The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
BEVERLY OAKER, )
on behalf of K.R., a minor child, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 2:21-cv-04242-MDH
)
CHRISTOPHER SKILES, MICHAEL COUTY, )
COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI, )
JOHN DOE, et al., and KATHY LLOYD, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court are defendant Kathy Lloyd’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9); defendant Cole
County’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11); and defendant Michael Couty’s Joinder in Cole County’s
Motions to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 21). The
motions are fully briefed and ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
On November 18, 2021, Plaintiff Beverly Oaker on behalf of K.R., a minor child and
former ward of the State of Missouri, filed her Petition in the Circuit Court of Cole County,
Missouri. The case was removed on December 27, 2021.
Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to excessive force on several occasions, while staying at
the Prenger Family Center, a juvenile detention facility where he was placed after the County
(Family Court) removed him from his home. The first incident is alleged to have occurred in
December 2020 when Plaintiff claims defendant Christopher Skiles (“Skiles”) “restrained”
Plaintiff “by grabbing the back of his shirt collar and belt loop, placing him on the floor, and lying
down on top of” Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that “[o]ther,” unidentified staff “yanked [Plaintiff]
off [a] table” causing Plaintiff to hit the floor. Plaintiff alleges that Skiles regularly and openly
antagonized Plaintiff and threatened him and other children by using foul and profane language,
inciting violence among the children, and numerous other alleged behaviors that created a violent
and hostile environment. Plaintiff alleges defendant Couty was aware of Skiles behavior and did
not take any action to correct or eliminate the behavior. In addition, Plaintiff alleges the injuries
he suffered were not documented by the nurse who was present and that Plaintiff also showed his
injuries to at least six other staff members who did not report the injuries. Plaintiff alleges
photographs were taken of his injuries but then later disappeared.
Plaintiff brings one claim against Defendant Lloyd in Count II pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for failure to train. Plaintiff’s sole claim against the County is also set forth in Count II.
Plaintiff claims the County and Lloyd failed to train the Prenger Center Staff on how to safely
restrain children and the reporting of incidents at the center. Plaintiff alleges the Defendants’
failure to train “reflected . . . an official policy or governmental custom” and that Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff includes defendant Couty in Count II and also brings claims for failure to
supervise pursuant to § 1983 (Count III); negligent supervision of an employee (Count V); and
negligent supervision of a child (Count VI) against Couty. Defendants Lloyd, the County and
Couty move to dismiss all claims raised against them.1
1 Defendant Skiles has filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
STANDARD
A motion to dismiss is the proper method to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Peck
v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981). Federal Rule 12(b)(6) states that a party may move for
dismissal of all or part of the claims against it if the allegations, taken as true, fail to state a claim
for which relief can be granted. The Court “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410
F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). The complaint’s factual allegations
must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and the motion to dismiss
must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Furthermore,
“the tenet a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
1. Defendant Lloyd’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9).
Defendant Lloyd, the state court administrator, is sued in her official capacity as an official
working for the Missouri State Courts, and by extension the State of Missouri (hereinafter “the
State”). Count II is a § 1983 claim for failure to train against defendants Couty, Lloyd and Cole
County. The Petition alleges, in part, defendant Skyles had undergone certain training directed by
Lloyd on how to physically restrain children and on making reports of incidents involving the
restraint of children. Plaintiff alleges Lloyd knew or should have known that Prenger Family Staff
would have occasion to physically restrain children and that she had a duty to adequately train the
staff on how to safely restrain and how to report incidents. Plaintiff alleges Lloyd failed to
adequately train defendant Skiles to properly and safely restrain children, because on December
31, 2020, he restrained K.R in a way that caused him pain and bruising. Plaintiff further alleges
Lloyd was deliberately indifferent to the safety needs of K.R. and that the Prenger Family Center
staff were “vaguely advised” to “use minimal force or your best judgment” and that this advice
did not adequately guide defendant Skyles. A review of the Petition reflects that Plaintiff’s claims
are based on the incident with K.R. and Skyles. While Plaintiff alleges Lloyd’s failure to train
reflected an “official policy or governmental custom of Cole County” Plaintiff does not allege any
incidents involving this alleged failure other than Plaintiff’s.
Lloyd moves to dismiss stating, “[a] Plaintiff wishing ‘to sue a state official in [her]
personal capacity must so specify in her complaint.’” Citing Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72
F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995)(citation omitted). Lloyd argues Plaintiff’s Petition should be
interpreted “as including only official-capacity claims.”
Plaintiff’s Petition states the following:
¶ 9. Defendant Kathy Llloyd was at all relevant times the Missouri State Courts
Administrator who acted under color of state law, and the acts and omissions of
Defendant Lloyd complained of herein represent those of an official policy or
government custom of Defendant Cole County, as well as its deliberately
indifferent failure to train and supervise as alleged herein.
42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a right of action against “persons.” “To state a claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff’s
suit against Defendant Lloyd in her official capacity is essentially a suit against the State of
Missouri itself. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “[N]either a
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. Because
Plaintiff does not bring an action against Lloyd in her individual capacity, Lloyd argues Plaintiff
fails to state a claim against a “person” under § 1983.
In addition, Lloyd argues an “official capacity [suit] is equivalent to a suit against the
government entity itself, and sovereign immunity therefore applies with equal force[.]” Citing
B.A.B, Jr. v. Board of Educ. Of City of St. Louis, 698 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff
brings her claims against Defendant Lloyd in her official capacity and Lloyd argues the Court
should dismiss the claim with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s opposition argues that the “allegations plausibly say that Plaintiff sues
Defendant Lloyd not in her capacity as an official of the State of Missouri but of Defendant Cole
County; and counties are “persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983.” Plaintiff argues “it is
true Lloyd is employed by the State of Missouri” but that she is an official of defendant Cole
County pursuant to statute and wears two hats: a state-official hat and a Cole County official hat.
Plaintiff further contends that the alleged inadequate training program for how to restrain Plaintiff,
demonstrated a pattern of constitutional violations.
After reviewing the record before the Court, the Court GRANTS Lloyd’s motion to
dismiss. Lloyd is a state court administrator sued in her official capacity and as a result the § 1983
claim against her in her official capacity fails to state a claim and Lloyd is hereby dismissed.
2. Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11).
Plaintiff’s claim against the County (Count II) alleges it failed to properly train Skiles and
other Prenger staff on how to properly restrain individuals and the County’s alleged failure to train
“reflected . . . an official policy or governmental custom.”
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim implicitly or explicitly brings a claim based on
respondeat superior, or some unspecific governmental policy, procedure, or custom and should be
dismissed. In addition, Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to allege notice of deliberate
indifference and has failed to allege prior incidents which would constitute notice. For all these
reasons Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim against the County should be dismissed.
Here, the Court has reviewed the Petition and while it makes no ruling on whether Plaintiff
may ultimately prevail on the claim for failure to train against the County, the Court finds Plaintiff
has pled enough to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the notice pleading requirements of the
federal rules. The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations are sufficient to put Defendant
on notice of acts, which if proved, would constitute deliberate indifference and as a result Plaintiff
has pled enough to survive a motion to dismiss. However, in order to ultimately prevail on
Plaintiff’s claim against the County Plaintiff must prove more than general conclusions of
deliberate indifference. The Court DENIES the County’s Motion to Dismiss Count II.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss also argues that Plaintiff’s claims alleging failure to
supervise (Count III), negligent supervision of an employee (Skiles) (Count V), and negligent
supervision of a child (Plaintiff) (Count VI) should be dismissed. However, Plaintiff’s response
clarifies that these Counts are not brought against the County (they are claims against defendant
Couty) and the sole count against the County is Count II. As a result, the County’s motion to
dismiss Counts III, V, and VI is denied as moot as there is no claim pending against it in those
counts.
3. Defendant Couty’s Joinder in Cole County, Missouri’s Motion to Dismiss or in
the alternative, Motion for Judgment on Pleadings. (Doc. 21).
Defendant Couty has filed a “Joinder in Cole County, Missouri’s Motions to Dismiss, or
in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.” 2 Couty is a retired Juvenile Officer for
the Family Court Division of the Circuit Court in Cole County. Plaintiff alleges Couty’s duties
included ensuring that Prenger Family Center staff be adequately trained to provide for the safety
of the children and to report incidents involving the restraints of children. In addition, with respect
to Couty, Plaintiff alleges defendant Couty was “aware of Defendant Skiles violent and hostile
behavior toward the children living at the Prenger Family Center, yet he did not take any action to
correct or eliminate such behavior.” Couty moves to dismiss the following claims raised against
him: Count II: Failure to Train – 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count III: Failure to Supervise – 42 U.S.C. §
1983; Count V: Negligent Supervision of an Employee; and Count VI: Negligent Supervision of
a Child.
Couty argues Count II and Count III, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, fail as a matter of
law because respondeat superior is an insufficient basis for liability and the Petition fails to allege
a specific unconstitutional official policy or custom. Similar to Llloyd and the County’s motions
to dismiss, Couty argues Plaintiff’s “threadbare recitals and conclusions” do not allege enough to
plead a claim of constitutional violations based on Plaintiff’s incident. In addition, Couty argues
the Petition is devoid of any factual allegation that he acted directly towards Plaintiff or with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. Defendant also contends Plaintiff does not allege
Couty had prior notice of any subordinate employees who acted in a manner which would indicate
2 Couty moves to dismiss but in the alternative moves for judgment on the pleadings. The Court
analyzes the motion as a motion to dismiss and finds a motion for judgment on the pleadings
premature.
polices and training were insufficient or unconstitutional. Plaintiff’s only additional allegations
(not raised against Lloyd or the County) is that Couty was “aware of Defendant Skile’s violent and
hostile behavior toward children” and that he “did not take any action to correct or eliminate such
behavior.”
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Whether
Plaintiff may ultimately prevail or be able to provide evidence to support the claims raised is not
presently before the Court. The Court agrees that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim based on
respondeat superior but finds that Plaintiff has pled allegations that include a claim not based on
respondeat superior. The Court DENIES Couty’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III - Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims.
Finally, Couty argues Count V - Negligent Supervision of an Employee and Count VI -
Negligent Supervision of a Child are state law negligence claims and as a result Couty is entitled
to official immunity as a public official as he was acting within the course and scope of his job
duties as a juvenile officer. The Court agrees that Couty’s role regarding his supervision of Skiles,
or any Prenger employee, would most likely be found to constitute a discretionary act under state
law. However, courts in determining whether an act is discretionary or ministerial must consider
the factual circumstances of Plaintiff’s claims. See e.g., Clines v. Special Admin. Bd. Transitional
Sch. Dist. of the City of St. Louis, No. 4:18-CV-00153-NAB, 2020 WL 3036053, at *11 (E.D. Mo.
June 5, 2020) (stating the test for whether an act is discretionary or ministerial is fact-intensive);
citing, Teague v. St. Charles County, 708 F.Supp. 2d 935, 940-41 (E.D. Mo. 2010); see also
Fortenberry v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:18-CV-01937-JCH, 2019 WL 1242671, at *7 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 18, 2019) (finding a more complete record was necessary and the issue of official immunity
is more appropriate for a motion for summary judgment). Wherefore, the Court finds the issue of
immunity is better suited for a motion for summary judgment and as a result will not dismiss
Plaintiff’s tort claim based on official immunity at this time.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons set forth herein the Court GRANTS defendant Lloyd’s Motion
to Dismiss. The Court DENIES defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss Count II. The Court
DENIES defendant Couty’s Motion to Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 21, 2022
/s/ Douglas Harpool ____
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE