apparently a wholly different incident. At some unspecified

time, he was taken to the hospital by the police; he implies that this was

related to a suspicion that he had COVID, although this is not entirely clear.

He states that he is suing because he needs funds to buy a ranch house and

move out of his parents’ home. A digression follows, the upshot of which is that

he is filing malicious prosecution suits in the hope of gaining the means to live

on his own and start a family. He then alleges that the City of Bayonne is liable

because the police “seized him and assisted in transport by following the

ambulance.”5

The Court has construed the amended complaint very liberally. It cannot,

however, take on the task of assembling these scattered allegations into a

coherent account and deeming them to be a complaint. I will, however, permit

the plaintiff to file a proposed second amended complaint that is sufficiently

coherent and factual to permit a response.

4 The supplementary filing attaches an excerpt from an earlier opinion in which I

granted defendants’ summary judgment against Mr. Meleika’s prior allegations of

“swatting,” i.e., making a false police report to harass a person. That action concerned

the police, acting on a complaint from Mr. Meleika’s parents, bringing Mr. Meleika to

Jersey City Medical Center, where he was administered antipsychotic medication.

Meleika v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., No. CV175759KMMAH, 2020 WL 2125245, at *3

(D.N.J. May 4, 2020). The excerpt consists of the court’s quotation of Mr. Meleika’s

allegations of “swatting” and citation of a Wikipedia entry on that topic. The City of

Bayonne is also named as a defendant in that action.

5 This seems to be a separate incident from the one described in the earlier

action. See n.4, supra.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is DISMISSED upon initial

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Mr. Meleika may, if he wishes, submit a second amended complaint within

30 days. This must be a single document, not a series of submissions. It should

simply tell the story of what happened, state when and where it happened, and

explain why the actions of the defendant were unconstitutional. It must be

specific enough to permit the defendant to respond with admissions or denials of

the allegations.

If no such amended complaint is received, this dismissal will become a

dismissal with prejudice.

An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

Dated: October 21, 2021

/s/ Kevin McNulty

____________________________________

Kevin McNulty

United States District Judge