Deboe v. Korneman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

ST. JOSEPH DIVISION

MELANIE DEBOE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 20-cv-06180-SRB

)

SHERRIE KORNEMAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Sherrie Korneman, Ryan Crews, Ryan Brownlow, Brandy

Hurt, Brian Deshon, and Andrew Fritzinger’s (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. #33.) For the reasons stated below, the motion

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of the death of Christopher Deboe (“Deboe”), who was stabbed by

fellow inmate Laurance Logan (“Logan”) while incarcerated at the Western Reception

Diagnostic and Correctional Center (“WRDCC”) operated by the Missouri Department of

Corrections. Plaintiff Melanie Deboe (“Plaintiff”) is the surviving spouse of Deboe. Plaintiff

sues Sherrie Korneman (“Korneman”), the then-acting Assistant Supervisor of the WRDCC,

Ryan Crews (“Crews”), the then-acting Supervisor of the WRDCC, and Ryan Brownlow

(“Brownlow”), the current-acting Supervisor of the WRDCC (collectively, “Defendant

Wardens”). Korneman is sued in her individual capacity, Crews is sued in both his individual

and official capacities, and Brownlow is sued in his official capacity.1 Plaintiff also sues Brandy

1 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff denotes in the heading that Brownlow is sued in “his official capacities.” (Doc.

#32, p. 1.) Plaintiff again specifically states under the “Parties” section of the Amended Complaint that, “Brownlow

Hurt (“Hurt”), Andrew Fritzinger (“Fritzinger”), Cole A. Reed (“Reed”), Brian Deshon

(“Deshon”), McCarty,2 and Wesley Deweese (“Deweese”), all of whom are or were correctional

officers at WRDCC (collectively, “Defendant Officers”). Defendant Officers are sued in their

individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges the defendants violated Deboe’s Eighth

Amendment rights by failing to protect him from harm by Logan and failing to provide medical

treatment after the stabbing. Briefly, the relevant facts taken from Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint3 (Doc. #32) are set forth below.

Prior to the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit, Logan was a known violent offender and

white supremacist. On September 22, 2015, on two separate occasions, Logan assaulted prison

guards at WRDCC. Despite Logan’s reputation and past behavior, he was placed in WRDCC’s

general population where Deboe, an African American male, was located. Logan affiliated with

Millsap, another WRDCC inmate also known as a violent offender and white supremacist.

In early December 2015, prison staff observed a verbal altercation in which Logan and

Millsap allegedly threatened to kill Deboe. Deboe reported Logan’s and Millsap’s threats to

is sued in his official capacity.” (Doc. #32, ⁋ 13.) Yet, in Count I through Count V, Plaintiff generically pleads that

either all defendants or all Defendant Wardens are sued in their individual and official capacities. The Court thus

finds that the Amended Complaint is at best ambiguous as to whether Brownlow is sued in only his official capacity

or in both his individual and official capacities. Because “in order to sue a public official in his or her individual

capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the

defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity,” the Court finds that Brownlow is only sued in his official

capacity. Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018). Additionally, even if Brownlow was sued in his

individual capacity, the Court finds the Amended Complaint fails to state an individual-capacity claim against

Brownlow as to all Counts.

2 The Amended Complaint does not identify McCarty’s first name.

3 On June 17, 2021, the Court granted in part and denied in part Korneman’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original

Complaint. (Doc. #14.) Compared to the Original Complaint, the Amended Complaint replaces certain “John Doe”

correctional officers with Defendant Officers and adds a few specific facts related to Defendant Officers’ alleged

involvement in Deboe’s death. The Amended Complaint also adds two WRDCC Supervisors, Crews and Brownlow.

The Amended Complaint is otherwise identical to the Original Complaint. The parties also advance substantively

similar arguments in support of and opposition to the pending motion to dismiss as the original motion to dismiss. In

turn, most of the facts and analysis below are taken from the Court’s June 17, 2021, Order. The current Order resolves

the minor factual changes in the Amended Complaint and addresses the newly-added, moving defendants.

prison staff and requested that he be placed in isolation or moved away from them. The

defendants did not move Deboe, Logan, or Millsap, nor did the defendants investigate the

reported threat. On December 7, 2015, Millsap stated during a recorded phone call that a desk

leg “would make a good shank.”4 (Doc. #32, ¶ 33.) Shortly after, Logan and Millsap damaged

an unmanned guard’s desk and removed one of its legs, which Logan then proceeded to sharpen

into a weapon. That same day, Logan was “written up” for destroying the guard’s desk. (Doc.

#32, ¶ 25.) However, the prison guards and staff never searched Logan’s cell or otherwise

investigated the whereabouts of the missing desk leg.

On December 9, 2015, Logan—still in possession of the sharpened desk leg—was

allowed to wander freely about the cell block while other inmates were locked down in their

cells. McCarty and Hurt, who were stationed in the cell block, left right before the other inmates

were released from their cells. No guards were present on the prison block. As Deboe exited his

cell, Logan stabbed him with the sharpened desk leg fourteen times. Other inmates shouted or

attempted to gain the attention of WRDCC staff including Reed, Hurt, and McCarty, but their

screams were ignored. Reed eventually unlocked the door for McCarty and Hurt to enter the cell

block. McCarty and Hurt, aware that a stabbing was occurring, failed to call a “10-50” which

would have signaled to other prison staff that a stabbing was occurring. (Doc. #32, ⁋ 55.)

McCarty then incorrectly called for an institutional lockdown which could have only been

authorized by a Warden or assistant Warden.

Other officers, including Fritzinger, Deshon, and Deweese, ignored the lockdown call,

further delaying assistance for Deboe. Fritzinger and other prison staff ignored the medical

4 Plaintiff’s Complaint first alleges this recorded statement was made by Millsap (Doc #32, ¶ 33), but later alleges the

statement was made by Logan (Doc. #32, ¶¶ 72(g), 76). In her response brief, Plaintiff clarifies that Logan and Millsap

were talking to each other during the recorded conversation when this statement was made. (Doc. #36, p. 4). The

Court finds the source of the statement does not make a material difference in the outcome of this motion.

emergency call, and several minutes passed before staff responded to Deboe. No Defendant

Officer attempted to assist Deboe; instead, McCarty, Hurt, and other staff stood over Deboe as he

“bled to death.” (Doc. #32, ¶ 64.) Approximately fifteen minutes passed before medical

personnel arrived, and thirty minutes passed before Deboe was placed in an ambulance. Deboe

later died from his injuries while in the care and custody of the defendants.

Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Amended

Complaint asserts that The defendants violated Deboe’s Eighth Amendment civil rights by their:

failure to use adequate procedures, deliberate indifference and/or gross negligence (Count I,

against all The defendants); failure to train (Count II, against Defendant Wardens); negligent

assignment (Count III, against Defendant Wardens); negligent supervision (Count IV, against

Defendant Wardens); and failure to provide adequate medical treatment (Count V, against all

The defendants). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for each Count, including compensatory

damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Moving Defendants, the only defendants to

enter an appearance in this case thus far, now move for the Court to dismiss the Amended

Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim],

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ash v. Anderson Merchs., LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. DISCUSSION

Moving Defendants argue the claims in this lawsuit should be dismissed because

(1) Plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their official capacity are barred, and (2)

Plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their individual capacity fail to state a § 1983 claim

because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing she has

done enough at this early stage to survive dismissal. The parties’ arguments are addressed

below.

A. Claims Against Defendants in Their Official Capacity

Moving Defendants argue that the claims against them in their official capacity are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff contends her official-capacity claims should not be

dismissed because Plaintiff seeks prospective relief. The Court agrees with Moving Defendants.

Under § 1983, a plaintiff may recover damages from “[e]very person who, under the

color of any statute . . . or regulation” causes “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” However, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits

“any [federal] suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of

another State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “A suit for damages against a state official in his official

capacity is a suit against the State, and the State is not a person under § 1983.” Calzone v.

Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 71 (1989)). However, state officials “may be sued in their official capacities for prospective,

injunctive relief.” Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Cir. 1998).

“[A] court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges

an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.”

Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (cleaned up). While

Plaintiff alleges the WRDCC policies and practices in 2015 violated Deboe’s constitutional

rights, Plaintiff fails to allege this violation is ongoing. Also, the prayer for relief for each count

seeks monetary damages including compensatory and punitive damages connected to the death

of Deboe. Such relief is not prospective. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)

(holding the Eleventh Amendment bars relief which “requires payment of state funds, not as a

necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question

determination, but as a form of compensation”); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

247, 271 (1981) (holding that a state “is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983”).

In turn, the Court finds the “prospective relief” exception to sovereign immunity does not

apply, and therefore Plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities are

barred. Accordingly, those claims on all counts are dismissed. As such, Brownlow, who is only

sued in his official capacity, is dismissed from this lawsuit.

B. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants5 violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and

unusual punishment. Specifically, Count I stems from the defendants’ failure to protect Deboe

from harm by Logan. Counts II, III, and IV allege similar failure-to-protect claims, but are

5 As already explained above, Brownlow is dismissed from this case because Plaintiff does not assert any individual

capacity claims against him. However, even assuming Plaintiff did, Plaintiff only alleges that Brownlow is the current

Supervisor of WRDCC, while Korneman and Crews were the Assistant Supervisor and Supervisor of the WRDCC

“at all relevant times.” (Doc. #32, ⁋⁋ 8, 10, 12.) Because Plaintiff fails to allege Brownlow’s involvement at the

WRDCC at any time relevant to the threat to Deboe’s life and Deboe’s serious medical needs, Plaintiff fails to state

an individual-capacity claim against Brownlow on all counts.

specific to Defendant Wardens in their supervisory role, namely failure to train, negligent

assignment, and negligent supervision respectively. Count V stems from the defendants’ alleged

failure to provide adequate medical treatment after Logan stabbed Deboe. Moving Defendants

contend they are entitled to qualified immunity on all Counts. The Court addresses the parties’

arguments below.

“Qualified immunity shields state officials from both civil liability and the burdens of

litigation unless their conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2018). “[D]efendants

seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on an assertion of qualified immunity must show

that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the face of the complaint.” Kulkay v. Roy, 847

F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “To determine whether a

public official is entitled to immunity, courts conduct a two-pronged analysis: whether the

plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for violation of a constitutional or statutory right and

whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged infraction.” Kulkay, 847 F.3d

at 642.

1. Count I – Failure to Use Adequate Procedures, Deliberate Indifference,

and/or Gross Negligence as to All Defendants.

“[T]he Eighth Amendment encompasses an inmate’s right to be protected from harm by

fellow inmates.” Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)).6 “Of course, prison officials do not commit a constitutional

violation every time one prisoner attacks another.” Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir.

6 This right was clearly established at the time of the alleged assault. See Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir.

2007) (“[I]t was no doubt clearly established long before 2004, when [the plaintiff] was assaulted, that the eighth

amendment required prison officials to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”) (quotation

marks and citation omitted).

2007). “In order to establish an eighth amendment failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must show

that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to a ‘substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id.

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828).

In doing so, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements, one objective and one

subjective. The first requirement tests whether, viewed objectively, the deprivation

of rights was sufficiently serious; i.e., whether the inmate is incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. The second requirement is

subjective and requires that the inmate prove that the prison official had a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.

Walls v. Tadman, 762 F.3d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

i. Objective Requirement

Moving Defendants do not argue the objective requirement of deliberate indifference.

Upon review, and for the same reasons stated in the Court’s previous Motion to Dismiss Order

(Doc. #14), the Court finds Plaintiff adequately alleges that Deboe was incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff has thus satisfied the objective

requirement.

ii. Subjective Requirement

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants had the

requisite knowledge, either regarding the insufficiencies in prison policies or the particularized

threat made to Deboe, to establish they acted with deliberate indifference. Moving Defendants

contend that Plaintiff instead relies solely on the defendants’ positions in the prison as a basis for

asserting liability against them. Plaintiff argues that she does allege the defendants had actual

knowledge to satisfy the subjective requirement. The Court, in part, agrees with Plaintiff.

“In a § 1983 case, an official ‘is only liable for his . . . own misconduct’ and is not

‘accountable for the misdeeds of [his] agents’ under a theory such as respondeat superior or

supervisor liability.” Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677). “Further, a warden’s general responsibility for supervising the

operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement.” Ouzts v. Cummings,

825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987). “These defendants are thus liable only if they personally

displayed deliberate indifference to the risk that [the inmate] would be assaulted[.]” Whitson,

602 F.3d at 928. “An official is deliberately indifferent if he or she actually knows of the

substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably to it.” Young, 508 F.3d at 873 (internal citation

omitted). “Negligence, and . . . even gross negligence . . . is insufficient to prove a violation of

[the inmate’s] constitutional rights.” Tucker, 276 F.3d at 1002.

The Court finds the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges facts which plausibly

support the inference that the defendants knew of the particular risk to Deboe’s health and safety

posed by Logan. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants knew Logan was a violent offender, a

white supremacist, that he had previously attacked two guards, and that he had removed a desk

leg which he later turned into a weapon. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants knew of the

recorded phone conversation in which either Millsap or Logan indicated a desk leg would make

a good weapon and then began destroying the desk. (Doc. #32, ¶ 76.) Plaintiff also alleges

Logan and Millsap threatened to kill Deboe and that he reported his fears for his life. While the

Amended Complaint is not clear as to whom the report was made to, this lack of clarification

does not warrant dismissal of this claims, particularly because Plaintiff specifically alleges

“Defendants knew . . . that Logan and Millsap had threatened to kill Mr. Deboe.” (Doc. #32,

¶ 40.) The Court finds that these allegations, taken as true, plausibly state that the defendants

had direct knowledge of the particularized threat to Deboe’s health and safety.

At this early stage, the Court finds the Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts which

plausibly support the inference that the defendants had knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to

Deboe and that Plaintiff does not solely impute knowledge on the defendants due to their role as

a correctional officer or supervisor. The defendants’ alleged failure to isolate Deboe, Logan, or

Millsap, investigate the location of the desk leg, or otherwise act in the face of the substantial

risk plausibly supports the inference that the defendants had the requisite culpable state of mind

to support the subjective requirement of deliberate indifference. Thus, the Court finds Count I

states a claim under § 1983.

To the extent Plaintiff argues in Count I that the defendants “should have known” these

facts and that their response (or lack thereof) amounts to gross negligence, those theories of

liability fail to state a claim. As previously stated, even gross negligence is insufficient to find

the defendants liable. See Tucker, 276 F.3d at 1002. Plaintiff also summarily alleges that the

defendants allowed violent attacks to occur with such frequency to put the staff on notice of a

substantial risk of harm, and that inadequacy of the polices, practices, and procedures made it

foreseeable that an attack would occur. As discussed in more detail below, the Court agrees with

the defendants that these assertions by themselves are not supported by facts as to impute

knowledge on Defendant Wardens as to the risk to Deboe’s health and safety. The Court thus

finds Count I states a claim under § 1983 against the defendants only to the extent it is based on

the allegations that the defendants had actual knowledge of the substantial risk of harm.

In sum, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the defendants’ direct knowledge of the risk to

Deboe and that they failed to reasonably act, and the Court determines that the defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity on the face of the Amended Complaint as to Count I. The truth of

the defendants’ actual knowledge of the substantial risk of harm, and their deliberate indifference

to it, is best determined after the benefit of discovery.

2. Counts II, III, and IV – Failure to Train, Negligent Assignment, Negligent

Supervision

Counts II, III, and IV allege Defendant Wardens are liable for their failure to protect

Deboe based on their alleged failure to train (Count II), negligent assignment (Count III), and

negligent supervision (Count IV). Moving Defendants argue that beyond the mere assertion that

Defendant Wardens failed to train, assign, or supervise staff, the Amended Complaint does not

allege sufficient facts to state a claim under § 1983. Plaintiff argues that the Amended

Complaint alleges sufficient facts which demonstrate Defendant Wardens have failed to

implement effective training and procedures to prepare guards for such emergencies as Deboe

faced.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 if he or she directly participates in a constitutional

violation or “if a failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee caused a

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996).

“A failure-to-supervise claim may be maintained only if the official demonstrated deliberate

indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts.” Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550

(8th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “This requires a showing that the

supervisor had notice that the training procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to

result in a constitutional violation.” Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1078.

In other words, “[w]hen a supervising official who had no direct participation in an

alleged constitutional violation is sued for failure to train or supervise the offending actor, the

supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity unless plaintiff proves that the supervisor (1)

received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by a subordinate, and (2) was

deliberately indifferent to or authorized those acts.” S.M. v. Krigbaun, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th

Cir. 2015) (citing Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 355 (8th Cir. 2012)). “This rigorous standard

requires proof that the supervisor had notice of a pattern of conduct by the subordinate that

violated a clearly established constitutional right. Allegations of generalized notice are

insufficient.” S.M., 808 F.3d at 340. At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not “plead

the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of

Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003). But “[a]t a minimum, the complaint must allege

facts which would support the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.” Id.

Supervisory liability will ordinarily not be imposed based upon a “single incident, or a series of

isolated incidents.” Howard v. Adkinson, 887 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989).

Upon review, the Court agrees with Moving Defendants. Plaintiff does not allege a

pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates which suggests that the risk to

Deboe’s health and safety were the result of an unconstitutional policy of training, assignment, or

supervision. Plaintiff does allege that Defendant Wardens “[a]llow[ed] such violent attacks to

occur with sufficient frequency as to place the Wardens and guards on notice and to create a

pervasive risk of harm that put prisoners in reasonable fear of harm” and “fail[ed] to put in place

adequate conditions or procedures to prevent such incidents from occurring when they

individually and collectively knew . . . the practices of [WRDCC] made it highly foreseeable that

some inmates, and in particular, [Deboe] would be killed by violent inmates[.]” (Doc. #32,

¶¶ 72(j)-73.)

The Court finds these are mere legal conclusions. Instead, the facts of the Amended

Complaint suggest Deboe’s substantial risk of harm was an isolated incident. While the alleged

facts support a plausible inference that Korneman and Crews personally knew of a substantial

risk of harm and failed to protect Deboe, there are no alleged facts from which it could be

inferred that WRDCC had a policy, custom, or practice of not investigating property damage or

reported threats, guards abandoning their post as prisoners were released from their cells,

allowing prisoners to harness weapons for multiple days, or allowing some prisoners to move

freely while others were on lock down. Counts II, III, and IV thus fail to state a § 1983 claim.

Regarding Count III and Count IV, the Court again reiterates that negligence, even gross

negligence, and respondeat superior theories of liability do not state a claim under § 1983.

However, the Court notes that “[w]hen a complaint is filed, a plaintiff may not be privy to

the facts necessary to accurately describe or identify any policies or customs which may have

caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Doe, 340 F.3d at 614. This observation is

particularly true where, as here, Plaintiff is suing on behalf of a deceased inmate and is therefore

even further removed from the policies and customs of WRDCC. In turn, while Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint at this time does not allege a pattern of unconstitutional conduct, the

allegations do not entirely foreclose the possibility that a policy, practice, or unofficial custom of

unconstitutional conduct could be found during discovery. As such, Counts II, III, and IV as to

Korneman and Crews are dismissed without prejudice.

3. Count V – Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Treatment

Moving Defendants argue Count V should be dismissed because Plaintiff “proffers no

allegations of Defendant Wardens’ knowledge of [Deboe’s] medical condition at the time of the

stabbing” and for Plaintiff’s failure to allege the defendants’ personal involvement. (Doc. #33,

p. 9.) Plaintiff argues that she does adequately allege Defendant Officers’ personal involvement,

and that Defendant Wardens are liable for failing to staff and adequately train prison guards.

The parties’ arguments are addressed in turn.

It is well-established that “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a

prisoner constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir.

1996) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 102-03 (1976)). “A prison official exhibits

deliberate indifference when the official actually knows of and disregards a prisoner’s serious

medical needs.” Id. (quotations marks and citations omitted). Unlike the allegations that

Korneman and Crews knew of the substantial risk of harm by Logan leading up to the stabbing,

Plaintiff does not allege that Korneman and Crews knew that Deboe had serious medical needs at

the time of the stabbing. No facts are alleged in which the Court can infer Korneman and Crews

directly participated in the decision to ignore inmate calls for medical attention or delay Deboe’s

treatment. The Court thus finds Plaintiff fails to allege Korneman’s and Crews’ deliberate

indifference to Deboe’s serious medical needs.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to recover on a theory of supervisory liability, the Court

finds Count V fails for the same reasons as Counts II, III, and IV. Plaintiff does not allege that

Korneman, Crews, or WRDCC had a policy or custom which unconstitutionally delayed the

medical treatment for injured inmates, nor pleads facts which indicate that Deboe’s situation was

more than an isolated incident. In turn, Count V fails to state a claim under § 1983 as it pertains

to Korneman and Crews. However, because discovery is ongoing, evidence of Korneman’s and

Crews’s knowledge of a policy, practice, or unofficial custom of unconstitutional conduct could

be found. Therefore, Count V against Korneman and Crews in their individual capacity is

dismissed without prejudice.

Regarding the Defendant Officers, Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference. Plaintiff

alleges that McCarty, Hurt, and Reed ignored inmate screams. Plaintiff also alleges that

Fritzinger, Deshon, and Deweese ignored the institutional lockdown, and Fritzinger and other

staff ignored the medical emergency call. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that McCarty, Hurt, and

other staff stood over Deboe as he died instead of addressing his obvious, serious medical needs.

The Court finds these allegations are sufficient to state a claim based on Defendant Officers’

deliberate indifference to Deboe’s known serious medical needs. In turn, Moving Defendants’

motion is denied on this point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint (Doc. #33) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion

is GRANTED insofar as all official-capacity claims are dismissed, Brownlow is dismissed, and

the individual-capacity claims against Korneman and Crews in Counts II, III, IV, and V are

dismissed without prejudice. The motion is DENIED insofar as the Count I individual-capacity

claims against Korneman, Crews, and Defendant Officers survive, but only to the extent they are

based on their actual knowledge, and Count V against Defendant Officers survives.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Stephen R. Bough

STEPHEN R. BOUGH

Dated: January 7, 2022 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE