The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
____________________________________
AMIN A. RASHID, :
: Civ. No. 20-5947 (RMB-KMW)
Plaintiff :
v. :
: OPINION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
et al., :
:
Defendants :
______________________________:
BUMB, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a civil
action by Plaintiff Amin A. Rashid, an inmate presently
incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix,
New Jersey. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) When a prisoner pays the filing
fee for a civil action and seeks redress from a governmental
entity, officer or employee of a governmental entity, 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) require courts to review the
complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are (1) frivolous
or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
I. STANDARD OF LAW
Courts must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro
se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, “a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to ‘less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). A pleading must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.) Legal conclusions, together
with threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do
not suffice to state a claim. Id.
Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at
679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If
a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may
not dismiss the complaint with prejudice but must permit the
amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002).
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Complaint
Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction over his claims for false
arrest, malicious prosecution and conspiracy under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and Ohio state common law.
Plaintiff named as defendants the United States of America and the
following employees and officials at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Elkton, Ohio (“FCI-Elkton”), in their individual
and official capacities: G. Shaffer, R. Martin, D. Stewart, K.
Callahan, C.O. Smith, Captain Grimm, Frank B. Williams, Ms. Brown
and Ms. Smith.
The Court accepts the following allegations as true for
purposes of screening the complaint. Plaintiff is an African
American of Islamic faith who was incarcerated at FCI-Elkton at
all relevant times alleged in the complaint. (Compl., ¶3, Dkt. No.
1.) In September 2017, Plaintiff worked in the law library and his
supervisor, Ms. Callahan terminated him due to her animosity for
his Islamic faith. (Id., ¶¶9-11.) Callahan directed other staff in
the Education Department to harass Plaintiff while he worked in
the law library assisting other prisoners. (Id., ¶12.) Education
Supervisor Ms. Grimm seized Plaintiff’s legal materials and
falsely accused him of abandoning his legal files and having
illegal possession of other prisoners’ legal files. (Compl., ¶13,
Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff appealed and Lieutenant Shaffer returned
his legal files to him. (Id., ¶¶14-19.)
On July 29, 2019, Lieutenant Shaffer falsely accused
Plaintiff of assaulting another inmate. (Id., ¶20.) Plaintiff
denied committing the assault but he was nonetheless placed in the
Segregated Housing Unit (“SHU”). (Id., ¶¶21-22.) As of August 5,
2019, Plaintiff had not been seen by the UDC Committee, as required
by Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) regulations. (Id., ¶¶25-27.)
Plaintiff complained to Lieutenant Stewart about due process
violations in connection with the prison disciplinary procedure.
(Id., ¶28.) Plaintiff was denied access to his legal files while
waiting for his disciplinary hearing. (Id., ¶30.)
At his prison disciplinary hearing on September 23, 2019,
Plaintiff professed his innocence. (Id., ¶¶31-32.) After watching
video of the alleged assault for ten seconds, the DHO dismissed
and expunged the charges because he did not see evidence of an
assault. (Id.) Two days later, Plaintiff was informed that he was
being transferred out of FCI-Elkton and he would remain in the SHU
until his transfer. (Id., ¶33.) Plaintiff complained that the false
accusations against him and his transfer were acts of
discrimination because he is a Black Muslim and the inmate he was
accused of assaulting was white and Jewish. (Id., ¶34.) Captain
Grimm told Plaintiff that he had been found not guilty of assault
and it was not the reason for his transfer. (Compl., ¶35, Dkt. No.
1.) Plaintiff learned that members of the SHU Committee had voted
to transfer him. (Id., ¶41.) Based on the above allegations,
Plaintiff filed a notice of a Federal Tort Claim with the BOP on
October 15, 2019. (Id., ¶40.)Plaintiff’s administrative tort claim
was denied on November 22, 2019. (Id., ¶43.)
At that time, Plaintiff had a custody classification score
that permitted his transfer to a minimum security camp. (Id., ¶44.)
His case manager, Ms. Brown, told him she had completed the
paperwork for his transfer to FCI Fairton, a minimum security camp.
(Id.) On December 16, 2019, Plaintiff arrived at FDC Philadelphia,
where he was put in the SHU because Ms. Grimm had classified him
with assaultive behavior. (Id., ¶46.) The following day, Plaintiff
arrived at FCI Fort Dix, where he learned Ms. Brown had classified
him with a Greater Security Management Variable (MGTV), which made
him ineligible for transfer to a prison camp for one year. (Id.,
¶47.) Plaintiff’s request for an administrative remedy was denied,
stating that although the disciplinary charges were expunged, he
had admitted to striking another inmate with his elbow. (Id., ¶49.)
Plaintiff is 71-years-old and suffers from hypertension, making
him vulnerable to COVID-19, but for his custody classification, he
would have been eligible for release under the CARES Act. (Id.,
¶50.) Plaintiff asserts tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act and under Ohio common law. (Compl., ¶¶53-62, Dkt. No. 1.) He
seeks compensatory damages.
B. FTCA Claims
The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1) provides, in relevant part:
the district courts … shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages,
for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
Plaintiff was in the State of Ohio when the alleged tortious
conduct occurred.
The only proper defendant to a claim under the FTCA is the
United States of America. 632 F. App’x 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2015)
(citing CNA v. U.S., 535 F.3d 132, 138 n. 2 (2008)). The FTCA and
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“FTCA”) limit claims by
prisoners for compensatory damages to those instances where the
prisoner suffered a physical injury. See Mitchavi v. U.S., 345 F.
App’x 727, 730 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Damages of mental and
emotional distress are insufficient to state a claim under the
FTCA or the PLRA. Id. For this reason, Plaintiff has failed to
state an FTCA claim against the United States, the only proper
defendant to such a claim.
Plaintiff has also alleged tort claims under Ohio common law.
A district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over state
law claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim; therefore, the Court
declines to exercises supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
claims. See Stone v. Martin, 720 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2017)
(district court properly declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims
over which it had original jurisdiction.) The Court will dismiss
the complaint without prejudice, permitting Plaintiff to file an
amended complaint if he can allege a cognizable claim over which
this Court has original jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
An appropriate Order follows.
DATE: August 3, 2020
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge