Brown v. Trump

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JACK BROWN, 8:21CV170

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM

vs. AND ORDER

DONALD J. TRUMP,

Defendant.

Plaintiff filed his pro se Complaint (Filing 1) on April 22, 2021, and has been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court now conducts an initial review

of the Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff sues Donald J. Trump for inflicting “mental and intellectual damage

across several international families due to slander.” He alleges that “people who are

much younger than me are terrified to come to the country.” (Filing 1, p. 4.)

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine

whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The court must dismiss a complaint or

any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B).

Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[ ] their

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be

dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). “The essential

function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the

opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a

general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199

F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)).

“A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held

to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). A “liberal construction” means that if the

essence of an allegation is “discernible, the district court should construe the

plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015).

However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a

claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th

Cir. 1980).

III. DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction is a threshold issue for this court. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-96 (1998); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 507 (2006) (“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction

... may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the

litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.”). The party seeking to invoke

federal jurisdiction carries the burden of proof on that issue. See DaimlerChrysler

Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006); V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban

Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).

The heart of standing “is the principle that in order to invoke the power of a

federal court, a plaintiff must present a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ within the meaning

of Article III of the Constitution.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585,

591 (8th Cir. 2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating

2

that “the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-

or-controversy requirement of Article III.’’). To satisfy the constitutional minimum

of standing, a plaintiff must allege and show: 1) an injury in fact; 2) that is fairly

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and 3) is likely to be redressed

by a favorable decision. Braden, 588 F.3d at 591. “The complaining party must ...

show that he is within the class of persons who will be concretely affected.” Blum v.

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982). If a plaintiff lacks standing, the district court

has no subject matter jurisdiction. Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 801 (8th

Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff does not allege that he is within the class of persons who allegedly

have been slandered and are afraid to come to this country. In fact, Plaintiff alleges

he is a Nebraska citizen. (Filing 1, p. 3.) Nor does Plaintiff allege, for example, that

he has relatives who are being excluded from the country. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138

S. Ct. 2392 (2018). “Standing requires more than just a ‘keen interest in the issue.’”

Id., at 2416 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013)). “It requires

allegations—and, eventually, proof—that the plaintiff “‘personal[ly]’ suffered a

concrete and particularized injury in connection with the conduct about which he

complains.” /d. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016)).

Plaintiff's Complaint contains no such factual allegations.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. This case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

2. Judgment will be entered by separate document.

Dated this 2nd day of June, 2021.

BY THE COURT:

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Richard G. Kopf

Senior United States District Judg