NAPOLI v. FIRST CHOICE LOAN SERVICES, INC.

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

PETER NAPOLI,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No, 19-7265

v. (JIMV) JAD)

FIRST CHOICE LOAN SERVICES, INC.,

et al., OPINION

Defendants.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff Peter Napoli sues Defendants First Choice Loan Services, Inc. (“FCLS”),

Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc. (“BHLB”), Norman Koenigsberg, and William Schneider

(collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection

Act (“CEPA”), the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). D.E.

1-1. Currently pending before the Court is Defendant BHLB’s motion to dismiss, D.E. 4, and

PlaintifP's cross-motion to amend his Complaint, D.E. 8.'_ The Court reviewed the parties’

submissions” and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and

' Plaintiff's cross-motion to amend his Complaint is raised for the first time in Plaintiff's

opposition brief. D.E. 8, at 3. Plaintiff seeks to add Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance

Group, Inc. as additional defendants. /d.; see also D.E. 8-2. Although Plaintiff made a cross-

motion, and the Court rules on it as such, going forward Plaintiff may also simply request leave to

file an amended pleading if necessary.

? BHLB’s brief in support of its motion to dismiss will be referred to as “Def.’s Br.” (D.E. 4);

Plaintiff's opposition will be referred to as “Pl.’s Opp.” (D.E. 8). BHLB did not reply.

L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, Defendant BHLB’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED, and Plaintiff's cross-motion to amend is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant BHLB is a Delaware corporation that operates as a financial holding company.

D.E. 4-3, Prescott Cert. 2. BHLB’s headquarters is in Massachusetts. /d. 3. BHLB is the

parent company of both Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc.? /d. J 1,4. BHLB

asserts that it is a legally and factually separate corporate entity, distinct from its subsidiaries

Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. /d. 4 4. BHLB indicates that it has its own

board of directors and officers, maintains its own independent corporate structure, and that its

subsidiaries likewise have their own independent legal structure. /d. [4. BHLB contends that (1)

it conducts no business in New Jersey; (2) does not own or lease any real estate, branch offices,

executive offices, loan production offices, or operation centers in New Jersey; (3) has no office or

mailing address in New Jersey; (4) does not pay New Jersey income, property, or franchise taxes;

(5) has never been registered, licensed, or otherwise qualified to do business in New Jersey; (6)

3 Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. are not defendants in this case. In fact,

Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to add Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc.

Pl.’s Opp. at 3, 8. Nonetheless, Plaintiff appears to conflate the separate entities of BHLB,

Berkshire Bank, and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. as a single entity. For example, Plaintiff's

Complaint appears to group BHLB and Berkshire Bank together as one entity. See Compl. {ff 2-

3. Moreover, Plaintiffs opposition brief refers to BHLB as “Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc. [] d/b/a

Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. (hereinafter the “Berkshire Entities” and

“Berkshire Bank”). Pl.’s Opp. at 2. On the other hand, Plaintiff's opposition brief appears to

acknowledge that Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc are wholly owned

subsidiaries of BHLB, citing as support Defendant’s own certification, which explains that “BHLB

is a legally and factually separate corporate entity, distinct from its subsidiaries Berkshire Bank

and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc.” P1.’s Opp. at 3; D.E. 4-3, Prescott Cert. {4 1,4. Moreover,

Plaintiffs own certification appears to acknowledge that BHLB is the parent company of

Berkshire Bank, which appears to be the parent company of FCLS. D.E. 8-1, Napoli Cert. 9 4,

7, 8. To the extent Plaintiffis contending that BHLB is the “alter ego” of its subsidiaries, the Court

finds this argument unpersuasive and addresses it below.

has not appointed a registered agent for service of process in New Jersey; (7) does not manufacture,

provide, or place into the stream of commerce in New Jersey any product or any service, including

banking, insurance, or mortgage services; and (8) does not engage in any advertising business in

New Jersey. fd. [J 5-10.

Defendant FCLS was Plaintiff’s employer from May 2009 until his termination in 2018.

D.E. 8-1, Napoli Cert. (2; Compl. §§5, 8. Defendant Koenigsberg is the COO and Senior

Executive Vice President of FCLS; Defendant Schneider is the Senior Vice President Consumer

Director of FCLS. Napoli Cert. 9-10. FCLS is a subsidiary of Berkshire Bank, which is itself

a subsidiary of BHLB. Pl.’s Opp. at 3; Def.’s Br. at 9,

Plaintiff was employed by FCLS from 2009 to 2018. Compl. □□□ 8; Napoli Cert. □□

Plaintiff alleges that from 2010 until his termination in 2018, Mr. Koenigsberg “embezzled money

from FCLS and required Plaintiff and other FCLS employees” to participate. Compl. 78. Plaintiff

claims that he “objected countless time[s] from 2010-2018 to Mr. Koenigsberg” and that “[e]ach

time [] Plaintiff objected ... Mr. Koenigsberg and Mr. Schneider expressed anger towards him

and retaliated against him.” Jd. { 15-16. Plaintiff was terminated in October 2018. Jd. 25.

Plaintiff initially filed his Complaint in state court, but Defendants subsequently removed

the case to this Court on February 28, 2019. D.E. 1. Defendants FCLS, Koenigsberg, and

Schneider answered the Complaint on March 25, 2019. D.E.3. That same day, Defendant BHLB

moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) and

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). D.E. 4. Plaintiff filed opposition , D.E. 8, to which

Defendant BHLB did not reply.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a party to move to dismiss a case for

“lack of personal jurisdiction.” Fed, R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In such a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff

“bears the burden of demonstrating the facts that establish personal jurisdiction.” Pinker v. Roche

Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). When a court “resolves the jurisdictional issue

in the absence of an evidentiary hearing and without the benefit of discovery, the plaintiff need

only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., 106

F. Supp. 3d 456, 461 (D.N.J. 2015). In such cases, a court “take[s] the allegations of the complaint

as true.” Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996). However, once a

defendant raises a jurisdictional defense, the “plaintiff bears the burden of proving by affidavits or

other competent evidence that jurisdiction is proper.” /d. In other words, a court looks beyond

the pleadings to all relevant evidence and construes all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff. See

Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992). Plaintiff must establish

“with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.”

Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 462 (citing Mellon Bank (E) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d

1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992)). In addition, a court “may always revisit the issue of personal

jurisdiction if later revelations reveal that the facts alleged in support of jurisdiction remain in

dispute.” Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 462 n.5 (citing Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566

F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2009)).

HI. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A federal court “engages in a two-step inquiry to determine whether it may exercise

personal jurisdiction”: (1) “whether the relevant state iong-arm statute permits the exercise of

jurisdiction,” and (2) “if so, [whether] the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process”

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d 166, 172

(D.N.J. 2016) (citing IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1998)); see

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (indicating that service “establishes personal jurisdiction over a

defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where

the district court is located”). “New Jersey’s long-arm statute extends the state’s jurisdictional

reach as far as the United States Constitution permits, so the analysis turns on the federal

constitutional standard for personal jurisdiction.” Jd. (citing IMO Industries, 155 F.3d at 259).

Accordingly, the two steps are collapsed into one and “we ask whether, under the Due Process

Clause, the defendant has certain minimum contacts with [New Jersey] such that the maintenance

of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” O'Connor v.

Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), In

other words, to establish personal jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause requires (1) minimum

contacts between the defendant and the forum; and (2) that jurisdiction over the defendant

comports with “‘fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 476 (1985) (quoting Int] Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).

“Personal, or in personam, jurisdiction, [generally] divides into two groups: ‘specific

jurisdiction’ and ‘general jurisdiction.’” Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 172 (citing Burger

King, 471 U.S. at 472 n. 14 (1985)). Specific jurisdiction “depends on an affiliatio[n] between the

forum and the underlying controversy (i.e., an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the

forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation).” Jd. (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571

U.S. 277, 284 n.6 (2014)). General jurisdiction “permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a

defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit.” Jd. (quoting Walden,

571 U.S, at 284 n.6). Ifa defendant is subject to a forum’s general jurisdiction, the defendant can

be sued there on any matter. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,

919 (2011). If, however, a defendant is solely subject to specific jurisdiction, the defendant may

only face suit in the forum if its activities concerning the forum are related to the claims in the

suit. fd.

A. General Personal Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction may be asserted over an out-of-state corporation “when [its]

affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home

in the forum State.” Jd. For an entity, its “place of incorporation and principal place of business

are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction[.]” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)

{internal quotation marks omitted). If general jurisdiction is established, a court may hear any and

all claims against the defendant. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 919.

Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over

It appears that BHLB is neither incorporated in New Jersey nor has its principal place of

business in New Jersey.* Rather, BHLB’s uncontested certification demonstrates that it is

‘ Plaintiff appears to misconstrue the standard for general personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff states in

his Complaint that “Defendants maintain one of their corporate headquarters at [sic] ‘nerve center’

is [sic] in the State of New Jersey.” Compl. 2. However, Plaintiff does not specify which of the

Defendants is headquartered in New Jersey. Moreover, Plaintiff's opposition brief states that

“Berkshire Bank maintains one of their ‘nerve centers’ in the State of New Jersey and specifically,

the East Brunswick, New Jersey office at which Plaintiff worked.” Pl.’s Opp. at 2. Again,

however, Plaintiff appears to conflate BHLB with Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group,

Inc. Plaintiff then proceeds to argue that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction -- as opposed to

personal jurisdiction — because “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State . . .

by which is has been incorporated and of the State . .. where it has its principal place of business”

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). Pl.’s Opp. at 6. Plaintiff then argues that “the Supreme Court

has adopted a ‘nerve center’ test to identify a corporation’s principal place of business” which

“should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters[.]” P1.’s Opp. at 6.

First, Defendants do not dispute the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, as Defendants

removed this action to federal court based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction. D.E. 1,

Notice of Removal 4 4. Second, and most importantly, Plaintiff provides no evidence to support

incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. D.E. 4-3, Prescott

Cert. {| 2-3. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to establish that this is an “exceptional case” that warrants

the exercise of general jurisdiction. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139.19, Accordingly, the Court

lacks general personal jurisdiction over BHLB.

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Specific jurisdiction requires the defendant to have “purposefully directed his activities at

residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to

those activities.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). The Third Circuit has developed a three-part test in determining whether specific

personal jurisdiction exists as to a particular defendant. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (internal

quotation marks omitted). First, the defendant must have “purposefully directed fits] activities at

the forum.”” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the litigation must “arise out of or

relate to at least one of those activities.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, if the first

two requirements are met, the exercise of jurisdiction must “otherwise comport with fair play and

substantial justice.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over

BHLB. The Complaint merely alleges that “Defendants maintain one of their corporate

his contention that BHLB’s principal place of business is in New Jersey, nor does Plaintiff contest

BHLB’s certification to the contrary.

° This factor has also been characterized as “purposeful availment.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.

The factor focuses on contact that the defendant itself created with the forum State. /d. The

“purposefully directed” or “purposeful availment” requirement is designed to prevent a person

from being haled into a jurisdiction “solely as the result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated

contacts” or due to the “unilateral activity of another party or third person.” /d. (internal quotation

marks omitted) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)); World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp., 44 U.S. at 299; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 417 (1984)).

headquarters at [sic] ‘nerve center’ is [sic] in the State of New Jersey” and that “Defendants

transact business throughout the United States and New Jersey[.]” Compl. 2. But the Complaint

does not indicate which specific Defendants have their headquarters in New Jersey, nor which

specific Defendants transact business in New Jersey. Indeed, the Complaint fails to allege any

facts from which the Court could reasonably infer that BHLB purposely directed any activity

toward New Jersey. In fact, Plaintiff does not dispute BHLB’s certification in support of its

motion, which states that (1) it conducts no business in New Jersey; (2) does not own or lease any

real estate, branch offices, executive offices, loan production offices, or operation centers in New

Jersey; (3) has no office or mailing address in New Jersey; (4) does not pay New Jersey income,

property, or franchise taxes; (5) has never been registered, licensed, or otherwise qualified to do

business in New Jersey; (6) has not appointed a registered agent for service of process in New

Jersey; (7) does not manufacture, provide, or place into the stream of commerce in New Jersey

any product or any service, including banking, insurance, or mortgage services; and (8) does not

engage in any advertising business in New Jersey. D.E. 4-3, Prescott Cert. $f] 5-10.

Plaintiff responds that personal jurisdiction exists for a myriad of reasons, including:

(1) [BHLB], Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc.

admittedly advertise to the public as doing business in New Jersey;

(2) [BHLB], Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc.

[s]hare a website; (3) [t]he Berkshire Entities® advertise to the public

that one of its corporate office addresses [is] in... New Jersey,

where Plaintiff worked; (4) FCLS is the wholly owned subsidiary of

Berkshire Bank{,] which is a wholly owned subsidiary of [BHLB];

(5) Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of

[BHLB}; (6) Berkshire Bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of

[BHLB}; (7) Plaintiff and [Mr. Koenigsberg and Mr. Schneider] are

all employees of the Berkshire Entities[.]; (8) all human resources

and other administrative work were done by Amy Nelson, an

employee of the Berkshire Entities; (9) all FCLS loans are processed

6 Plaintiff at times collectively refers to BHLB, Berkshire Bank, and Berkshire Insurance Group,

Inc. as the “Berkshire Entities.” P1.’s Opp. at 2.

on behalf of Berkshire Bank in its [] New Jersey office; (10)

Defendant [Koenigsberg], one of Plaintiff's harassers ... work[ed]

out of the [] New Jersey office; (11) Plaintiff met with

representatives about his employment in New Jersey; and (12)

Plaintiff was discriminated against, harassed and brought his

whistleblower claims in the Berkshire Entities’ office in New Jersey

to employees of the Berkshire Entities who live and work in New

Jersey.

Pl.’s Opp. at 10-11. However, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts from which the Court can

reasonably infer that BHLB, itself, purposefully directed any activity toward New Jersey, much

less that the current litigation arose out of, or related to, at least one of those activities. Burger

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472 (explaining that specific jurisdiction requires the defendant to have

“purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation result[] from alleged

injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities”). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not carried

its “burden of demonstrating the facts that establish personal jurisdiction.” Pinker v. Roche

Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (Gd Cir. 2002).

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that there exists personal jurisdiction over BHLB because BHLB,

Berkshire Bank, and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc., collectively, “are one employer pursuant to

applicable law.” Pl.’s Opp. at 9-10. It appears that Plaintiff seeks to impute the jurisdictional

contacts of Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. onto BHLB under an “alter ego”

theory. However, even assuming Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. have

sufficient contacts with New Jersey, “[i]t is well-established in New Jersey that the forum contacts

of a subsidiary corporation will not be imputed to a parent corporation for jurisdictional purposes

without a showing of something more than mere ownership.” Seltzer v. LC. Optics, Litd., 339 F.

Supp. 2d 601, 609 (D.N.J. 2004) (citing State, Dep't of Environ. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d

150, 164 (N.J. 1983)). “In this context, courts in this Circuit will consider ‘whether the subsidiary

was merely the alter ego or agent of the parent, and whether the independence of the separate

corporate entities was disregarded.’” Jd. (quoting Lucas v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 666 F.2d

800, 806 (3d Cir. 1981)).

To this point, courts will not pierce the corporate veil of a wholly-owned subsidiary vis-a-

vis its parent entity unless “(1) ‘the parent so dominated the subsidiary that it had no separate

existence but was merely a conduit for the parent,” and (2) ‘the parent has abused the privilege of

incorporation by using the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise to circumvent

the law.’” Pathfinder Met., Inc. v. Mayne Pharma PTY, No. 06-2204, 2008 WL 3192563, at *5

(D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2008) (quoting Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir.

1988); see also Seltzer, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (“In New Jersey, a subsidiary will be deemed to be

the alter ego or ‘mere instrumentality’ of its parent if ‘the parent so dominated the subsidiary that

it had no separate existence but was merely a conduit for the parent.’”) (quoting State, Dept. of

Envtl. Protec. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983)). “Various factors may be

considered in making these determinations, including, inter alia, failure to observe corporate

formalities, gross undercapitalization, absence of corporate records, siphoning of funds of the

corporation, and the corporation’s existence as a facade for the operations of the dominant

stockholder.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 12-6775, 2013 WL 6816173, at *21

(D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2013) (citing Craig, 843 F.2d at 150 (3d Cir. 1988)).

Here, Plaintiff provides no factual allegations to suggest that BHLB so dominated

Berkshire Bank or Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc. such that the subsidiaries “had no separate

existence but [were] merely a conduit for [BHLB],” much less any factual allegations suggesting

that BHLB “abused the privilege of incorporation by using [its] subsidiar[ies] to perpetrate a fraud

or injustice, or otherwise to circumvent the law.” See Pathfinder Mgt., Inc., 2008 WL 3192563,

at *5. Indeed, BHLB asserts that “it is a legally and factually separate corporate entity, distinct

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from its subsidiaries{] Berkshire Bank and Berkshire Insurance Group, Inc.” Prescott Cert. { 4.

BHLB also asserts that it “has its own board of directors and officers and maintains its own

independent corporate structure,” and that BHLB’s subsidiaries likewise “maintain[] [their] own

independent corporate, partnership, or limited liability company status, identity, and structure.”

id. Plaintiff provides no evidence to the contrary, nor sets forth any facts otherwise showing that

BHLB is an “alter-ego” of its subsidiaries. Accordingly, BHLB’s subsidiaries’ forum contacts, if

any, will not be imputed to BHLB.

In sum, after having looked at the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as well

as “considering New Jersey’s strong presumption against attributing a subsidiary’s forum contacts

to its corporate parent,” Se/rzer, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 613, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

establish “with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [BHLB] and the forum state.”

Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 462. Therefore, BHLB’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction is granted.®

7 The Court notes that Plaintiff has not requested jurisdictional discovery. As explained by the

Third Circuit, “[a]Jithough the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that support

personal jurisdiction, courts are to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional discovery unless

the plaintiff's claim is ‘clearly frivolous.’” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456

(3d Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc.

v. American Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997). In other words, “[ijf a plaintiff

presents factual allegations that suggest ‘with reasonable particularity’ the possible existence of

the requisite ‘contacts between [the party] and the forum state,’ the plaintiff's right to conduct

jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.” /d. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Mellon Bank

(East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (Gd Cir. 1992)). Here, however, Plaintiff

has not requested jurisdictional discovery, and Court declines to provide it sua sponte.

® Defendant also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). D.E. 4. However, because the Court finds the issue of personal jurisdiction to be

dispositive, the Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim.

The Court does note, though, that BHLB provided only a one-page analysis regarding its motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Def.’s Br. at 12, to which Plaintiff did not respond.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant BHLB’s motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction, D.E. 4. Plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend his Complaint is granted. Pl.’s

Opp. at 3, 8. Plaintiffis provided with thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint that cures the

deficiencies noted herein. If Plaintiff fails to do so, then his Complaint as to BHLB will be

dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: January 3, 2020

John Michael Vazquéz, Ui$.D.J.

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