KWANZAA v. TELL

[Docket No. 17]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

PEGGY BOLER KWANZAA,

Plaintiff, Civil No. 19-20373 (RMB/AMD)

v. OPINION

GIRARD TELL, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

PEGGY BOLER KWANZAA, pro se

207 South Franklin Blvd.

Pleasantville, New Jersey 08232

REYNOLDS & HORN, P.C.

By: Thomas B. Reynolds

750 Route 73 South, Suite 202 A

Marlton, New Jersey 08053

Attorneys for Defendants

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pro se plaintiff, Peggy Boler Kwanzaa, brings this suit

alleging that defendants-- officers with the Pleasantville Police

Department-- violated her constitutional rights during a traffic

stop. Defendants contend that Kwanzaa lacks standing to assert

these claims. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be

granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Amended Complaint alleges the following. On February

28, 2019, Latasha Leggett, a non-party, was driving a car on the

Black Horse Pike in Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey. (Amend.

Compl., Dkt. 2, at 7). Lamont Scott, also a non-party, was the

only passenger. (Id. at 7-8). Defendant Ryan Van Sykle, an

officer with the Pleasantville Police Department, stopped the

vehicle for allegedly failing to use a turn signal within 100

feet of a turn. (Id. at 7). During the stop, Officer Van Sykle

called police dispatch to request a K-9 unit for a narcotics

sniff of the car. (Id.). Defendant Girard Tell, also a

Pleasantville Police Officer, then joined Officer Van Sykle.

(Id.).

Shortly thereafter, Kwanzaa arrived on the scene. (Id. at

8). She informed the officers that she owned the vehicle that

Leggett was driving, and she stated that they did not have her

permission to search the car. (Id.). At this point, “Scott

exited the vehicle and left the area on foot.” (Id.). Officer

Van Sykle then searched the vehicle without a warrant. (Id.).

Kwanzaa alleges that Officer Van Sykle’s justification for

stopping the vehicle was pretextual, and that he actually stopped

the car as part of the Pleasantville Police Department’s

unwritten racial profiling policy. (Id. at 7-9). Moreover, she

alleges that this informal policy is endorsed by Defendants Chief

Sean Riggins and Captain James Williams, both of the

Pleasantville Police Department. (Id. at 9).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 662. “[A]n unadorned, the

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not suffice to

survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. “[A] plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). When the plaintiff is pro se, the Court

must construe the complaint liberally, holding it “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

In reviewing a plaintiff’s allegations, the district court

“must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations as well as

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and

construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 358 n.1 (3d Cir.

2012). The Court may consider only the allegations in the

complaint, and “matters of public record, orders, exhibits

attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of

the case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d

1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Chester Cnty. Intermediate

Unit v. Penn. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)).

III. ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, the Court has identified some

confusion in the relevant filings-- namely Kwanzaa’s repeated

references to Lamont Scott as a co-plaintiff in this case. That

is incorrect.

This action originated from a separate case: Chaka Kwanzaa

et v. Tell et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-16052-RMB-AMD. That case

began with three plaintiffs: Chaka Kwanzaa, Peggy Boler Kwanzaa,

and Lamont Scott. Id. In November 2019, the Court severed Peggy

Boler Kwanzaa’s claims from that action into the instant case.

Id. at Dkt. 9. At that time, Scott’s claims were still included

in the original lawsuit. Then, three months later, the Court

severed Scott’s claims into a third action-- Scott v. Tell et

al., Case No. 1:20-cv-1295-RMB-AMD.

To clarify, Lamont Scott is not a plaintiff in this case and

his claims are currently being litigated in a separate action.

To the extent that Scott’s claims have been reasserted here,

those claims are dismissed as duplicative. See Fabics v. City of

New Brunswick, 629 F. App’x 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2015) (“As part of

its general power to administer its docket, a district court may

dismiss a duplicative complaint.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

A. Section 1983 Claims

Kwanzaa brings her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

§ 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . or other person . .

. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish liability under

§ 1983, “a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under

color of law, violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or

statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained-of injury.”

Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005).

The amended complaint lists four injuries. (Amend. Compl.

Dkt, 2, at 9-10). Those are:

Plaintiff. . . suffered emotional distress as a result

of the violation of [her] fourth amendment rights.

Plaintiff . . . suffered economic loss as the result

of defendant’s unconstitutional conduct.

Plaintiff . . . suffered long-term financial calamity

as a result of defendant’s wrongful conduct.

Plaintiff . . . suffered personal embarrassment and

loss of good reputation as a result of defendant’s

wrongful actions.

(Id.).

From these alleged injuries, coupled with plaintiff’s

description of the facts, the Court must make two inferences.

First, Kwanzaa has asserted Fourth Amendment claims against only

Officer Van Sykle. Although the amended complaint mentions that

Officer Tell joined Officer Van Sykle at the traffic stop, it

states that “defendant Van Syckle (sic) commenced with a

warrantless search of the vehicle.” (Amend. Complt., Dkt. 2, at

8). Second, Kwanzaa has alleged that all four defendants engaged

in a racial profiling practice in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s equal protection clause.1

1. Fourth Amendment

Kwanzaa contends that Officer Van Sykle violated her Fourth

Amendment rights by searching the vehicle without her permission

1 In her amended complaint, Kwanzaa states that defendants have violated

her “Due Process of Law [rights] both procedurally and substantively and

retaliation from public servants for exercising their right to file formal

complaints or grievances(sic).” (Amend. Compl., Dkt. 2, at 5). The Court

construes these claims as both Fourth Amendment and equal protection claims.

See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010)

(“Under [the more-specific provision rule], if a constitutional claim is

covered by a specific constitutional provision . . . the claim must be analyzed

under the standard appropriate to that specific provision.”) (cleaned-up). In

addition, the complaint makes no further mention of retaliation.

and without cause. (Amend. Compl., Dkt. 2, at 8). Specifically,

Kwanzaa asserts that she is the vehicle’s owner and refused to

give Officer Van Sykle permission to conduct his search. (Id.).

Moreover, Kwanzaa explains that Scott had “exited the vehicle and

left the area on foot,” thus negating the need to search the car.

(Id.). In response, defendants argue that Kwanzaa was not the

owner of the vehicle in question, and therefore cannot assert

claims arising under the Fourth Amendment for a search of that

car. (Defendant’s Brief, Dkt. 17, at 3). Furthermore,

defendants contend that even if Kwanzaa owned the vehicle, she

similarly cannot allege Fourth Amendment claims because she was

not driving or occupying the vehicle during the traffic stop.

(Id.).

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment rights are

“personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted.” Plumhoff

v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014).

Property ownership “is clearly a factor to be considered in

determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights have

been violated . . . [but] property rights are neither the

beginning nor the end of [the] Court’s inquiry.” United States

v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980). Instead, “an illegal search

only violates the rights of those who have ‘a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’” Id. (quoting

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)).

Several courts have held that a car’s owner cannot maintain

a legitimate expectation of privacy when lending that car to

others. In United States v. One 1986 Mercedes Benz, 846 F.2d 2

(2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit held that a car’s owner

“abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy[,]” by lending

their car to another person. 846 F.2d at 4. Similarly, the

Ninth Circuit has held that an owner “relinquished her

expectation of privacy when she lent her automobile” to another

person. United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444,

449 (9th Cir. 1983). Relying on these two cases, the Tenth

Circuit has also explained that when a car’s owner “surrendered

the car to his friends to drive,” he also “abandoned his privacy

interest in the car as a whole.” United States v. Blaze, 143

F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 1998). This Court now adopts that same

principle.

Here, Kwanzaa has not alleged that she was an occupant of

the car during Officer Van Sykle’s search; she challenges the

search only as the vehicle’s purported owner. But Kwanzaa did

not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her car at the

time of the search. She has not claimed that Leggett and Scott

were using her car without permission, and the Court must infer

that she allowed them to use the vehicle. But by lending the

vehicle to others, she abandoned a legitimate expectation of

privacy in her car. As a result, the Court finds that Kwanzaa

has attempted to vicariously assert the Fourth Amendment rights

of others, and this is not permitted. Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 778.

Thus, Kwanzaa cannot challenge the validity of Officer Van

Sykle’s search, and the Court grants defendants’ motion to

dismiss as to all Fourth Amendment claims.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Kwanzaa has similarly failed to state a claim for a

violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Fourteenth

Amendment’s equal protection clause provides that “[n]o State

shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Kwanzaa alleges

that all four defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights

through a series of racially motivated actions.

Kwanzaa has alleged no facts that give rise to a reasonable

inference that Officer Van Sykle was motivated by race when he

stopped Leggett and Scott. Similarly, Kwanzaa has alleged no

facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that the

Pleasantville Police Department maintains some sort of racially

motivated practice in conducting traffic stops, that Chief

Riggins or Captain Williams somehow endorse this policy, or that

“[i]t is now a common practice for Pleasantville Police Officers

to stop vehicles driven by African-American males and conduct

warrantless illegal searches of their vehicles.” (See Amend.

Compl., Dkt. 2, at 9). Moreover, Kwanzaa has failed to allege

that she was a victim of these purported practices. She does not

claim to have been in the car that Officer Van Sykle stopped, nor

does she claim to have been otherwise targeted by any of the

defendants’ alleged, racially motivated practices. Thus, Kwanzaa

has failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and

defendants are entitled to dismissal.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

granted. But the Court must afford a pro se litigant the

opportunity to amend her complaint, even when she does not seek

leave to amend. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236

(3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, plaintiff may file an amended

complaint within 30 days.2 An appropriate Order shall issue on

this date.

Dated: October 5, 2020 s/ Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2 Although Kwanzaa’s live pleading is technically an amended complaint,

the Court notes that it has not yet given Kwanzaa the opportunity to correct

any pleading defects. When plaintiff’s claims were included in Chaka Kwanzaa

v. Tell et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-16052-RMB-AMD, the Court never addressed her

individual claims-- Mrs. Kwanzaa had not yet paid the filing fee when the Court

dismissed all but one of Mr. Kwanzaa’s claims. When the Court then severed

plaintiff’s claims into this action, it ordered plaintiff to file an amended

complaint addressing only her own claims. (Order, Dkt. 1). Therefore, the

Court finds it appropriate to permit plaintiff to file an amended complaint.