CARMICHAEL v. THOMSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTHONY CARMICHAEL, HONORABLE NOEL L. HILLMAN

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 14-3323

v. (NLH-AMD)

JOHN SCOTT THOMSON, et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Cheryl L. Cooper, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF CHERYL L. COOPER

342 Egg Harbor Road, Suite 1-A

Sewell, NJ 08080

Attorney for Plaintiff

Christine O’Hearn, Esq.

BROWN & CONNERY, LLP

360 Haddon Avenue

Westmont, NJ 08108

Attorney for County Defendants

Daniel Edward Rybeck, Esq.

John C. Eastlack, Jr., Esq.

Lilia Londar, Esq.

WEIR & PARTNERS

250 Fries Mill Road, 2nd Floor

Turnersville, NJ 08012

Attorneys for City Defendants

HILLMAN, District Judge:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anthony Carmichael (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”)

brought this employment action against Defendants City of

Camden, County of Camden, and John Scott Thomson, Orlando

Cuevas, Michael Lynch, Louis Vega, Joseph Wysocki, and J.L.

Williams, in their official capacities as employees of the City

of Camden, the County of Camden, or both (collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff, formerly a Lieutenant in the Camden

City Police Department and now a Captain in the Camden County

Police Department, generally alleges that Defendants engaged in

retaliation against him based on protected activity in violation

of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, the New

Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), the New Jersey

State Constitution, the First Amendment of the United States

Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also alleges race

discrimination in violation of NJLAD and § 1983.

This Opinion addresses only Plaintiff’s remaining claims

against Defendants County of Camden, County Police Chief

Thomson, Deputy Chief Cuevas, Deputy Chief Lynch, and Louis

Vega, in their capacity as employees of the County of Camden and

County of Camden Police Department (collectively, “County

Defendants”) for allegedly discriminating against Plaintiff by

failing to promote him to Captain during or soon after the

formation of the Camden County Police Department in May 2013 and

does not address any of Plaintiff’s claims against City

Defendants.1

1 The Amended Complaint contains two distinct components:

(1) Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Six, Seven, Eight, and

Nine allege discrimination and retaliation by the City

of Camden and Chief John Scott Thomson, Deputy Chief

Orlando Cuevas, Deputy Chief Michael Lynch, Louis Vega,

Joseph Wysocki, and J.L. Williams in their capacities as

former employees of the City of Camden and City of Camden

Police Department (collectively, “the City Defendants”),

for transferring Plaintiff out of his position as

“acting Captain” of the Camden City Police Internal

Affairs, forcing him to work midnight and work split

shifts, assigning him to supervise those identified by

the administration as “problem” officers, requiring him

to attend meetings without overtime compensation,

assigning him a schedule where he was the only officer

in the Camden City Police Department forced to work every

weekend, and unfairly writing up and/or disciplining him

after he objected to the City Defendants’ instructions

to violate the Attorney General Guidelines; and

(2) Counts Eleven and Twelve alleging discrimination by

Defendants County of Camden, County Police Chief

Thomson, Deputy Chief Cuevas, Deputy Chief Lynch, and

Louis Vega, in their capacity as employees of the County

of Camden and County of Camden Police Department

(collectively, “County Defendants”), for skipping over

Plaintiff and failing to promote him to Captain sooner.

(See Amended Complaint [Docket Item 26].) The late Honorable

Jerome B. Simandle previously dismissed Counts Five, Ten, and

Fourteen for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, and those claims are not part of the operative Amended

Complaint. (See Opinion [Docket Item 20], Mar. 6, 2015 at 24-28;

Order [Docket Item 21], Mar. 6, 2015, 1-2.) Judge Simandle

further granted summary judgment in favor of County Defendants

with respect to Counts Thirteen and Fifteen in full and with

respect to Counts Eleven and Twelve except insofar as Counts

Eleven and Twelve relate to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

Officer Wysocki’s potential role as a comparator. (See Opinion

[Docket Item 202], Sept. 27, 2018; Order [Docket Item 203],

Sept. 27, 2018.)

This matter comes before the Court on County Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Counts Eleven and Twelve of the

First Amended Complaint.2 (Motion for Summary Judgment

(hereinafter “County Defs.’ Mot.”) [Docket Item 240].)

The principal issue remaining to be decided is, discovery

having been concluded, whether there are genuine issues of

material fact from which, giving all reasonable inferences to

Plaintiff, a jury could reasonably find that County Defendants

failed to promote Plaintiff to the rank of Captain in the Camden

County Police Department due to race discrimination in violation

of his First Amendment rights. For the reasons discussed below,

the motion for summary judgment will be granted.

BACKGROUND3

The pending motion was filed by County Defendants and as

noted previously does not address any of Plaintiff’s allegations

2 In the alternative, County Defendants’ present motion seeks to

have all individual defendants dismissed, with the exception of

Defendant Lynch, as he was the sole decision maker with regard

to hiring Officer Wysocki rather than Plaintiff. (See County

Defs.’ Br. [Docket Item 240-2], 16-18.) As the Court will grant

County Defendants’ primary request for relief, the Court need

not discuss their alternative request for relief at this time.

3 For purposes of the instant motion and pursuant to Local Civil

Rule 56.1, the Court looks to the Amended Complaint [Docket Item

26] when appropriate, County Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts [Docket Item 240-1] and Plaintiff’s Responsive

Statement of Material Facts [Docket Item 253]. County

Defendants assert that portions of Plaintiff’s Responsive

Statement of Material Facts do not appropriately cite to the

record or improperly engage in legal argument. (See County

against City Defendants. (County Defendants’ Brief in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter “County Br.”) [Docket

Item 240-2], 1 n.1.) Accordingly, the Court recounts only those

portions of the factual the procedural history relevant to

Plaintiff’s failure-to-promote claims against County Defendants.

A. Factual Background

The late Honorable Jerome B. Simandle thoroughly detailed

the factual background of this case in his Opinion addressing

County Defendants’ prior motion for summary judgment, (see

Opinion [Docket Item 202], Sept. 27, 2018, 17-22), and the Court

need not repeat that background here.

B. Procedural History

Judge Simandle’s Opinion addressing County Defendants’

prior motion for summary judgment also thoroughly addressed the

procedural history of this case, (see Opinion [Docket Item 202],

Sept. 27, 2018, 22-25), and the Court need not recite that

history, known to the parties, here. Subsequent to that

Opinion, Judge Simandle granted County Defendants leave to file

the present motion. (See Opinion [Docket Item 236], Apr. 5,

2019; Order [Docket Item 237], Apr. 5, 2019.)

Defs.’ Reply [Docket Item 259], 2-7.) The Court will not

consider such portions of Plaintiff’s Statement of Material

Facts in the context of the present Opinion. Unless otherwise

noted, the facts in this section are undisputed by the parties.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

At summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial

burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once a properly supported

motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the

non-moving party, who must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In reviewing a motion for

summary judgment, the court is required to examine the evidence

in light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all

reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287

(3d Cir. 2014).

A factual dispute is material when it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and genuine when

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The non-moving party “need not match, item for item, each piece

of evidence proffered by the movant,” but must simply present

more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence on which a jury could

reasonably find for the non-moving party. Boyle v. Cty. of

Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252).

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s remaining claims against County Defendants only

include claims of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Count Eleven) and NJLAD (Count Twelve) as they pertain

to Plaintiff’s proffer of Joseph Wysocki as a comparator.

In Counts Eleven and Twelve of the Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that County Defendants’ failure to promote him

to Captain instead of Joseph Wysocki constitutes racial

discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and NJLAD.

County Defendants move for summary judgment on this claim,

arguing that, while Plaintiff is a member of a protected class,

he has failed to make a prima facie case of racial

discrimination with respect to Officer Wysocki’s promotion. (See

County Defs.’ Br. [Docket Item 240-2], 5-8.) Alternatively,

County Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiff could establish

a prima facie case for racial discrimination with respect to the

promotion of Officer Wysocki, Plaintiff cannot rebut County

Defendants’ proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

promoting Wysocki to Captain rather than Plaintiff. (See id. at

8-16.) Plaintiff, in turn, argues that Officer Wysocki was

demonstrably less qualified for promotion to Captain than

Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Opp’n [Docket Item 252], 7-13.)

Plaintiff’s § 1983 and NJLAD claims are both analyzed

through the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Stewart v.

Rutgers, State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying

McDonnell Douglas framework to § 1983 claims); Viscik v. Fowler

Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 13-14 (2002) (adopting McDonnell Douglas

framework for NJLAD employment discrimination cases). The

McDonnell Douglas framework first requires the plaintiff to

establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, at which

point the burden shifts to the defendant employer to provide a

legitimate non-discriminatory rationale for their employment

decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03. Once the

defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory

explanation, the plaintiff may prevail if he can prove the

defendant’s purported reasoning was merely a pretext and that

the adverse employment action was actually motivated by

discriminatory intent. Id. at 802.

A. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination

County Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has failed to

produce sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of

racial discrimination. (See County Defs.’ Br. [Docket Item 240-

2], 5-8.) To establish a prima facie case of racial

discrimination for failure to promote, a plaintiff must

establish that: (1) he belongs to a protected category; (2) he

applied for a job in an available position for which he was

qualified; (3) he was rejected; and (4) after he was rejected,

the position stayed open and the employer continued to seek

applications from individuals with similar qualifications.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Bates v. Tandy Corp.,

186 Fed. App’x 288, 293 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Bray v. Marriott

Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 990 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Here, County Defendants concede that Plaintiff satisfies

the first prong: he is a member of a protected class because he

is African American. (County Defs.’ Br. [Docket Item 240-2],

5.) But the parties contest whether Plaintiff can establish the

remaining three elements of the prima facie case, which the

Court will address in turn.

Plaintiff testified that his employment discrimination

claims are primarily derived from County Defendants’ failure to

promote him during the Pilot Program, which lasted between

November 1, 2012 and October 31, 2013. (See Pl.’s Dep. [Docket

Item 240-3], Ex. K, 47:21-48:18.) There was no formal

application process for promotions made through the Pilot

Program; instead, Defendants Lynch and Thomson made final

recommendations for promotions within the County Police

Department during the program, including promotions to County

Police Captain. (See Lynch Cert. [Docket Item 240-3], Ex. H,

¶¶ 8, 15; Thomson Decl. [Docket Item 240-3], Ex. P.) These

recommendations were then subject to formal approval by the

Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders. During the Pilot

Program, Defendants Lynch and Thomson recommended that Officer

Wysocki be promoted to Captain and Officer Wysocki received his

promotion on April 30, 2013, fifteen (15) days after Plaintiff

was hired by County Defendants. (See Lynch Cert. [Docket Item

240-3], Ex. H, ¶¶ 20-38; Thomson Decl. [Docket Item 240-3], Ex.

P; Lynch Decl. [Docket Item 240-3], Ex. Q; Intergovernmental

Transfer Agreement [Docket Item 240-3], Ex. A, 2.) Furthermore,

County Defendants argue that “it is undisputed that every single

City Police Officer the County Police Department hired [under

the Pilot Program] transferred to the County at the same rank he

or she held with the City Police Department regardless of any

indication on their application.” (County Defs.’ Br. [Docket

Item 240-2], 6.)

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff indicated on his

application that he was applying for the position of Captain.

Nevertheless, County Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot

satisfy the second and third prongs of the prima facie case —

that is, that he applied for Captain and was rejected — because

of how the hiring process under the Pilot Program worked.

Namely, since Plaintiff was a Lieutenant with the City Police

Department at the time the County Police Department hired him,

he was hired into the position of Lieutenant. Therefore,

Plaintiff did not actually apply for a promotion, meaning that

he could not have been rejected for a promotion either. As a

result, County Defendants argue, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the

second or third prongs of the prima facie case.

Plaintiff argues that his indication on his application

that he was applying for the position of Captain clearly shows

that he applied for the promotion. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts

that during his interview with then-Police Director for the

Camden County Police Department, Edward Fanelli, Plaintiff

reiterated the fact that he had been a Captain with the Camden

City Police Department and that he was seeking the same position

or higher with the Camden County Police Department. Plaintiff

notes that County Defendants have not presented evidence to

contradict this assertion.

The Court finds that there is a disputed issue of material

fact with respect to the second prong. Namely, the issue is

whether Plaintiff’s indication on his application that he was

applying for Captain, when considered with the other

circumstances surrounding the hiring process, constitutes an

application for that position under the Pilot Program hiring

process. This issue, being one of fact, does not fall within

the province of the Court for the purposes of this motion, but

rather must be decided by the trier of fact. Furthermore, the

Court notes that the trier of fact’s decision on whether the

second prong is satisfied will determine whether the third prong

is satisfied. That is, if Plaintiff applied to be Captain, then

he was clearly rejected as well, since he did not get that

position. Conversely, if Plaintiff did not apply, then he could

not have been rejected. Thus, the Court will not grant summary

judgment in favor of County Defendants on the basis that

Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second and third prongs of the

prima facie case because there is a genuine issue of disputed

material fact as to those prongs.

County Defendants next argue that, even if Plaintiff is

able to satisfy the second and third prongs, he is unable to

satisfy the fourth prong. The fourth prong of a prima facie

failure-to-promote case requires an inquiry into the “relative

qualifications of the plaintiff and the employee who actually

received the promotion.” Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663

F.3d 806, 814 (6th Cir. 2011). For a plaintiff to be considered

“similarly qualified” to employees promoted in his stead such

that a factfinder could reasonably infer discriminatory failure

to promote, he must show that he “possesses ‘similar

qualifications’ to the employee who received the promotion.”

Id.

County Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot meet this

burden because Wysocki was the Commander of Internal Affairs for

four years with the Camden City Police Department, which

position he held when he transferred to the County. Conversely,

Plaintiff held that position for only four months, four years

prior to the formation of the County Police Department. Wysocki

also had four more years of experience as a police officer than

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff counters County Defendants’ arguments with the

following assertions: (1) Plaintiff was a Lieutenant — a higher

rank than Wysocki — for more than five years with the City

Police Department; (2) Plaintiff served as Acting Captain of

Internal Affairs and later as a permanent Captain for a combined

time of nearly two years at the City Police Department; (3)

Plaintiff passed the Captain exam with the City Police

Department, which Wysocki did not do, and placed second in

scoring; and (4) Plaintiff had a Bachelor’s degree, compared to

Wysocki having no degree at all.4

4 In addition, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Wysocki’s

installation as a Captain in the Camden County Police Department

constitutes impermissible “rank jumping,” as Officer Wysocki was

elevated directly from the rank of Sergeant to the rank of

Captain without first being elevated to the intermediate rank of

Lieutenant. (See Pl.’s Opp’n [Docket Item 252], 9-13.) However,

Judge Simandle already ruled that this argument has no merit.

(See Opinion [Docket Item 202], 41-44.) Plaintiff has not

sought reconsideration of this holding, nor has Plaintiff

briefed any issue which would justify such reconsideration.

Therefore, the Court shall not reconsider this issue at this

time.

Plaintiff also argues that County Defendants have made

multiple misrepresentations to the Court regarding Officer

Wysocki’s work history that raise the specter of discriminatory

pretext. (See Pl.’s Opp’n [Docket Item 252], 13.) However,

The inquiry at this point is not whether Plaintiff and

Wysocki have the exact same qualifications; rather, as noted

above, it is whether they have similar qualifications. The

Court notes that Plaintiff and Wysocki’s “strengths and

weaknesses [are] in different areas.” See id. Therefore, the

Court, making all reasonable inferences in favor of nonmoving

Plaintiff, holds that a reasonable jury could find that

Plaintiff and Wysocki were similarly qualified such that

Plaintiff is able to satisfy the fourth requirement of the prima

facie case. Therefore, summary judgment will not be granted in

favor of County Defendants on that basis.

B. County Defendants’ Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons

for Not Promoting Plaintiff

Since the Court has held that it is inappropriate to grant

summary judgment on the basis of Plaintiff failing to meet his

prima facie burden, the burden now shifts to County Defendants

to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-

03; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 506-07. Under the law,

[t]he employer satisfies its burden of production by

introducing evidence which, taken as true, would

Plaintiff makes these assertions without citation to any

specific documents containing alleged misrepresentations. (See

id.) Therefore, the Court cannot consider the merits of these

arguments at the present time.

permit the conclusion that there was a

nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable

employment decision. The employer need not prove that

the tendered reason actually motivated its behavior,

as throughout this burden-shifting paradigm the

ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination

always rests with the plaintiff.

Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in

original) (citations omitted).

Once the defendant has established a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision, the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s

reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.

The relevant standard for showing pretext requires the plaintiff

to “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a

reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of

credence,’ and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for

[the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d

at 765 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (first

quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d

509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992); and then quoting Josey v. John R.

Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993)). “It is

not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must

believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional

discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519 (emphasis in original).

The plaintiff “must show, not merely that the employer’s

proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong

that it cannot have been employer’s real reason.” Keller, 130

F.3d at 1109. Importantly in the context of this matter, it

matters not to the Court “whether the employer is wise, shrewd,

prudent, or competent” in its employment decisions. Fuentes, 32

F.3d at 765. Rather, all that matters is “whether

discriminatory animus motivated the employer.” Id.

The Third Circuit has synthesized the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework and the summary judgment rule, holding

that:

to defeat summary judgment when the defendant answers

the plaintiff’s prima facie case with legitimate, non-

discriminatory reasons for its action, the plaintiff

must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial,

from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1)

disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate

reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious

discriminatory reason was more likely than not a

motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s

action.

Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.

Here, County Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for promoting Wysocki instead of Plaintiff was

essentially that they believed Wysocki was better qualified for

the position. County Defendants — in particular, Deputy Chief

Lynch, who made the hiring decision — valued Wysocki’s

experience as Captain for Internal Affairs with the City Police

Department more than Plaintiff’s experience. After all, Wysocki

had been in that position longer and more recently than

Plaintiff, and Lynch was evidently impressed with what Wysocki

was able to accomplish in the position, especially when compared

to Plaintiff’s performance. Lynch felt that the improvements

made by Wysocki in that position were illustrative of his

superior candidacy for the same position with the County Police

Department. Thus, on this record County Defendants have

proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the choice

of Wysocki, shifting the burden to Plaintiff to show that reason

was pretextual.

In arguing that County Defendants’ proffered legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for not promoting him is pretext,

Plaintiff relies on the same arguments as he did for the fourth

element of the prima facie case. That is, he argues that he

was, in fact, better qualified for the position and that the

issue of rank jumping shows discriminatory animus. As noted

above, the Court has previously held in this case that the rank

jumping argument has no merit. See supra, note 4. Thus,

Plaintiff’s remaining argument is that he was the better

candidate. But, as the Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez explained

in Jackson v. Trump Entm’t Resorts, Inc.,

[a] plaintiff’s subjective belief that his

qualifications should have been accorded more

weight is not probative of pretext. An

employer is entitled to evaluate which

qualifications best fit its needs in selecting

a candidate. That is, a plaintiff’s

disagreement with assessment criteria and

belief that he or she is better qualified for

the position is not sufficient to avoid

summary judgment.

149 F. Supp. 3d 502, 508–09 (D.N.J. 2007) (citing various

sources).

Whether County Defendants were imprudent in making their

decision has no impact on the question at hand: whether their

decision was motivated by discriminatory animus. County

Defendants point out that during this same timeframe, Lynch

promoted several African American officers, including one who

was promoted to the rank of Captain. (A Hispanic officer was

also promoted to the rank of Captain.) This, County Defendants

argue, undermines any argument that racial animus motivated the

decision to hire Wysocki over Plaintiff.

Plainly put, Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence to

suggest such animus. His view that he was more qualified than

Wysocki is irrelevant here, even assuming arguendo that he is

correct in that view. Employers are free to make bad hiring

decisions. What they are prohibited from doing is making hiring

decisions based on racial animus.

In the case at hand, the best argument that Plaintiff can

make given the evidence presented is that County Defendants made

a bad decision by promoting Wysocki instead of him. However, he

does not successfully argue that the decision was motivated by

racial animus. Therefore, he is unable to show that County

Defendants’ proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

not promoting him is pretext.

As a result of the above analysis, Plaintiff’s claim cannot

sustain the summary judgment standard. While it is possible

that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff made out a

prima facie case of racial discrimination, as a matter of law

Plaintiff has not shown that County Defendants’ proffered

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not promoting him was

pretext. Accordingly, the Court will grant County Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Counts Eleven and Twelve of

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as they pertain to allegations

regarding the hiring of Officer Wysocki by the Camden County

Police Department.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant County

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Docket Item 240] and

the accompanying Order will be entered.

January 2, 2020 s/Noel L. Hillman

DATE NOEL L. HILLMAN

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

At Camden, New Jersey