LONG v. LEGGETT & PLATT, INCORPORATED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RANDAL LONG, 1:16-cv-04907 (NLH/KMW)

Plaintiff, OPINION

v.

LEGGETT & PLATT,

INCORPORATED; JOHN CASE; XYZ

ENTITIES 1-100, fictitious

unknown business entities;

and J. DOES 1-100, fictitious

unknown individuals,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

ROBERT J. HAGERTY

HAGERTY & BLAND-TULL LAW LLC

MOORESTOWN TIMES SQUARE

714 EAST MAIN STREET – SUITE 2C

MOORESTOWN, NJ 08057

Counsel for Plaintiff.

MICHAEL R. MILLER

MARGOLIS EDELSTEIN

THE CURTIS CENTER, SUITE 400E

170 S. INDEPENDENCE MALL W.

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106-3337

CHRISTOPHER JAMES GILLIGAN

MARGOLIS EDELSTEIN

THE CURTIS CENTER, SUITE 400E

170 S. INDEPENDENCE MALL W.

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106-3337

Counsel for Defendants.

HILLMAN, District Judge

In this employment action, Plaintiff Randal Long

(“Plaintiff”) alleges that his former employer, Defendant

Leggett & Platt, Inc. (“Defendant”) unlawfully retaliated

against him for reporting sexual harassment occurring in the

workplace, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination (the “NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq.

Plaintiff also alleges that certain employees of Defendant aided

and abetted in Defendant’s retaliatory conduct.

Before the Court are two motions: (1) Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment (ECF No. 64), and (2) Plaintiff’s motion to

have late-served responses to requests for admissions propounded

by Defendant deemed served within time. (ECF No. 67). For the

reasons expressed below, Plaintiff’s discovery motion – the

outcome of which has no material impact on this Court’s

resolution of Defendant’s dispositive motion - will be granted.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will also be granted,

and the Clerk will be directed to close this matter.

BACKGROUND

The Court takes its facts from the statements of material

fact submitted by each party pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.

The material facts are largely undisputed.

Plaintiff worked with Defendant, on and off, for the better

part of the last thirty years. Plaintiff first joined Defendant

in 1982 and remained with Defendant for eight consecutive years

before departing. (ECF No. 68 (“Pl. SOMF”) at ¶¶1–3). After

spending four years elsewhere, Plaintiff returned to work for

Defendant, quickly rising through the leadership ranks, becoming

Vice President of Sales in 2005, Director of Sales in 2009, and

Senior Vice President of Sales in January 2014. (Pl. SOMF at

¶¶4-7).

In April 2014, John Case (“Case”) was hired as the

President of Defendant’s Consumer Products Unit and became

Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (Pl. SOMF at ¶8). Case was

hired to, at least in part, restructure Defendant’s sales units

and cut costs where possible, including through reducing the

work force. (Pl. SOMF at ¶11). Under Case’s leadership, and in

the context of this broader restructuring plan, Plaintiff was

demoted in April 2015 to Regional Vice President of Sales for

the Northeast Region. (Pl. SOMF at ¶10).

In September of 2015, as further part of the restructuring

plan, Case and his team decided to remove two positions from the

organizational chart, one of which was occupied by Plaintiff.

(Pl. SOMF at ¶¶12, 16-18). According to Case, Plaintiff was

chosen for a reduction in force because he was the highest paid

regional vice president and his sales region was one of the

smallest in the company. See (Pl. SOMF at ¶14).

Conversations regarding the restructuring plan, and as a

byproduct, Plaintiff’s termination, continued internally through

October 2015. (Pl. SOMF at ¶12). For example, on October 12,

2015, at Case’s direction, Justen Moore (“Moore”), a member of

Defendant’s human resources department, calculated Plaintiff’s

severance benefits. See (Pl. SOMF at ¶¶21-22, 25). Moore

explained that Plaintiff would be entitled to general severance

under Defendant’s severance policy, but also identified that

Plaintiff would be entitled to a substantial bonus if he

remained with the company until January 1, 2016. (Pl. SOMF at

¶¶33-34). Shortly thereafter, Case sent an internal email

indicating (1) Plaintiff’s position would be dissolved and the

work absorbed by another pursuant to a force reduction, and (2)

Plaintiff would be severed on or around January 1, 2016. See

(Pl. SOMF at ¶12). Case decided, due in large part to

Plaintiff’s long tenure with Defendant, that Plaintiff’s

severance should wait until Plaintiff was eligible to receive

his full bonus. (Pl. SOMF at ¶¶34-35).

Two months later, in December 2015, Plaintiff reported to

Robert Newcombe (“Newcombe”), the Senior Vice President of Sales

and Marketing, that Bobby Keen, an employee of Defendant, was

sexually harassing a female employee. (Pl. SOMF at ¶¶45-47).

Plaintiff reported that the female colleague confided in him

that if Defendant fired her, she would file a sexual harassment

lawsuit.1 (Pl. SOMF at ¶47).

1 The Court has also considered Plaintiff’s counterstatement of

material fact (ECF No. 71), which largely focuses on these

On January 6, 2016, after Plaintiff became eligible for his

bonus, Case instructed that Plaintiff be paid out, terminated,

and that his position be dissolved consistent with the

reorganization plan. (Pl. SOMF at ¶39). That same day,

Defendant fully approved Plaintiff’s severance and set a

termination date of January 7. (Pl. SOMF at ¶41). Because

Plaintiff was out of town on vacation during that date,

Defendant delayed Plaintiff’s termination until January 15 so

that parties could meet in person to discuss the situation. See

(Pl. SOMF at ¶¶41-44). Such ended Plaintiff’s long-standing

employment with Defendant.

Plaintiff filed an initial complaint against Defendant on

August 11, 2016 alleging retaliation and aiding and abetting

under the NJLAD, along with a claim for punitive damages. That

complaint was subsequently removed to this Court from the

Superior Court of New Jersey. (ECF No. 1). On February 10,

2017, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No.

25), and on March 6, 2017, Plaintiff cross-moved for leave to

sexual harassment allegations. Indeed, Plaintiff spends much of

his brief in opposition to summary judgment focused on these

issues. Any relevancy of such content, however, is marginal at

best to this action. For reasons to be discussed further below,

all that remains relevant to this Court’s inquiry is that

Plaintiff reported what he believed to be sexual harassment

incidents to Defendant’s employees during December 2015.

Therefore, the Court chooses not to recite any detailed

commentary about these underlying accusations regarding third

parties in this Opinion.

amend (ECF No. 28). On September 27, 2017, this Court granted

in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings and granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.

(ECF No. 34). Plaintiff filed the operative first amended

complaint in this action on October 11, 2017. (ECF No. 35).

The first amended complaint alleges Defendant retaliated against

Plaintiff in violation of the NJLAD and also contains an NJLAD

aiding and abetting claim against various employees of

Defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment on December 13,

2019 (ECF No. 64), which Plaintiff opposed on January 7, 2020

(ECF No. 66). Plaintiff also cross-moved to amend its responses

to requests for admission Defendant propounded (ECF No. 67),

which Defendant opposed on January 14, 2020 (ECF No. 78). Both

motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication.

ANALYSIS

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

II. Plaintiff’s Motion To Amend Its Request For Admission

(“RFA”) Responses Will Be Granted, But Only Because That

Motion Has No Material Impact On The Court’s Resolution

Of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment

The Court begins, unfortunately, with a foray into

otherwise straightforward discovery rules. Indeed, courts,

including this one, loathe policing basic discovery disputes

that should otherwise be easily resolved by the parties without

the Court’s intervention.

The facts underlying the parties’ discovery dispute are

hardly contested. On March 28, 2018, Defendant propounded RFAs

upon Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (ECF No. 72 at ¶3). Plaintiff admits that, on April

27, 2018 – thirty days after the RFAs were propounded – he

failed to serve responses on Defendant. (ECF No. 72 at ¶4).

After the deadline to respond had passed, on May 1, 2018,

Plaintiff sought an extension of time within which to serve

responses, which Defendant graciously agreed to that same day.

(ECF No. 72 at ¶¶4-6). Defendant agreed to accept responses

served on or before May 8, 2018. (ECF No. 72 at ¶6).

May 8th came to pass without Plaintiff serving his responses

or otherwise communicating with Defendant’s counsel. Instead,

Plaintiff waited until May 14, 2018 to serve responses. (ECF

No. 72 at ¶8). Defendant avers that, because Plaintiff failed

to timely serve responses, the RFAs are deemed admitted.

Plaintiff disagrees and asks this Court to retroactively forgive

his tardiness.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are unquestionably

clear on this matter. Any party may serve RFAs on another.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). Responses to those RFAs must be

served upon the propounding party “within 30 days after being

served” unless the parties stipulate to an alternative schedule.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Any matter not responded to in a

timely fashion is deemed admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).

Plaintiff admits he failed to serve timely responses on two

occasions: first, Plaintiff missed the initial thirty-day

deadline, and second, Plaintiff missed the extended deadline

Defendant was gracious enough to afford him. Such results in

the RFAs being deemed admitted.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that his tardy responses

should be accepted to promote fairness in this action. (ECF No.

66-1 at 19-20). Rule 36(b) provides that courts may permit

admissions to be withdrawn or amended “if it would promote the

presentation of the merits of the action” and if the court is

persuaded that withdrawal would not prejudice the requesting

party in maintaining or defending the actions on the merits.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Plaintiff has done little to satisfy

this Court that the requirements of Rule 36(b) have been met.

Nonetheless, under the circumstances, and finding that

granting Plaintiff’s motion to have his RFAs deemed served

within time will not materially alter the outcome of Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s

motion, but with this important reminder of the goal and

dictates of the rules of procedure. Congress has decided that

failure to timely serve responses to RFAs shall be met with

strict penalty, namely, those requests being deemed admitted;

this Court is not in the business of second-guessing Congress’

clear directives. Had Plaintiff’s delays materially impacted

the outcome of Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff can be assured its

motion would have been denied and it would have been left with

the consequences of the lack of timely compliance.

III. Legal Standard – Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is

satisfied that “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits if any,’ . . . demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact” and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).

An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the

outcome of the suit. Id. “In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;

instead, the non-moving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”

Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party bears the burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party seeking summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact.”); see Singletary v. Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although

the initial burden is on the summary judgment movant to show the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ‘the burden on the

moving party may be discharged by []showing[]--that is, pointing

out to the district court—–that there is an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case’ when the nonmoving party

bears the ultimate burden of proof.” (citing Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 325)).

Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving

party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324. A “party opposing summary judgment ‘may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading[s].’”

Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). For

“the non-moving party[] to prevail, [that party] must ‘make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Cooper v. Sniezek, 418 F.

App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and

affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

IV. Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment

The NJLAD prohibits retaliation against an employee because

that employee “has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under

[the NJLAD] or because that person has filed a complaint,

testified or assisted in any proceeding under [the NJLAD].”

Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc, 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 605

(D.N.J. 2016) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–12(d)). To state

a prima facie case for retaliation under the NJLAD, Plaintiff

must show that he (1) engaged in protected activity, (2)

suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there was a

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Id. (quoting Sanchez v. SunGard Availability

Servs. LP, 362 Fed. Appx. 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2010)). Once a

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the

defendants must “articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason

for the decision.” Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 897 A.2d 1063,

1072–73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quoting Romano v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 665 A.2d 1139, 1142 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)). Next, “the plaintiff must come

forward with evidence of a discriminatory motive of the

employer, and demonstrate that the legitimate reason was merely

a pretext for the underlying discriminatory motive.” Id.

(quoting Romano, 665 A.2d at 1142).

A. Plaintiff May State A Prima Facie Case For NJLAD

Retaliation

The Court hesitates to find Plaintiff states a prima facie

case for retaliation for the reasons to follow, but nonetheless,

out of an abundance of caution, will conduct a complete NJLAD

analysis.

1. Plaintiff May Have Engaged In A Protected Activity

Reporting to an employer what an employee objectively and

reasonably perceives to be unlawful discriminatory behavior, and

then being retaliated against for doing so, constitutes a

violation of the NJLAD’s prohibition against retaliation. See

Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193–94 (3d

Cir. 2015) (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276, 129 S. Ct. 846, 851, 172 L.

Ed. 2d 650 (2009)) (“When an employee communicates to her

employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form

of employment discrimination, that communication’ virtually

always ‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the

activity.”); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522

F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore v. City of

Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended

(Sept. 13, 2006)). In determining whether a plaintiff was

opposing discrimination or was otherwise engaging in a separate

activity, courts “look to the message being conveyed[.]” Moore,

461 F.3d at 343 (quoting Curay–Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of

Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006)).

It remains unclear whether Plaintiff was engaged in a

protected activity. On the one hand, Plaintiff’s activity could

be viewed as alerting his employer to potential sexual

harassment occurring within the company. Such would be a

protected activity. Smith v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d

406, 419 (D.N.J. 2005) (“[Plaintiff] engaged in a protected

activity when she turned to various levels of management with

complaints regarding . . . sexual harassment.”); Hargrave v.

County of Atlantic, 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 424 (D.N.J. 2003)

(“Plaintiff . . . clearly engaged in protected activity . . .

when she made complaints about Defendant[’s] . . . alleged

sexual harassment”); Michaels v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No.

11-5657, 2014 WL 2805098, at *6 (D.N.J. June 19, 2014) (quoting

Fabrikant v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., A-5995-05T1, 2008 WL

281690, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 4, 2008))

(“Protected activity can include a plaintiff[’]s complaints

concerning allegations of discrimination against herself or

others . . . .”).

On the other hand, the tenor of Plaintiff’s message appears

less akin to reporting sexual misconduct and more akin to

alerting his employer to potential litigation risks. Indeed,

Plaintiff reported that an employee was threatening to sue only

if she was terminated. Reporting the risk of potential

litigation, of itself, would not qualify as a protected

activity.

Because the meaning of Plaintiff’s words and the message he

intended to convey remains in question, the Court cannot

determine definitively from the record before it whether

Plaintiff’s activity is of the protected type. As such, the

analysis must continue.

2. Plaintiff Suffered An Adverse Employment Action

“Under the LAD, an ‘adverse employment action’ is one

‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered plaintiff’s

conditions of employment in an important and material manner.’”

Ivan v. County of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp. 2d 425, 470 (D.N.J.

2009) (quoting El-Siofi v. St. Peter’s Univ. Hosp., 887 A.2d

1170, 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)). Termination from

employment is the quintessential adverse employment action.

Because Plaintiff was fired, he satisfies this element of the

analysis.

3. While Plaintiff Was Fired Shortly After Reporting

Sexual Harassment Activity, The Circumstances Suggest

There Was No Causal Connection Between His Reporting

Of Sexual Harassment And His Termination

“In determining whether a plaintiff has produced prima

facie evidence of causation, the decisions of our Court of

Appeals have generally focused on two indicia: timing and

evidence of ongoing antagonism.” Hargrave, 262 F. Supp. 2d at

424.

Although the timing of an employer’s adverse employment

action will, by itself, rarely provide prima facie

evidence that disciplinary action is attributable to

retaliatory motives, the temporal proximity between an

employer’s action and an employee’s protected activity

may permit an inference of causation where the

relatively short interval between the two is “unusually

suggestive” of retaliation.

Id. (footnote omitted). “In cases where the timing of an

employer’s adverse action is, by itself, inconclusive,

plaintiff[s] may demonstrate a causal link by producing

circumstantial evidence of ‘ongoing antagonism’ or ‘retaliatory

animus’ in the intervening period between [t]he[i]r complaints

and the adverse action.” Id. at 424-25 (quoting Kachmar v.

SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997);

Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Further, “the Court of Appeals has not excluded the possibility

that the timing of an employer’s action, together with ‘other

types of circumstantial evidence,’ may also suffice to support

an inference of causation.” Id. at 425. “In short, the case

law has set forth few limits on the type of evidence which might

suffice to establish a prima facie showing of causation.” Id.

In September of 2015, Case decided to remove two positions

from the organizational chart, one of which was Plaintiff’s.

(Pl. SOMF at ¶12). This decision came as part of an

organizational restructuring and work force reduction plan.

Plaintiff admits as much. See (Pl. SOMF at ¶¶21-22, 25).

Discussions percolated internally until a termination date was

agreed upon. Months after those decisions had been made, in

December 2015, Plaintiff informed Newcombe that a female

employee would sue if fired because she allegedly faced sexual

harassment while at work. (Pl. SOMF at ¶¶45-47). Plaintiff was

terminated from employment in January 2016, consistent with

Defendant’s long-standing plan. While his termination was made

in close temporal proximity to his reporting of potential sexual

harassment, there appears to be little, if any connection

between Plaintiff’s reporting and his termination. Indeed,

Plaintiff concedes Defendant was planning to lay him off as

early as 2015.

Additionally, Plaintiff has not identified evidence

suggesting ongoing animus towards him. Instead, the undisputed

facts suggest the opposite. Defendant delayed Plaintiff’s

termination on two occasions, extending two separate courtesies:

(1) permitting Plaintiff to claim a full bonus and (2) delaying

Plaintiff’s termination until he returned from vacation. These

facts hardly suggest Plaintiff was treated unfairly.

As such, this Court finds Plaintiff unable to satisfy this

final element of a prima facie showing. Even assuming, however,

that Plaintiff states a prima facie case of retaliation,

Plaintiff’s claim would still fail.

B. Defendant Has Articulated A Legitimate, Non-

Retaliatory Reason For Terminating Plaintiff and

Plaintiff Has Not Presented Evidence Proving

Defendant’s Reason Is Pretextual

Defendant says it terminated Plaintiff as part of a force

reduction; the record fully supports that assertion. Plaintiff

does not identify sufficient evidence to suggest Defendant’s

stated basis was pretextual. Instead, Plaintiff recognizes that

he was on the proverbial chopping block for nearly a year before

he was fired, and months before he ever reported potential

sexual harassment to Defendant. Moreover, the record

establishes Defendant showed no animosity towards Plaintiff.

Where Defendant could have initiated Plaintiff’s termination in

2015, it waited until 2016 to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to

earn his full bonus. In light of these facts, Defendant is

entitled to summary judgment. See Wood v. Univ. of Pittsburgh,

395 F. App’x 810, 815–16 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district

court’s grant of summary judgment on a Title VII retaliation

claim where defendant established it fired plaintiff as part of

a workforce reduction and where plaintiff could not identify

evidence suggesting defendant’s reason was pretextual).

C. Because Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim Fails, So Too

Must Plaintiff’s Aiding and Abetting Claim

The “LAD holds individuals liable for their actions in

aiding and abetting violations of an individual’s rights rather

than simply imputing general liability to the employer for the

employees’ acts.” Lopez-Arenas v. Zisa, No. 10-2668, 2012 WL

933251, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012). There are two forms of

aiding and abetting under NJLAD: an active form and a passive

form. Id. To establish the active form, three elements must be

proven:

(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a

wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant

must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall

illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides

the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and

substantially assist the principal violation.

Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3d Cir.

1999). To establish the passive form, “a plaintiff must show

that the supervisor holds a duty to act against harassment and

yet remains deliberately indifferent to its existence.” Lopez-

Arenas, 2012 WL 933251, at *10. Under the passive theory, the

employer remains the principal violator for its failure to

prevent or redress the harassing actions of its supervisors.

Id. (citations omitted).

Having found Defendant did not commit an actionable

violation or “wrongful act,” its employees cannot be found

liable for aiding and abetting. See Hurley, 174 F.3d at 127;

Lopez-Arenas, 2012 WL 933251, at *10.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff’s motion to have

its RFA responses deemed served within time (ECF No. 67) will be

granted and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 64)

will be granted. Such resolves this matter in its entirety.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: July 27, 2020 s/ Noel L. Hillman______

At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.