PEARSON v. SWEENEY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

______________________________

COREY PEARSON, :

: Civ. No. 20-2065 (RMB-JS)

Plaintiff :

v. :

: OPINION

DONNA SWEENEY, et al., :

:

Defendants :

______________________________:

BUMB, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a

supplemental1 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Corey

Pearson, an inmate presently incarcerated in Bayside State Prison

in Leesburg, New Jersey. (Supp. Compl., Dkt. No. 5.) On July 27,

2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, but dismissed his civil rights

complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

(Order, Dkt. No. 4.) Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint is an

attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies of his Eighth Amendment

failure to protect claims. The Court must also review the

1 The Court will treat Plaintiff’s new filing as a supplemental

complaint, See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), rather than an amended

complaint because Plaintiff clearly intends to continue to rely on

the facts and claims in the original complaint. Thus, the complaint

includes the submissions filed in Docket entry numbers 1 and 5.

complaint, as supplemented, for possible dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

I. Sua Sponte Dismissal

When a prisoner is permitted to proceed without prepayment of

the filing fee or when the prisoner pays the filing fee for a civil

action and seeks redress from a governmental entity, officer or

employee of a governmental entity, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) require courts to review the

complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are (1) frivolous

or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.

Courts must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro

se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, “a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to ‘less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). A pleading must contain a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.) Legal conclusions, together

with threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do

not suffice to state a claim. Id.

Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at

679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If

a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may

not dismiss the complaint with prejudice but must permit the

amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108

(3d Cir. 2002).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Original Complaint

Plaintiff brings his claims against defendants under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Eighth Amendment by failing to

protect him from assault by another inmate. (Compl., ¶4, Dkt. No.

1.) Plaintiff alleges he was incarcerated in a prison in New

Hampshire, presumably under an interstate agreement for housing

New Jersey prisoners, and he was misclassified as a sex offender

by the defendants, New Jersey officials. Plaintiff alleges he was

assaulted by another inmate in New Hampshire before he was

transferred to C.R.A.F.2 in New Jersey, where he remained from May

13, 2019 to June 3, 2019. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) The named

defendants are Donna Sweeney, Interstate Transfer Analyst for the

New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”); Marcus O’Hicks,

NJDOC Commissioner; Detective Tabolski, Special Investigative

Officer for South Woods State Prison; and S. Bailey, Senior

Classifications Officer at South Woods State Prison. (Compl. ¶4,

Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that these defendants had the

opportunity to correct his misclassification as a sex offender but

negligently failed to do so before he was assaulted by another

prisoner. (See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)

In the Court’s Opinion dated July 27, 2020, the Court

dismissed the complaint for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff was not in

the custody of the defendants when he was assaulted; therefore, it

is unclear how they could have protected him from assault by

another inmate; and (2) even assuming the defendants could have

protected Plaintiff, he did not allege how the defendants were

2According to its website, “CRAF”, Central Reception and Assignment

Facility, “serves as a central processing unit for all adult males

sentenced to the New Jersey Department of Corrections.”

Available at

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=19oCJlVou1rAvf3KLu7Se3U

fAJF0&ll=40.24716930000003%2C-74.8046279&z=8 (last visited July

27, 2020).

aware that he was under a substantial risk of serious harm from

assault by another inmate. (Opinion, Dkt. No. 3 at 6-7.)

B. The Supplemental Complaint

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his supplemental

complaint. The assault on Plaintiff by another prisoner in the New

Hampshire prison occurred on May 12, 2019. (Supp. Compl., Dkt. No.

5 at 1.) The inmate who assaulted Plaintiff had overheard an

officer telling Plaintiff that he would have to attend sex offender

treatment programs. (Id.) Plaintiff wrote to Defendants in New

Jersey prior to the assault, asking them to correct his

misclassification as a sex offender, but they did not act. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s mother also made calls on his behalf, to no avail.

(Id.)

Several inmates confronted Plaintiff after hearing a rumor

that Plaintiff was a sex offender. (Id.) As Plaintiff tried to

explain that he was not a sex offender, one inmate pulled out a

shank and another inmate punched him in the eye. (Id.) This

occurred the day before Plaintiff’s scheduled court date in Newark,

New Jersey, and as a result of his assault, he was not sent back

to New Hampshire. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “everyone knows sex

offenders do not live in prisons peacefully” and “every defendant

knew my life was in danger.” (Id.)

C. Eighth Amendment Claim

An Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts indicating that the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

serious harm to the inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). A showing of deliberate indifference requires courts to

“focus [on] what a defendant's mental attitude actually was (or

is), rather than what it should have been (or should be).” Hamilton

v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. 825, 839 (1994)).

Misclassification of a prisoner as a sex offender, while

certainly a serious problem that requires attention, does not in

itself establish deliberate indifference of a substantial risk of

serious harm to the prisoner. Even accepting it is obvious that

sex offenders are targets for violence in prison, Plaintiff has

not alleged that the defendants who were responsible for correcting

the classification error, who were in New Jersey, knew that inmates

in the New Hampshire prison were aware of Plaintiff’s

classification. Plaintiff has explained how the New Hampshire

inmates discovered his classification, but he has not alleged that

the defendants in New Jersey were aware of this, and the threat it

posed to him if they did not correct his classification.

Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that he informed

Defendants that he had no means of protection in the New Hampshire

prison. Plaintiff suggests in his supplemental complaint that he

should have been housed in a secured unit for sex offenders until

the misclassification was corrected, but he has not named any

defendant who refused to grant him protective custody or alleged

that Defendants in New Jersey were aware that he would not be

afforded protective custody.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court will dismiss the complaint, as supplemented.

Dismissal is without prejudice and leave will be granted to file

an amended complaint. An amended complaint will replace the

original complaint. See W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v.

Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he

amended complaint ‘supersedes the original and renders it of no

legal effect, unless the amended complaint specifically refers to

or adopts the earlier pleading’”) (quoting New Rock Asset Partners,

L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1504

(3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d

504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985)).

An appropriate Order follows.

DATE: November 24, 2020

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

United States District Judge