SPADY v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TRACY SPADY,

1:18-cv-14012-NLH-KMW

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

TRACY SPADY

217 NORCROSS LANE

PEMBERTON, NJ 08068

Plaintiff appearing pro se

JESSICA ROSE O'NEILL

OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

401 MARKET STREET - 4TH FLOOR

P.O. BOX 2098

CAMDEN, NJ 08101

On behalf of Defendant

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter concerns Plaintiff’s claim for the return of

money seized by the United States during a search of her home

and ultimately subjected to administrative forfeiture. The

United States has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

claim against it. Plaintiff has not opposed Defendant’s

motion. For the reasons expressed below, Defendant’s motion

will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a search warrant, on June 17, 2016, the

United States Postal Inspection Service seized $44,855.00 from

the residence of Plaintiff, Tracy Spady, a home she shared

with Terrell Nelson.1 As a result of that search and the

subsequent investigation associated with it, Nelson was

federally prosecuted, he pled guilty, and he was sentenced.

The money seized was subject to forfeiture and was ultimately

administratively forfeited.

Plaintiff’s action against the United States seeks the

return of $44,855.00. Plaintiff claims, “the $44,855.00 was

not Mr. Nelson’s to forfeit simply because it was [her]

property that was simply tied-up with the defendant’s seized

property,” and she never received notice of the impending

administrative forfeiture. (Docket No. 1 at 3.) Because the

money belonged to her and because she did not receive notice

of the forfeiture proceeding, Plaintiff claims that the money

must be returned to her. Plaintiff further contends that she

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputed

facts regarding her right to the money and lack of notice of

its administrative forfeiture. (Docket No. 20 at 1.)

1 Various quantities of controlled substances and a loaded .38

special Smith and Wesson revolver were also seized.

The parties engaged in discovery, and Plaintiff’s

deposition was taken. The United States has now filed a

motion for summary judgment arguing that there are no disputed

facts regarding the ownership of the money or the notice of

the administrative forfeiture. Plaintiff has not opposed

Defendant’s motion.

DISCUSSION

A. Subject matter jurisdiction

This Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over

this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3)

because the complaint challenges an administrative forfeiture

pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. See 21 U.S.C. §

881(a). In addition, this Court has jurisdiction to review an

administrative forfeiture to determine whether it has met

statutory and due process requirements. See Longenette v.

Krusing, 322 F.3d 758, 760 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is

satisfied that the materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information,

affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, or

interrogatory answers, demonstrate that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the

outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;

instead, the non-moving party's evidence “is to be believed

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.

2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the

moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must

identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. Thus, to

withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment,

the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and

affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the

moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing

summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere

allegations, general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v.

Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff originally filed her claim for the return of

the administratively forfeited money in Nelson’s criminal

case. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a]

person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property

or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s

return.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). Rule 41(g) cannot be

used, however, to recover property that has already been

forfeited to the Government. Williams v. Drug Enforcement

Admin., 620 F. App’x 72, 74–75 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing United

States v. Watkins, 120 F.3d 254, 256 (11th Cir. 1997) (per

curiam) (explaining that the government’s admission that

property was administratively forfeited “deprive[s] the court

of authority to grant the Rule 41(g) motion”)).

Because the money at issue here had already been

forfeited at the time Plaintiff filed her claim,2 Plaintiff

2 On February 10, 2017, as part of his plea agreement, Nelson

agreed to forfeit to the United States the $44,855.00 seized

from 103 Blanche Street, Browns Mills, New Jersey on June 17,

2016.

could only proceed under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act

of 2000 (CAFRA), which provides “‘the exclusive remedy for

seeking to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under a civil

forfeiture statute.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(5)).

Accordingly, this Court directed that Plaintiff’s claim was to

be filed as a civil complaint under a civil action docket

number pursuant to CAFRA. (See Docket No. 7.)

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the merits of

administrative or nonjudicial forfeitures under CAFRA, but

courts may “determin[e] whether the agency followed the proper

procedural safeguards.” Williams, 620 F. App’x at 72

(citing United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.

2000) (en banc) (holding that “a district court has

jurisdiction to consider a claim that a person received

inadequate notice of completed administrative forfeiture

proceedings”)) (other citations omitted). Proper procedure

requires that the seizing agency send written notice of the

seizure “to each party who appears to have an interest in the

seized article.” 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a). That notice must “be

sent in a manner to achieve proper notice as soon as

practicable, and in no case more than 60 days after the date

of the seizure.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i).

Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider

whether the forfeiture of the $44,855.00 was proper.3 This

Court may, however, determine whether Plaintiff received the

proper notice of the impending forfeiture in compliance with

CAFRA.

Under CAFRA,

(1) Any person entitled to written notice in any

nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil

forfeiture statute who does not receive such notice may

file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture

with respect to that person’s interest in the property,

which motion shall be granted if –

(A) the Government knew, or reasonably should have

known, of the moving party’s interest and failed to

take reasonable steps to provide such party with

notice; and

(B) the moving party did not know or have reason to

know of the seizure within sufficient time to file a

timely claim.

18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1).

3 The United States acknowledges that the propriety of the

forfeiture is not before the Court, but it nonetheless

explains how the forfeiture was proper. The Court will not

address that part of the United States’ motion. See Williams

v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 620 F. App’x 72, 75 (3d Cir. 2015)

(explaining that the district court correctly declined to

review Williams’s argument that the BMW [the seized property]

should be returned to him because there was no probable cause

to find that it was used in connection with a drug

transaction, because “[c]learly, such an argument goes to the

merits of the administrative forfeiture,” but finding that the

district court erred by reviewing the merits of Williams’s

additional argument that the BMW should be returned to him

because the DEA did not have a warrant for its seizure,

finding that such a question also fell outside of the district

court’s jurisdiction).

The United States took the following undisputed4 steps

with regard to notice of the nonjudicial civil forfeiture

proceeding for the money at issue: Notice of the

administrative forfeiture was sent to (1) Nelson’s counsel at

her office; (2) Nelson at the federal institution where he was

housed as an inmate; (3) both Nelson and Plaintiff at the

residence located at 103 Blanche Street, Browns Mills, NJ

08015; and (4) through an internet advertisement posted on

August 8, 2016 for a period of 30 days. (Docket No. 23-2,

Def. Statement of Material Facts, ¶¶ 8-16.)

At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she received

notice at the 103 Blanche Street address when she received two

letters from the government advising of the forfeiture of the

seized funds in August 2016. (Docket No. 23-4 at 27; 26:1-

27:22.) Plaintiff further testified that the letters

informed her that the government was going to take possession

4 L. Civ. R. 56.1 provides, “The opponent of summary judgment

shall furnish, with its opposition papers, a responsive

statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the

movant's statement, indicating agreement or disagreement and,

if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute and

citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in

connection with the motion; any material fact not disputed

shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of the summary

judgment motion.” Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to

the United States’ motion for summary judgment. The Court,

therefore, deems the United States’ statement of material

facts as undisputed.

of the funds at that time. (Id. at 23-4 at 28; 26:16-27:5.)

Based on these undisputed facts, and accepting as true

for the purposes of this motion that the entire $44,855.00 is

Plaintiff’s, it is evident that the United States did not fail

to provide Plaintiff with proper notice of the impending

forfeiture. It is also evident that Plaintiff had notice of

the forfeiture within sufficient time to file a timely claim.

Consequently, there are no record facts, disputed or

otherwise, to support the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1)

and which warrant setting aside the forfeiture. The United

States’ motion for summary judgment in its favor must be

granted. See, e.g., U.S. v. Tidwell, 477 F. App’x 23, 25 (3d

Cir. 2012) (denying the appellant’s motion for the return of

his seized and forfeited money, finding that the government’s

notice was adequate by (1) sending notice to the appellant at

his place of incarceration by certified mail and demonstrating

that adequate procedures existed within the prison that would

ensure that notice would be delivered, (2) sending the notices

to his last known address, and (3) by publishing notice in the

USA Today newspaper, and rejecting the prisoner’s argument

that the government was required to hand deliver notice to him

or to his attorney); Williams, 620 F. App’x at 72 (“Having

reviewed the record, we agree with the District Court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to

whether the DEA provided Williams with notice of the

administrative forfeiture proceedings and the opportunity to

file a claim and contest the forfeiture in court. Indeed,

Williams does not dispute that he received proper notice from

the DEA and that he declined to file a judicial claim.”).

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: September 16, 2020 s/ Noel L. Hillman

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.