CHAPMAN v. INSPIRA HEALTH NETWORK, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AUDREY CHAPMAN

1:17-cv-03145-NLH-JS

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

INSPIRA HEALTH NETWORK, INC.

et al.

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

JEREMY CHARLES ROSENBAUM

THE LAW OFFICES OF JEREMY C. ROSENBAUM

2323 RACE STREET - SUITE 1016

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103-1089

Attorney for the Plaintiff.

THOMAS PASCHOS

THOMAS PASCHOS & ASSOCIATES, PC

30 NORTH HADDON AVENUE - SUITE 200

HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033

Attorney for the Defendants.

HILLMAN, District Judge

This action concerns Plaintiff Audrey Chapman’s employment

at Inspira Health Network, Inc. Plaintiff has alleged that in

the course of her employment, Defendants discriminated against

her on the basis of race, retaliated against her for her

whistleblower activity, breached its contract with her, and

tortiously interfered with her contractual rights. This matter

comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment and a joint motion to seal.

For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part

and deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

Court will grant the parties’ joint motion to seal.

BACKGROUND

The Court takes its facts from the parties’ briefing, the

material facts not in dispute, and the procedural history of

this case. The facts relevant to this case are summarized

below.

Plaintiff, Dr. Audrey Chapman (“Chapman”), is an African-

American woman. She graduated from Edward Via Virginia College

of Osteopathic Medicine in October 2014. Inspira Health

Network, Inc. (“Inspira”) is a private corporation, organized as

a nonprofit entity under the laws of New Jersey. Inspira’s

principal place of business is located in Vineland, New Jersey.

Inspira facilitates several medical residency programs for

licensed physicians at the beginning of their careers.

Defendant Dr. Michael Geria is a doctor of osteopathy and

Inspira’s Director of Medical Education. Dr. Douglas Hargrave

served as Inspira’s program director for family residents.

Defendant Nicole Zucconi is a doctor of osteopathy who served as

assistant program director for family medicine residents.

Plaintiff was accepted into the family medicine residency

program at Defendant Inspira on a “scramble” basis in 2015. She

signed her Residency Agreement in March 2015 for a one-year

term. This Agreement states that her residency would start on

July 1, 2015 and end on June 30, 2016. This Agreement also

included several terms that obligated Inspira to meet certain

educational and professional requirements throughout the course

of Plaintiff’s residency.1 Plaintiff alleges that at the time

she started her residency, she was the only African-American

resident in the family medicine program at Inspira.

According to Plaintiff, residents in the family medicine

program rotated to a different subspecialty at the beginning of

each month. Plaintiff states that she completed her first

rotation in surgery in July 2015 before moving to inpatient

family medicine in August. During her inpatient rotation,

Plaintiff was supervised by Dr. David Aderholdt, a white, third-

year resident in family medicine. Plaintiff alleges Aderholdt

has a close friendly relationship with Defendant Zucconi through

Aderholdt’s wife. Plaintiff alleges that Aderholdt harassed her

and treated with “unreasonable disfavor, particularly as

compared to non-black interns.”2

1 Specifically, Plaintiff’s complaint highlights Sections 3.2,

3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, and 3.9 of the agreement. ECF No. 1, at ¶

9.

2 Plaintiff details a number of instances of this alleged

harassment, including “(a) speaking to her in a belittling tone

and/or screaming at her, and embarrassing her in front of others

(b) threatening Plaintiff’s position by telling her ‘we have

fired people before’ and making her feel that she would have not

a job with Defendant IHN the following year; (c) telling

Plaintiff also claims that Aderholdt told her to “go home”

and “leave the building” in August 2015. Plaintiff contends

that doing so would have constituted abandonment of her job, and

she did not comply with Aderholdt’s instructions to leave. This

incident prompted Plaintiff to contact Defendant Zucconi and

inform her of Aderholdt’s conduct. Plaintiff alleges that

during her conversation with Zucconi, she sought to “find

productive alternatives to being paired with Dr. Aderholdt in

the future” but asked not to escalate the issues beyond the

Zucconi.

In August 2015, Plaintiff alleges that during a meeting

with Dr. Stephanie Flaherty, the chief resident in family

medicine, she alerted Flaherty, Ralph Vicente, and another

Inspira employee that Aderholdt had sent text messages with

patient names, which Plaintiff alleges amounted to a Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)

violation. According to Plaintiff, Flaherty noted that text

messaging was an improper way to avoid Inspira’s sign-out

procedure. Plaintiff claims to have seen and received similarly

Plaintiff he did not want her on his rotation; (d) telling

Plaintiff she could not see any of his patients; (e) telling

Plaintiff she was a ‘problem’ and threatening to email

Defendants Geria and Zucconi, as well as Douglas Hargrave, DO,

the official Program Director of the Family Medical Residency

Program; and, (f) referring to other residents as “Dr.” and

referring to Plaintiff by her first name, as if she were a

medical student.” ECF No. 1, at ¶ 15.

improper text messages from Inspira’s other attending

physicians. According to Plaintiff, no action was taken to

address this practice.

Flaherty testified that in August 2015, the family medicine

faculty meeting held a meeting. During this meeting, various

residents discussed Plaintiff’s difficulty accepting

constructive criticism. Plaintiff’s disagreements with

Aderholdt were also considered at this meeting. Flaherty

further testified that in September 2015, an email between

Flaherty, Hargrave, Zucconi, and Brenda Mulford, the office

coordinator for the family medicine residency program, noted

many instances of Plaintiff’s unprofessional behavior as well as

concerns about her medical knowledge and efficiency.

On October 16, 2015, Plaintiff met with Defendant Geria,

Hargrave, Mulford, and Ralph Vicente, Inspira’s Director of

Human Resources. According to Plaintiff, she was informed that

the purpose of this meeting was the discuss the findings of

Inspira’s investigation into her complaint against Aderholdt in

August 2015. Plaintiff alleges that she was told Inspira had

“done its ‘due diligence,’ and found no grounds for disciplining

Dr. Aderholdt” and that her request not to work with him in the

future was denied. Plaintiff contends that Inspira did not do

its due diligence during the course of this investigation

because it did not interview certain witnesses.

Plaintiff alleges that this meeting turned to complaints

that had supposedly been received about the Plaintiff and her

behavior. According to the Plaintiff, during the course of this

discussion, she expressed alarm about what she perceived to be

unlawful deception committed by Inspira’s medical staff,

including falsification of a patient’s medical history to cover

up for “recklessly botching surgery.”3 Plaintiff contends that

Defendants Geria and Inspira did not respond receptively to this

disclosure. Inspira contends that Plaintiff refused to provide

any details of this event, including the date of the incident,

any details about the patient, or the doctors allegedly

involved. According to Plaintiff, when the meeting ended,

Defendant Geria stated that unless new allegations arose, he

would consider the complaints against Aderholdt and the

Plaintiff closed.

On October 19, 2015, Plaintiff contends that she wrote to

Defendant Geria regarding bullying and “tattling” among

3 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she witnessed an attending

physician perform a procedure on a patient “despite clearly not

knowing what he was doing, fumbling around and failing to

properly assemble or operate the surgical equipment.” Plaintiff

alleges that a pulmonologist had been called to perform this

procedure, but was not permitted to do so. Plaintiff alleges

that this procedure was dangerous because the attending

physician did not use an ultrasound, but instead “instructed a

resident to blindly poke around,” resulting in “serious and

unnecessary complications, such as difficulty breathing and

procedures to re-intubate the patient and re-inflate her lung.”

ECF No. 1, at ¶ 25.

residents. Plaintiff alleges she requested that Defendant

Geria, as the head of residency programs, either hold a

conference or send a mass email regarding this issue. According

to Plaintiff, Defendant Geria declined to take either action.

Plaintiff contends that at the end of October 2015, Defendant

Geria confirmed that the allegations against her were no longer

an issue and that neither Plaintiff nor Geria referenced these

complaints in a November 2015 meeting.

In December 2015, Plaintiff alleges that every resident

except her received a $100 gift card from Defendant Zucconi for

Christmas. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a

“humiliating runaround” when she tried to claim her gift card.

After Defendant Zucconi returned from maternity leave, she

met with Plaintiff on December 18, 2015. The purpose of this

meeting was purportedly to discuss Plaintiff’s six-month

evaluation. Plaintiff contends that this evaluation did not

occur and she never learned if she had passed or failed her

rotations. Instead, Plaintiff alleges she was presented with a

Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) as a disciplinary measure.

Plaintiff alleges that the only stated grounds for this measure

were the same allegations that Defendant Geria had confirmed

were no longer an issue. Zucconi testified that in her opinion,

Plaintiff was creating a hostile work environment for the other

residents.

Plaintiff alleges that following this meeting, she returned

to work and had a conversation with Dr. Shirley Ayuk-Takem.

Plaintiff alleges that during this conversation she expressed

her frustration with the attacks on her professionalism.

Plaintiff alleges that she was “noting the absurdity of the

situation” when she remarked “I should just kill myself” to

Ayuk-Takem.

Ayuk-Takem reported this comment to the attending

physician, who asked Plaintiff to report to the emergency room

for evaluation. Plaintiff was examined by a doctor and a social

worker before seeing a psychiatrist. Plaintiff alleges that she

was told she could safely return to work following these

examinations.

On December 21, 2015, Plaintiff reported for work and

alleges she was told to meet with Defendant Geria before

beginning her shift. Plaintiff alleges she was placed on an

immediate and involuntary paid leave of absence. Plaintiff

states she was in her intensive care rotation, which was

scheduled to end on January 3, 2016. Plaintiff alleges that she

underwent a psychological/psychiatric examination on January 12,

2016 and was cleared to return to work.

Plaintiff returned to work on January 27, 2016 and was

presented with a PIP. The parties dispute when this PIP was

first contemplated. Plaintiff alleges this process started as

early as October 14, 2015. Defendant alleges this action was

contemplated starting in December 2015.

The January 2016 PIP states, in part, that Plaintiff was

placed on a PIP for unprofessional behavior. According to

Plaintiff, the PIP stated she would be placed on probation for

three months and would have “monthly meetings with the program

directors (either Dr. Hargrave or Dr. Zucconi).” Plaintiff

alleges that only one monthly meeting occurred on February 19,

2016. Plaintiff states that during this meeting, Defendant

Geria and Hargrave addressed her behavior and performance during

her obstetrics and gynecology rotation, describing her

performance as very good. Plaintiff also alleges that other,

non-black residents who received a PIP or notifications of

performance issues did have monthly meetings with Defendant

Zucconi.

Zucconi testified that it was not uncommon for residents to

be placed on a PIP or face discipline. Of the six family

medicine residents who started in July 2015, two were terminated

before the year ended, one transferred to internal medicine, and

another transferred to another program in New Brunswick, New

Jersey. That year, only one of six residents completed a

residency at Inspira.

In March 2016, Plaintiff filed her first complaint about

another resident, specifically Dr. Kristen Trom. According to

Plaintiff, Trom is not black. Trom had previously been a topic

of discussion at a faculty meeting and had been warned to “watch

what she says,” and reprimanded for “talking badly about

attendings.” Trom was eventually cleared on any accusations

and, according to Plaintiff, did not receive any discipline.

Plaintiff alleges that on March 6, 2016, during a night

shift, she overheard Dr. Sandra Mason, a second-year resident in

family medicine, making “unprofessional and disparaging remarks”

about Plaintiff to another doctor. According to Plaintiff,

Mason is not black. Plaintiff alleges that she had observed

other unprofessional behavior by Mason before March 6 and had

previously made a complaint to Defendant Geria, Hargrave, and

Vicente on March 8. Plaintiff filed another formal complaint

against Mason. On April 25, 2016, Plaintiff received a letter

from Vicente stating that it did not appear that any

inappropriate behavior or violations of company policy had taken

place with regard to Mason.

According to Vicente, he had observed what he characterized

as “very odd behavior” by Plaintiff, including covering her ears

and saying she did not want to hear anything Vicente was saying

and falling on the floor crying in the face of criticism.

According to Dr. George Dendrinos, a member of the faculty at

Inspira, Plaintiff had many interpersonal conflicts with other

residents at Inspira. Dendrinos stated that other residents did

not want to work with Plaintiff, that Plaintiff was

confrontational and that Plaintiff did not properly follow-up

with patients. Dendrinos also stated that Plaintiff had accused

Defendants Geria and Zucconi of lying and called them liars.

Flaherty testified that she also did not observe any improvement

in Plaintiff’s performance or demeanor after the Plaintiff was

placed on a PIP.

In April 2016, the family medicine faculty met again. Dr.

Jack Shields, a member of Inspira’s family medicine department,

attended this meeting and testified that everyone was “in

agreement of the mutual release of contract or non-renewal for

PGY2 contract” for Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, the

minutes of this meeting also show that the faculty “fear[ed]

working with [Plaintiff] due to her accusations.”

Plaintiff met with Defendants Geria and Zucconi, Hargrave,

and Vicente on May 5, 2016. At this meeting, Plaintiff alleges

she was told that her residency agreement was not going to be

renewed and that she was being dismissed from the residency

program for “persistent unprofessional behavior and failure to

comply with a performance improvement plan.” Zucconi testified

that she felt threatened at this meeting because Plaintiff made

the remark “life changes in an instant” after being told her

contract would not be renewed.

Plaintiff alleges that she requested an extension of

approximately six weeks so she could complete the intensive care

rotation that had been cut short by her involuntary leave of

absences. On June 24, 2016, the last day of Plaintiff’s

scheduled residency, Plaintiff alleges that she met with

Defendant Zucconi. At this time, Plaintiff claims that Zucconi

have her a document called a “ACOFP Core Competency” Evaluation.

According to Plaintiff, this document states that Plaintiff

received credit for ten months of her training. This document

also shows that Plaintiff had reached an appropriate level of

training in the area of “Interpersonal and Communication

Skills.” Another evaluation Zucconi prepared and signed

acknowledged that Plaintiff’s “performance in June on the Family

Medicine service did improve.” Hargrave testified that he

provided Plaintiff with letters of recommendation, despite

believing that some of her behavior had been inappropriate.

Plaintiff also alleges that at this time she was informed

her request for an extension had been denied. Plaintiff alleges

that Inspira has made such an accommodations for another intern,

Dawn Krystusa, after she took a leave of absence during her

residency the previous year. Inspira contends that Plaintiff

received full credit for her first year of residency and that

after Hargrave looked at her rotations, he determined that

Plaintiff was not required to do any additional time. Plaintiff

asserts that her documents reflect that she had “one year of

family medicine training” but do not reflect the credit she

earned. Plaintiff also contends that she was only given credit

for ten months of her residency, not twelve.

Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 5, 2017, including

several counts: (1) violations of Section 1981: race

discrimination in employment (against all Defendants); (2)

violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

(“NJLAD”): race discrimination in employment (against all

Defendants); (3) Violations of the New Jersey Conscientious

Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”): whistleblower retaliation

(against all Defendants);(4) breach of contract (against

Inspira); (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing (against Inspira); and (6) tortious interference

(against Geria and Zucconi). Defendants answered this complaint

on September 27, 2017, asserting twenty-three affirmative

defenses.4

4 These defenses include: (1) Plaintiff failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted; (2) Plaintiff is not entitled

to the relief sought as a matter of law; (3) Plaintiff failed to

mitigate damages; (4) Defendants have not committed any unlawful

discrimination and Plaintiff is not entitled to relief; (5)

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (6)

Defendants did not violate any legal duties owed to Plaintiff;

(7) any injury to Plaintiff was the result of her own conduct or

persons other than Defendants; (8) Plaintiff cannot establish a

prima facie case of discrimination; (9) Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim for pain, suffering emotional distress,

embarrassment, humiliation, illness and emotional injury; (10)

During discovery, Plaintiff produced eighty-nine recordings

of staff and faculty at Inspira taken while in her residency.

Plaintiff claims she started making recordings while at Inspira

because Flaherty told Plaintiff “it’s your word versus their

word,” regarding an incident that occurred during Plaintiff’s

shift. Plaintiff had allegedly informed a number of Inspira

staff members that she was recording them during the course of

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which pack pay, front

pay, overtime, lost fringe benefits, attorney’s fees and costs,

declarative or injunctive relief can be awarded; (11) Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim upon which relief of compensatory or

punitive damages may be granted; (12) Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by her failure to mitigate damages; (13) Plaintiff’s

claim for punitive damages is barred by public policy; (14)

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is in contravention of

Defendants’ rights under the Commerce Clause, the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional

prohibition against vague and overbroad laws and the

corresponding provisions under the Pennsylvania state

constitution; (15) Plaintiff did not suffer any intentional

discrimination based on her race, gender, age and/or any

retaliation by Defendants; (16) Defendants did not discriminate

against Plaintiff because of her race, sex, age, harassed

Plaintiff, and/or subjected Plaintiff to a hostile work and/or

retaliated against Plaintiff; (17) there is no merit to

Plaintiff’s allegations of race discrimination, gender

discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment,

retaliation, and/or constructive discharge; (18) the allegations

do not establish a constructive discharge claim; (19)

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by estoppel and/or equitable

estoppel; (20) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by her own breaches

of contract or other duties; (21) Defendants did not breach a

duty, contractual or otherwise, to Plaintiff; (22) Plaintiff’s

damages are not attributable to any breaches or wrongdoing by

Defendants; (23) Defendants reserve the right to amend its

answer to assert additional affirmative defenses based on

information obtained during discovery.

her residency and contends that on at least one occasion

Defendant Geria told her it was “fine” for her to tape record a

meeting. Plaintiff further stated that she was never told not

to record her coworkers and that the recordings were not

mentioned in her PIP. At least one member of Inspira’s faculty

has testified that it was “common knowledge” that Plaintiff made

these recordings.

Plaintiff does not contend that these recordings include

comments made about her race. Plaintiff has conceded that

“there were no ‘words’ or comments regarding her race on the

recordings, but argued that the actions addressed do indicate

discrimination.” ECF No. 62, at ¶ 20.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on September

30, 2019. The parties filed a joint motion to seal certain

documents on December 24, 2019. These matters have been fully

briefed and are ripe for adjudication.

ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court has original federal question jurisdiction over

this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff has alleged

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court has supplemental

jurisdiction over any common law causes of action asserted by

Plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because these claims are part

of the same case or controversy.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court is satisfied

that “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any,’ .

. . demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56).

An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the

outcome of the suit. Id. “In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;

instead, the non-moving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”

Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party bears the burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party seeking summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact.”).

Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving

party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324. A “party opposing summary judgment ‘may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading[s].’”

Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). For

“the non-moving party[] to prevail, [that party] must ‘make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Cooper v. Sniezek, 418 F.

App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and

affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

C. Inspira’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff has withdrawn her claims under CEPA and the NJLAD

(Counts II and III). ECF No. 64, at 20 n. 6. This opinion will

address the remaining counts below.

1. Chapman’s Race Discrimination in Employment Claims (Count

I)

The Court will analyze Count I of Plaintiff’s claim using

the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Stewart v.

Rutgers Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972)). This

framework has three basic steps and is its own separate

analysis. Hicks v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, et

al., No. 3:16-cv-00927, 2019 WL 5587324, at * 4 (D.N.J. Oct. 30,

2019). First, a plaintiff must put forward a prima facie case

of race discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).

If a plaintiff succeeds at this step, the analysis continues to

step two, where the burden shifts to the defendant to provide “a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Tucker

v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 484 F.App’x 710, 712 (3d Cir. 2012).

If the defendant can provide such an explanation, the analysis

proceeds to the third step. At this step, “the inference of

discrimination drops and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff

to show that the defendant’s proffered reason is merely a

pretext for intentional discrimination.” Makky v. Chertoff, 541

F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). If each side meets its burden at

each stage, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Whishkin v.

Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007).

Step One: Chapman’s Prima Facie Case

The prima facie case “raises an inference of discrimination

only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained,

are more likely than not based on the consideration of

impermissible factors.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (quoting Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). For her claim of

discrimination under Section 1981, McDonald must show: “(1) she

belongs to a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her

position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)

the circumstances support an inference of unlawful

discrimination.” Hicks, 2019 WL 5587324 at *4 (citing In re

Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 402 (3d Cir. 2018)). The

elements of the prima facie case are not meant to be “applied

woodenly, but must rather be tailored flexibly to fit the

circumstances of each type of illegal discrimination.” Geraci

v. Moody-Tottrup Int’l, 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996). The

Supreme Court has held that this “burden of establishing a prima

facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Burdine, 450

U.S. at 253.

If non-members of the protected class receive more

favorable treatment than plaintiff under similar circumstances,

these circumstances support an inference of unlawful

discrimination. Hicks, 2019 WL 5587324, at * 4 (citing Sarullo,

352 F.3d at 797 n 7). Hiring someone not in the protected class

as a replacement is also a common circumstance giving rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination. May v. PNC Bank, No. 18-

2933, 2020 WL 370043, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2020).

Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff belongs to a

protected class, is qualified for her position, or that she

suffered an adverse employment action. Defendants argue that

the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s employment at Inspira

do not support an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Defendants point to Plaintiff’s own testimony to support its

argument that Plaintiff cannot prove any discrimination due to

her race or any discriminatory intent because of her race. ECF

No. 52-2, at 22-24. In her deposition, Plaintiff stated that

she contends that her contract was not renewed because of her

race. Plaintiff also stated that she talked about her race at

meetings, but none of her supervisors or fellow residents made

disparaging comments regarding her race. She further stated

that Defendant Geria, Defendant Zucconi, Vicente, and Hargrave

did not make comments about her race. Instead, Plaintiff stated

that “the actions that they were doing suggested race.”

Plaintiff admitted that in the eighty-nine recordings she took

and the emails she produced, the subject of race was not

discussed. ECF No. 52-3, at 306-09. Defendants also point to

Inspira’s hiring record as evidence that there is no pattern of

discrimination due to race at Inspira.5

Plaintiff counters that she has introduced enough

comparator evidence to establish a prima facie case of racially

disparate treatment. According to Plaintiff, it is indisputable

that she was the only African-American or black resident and

that she was treated differently. To support this claim,

Plaintiff highlights that she only had one meeting with

Defendant Geria and Hargrave during the course of her PIP, while

other, non-black residents had multiple meetings after being

placed on a PIP. Plaintiff further emphasizes that Defendant

Zucconi avoided her, refused to take her phone calls, and failed

to schedule meetings with Plaintiff. Plaintiff also asserts

that two other non-black doctors, Dr. Trom and Dr. Mason,

received more favorable treatment after Plaintiff made

legitimate complaints about their objectionable conduct.

Plaintiff also highlights that Inspira granted a white intern in

the same residency program a four to six-week extension to

complete her intern year following a year of absence, but denied

Plaintiff’s similar request. As part of her prima facie case,

Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant Inspira hired a non-

5 In support of this argument, Inspira introduced evidence that

since its inception, Inspira has accepted into its residency

program 23 Black-Americans, 15 Hispanic-Americans, and 67 Asian

Americans. ECF No. 52-2, at 24.

African American as a replacement after she left the Family

Medical Residency Program.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden in

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Recognizing

that this is not an onerous burden, the Plaintiff has shown that

the different treatment she faced, if otherwise unexplained, is

more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible

factors. Defendants’ explanations for this treatment will be

discussed in the next step of the McDonnel Douglas analysis.

Step Two: Defendants’ Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons for

its Actions

At this stage, defendants need only “introduce[e] evidence

which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that was a

nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment

decision.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).

A defendant only has the burden of production, not the burden of

persuasion at this stage and “need not prove that the tender

reason actually motivated its behavior.” Id. (emphasis in

original). The Third Circuit has characterized this burden is

“relatively light.” Id. at 762

Defendants argue that it has the freedom to fire its

employees “‘for a good reason, bad reason or reason at all,’ as

long as there is no intentional discrimination.” ECF No. 52-2

at 26 (citing Maiorino v. Sherign-Plough Corp., 302 N.J. Super.

323, 345 (App. Div. 1997)). In this case, Defendants argue that

they did have a good, non-discriminatory reason for not renewing

Plaintiff’s contract. Defendants explain the adverse employment

actions taken against Plaintiff by highlighting that she

violated HIPAA, created a hostile work environment, secretly

recorded Inspira employees, doctors, and human resources

personnel, called Defendants Geria and Zucconi liars, and acted

unprofessionally.

In contrast, Plaintiff refers to Defendants’ explanations

as a “mishmash of nonsensical excuses.” ECF No. 64, at 13.

Plaintiff argues that the recordings she took were not secret,

and Defendants did not become aware of any HIPAA violations

until after the commencement of litigation. Therefore,

Plaintiff characterizes Defendants’ explanation as an “absurd

post hoc fabrication.” ECF No. 64, at 14.

Because this burden is “relatively light,” Fuentes, 32 F.3d

at 762, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden at

this step of the analysis. Defendants have offered a non-

discriminatory explanation for the incidents Plaintiff

describes, including the non-renewal of her contract. The Court

will proceed to step three of the McDonnel Douglas analysis.

Step Three: Whether Defendants’ Explanation is Pretextual

At this step, a plaintiff must “convince the fact finder

‘both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the

real reason.’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (quoting St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis in

original)). This analysis “focuses on whether there is

sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the

purported reasons for the defendant’s adverse employment actions

were in actuality a pretext for intentional race discrimination.

Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 1999).

A plaintiff can meet his or her burden in several ways: by

showing that the defendant had previously discriminated against

the plaintiff, that the defendant had previously discriminated

against other persons within the plaintiff’s protected class, or

that the defendant has treated more favorably similarly situated

persons not within the protected class. See Simpson v. Kay

Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir.

1998).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ reasons are pretextual

because she was never disciplined for her alleged HIPAA

violations or recordings. Plaintiff also emphasizes that if she

was disciplined for her alleged violations of HIPAA, this is

further evidence of discrimination because Inspira did not

discipline Aderholdt for his violations of HIPAA. Next,

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ explanation that she was

creating a hostile work environment is pretextual because

Inspira had allowed an “environment of gossip, rumor and

accusation to thrive” and that Plaintiff is a victim of this

culture. ECF No. 64, at 16-17. Finally, Plaintiff points to

her evaluations, which show that Defendant Zucconi indicated

Plaintiff “meets expectation” and exhibited professionalism.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to refute

Defendants’ legitimate business reasons for not renewing her

contract. Defendants emphasize again that “courts have no

business telling [companies] . . . how to make personnel

decisions, which may be objectively or subjectively based.” ECF

No. 52-2, at 25 (citing Maiorino, 302 N.J. Super. 323).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden at

this stage. Plaintiff not proven that a reasonable factfinder

could conclude Inspira’s reasons were false or that

discrimination was the real reason for Inspira’s decision not to

renew her contract or its handling of her PIP. Plaintiff has

not shown that Inspira had previously discriminated against her,

nor has the Plaintiff shown that Defendants have previously

discriminated against others in her protected class. In fact,

several Inspira residents were placed on PIPs as Plaintiff was.

Furthermore, multiple Inspira family medicine residents were

terminated before their year was finished.

Plaintiff has not established that Defendants treated more

favorably similarly situated employees not within Plaintiff’s

protected class. Though Plaintiff has identified other

employees at Inspira who were subject to PIPs and faced

complaints for unprofessional behavior, Plaintiff has not shown

that these employees were similarly situated to Plaintiff.

Inspira has shown that other employees had concerns about

Plaintiff’s medical knowledge and efficiency, her practice of

recording her coworkers, and her ability to take constructive

criticism, none of which seem to be concerns with the other

employees subject to PIPs or complaints of unprofessionalism.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not introduced

sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the

Defendants’ purported reasons for not renewing Plaintiff’s

contract were in actuality a pretext for intentional race

discrimination. As such, Plaintiff has not met her burden at

this step and the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to Count I.

2. Chapman’s Breach of Contract Claim (Count IV)

Plaintiff contends that the Residency Agreement she signed

with Inspira constitutes a contract. Plaintiff further contends

that an employer’s right to terminate an employee at will is

limited by statutes that proscribe retaliation. Plaintiff also

argues that any accusation of her own wrongdoings or violations

of her contract are evidence Defendants’ pretextual explanations

for its treatment of her and do not defeat her breach of

contract claim. Plaintiff also disputes Defendants’ claims that

Inspira is an academy and its residents are students.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was an employee at will and

therefore has no claim for breach of contract regarding her

termination or the non-renewal of her contract. Defendants also

assert that this claim is duplicative of Plaintiff’s now

withdrawn NJLAD claim. Defendants further contest Plaintiff’s

reliance on Inspira’s Resident Manual or Resident Agreement,

emphasizing both the overlap with Plaintiff’s discrimination

claim and Plaintiff’s actions in violation of this manual.

According to the Defendants, the Court should defer to Defendant

Inspira’s decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract because

this decision was an academic judgment and medical residents are

students.

A breach of contract claim has four elements: (1) a

contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3)

damages flowing there from; and (4) that the party stating the

claim performed its own contractual obligations. Gordon v.

United Continental Holding Inc., 73 F.Supp.3d 471, 478 (D.N.J.

2014) (citing Frederic v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir.

2007)).

The parties do not dispute that the Resident Agreement

Plaintiff signed in March 2015 constitutes a contract between

the parties. Defendants maintain that they did not breach this

contract, but rather that Plaintiff breached the contract by

failing to adhere to state federal and local laws. Defendants

do not speak to damages flowing from the alleged breach in their

motion for summary judgment.

The Court notes that Defendants argue both that Plaintiff

is an at-will employee and that Plaintiff is a student in an

academic program. Defendants argue that because of this dual

status as an at-will employee and student, Plaintiff could be

discharged for any reason and that Courts must defer to

Defendant Inspira’s decision-making process. Though Defendants

cite cases that speak to the subject of judicial deference to

academic institutions and their administrative decisions such as

Beukas v. Board of Trustees of Farleigh Dickinson University,

255 N.J. Super. 522 (N.J. 1992) (discussing dental student’s

challenge of a private university’s decision to close its dental

school) and Napolitano v. Princeton University Trustees, 186

N.J. Super. 548 (N.J. App.Div. 1982) (discussing a student’s

challenge of the trustee’s decision to withhold her degree for

one year for academic fraud), the Court declines to extend this

reasoning to Inspira’s residency program at this stage.6

6 While it is true that participants in Inspira’s family medicine

residency program attend lectures and receive grades, they also

work full time, a factor the Supreme Court considered in

deciding whether medical residents were classed as students or

employees for tax purposes in Mayo Foundation for Medical Educ.

& Research v. U.S., 562 U.S. 44 (2011).

The Court also recognizes that Defendants have

characterized Plaintiff’s claim as asserting that Defendant

Inspira breached its contract when it decided not to renew

Plaintiff’s residency agreement for another year. In fact,

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Inspira breached its contract

with her by failing to provide a complaint procedure consistent

with the terms of her contract and not allowing her to complete

her training.

Characterizing the claim as Plaintiff does, the Court finds

that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding

whether Defendants violated its contract with Plaintiff and

whether Plaintiff performed her own contractual obligations.

Whether the Resident Agreement obligated Defendants to provide a

different or more robust complaint procedure and, if so, whether

Defendants failed to do so remains a genuine dispute of material

fact. Plaintiff’s own actions in compliance with local, state,

and federal laws are also subject to a genuine dispute of

material fact.

As such, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as it relates to this count.

3. Chapman’s Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing Claim (Count V)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Inspira engaged in bad

faith in its contractual dealing and failed to carry out its

contractual obligations to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues this

claim should go to trial because a jury could reasonably find

that Defendant Inspira made it impossible for Plaintiff to enjoy

the fruits of her employment contract. Plaintiff further

contends that her contract includes the “right to be free to

present her concerns and grievances for a hearing without fear

of reprisal.” Plaintiff asserts that when she exercised this

right, she was terminated and denied the opportunity to get full

credit for the year. Plaintiff also contends that Defendants

acted in bad faith when they forced her to take a leave of

absence for an offhand comment about self-harm. Plaintiff

points to the actions of Defendants Zucconi and Geria as further

evidence of bad faith.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot recover on both an

express contract provision and on the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing because the two breaches arose from the

identical alleged conduct. Defendants also argue that the

renewal of Plaintiff’s contract was optional, and therefore

cannot form the basis of a claim for breaching the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Under New Jersey Law, every contract contains an implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Luongo v. Village

Supermarket, Inc., 261 F.Supp.3d 520, 531 (D.N.J. 2017) (citing

Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396 (N.J.

1997)). However, “a breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing differs from a literal violation of the

contract.” Spellman v. Express Dynamics, LLC, 150 F.Supp.3d

378, 389 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Wade v. Kessler Inst., 172 N.J.

327, 340 (N.J. 2002)). A party, even if it does not breach an

express term of a contract, can act in bad faith to interfere

with the other party’s ability to enjoy the fruits of the

contract. Luongo, 261 F.Supp.3d at 531 (citing Wilson v.

Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 244 (N.J. 2001)). When a party

has breached a specific term of a contract, that party cannot be

found separately liable for breaching the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing “when the two asserted breaches

basically rest on the same conduct.” Id.

To recover for a breach of the implied covenant, a

plaintiff must prove that: (1) a contract exists between the

parties; (2) the plaintiff performed under the terms of the

contract; (3) the defendant acted in bad faith with the purpose

of depriving the plaintiff of rights or benefits under the

contract; and (4) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff

to sustain damages. Luongo, 261 F.Supp.3d at 531-32 (citing TBI

Unlimited, LLC v. Clear Cut Lawn Decisions, LLC, No. 12-3355,

2014 WL 3853900, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2014)).

The Court finds that this claim is duplicative of

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Plaintiff cannot rely on

evidence that Defendants did not comply with the grievance

procedure described in the Resident Agreement as evidence of

both a breach of contract and as evidence of a breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Likewise,

Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants Zucconi and Geria’s

action, or lack thereof, in regards to Plaintiff’s complaints

about her co-residents constitute “subterfuges and evasions” in

the performance of the contract cannot be the basis of both

Count IV and Count V. These two asserted breaches rest on

basically the same conduct and therefore cannot both continue

forward. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not introduced sufficient

evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding

whether Defendant Zucconi and Geria’s purpose was to deprive

Plaintiff of rights or benefits under the Resident Agreement.

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

with respect to this count.

4. Chapman’s Tortious Interference Claim (Count VI)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Zucconi and Geria

interfered with her contract with Inspira through their

“deliberate dismantlement of Plaintiff’s ability to adequately

complete her internship requirements and continue the normal

course of a residency.” ECF No. 1, at ¶ 94. Plaintiff points to

Defendant Zucconi and Geria’s decision not to let her make up

her rotation time, dismissal of her complaints about her

colleagues, and discontinuation and nonrenewal of her residency

contract as being motivated by biases rather than business

interests. Plaintiff contends that these actions were motivated

by Defendants Zucconi and Geria’s personal vendetta against

Plaintiff for opposing harassment by Aderholdt.

Defendants counter that Plaintiff does not refer to any

specific contract that could be the basis of a tortious

interference claim. Defendants further state that Plaintiff

cannot prove that Defendant Geria or Zucconi acted with malice.

Defendants highlight that Geria and Zucconi have sole discretion

to decide if Plaintiff’s agreement would be renewed for a second

year of residency. Defendants argue that it was well within

Defendants Zucconi and Geria’s discretion to determine that

renewing Plaintiff’s contract did not further Inspira’s

objectives. Lastly, Defendants assert that Defendants Zucconi

and Geria cannot be liable for tortious interference because

they are co-employees of a party to an employment relationship

and acting within the scope of their employment.

Under New Jersey law, tortious interference with a contract

has four elements: (1) an existing contractual relationship; (2)

intentional and malicious interference with that relationship;

(3) loss or breach of a contract as a result of the

interference; and (4) damages resulting from that interference.

DiGiorgio Corp. v. Mendez & Co., Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 552, 558

(D.N.J. 2002) (citing Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.

Corp., 116 N.J. 729, 751-52 (1989)). “Interference is

intentional when ‘the actor desires to bring it about or if he

knows that the interreference is certain or substantially

certain to occur as a result of his action.’” Cargill Global

Trading v. Applied Dev. Co., 706 F.Supp.2d 563, 575 (D.N.J.

2010) (quoting Dello Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J. Super. 254, 268

(N.J. Super.App.Div. 2003)). In this context, malice “does not

require ill will toward the plaintiff, but rather ‘is defined to

mean that the harm was inflicted intentionally and without

justification or excuse.” Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic

Gallery, Inc., 870 F.Supp.1237, 1248 (D.N.J. 1994) (quoting

Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 751). Put differently, to

demonstrate malice, a plaintiff must “show that the defendant’s

conduct was ‘“transgressive of generally accepted standards of

morality”; that is, a violation of standards of “socially

acceptable conduct.”’” Id. (quoting Baldasarre v. Butler, 254

N.J. Super. 502, 526 (N.J. App.Div. 1992) (quoting Leslie Blau

Co. v. Alfieri, 157 N.J. Super. 172, 189 (N.J. App.Div. 1978))).

The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of

material fact with regard to this count. Plaintiff cannot show

that Defendants Zucconi and Geria acted intentionally and with

malice. Though Plaintiff did not seem to have good professional

or personal relationships with Defendants Zucconi or Geria

during her employment at Inspira, none of the evidence Plaintiff

introduced shows that the Defendants’ conduct was transgressive

of generally accepted standards of morality or outside of

socially acceptable conduct. Furthermore, any harm that

Defendants Zucconi and Geria inflicted by not recommending that

Plaintiff’s contract be renewed was justified or with excuse,

given the issues raised by Plaintiff’s conduct and performance

as a resident. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to this count.

D. Motion to Seal

In this District, Local Civil Rule 5.3 governs motions to

seal or otherwise restrict public access to materials filed with

the Court and judicial proceedings themselves. To place a

docket entry under seal, the Rule requires that the motion to

seal must be publicly filed and “shall describe (a) the nature

of the materials or proceedings at issue, (b) the legitimate

private or public interests which warrant the relief sought, (c)

the clearly defined and serious injury that would result if the

relief sought is not granted, and (d) why a less restrictive

alternative to the relief sought is not available.” L.Civ.R.

5.3(c)(2). The party moving to seal must submit a proposed

order that contains proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law. L.Civ.R. 5.3(c)(3).

In this case, the parties filed a joint motion seeking to

redact certain portions of documents and seal the entirety of

one document. These documents contain certain personally

identifiable information such as Plaintiff’s date of birth and

her personal identification numbers with several academic and

professional organizations, and Plaintiff’s psychiatric

evaluation. The information in the parties’ submission

satisfies the standards set forth in Local Rule 5(c)(3) and

there is no less restrictive alternative to sealing the

confidential information.

The Court will grant the joint motion to seal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant in part

and deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

Court will also grant the parties’ joint motion to seal.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: September 25, 2020 s/ Noel L. Hillman_______

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.