Opinion

CHERRY HILL TOWNE CENTER PARTNERS, LLC v. GS PARK RACING, L.P.

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Sep 15, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.2%

The opinion

[Docket No. 52]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

CHERRY HILL TOWNE CENTER

PARTNERS, LLC,

Plaintiff, Civ. No. 18-12868 (RMB/KMW)

v. OPINION

GS PARK RACING, L.P.,

GREENWOOD NEW JERSEY, INC.,

GREENWOOD RACING, INC.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

BROWN & CONNERY, LLP

By: William M. Tambussi, Esq.

Mark P. Asselta, Esq.

Andrew S. Brown, Esq.

360 Haddon Avenue

Westmont, New Jersey 08108

Counsel for Plaintiff

BALLARD SPAHR LLP

By: Roberto A. Rivera-Soto, Esq.

210 Lake Drive East-- Suite 200

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002

Counsel for Defendants

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

By operation of New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Act, Plaintiff

Cherry Hill Towne Center-- after obtaining the requisite

license-- could open a sports wagering facility on the property

at issue in this case but for the restrictive covenant held by

Defendants GS Park Racing, L.P., Greenwood New Jersey, Inc., and

Greenwood Racing, Inc. (collectively “GSPR”). That covenant

exclusively reserves to GSPR the right to operate “wagering

activities and gambling and gaming of any sort.” Approximately

one year ago, this Court held, in the context of a Motion for

Preliminary Injunctive Relief, that GSPR would likely prevail on

its position that the restrictive covenant is enforceable. See

Cherry Hill Towne Ctr. Partners, LLC v. GS Park Racing, L.P.,

2019 WL 4187836 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2019).1 Since that decision,

two relevant events have occurred: (1) GSPR filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment after the parties had exchanged discovery, and

(2) the COVID-19 global pandemic arose.

Cherry Hill Towne Center now claims that it no longer

wishes to pursue this litigation because its business plans have

changed as a result of the pandemic and related public health

restrictions.2 Thus, instead of filing opposition to GSPR’s

1 The Court, however, denied the Motion for Preliminary

Injunctive Relief, additionally holding that GSPR had not

established that, absent provisional injunctive relief,

immediate irreparable harm would result before this Court could

render a final judgment on the merits.

2 Specifically, Cherry Hill Towne Center states, “as a

result of the ongoing global pandemic and the concomitant

governmental restrictions, it no longer makes sense from a

business perspective to open a ‘bricks and mortar’ sports

wagering facility, at least for the foreseeable future.” (Moving

Brief, Dkt. 52-1, p. 1-2)(emphasis added by the Court).

Motion for Summary Judgment, Cherry Hill Towne Center presently

moves to dismiss this suit without prejudice, and without costs,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). GSPR opposes the motion

insofar as Cherry Hill Towne Center seeks a dismissal without

prejudice. GSPR contends that, in light of the Court’s holding

that GSPR would likely prevail on the merits of this suit, and

GSPR’s pending Motion for Summary Judgment, the dismissal should

be with prejudice. For the reasons stated herein, the Court

will dismiss this case without prejudice but with certain

“terms,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), intended to mitigate any

prejudice to GSPR that might arise if Cherry Hill Towne Center

were to refile this suit in the future.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court incorporates herein by reference the Court’s

Opinion addressing GSPR’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

Cherry Hill Towne Ctr. Partners, LLC v. GS Park Racing, L.P.,

2019 WL 4187836 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2019).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides, in

relevant part, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s

request only by court order, on terms that the court considers

proper.”3 Such “terms” must be “designed to protect the

3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) does not

apply because GSPR answered the Complaint on September 12, 2018,

defendant” and must “not create burdensome obstacles to

refiling” by the plaintiff. S.B. v. KinderCare Learning

Centers, LLC, 815 F.3d 150, 152–53 (3d Cir. 2016).

III. ANALYSIS

This Court’s dismissal order must reflect a balancing of

two competing interests: Cherry Hill Towne Center’s right to

dismiss its claims, and the prejudice to GSPR that may result

from such dismissal. Contrary to Cherry Hill Towne Center’s

argument, a bare dismissal without prejudice does carry with it

the potential for prejudice to GSPR if Cherry Hill Towne Center

were to refile this suit in the future. As GSPR understandably

emphasizes, this Court has held that the restrictive covenant is

likely enforceable and in GSPR’s view there is little left to do

or say in this litigation. While this Court’s holding, of

course, is not a final adjudication of the issue, it nonetheless

has value to GSPR. In the event that Cherry Hill Towne Center

refiles its suit, GSPR should not be required to litigate the

new suit as if this Court had never ruled anything as to the

enforceability of the restrictive covenant. Nor should GSPR be

exposed to the additional time and expense of conducting

previous discovery, re-drafting and re-filing previous

and filed a motion for summary judgment on March 3, 2020. Rule

41(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not apply because GSPR does not stipulate

to the type of dismissal Cherry Hill Towne Center seeks.

pleadings, and re-drafting and re-filing its summary judgment

motion. Nor should GSPR face the threat of another judicial

forum. In the end, this Court agrees with GSPR and finds that

GSPR would be prejudiced by having to litigate a new, refiled

suit from scratch.

Although GSPR’s concerns are certainly well-founded,

dismissal with prejudice, as GSPR requests, would shift the

balance too far, and might also erroneously suggest that this

Court has rendered a final judgment as to the enforceability of

the restrictive covenant, which it has not. Thus, the Court

concludes that the following terms will adequately mitigate

prejudice to GSPR while allowing Cherry Hill Towne Center to

dismiss, without prejudice, and without costs, its claims.

First, any future suit by Cherry Hill Towne Center against GSPR,

seeking a declaration that the restrictive covenant at issue in

this suit is unenforceable, filed in the District of New Jersey,

or filed in New Jersey state court and removed to this District4,

shall be designated as related to this case and directly

assigned to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(c).

Second, upon assignment of the new case to the undersigned, the

Court’s prior ruling on GSPR’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

will be deemed as rendered in the new case, GSPR’s Motion for

4 GSPR removed this suit from New Jersey Superior Court,

Chancery Division on the basis diversity of citizenship.

Summary Judgment will be deemed as pending in the new case, and

a new briefing schedule on the Motion for Summary Judgment will

be set by the Court. In essence, the case will pick-up where it

left off when Cherry Hill Towne Center makes its business

decision to proceed with building a sports betting facility.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant, in part,

and deny, in part, Plaintiff’s Rule 41(a)(2) Motion. An

appropriate Order: (1) dismissing this case without prejudice,

without costs, and upon the terms set forth above, and (2)

dismissing as moot GSPR’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall

issue on this date.

Dated: September 15, 2020 _s/ Renée Marie Bumb _____

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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