Baca v. City of Parkville

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

ST. JOSEPH DIVISION

THERESA BACA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 5:19-cv-06057-RK

)

CITY OF PARKVILLE, PARKVILLE )

POLICE DEPARTMENT, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Defendants City of Parkville and Parkville Police Department’s motion

for summary judgment. (Doc. 65.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 66, 69, 70, 79.) After

careful consideration and for the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. The motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful prosecution for

resisting arrest (Count IV) inasmuch as Monell liability as to Defendant City of Parkville rests on

a decision by the city prosecutor. The motion is granted in all other respects.

Background1

On March 25, 2017, Plaintiff Theresa Baca was driving in Parkville, Missouri, when she

was pulled over by Parkville Police Officer Eric Sollars. Several of Plaintiffs’ friends were riding

in the car with her. Officer Sollars initiated the traffic stop after he witnessed Plaintiff fail to

properly signal a left-hand turn. Officer Sollars’ in-dash camera and interior camera recorded

audio and video of the interaction.

Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and is a rape survivor; as a

result, she is fearful of men. Officer Sollars approached the passenger side of Plaintiff’s vehicle

and obtained her identifying information and vehicle registration. Officer Sollars then contacted

dispatch who informed him that Plaintiff had an active arrest warrant for assault by the City of

Independence, Missouri. After Parkville Police Officer Dakota Haynes arrived on the scene,

Officer Sollars and Officer Haynes approached Plaintiff’s vehicle together. Officer Sollars

1 The following facts are taken from the parties’ statements of uncontroverted material facts. The

Court has omitted properly controverted facts, asserted facts that are immaterial to the resolution of the

pending motion, asserted facts that are not properly supported by admissible evidence, legal conclusions,

and argument presented as an assertion of fact.

approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked Plaintiff to exit the vehicle. After she did

so, Officer Sollars informed her of the warrant for her arrest and that she was going to be taken

into custody. Plaintiff told Officer Sollars that the only person she knew in Independence was her

son’s father, whom she was “in a DV shelter from.” She stated that she wanted to know more

information before getting into a car with two men. Officer Sollars told Plaintiff she would need

to address the substance of the warrant with Independence. Plaintiff asked the police officers to

call a female officer. Officer Sollars responded, “we don’t have a female officer” and “I can still

take you into custody.” Officer Sollars instructed Plaintiff to turn around and place her hands

behind her back, and that if she did not do so she would be resisting arrest. As Plaintiff turned

around, Officer Sollars moved toward Plaintiff and told her to place her hands at the small of her

back. When Plaintiff began to turn away from him, Officer Sollars touched Plaintiff’s arm to

attempt to place her hands behind her back and into handcuffs. Plaintiff’s PTSD symptoms were

triggered and she told the police officers to “please don’t touch me like that” and “you don’t

understand, I’ve been raped,” as she moved and struggled against the officers’ attempts to take her

into custody. Plaintiff and her friends stated that she suffers from PTSD and asked if the officers

were trained about PTSD. The officers had difficulty placing Plaintiff into handcuffs; they told

her to stop resisting and twisted her arms behind her back, using their body weight to push her

against the rear of her vehicle. It took the officers approximately four minutes to properly secure

Plaintiff in handcuffs due to her movements and actions that prevented them from doing so.

After she was secured in handcuffs, Officer Sollars conducted a pat-down search on the

outside of Plaintiff’s clothing to check for weapons (a standard and cursory search he performs

whenever he places an individual under arrest). Officer Sollars and Officer Haynes placed Plaintiff

in the back of Officer Sollars’ patrol vehicle. Officer Sollars testified at his deposition he had

probable cause to believe Plaintiff was resisting arrest based on her failure to comply with his

instructions to place her hands behind her back, attempting to pull her arms and body away from

him, kicking her feet, and moving her body.

Officer Sollars requested that a female officer meet him at the police station to assist in

booking Plaintiff and was told a female officer would be available in approximately fifteen minutes

at the Parkville police station. Sergeant Kat Smith, a female officer with the Parkville Police

Department, assisted Plaintiff through the booking process.

After the booking process was complete, Plaintiff was transferred to the Platte County

Detention Center. Independence declined to have Plaintiff transferred to their jurisdiction and was

willing to allow her to be released on bond. Because she had been charged with resisting arrest,

however, Plaintiff remained at the Detention Center for two days under a “Municipal Hold.”

Legal Standard

The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and giv[es] the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.”

Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). “If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for

the nonmoving party, summary judgment should be granted.” Smith-Bunge v. Wis. Central, Ltd.,

946 F.3d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

At the summary judgment stage, the movant must “support” its motion either by “citing to

particular parts of materials in the record” or by “‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district

court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

In resisting summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in its

pleadings, but must, by affidavit and other evidence, set forth specific facts showing that a genuine

issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527

(8th Cir. 2007) (mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond a nonmoving

party’s own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment). An

“adverse party may not rely merely on allegations or denials, but must set out specific facts – by

affidavits or other evidence – showing [a] genuine issue for trial.” Tweeton v. Frandrup, 287 F.

App’x 541, 541 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). In so doing, the nonmoving party

“cannot create sham issues of fact in an effort to defeat summary judgment.” RSBI Aerospace,

Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). To controvert a

factual position, the nonmoving party must “refer specifically to those portions of the record upon

which [he] relies.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 461 F.3d 982, 990 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation

omitted).

Discussion

Plaintiff brings two claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

42 U.S.C. § 12132, for wrongful arrest and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. She

also asserts two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force and wrongful arrest and

prosecution, as well as a claim that the officers violated her substantive due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against the City of Parkville, Missouri,

(“the City”) and the Parkville Police Department. She does not assert any claims against the

individual officers.

I. Counts I and II – ADA Claims

In Counts I and II Plaintiff brings several claims under the ADA against both Defendants

based on the officers’ actions during the traffic stop that culminated in her arrest and detention for

resisting arrest. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the police officers discriminated against her based

on her disability by arresting her for resisting arrest when the conduct for which she was arrested

was related to her PTSD disability. Plaintiff also claims Defendants failed to accommodate her

PTSD disability in the course of her arrest and prosecution for resisting arrest and failed to properly

train the police officers in dealing with persons suffering from PTSD. Defendants argue they are

entitled to summary judgment because Officer Sollars and Officer Haynes did not violate the ADA

by arresting Plaintiff for resisting arrest because they perceived her behavior as unlawful, and she

was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant rather than because of her disability. Defendants

also argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the ADA does not apply to traffic stops

and Plaintiff’s accommodation request was not reasonable under the circumstances.

The ADA prohibits the “exclu[sion] from participation,” the “den[ial of] the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” or “discrimination by any such entity” based

on the disability of a qualified individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.2 The ADA defines “public

entit[ies]” to which the ADA applies as including “any department, agency, . . . or other

instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B).

A. Wrongful Arrest Theory

First, Plaintiff advances the theory of a claim under the ADA based on “the officers[]

unreasonably mistak[ing] an innocent, disability-related behavior for criminal conduct.” Roberts,

723 F.3d at 973 (citing Jackson v. Inhabitants of the Town of Sanford, No. 94-12 P-H, 1994 WL

2 Defendants do not contest Plaintiff is disabled under the ADA.

589617, at *1, 6 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994)); see Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir.

1999) (this theory of ADA liability is based on police “wrongly arrest[ing] someone with a

disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity”) (citing

Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp, 175, 178 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 1997) (citing Jackson).

As a factual matter, this case is distinguishable from these cited cases (including Roberts

and Jackson, on which Plaintiff expressly relies). In each of the above cases applying this theory

of ADA liability, the plaintiff seeking to recover damages was arrested solely for conduct

perceived as criminal by law enforcement that was, in actuality, a function or outcome of the

plaintiff’s disability. In Jackson, for instance, police arrested plaintiff for driving under the

influence when, in actuality, what the officers observed (slurred speech and partial paralysis) was

the result of plaintiff having suffered a brain aneurysm several years earlier. 1994 WL 589617, at

*1. The same is true in Roberts. In that case, the ADA claim rested on responding officers

shooting and killing an individual who had been diagnosed with a mental disability and paranoid

schizophrenia and was having a psychotic episode; shooting him after he refused officers’

commands to lie down on the floor and drew a knife and stabbed at the officers while they

attempted to physically restrain him. Roberts, 723 F.3d at 970. Similarly, in Gohier, the plaintiff

sought damages under the ADA after police officers shot and killed Gohier who suffered mental

health issues when he began advancing towards officers with an object in his hand and swung it

down and forward in a stabbing motion. 186 F.3d at 1217-18. Finally, in Lewis, the plaintiff

pursued an ADA claim for damages after the police arrested plaintiff for resisting law enforcement

but in reality, plaintiff was deaf and the officers refused to try to communicate with him by writing

on paper while giving him orders to follow. 960 F. Supp. at 176.

In the present case, Officer Sollars and Officer Haynes initiated Plaintiff’s arrest not on the

basis of any disability-related conduct they perceived as criminal but because she had an active

warrant for her arrest for assault from another jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s claim is not so much that

she was arrested “for” resisting arrest (which she contends was due to her disability) but that she

was criminally charged with and detained under a Municipal Hold for conduct the officers

perceived as criminal but that was involuntary disability-related conduct. Plaintiff provides no

legal support for her argument that the “wrongful arrest” theory for claims made under the ADA

applies in this circumstance, particularly when she was at a minimum arrested “for” wholly non-

disability-related conduct or reason (the active arrest warrant) if alongside the additional reason

(resisting arrest) that Plaintiff contends was misperceived. Nonetheless, assuming this is a viable

claim under the ADA, Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment.

In pursuing a claim under the ADA for wrongful arrest, federal courts have recognized that

“a plaintiff must establish three elements: (i) the plaintiff was disabled, (ii) the arresting officers

knew or should have known that the plaintiff was disabled, and (iii) the defendant arrested the

plaintiff because of legal conduct related to the plaintiff’s disability.” J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo

Cty., No. CIV 12-0128 JB/LAM, 2014 WL 3421037, at *76 (D.N.M. July 8, 2014) (citation

omitted). When applying this theory, federal courts have held “the conduct that is mistaken for

criminal activity must actually be lawful.” Sperry v. Maes, No. 10-cv-03171-RPM, 2013 WL

3465784, at *5 (D. Colo. July 10, 2013) (comparing Jackson, “a case where a stroke victim was

arrested for driving under the influence, even though he had actually been driving sober” and

Lewis, “a case where a deaf man was charged with resisting arrest, when in fact he simply could

not hear the officers’ orders,” with Gohier, holding the theory did not apply when a schizophrenic

man physically threatened a police officer even though the behavior was related to his disability);

accord Glover v. City of Wilmington, 966 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428-29 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2013) (“The

essence of this theory is that the police mistake legal conduct caused by the disability of illegal

conduct.”) These cases reveal the critical defect in Plaintiff’s case for ADA liability for wrongful

arrest.

The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that she should not have been separately charged with

and detained under a Municipal Hold for resisting arrest because what the officers objectively

viewed as her resisting their lawful arrest was actually an involuntary reaction from her PTSD

disability. This argument appears to improperly conflate lack of criminal liability with civil

liability under the ADA, however. That the reason underlying Plaintiff’s bodily movements or

behavior when the officers moved to physically place her in handcuffs after she refused their

instructions to allow them to do so may well have ultimately absolved her of any criminal liability

does not mean she was necessarily charged with resisting arrest based on “lawful conduct related

to [her] disability.” Indeed, Plaintiff does not argue the conduct or behavior perceived by Officer

Sollars and Officer Haynes as her resisting arrest was legal; rather, she argues her behavior and

conduct was involuntary and was triggered by the officers reaching to physically secure her in

handcuffs.

Although cited by neither party, the Court finds particularly persuasive Hoolihan v.

Clayton County, Georgia, No. 1:10-cv-01753-SCJ, 2012 WL 12888679 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2012),

aff’d 507 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013). In Hoolihan, a diabetic plaintiff sued the county after he

was arrested for battery and obstruction (charges which were later dismissed) while suffering a

diabetic episode. While returning home from work, plaintiff became disoriented and parked his

car in a parking lot. Id. at *1. Officers on patrol approached plaintiff’s car when they noticed it

was parked improperly in the parking lot at an unusual hour. Id. As the officers approached the

car, they saw it was still running and that plaintiff was slumped over the center console. Id. One

of the officers knocked on the driver’s side window and plaintiff responded with incoherent

mumbling. Id. Plaintiff did not respond when one of the officers asked him to put the car in “park”

and to unlock the door. The officers then broke a back window so they could place the car (which

was still in drive) in “park.” Id.

As one of the officers tried to unlock the driver’s side door from inside the back seat,

plaintiff turned towards him, grabbed the officer’s arm and wrist, and began punching the officer.

Id. The officer and plaintiff began fighting in the back seat of the car. Id. The other officer opened

the passenger side door, which had been unlocked during the struggle, and pulled plaintiff out of

the car. Id. at *2. The officers struggled with plaintiff while trying to handcuff him and physically

restrain him. Id. The officers called for medical assistance and after the ambulance arrived,

discovered plaintiff had had a “diabetic issue.” Id. Plaintiff recalled finding himself in the

ambulance handcuffed to the stretcher with injuries on his face, wrist, and leg. Id. The district

court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the officers had violated the ADA by arresting him for

disability-related conduct confused with criminal activity. Id. at *8. The court held: “Mr.

Hoolihan was not arrested for legal conduct related to his medical condition, rather he was arrested

for his actions, which under the circumstances could have been reasonably viewed to be intentional

and, thus, unlawful.” Id. at *8.

The same is true here. Plaintiff was not arrested for legal conduct but instead was arrested

for actions that could have reasonably been viewed as unlawful. Again, Plaintiff argues only her

conduct was “involuntary,” not that it was necessarily legal conduct. The undisputed facts show

Plaintiff was not arrested and charged for “legal conduct related to [her] medical condition.”

Plaintiff verbally and then physically resisted the officers’ instructions to place her hands behind

her back so they could place her in handcuffs to arrest her based upon the active arrest warrant.

To the extent Plaintiff was arrested for the physical conduct and bodily movements the officers

perceived as resisting arrest (and because of which it took the officers four minutes of struggling

to place Plaintiff in handcuffs) Plaintiff was arrested for her actions that could reasonably have

been viewed as unlawfully resisting arrest. Moreover, like Hoolihan, it is undisputed that Officers

Sollars and Haynes were told about Plaintiff’s PTSD diagnoses only after she refused to follow

the officers’ instructions and began to struggle with them when they moved to place her in

handcuffs.3 Even if the wrongful-arrest theory applies under these circumstances (which the Court

is doubtful), Defendants did not violate the ADA by charging Plaintiff with (and detaining her

under a Municipal Hold for) resisting arrest, notwithstanding she suffers a disability under the

ADA. See also Bates ex rel. Johns v. Chesterfield Cty., Va., 216 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2000)

(finding no ADA violation where plaintiff – who was autistic – was not arrested because of his

disability but because of “objectively verifiable misconduct” when plaintiff assaulted a police

officer, even though plaintiff argued the struggle that ensued would not have occurred but for the

officer detaining and arresting him and the struggle ensued because of his disability).

B. Reasonable Accommodation Theory

Second, Plaintiff argues the officers failed to reasonably accommodate her disability when

taking her into custody. Whether officers reasonably accommodate an individual in the context of

an arrest is “highly fact-specific and varies depending on the circumstances of each case, including

the exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity and safety concerns.” Bahl v. Cty. of

Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Bircoll v. Mami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072,

1086 (11th Cir. 2007)). This is so because, as the Eighth Circuit has reasoned, “[t]he duties of

police officers during a traffic stop call for the exercise of significant judgment and discretion, and

[courts] will not second guess those judgments, where . . . an officer is presented with exigent or

unexpected circumstances” under which “it would be unreasonable to require that certain

accommodations be made in light of overriding public safety concerns.” Id. at 785 (citations

omitted). Additionally, in this context, “a duty to reasonably accommodate a person’s disability

during an arrest . . . arise[s] only if [the officer] had known that [the arrestee] needed an

accommodation.” J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo Cty., 806 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2015)

3 To the extent Plaintiff requested a female officer and told the officers she was in a domestic

violence shelter from her son’s father, these facts go to Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim rather

than her ADA claim under the wrongful arrest theory.

(citation omitted); see Thompson v. Badgujar, No. 20-cv-1272-PWG, 2021 WL 3472130, at *9

(D. Md. Aug. 6, 2021) (“when it comes to holding public entities liable under the ADA, a plaintiff

must establish knowledge on that entity’s part, meaning the entity is aware of a ‘known physical

or mental limitation,’ evincing a clear need for accommodation”) (collecting cases).

Here, Plaintiff argues the officers violated the ADA and failed to accommodate her

disability by not asking about or awaiting the arrival of a female officer. Plaintiff argues that she

had followed the officers’ instructions to get out of the car, had told them she was in a domestic

violence shelter from her son’s father, and had requested a female officer. By that point, however,

the officers had learned Plaintiff had an active warrant for her arrest for assault and had told her

she was going to be taken into custody based on that warrant. It is undisputed that neither Plaintiff

nor her friends had mentioned she suffered from or was diagnosed with PTSD at that point. By

the time Plaintiff and her friends told the officers she suffered from PTSD, Plaintiff had already

begun physically resisting and struggling against the officers’ attempt to secure her in handcuffs

and arrest her. The Court is sensitive and sympathetic to Plaintiff’s PTSD diagnosis and symptoms

of that diagnoses and the effect it undoubtedly has on Plaintiff’s daily life. Under these

circumstances, however, the officers did not violate the ADA by moving to take Plaintiff into

custody on the active arrest warrant and to secure a scene involving multiple other persons in

Plaintiff’s car and then, most especially, after Plaintiff began physically resisting the officers’

attempt to handcuff her.

Apart from not waiting for a female officer, Plaintiff’s related argument that the officers

failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability by using physical force against her to take her into

custody similarly fails. Plaintiff did not follow the officers’ commands to place her hands and

arms behind her back to take her into custody on the arrest warrant and began physically struggling

when the officers touched her arm to place her in handcuffs. It is not disputed that only after the

officers moved to physically place Plaintiff’s hands and arms behind her back (and after she started

physically resisting) that they were told Plaintiff suffered from PTSD. Given Plaintiff’s verbal

and then physical resistance to being arrested and placed in handcuffs under the active arrest

warrant (whether because her PTSD was triggered or not), the officers did not violate the ADA by

using physical force against her to place her in handcuffs.

Finally, Plaintiff argues the officers’ pat-down search after securing her in custody, without

waiting for a female officer, constitutes a failure to accommodate her disability. Given the need

to further secure the scene before placing Plaintiff in a patrol vehicle (and considering the several

other persons in Plaintiff’s car), the officers did not violate the ADA to the extent they conducted

a cursory pat-down search after finally securing Plaintiff in handcuffs after several minutes of

struggling to arrest her.4

C. Conclusion

Because the Court finds the officers did not violate the ADA by wrongfully arresting

Plaintiff because of her disability or failing to make reasonable accommodations for her disability

in security the traffic stop and taking her into custody, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on Counts I and II. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Counts I and II.

II. Counts III and IV – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff asserts two claims under § 1983 for excessive force and

unlawful arrest/prosecution against both Defendants.

A. Defendant Parkville Police Department

First, Defendant Parkville Police Department argues it is entitled to summary judgment

because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued. Plaintiff concedes that the City, and not the

Parkville Police Department, is the sole party liable for the claims she asserts in her petition. (Doc.

69 at 55 n.1.) The Court agrees. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th

Cir. 1992) (dismissing § 1983 complaint against West Memphis Police Department because it is

“not [a] juridical entit[y] suable as such” but is “simply [a] department[] or subdivision[] of the

City government”); Running Shield v. Huether, No. 4:17-CV-04095-LLP, 2018 WL 3651353, at

*3 (S.D. 2018) (granting summary judgment to Sioux Falls Police Department as an entity not

amenable to § 1983 lawsuit; collecting cases); Mosley v. Reeves, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053-54

(E.D. Mo. 2000).

Moreover, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3), the Parkville Police

Department’s capacity to be sued is determined by the laws of the State of Missouri. “The Missouri

Supreme Court held long ago that departments of a municipality cannot be sued unless statutory

4 Having found the evidence demonstrates no violation of the ADA under these circumstances,

Plaintiff’s claims for failure-to-train under the ADA must also fail. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s failure-to-train

claim would fail on the merits. See Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527-28 (8th Cir.

2007) (holding city did not violate individual’s ADA rights because “[i]t was not the City’s failure to train

its officers, but Alfred’s apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting,”

notwithstanding Alfred’s bipolar disorder diagnosis).

authorization to sue and be sued has been given to the departments.” Catlett v. Jefferson Cty., 299

F. Supp. 2d 967, 969 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (citing Am. Fire Alarm Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of

Kansas City, 227 S.W. 114, 117 (Mo. 1920); White v. Camden Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 106 S.W.3d

626, 631 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003) (holding that a county sheriff’s department is not a legal entity

capable of being sued); other citation omitted). Because the Court finds no statutory authority

granting the Parkville Police Department the ability to sue or to be sued, the entity is a department

of the city and is not subject to suit. See Reed v. Choice Hotels, Inc., No. 05-3133-CV-S-SWH,

2005 WL 8157325, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2005) (holding that the Springfield Police

Department is not subject to suit under § 1983, granting the Department’s motion to dismiss).

Accordingly, because it is a non-suable entity, Defendant Parkville Police Department is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Plaintiff’s claims asserted in Counts III and IV against the Parkville Police Department. See, e.g.,

Willis v. Rock Hill Mech. Corp., No. 4:19 CV 952 RWS, 2021 WL 4476740, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Sept.

30, 2021).

B. Section 1983 – Municipal Liability

Next, the City argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff does not show

she is entitled to relief under § 1983 for excessive force and unlawful arrest/prosecution.

It is well established that municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be based on a respondeat

superior theory (that is, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 “solely because it

employs a tortfeasor”). Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minn., 486 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 2007)

(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Rather, municipal liability under

§ 1983 rests only upon some “‘action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature [that]

caused a constitutional tort.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Under Monell, the City may

be liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation that results from (1) an official municipal

policy; (2) an unofficial municipal custom; or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or

supervise. Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013).

Additionally, a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional

violation by the individual officers. Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th

Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)) (other citation omitted);

see Williams v. City of Carl Junction, Mo., 480 F.3d 871, 878 (8th Cir. 2007).

1. Excessive Force

First, the City argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim

because there is no underlying constitutional violation. See Sanders, 474 F.3d at 527 (“[w]ithout

a constitutional violation by the individual officers, there can be no § 1983 or Monell . . . municipal

liability”; citation omitted); Schuettle v. Jefferson Cty., 788 F.3d 855, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2015)

(affirming summary judgment in favor of county where plaintiff failed to establish that the

individual law enforcement officers violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights). The Court agrees.

“An officer’s use of force violates the Fourth Amendment when it is objectively

unreasonable, given the facts and circumstances of the particular case, as judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The necessary inquiry is “whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is

‘reasonable.’” Id. at 906 (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Winters v. Adams, 254

F.3d 758, 765 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Law enforcement

officers may use physical force to subdue an arrestee who fails to comply with orders during

handcuffing. Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

The Court concludes it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Plaintiff was

resisting arrest when she refused their instruction to place her hands behind her back and when she

twisted away as Officer Sollars grabbed her arm to place her in handcuffs. Officer Sollars had told

Plaintiff she was going to be arrested under the active warrant and that if she did not turn around

and place her hands on the small of her back, she would be resisting arrest. It was only at the point

Plaintiff began to turn away from the officers that they grabbed her arms to place them behind her

back and secure her in handcuffs. It is undisputed Plaintiff then tensed up, twisted away, and

physically resisted the officers’ attempt to place her in handcuffs. To the extent the officers used

physical force against Plaintiff – placing her arms behind her back, using their body weight to push

her against the rear bumper of the car, and grabbing her arms – this force was objectively

reasonable.

Plaintiff also argues that her reaction to the officers touching her and trying to place her

hands behind her back (that is, being unable to stand, tensing up, shaking, etc.) was an involuntary

reaction due to her PTSD. This argument is unavailing, however. It is significant that Plaintiff

and her friends stated she had PTSD only after the officers learned of the active arrest warrant,

experienced Plaintiff’s resistance, and began to physically try to secure Plaintiff in handcuffs after

she initially began resisting. In Schoettle v. Jefferson County, 788 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2015), a

plaintiff alleging excessive force during his arrest argued that the force used in his arrest (including

being physically removed from his truck, the restraint of his arms, being forced to the ground, the

employment of pepper-spray, and strikes to his head and body) was unreasonable because at the

time he was suffering a diabetes-related reaction. The plaintiff argued the defendants were not

entitled to summary judgment because there was a material dispute whether the officers knew he

was experiencing a medical emergency. The Eighth Circuit reasoned:

It is certainly true that an officers’ knowledge of an arrestee’s medical

condition can be relevant to a determination of whether the officer employed

excessive force. After all, Graham [v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989),] instructs that

we are to determine whether the level of force was objectively reasonable in light

of the facts and circumstances confronting the officers at [the] time the force was

used. However, we are persuaded by the record before us that the level of force

used by the officers against Schoettle was objectively reasonable, regardless of

when they learned that he was experiencing a medical emergency.

. . .

. . . [T]he record indisputably shows that even if the officers became aware

at some point during their interaction with Schoettle that he was suffering a

hypoglycemic episode, they were still confronted with a belligerent and impaired

man who was refusing to comply with their orders to exit the vehicle and who was

physically resisting their attempts to remove him from it.

Id. at 861 (citation omitted).

Here, even accepting as true that Officer Sollars and Officer Haynes learned Plaintiff was

suffering from PTSD symptoms while they were trying to place her in handcuffs, they were still

faced with an individual with an active arrest warrant for assault who refused the officers’ multiple

orders to turn around and place her hands behind her back to be handcuffed, and who pulled away

and otherwise physically resisted their attempts to secure her in handcuffs. It was objectively

reasonable under these circumstances for the officers to physically grab her arms and place them

behind her back and to use their body weight to push Plaintiff against the rear bumper of her car

to secure her in handcuffs. Accepting that Plaintiff’s reaction when the officers moved to

physically place her in handcuffs (after having failed to comply multiple orders to turn around and

place her hands behind her back) was involuntary and due to her PTSD, the Court finds

nevertheless “the [officers] on the scene reasonably could have interpreted [Plaintiff]’s actions as

resistance and [they] responded with an amount of force that was reasonable to effect the arrest.”

Carpenter, 686 F.3d at 650 (citation omitted). The undisputed facts show it was only after this

initial point the officers learned Plaintiff suffered from PTSD. The officers otherwise used

minimal force to place Plaintiff in handcuffs by placing her arms behind her back; they did not

strike, punch or kick Plaintiff, nor did they utilize weapons or irritants of any kind to garner

compliance. “A de minimus use of force . . . is insufficient to support a finding of a constitutional

violation.” Crumley v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 324 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). Because the Court finds no reasonable jury could find the officers used excessive force

by physically restraining Plaintiff in this instance to effectuate her arrest pursuant to an active

arrest warrant, the City is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See Schuettle, 788 F.3d at

861-62. Therefore, the City’s motion for summary judgment as to Count III is GRANTED.

2. Unlawful Arrest/Prosecution

In Count IV, Plaintiff asserts a claim of unlawful arrest/prosecution. Plaintiff argues her

constitutional rights were violated when she was arrested, detained, and charged for resisting arrest

because Officer Sollars and others knew she did not resist arrest but that her reaction was

involuntary due to her PTSD.

To the extent Plaintiff brings a claim for wrongful arrest, the Court finds the City is entitled

to summary judgment. First, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was arrested on a valid warrant for her

arrest. In the context of a claim of unlawful arrest, a constitutional violation occurs when an

individual is arrested without probable cause. See Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir.

1993) (“If defendants in fact had probable cause to arrest Arnott, then Arnott’s claim for false

arrest [under § 1983] is barred.” Citations omitted.). “It is firmly established that an arrest executed

pursuant to a facially valid warrant generally does not give rise to a cause of action under 4 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against the arresting officer.” Wood v. Wooten, No. 1:18 CV 133 ACL, 2019 WL 5394506,

at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because the officers had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on the warrant, she cannot, as a matter of law, maintain an

unlawful arrest claim under § 1983. See Cox v. N. Towne Mall, No. 95 C 50283, 1997 WL 760505,

at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1997).

Plaintiff also claims her constitutional rights were violated when she was detained and

charged with resisting arrest. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was detained for resisting arrest beyond

the arrest warrant under the Municipal Hold for the resisting arrest charge and was separately

charged with resisting arrest. The City argues it is entitled to summary judgment because the

decision to charge Plaintiff with resisting arrest, was not a decision by a final policymaker. (Doc.

66 at 18.) The Court disagrees.

As the City acknowledges, “[a]though proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity

is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, an unconstitutional government policy can be

inferred from a single decision” made by a final policymaker; that is, a “decisionmaker

possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.”

Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 882 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In

Copeland, the Eighth Circuit held the City of Bella Villa could not be held liable under Monell

because the chief of police (whom the plaintiff alleged used excessive force to effectuate an

unlawful arrest) was not the final policymaker under state law. Specifically, the Court of Appeals

reasoned that under Missouri state law, as a fourth-class city, “the mayor and the board of aldermen

. . . are the final policy makers for the ‘good of the government of the city [and] the preservation

of peace and good order.’” Id. (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 79.110) (alteration in original).

Like the City of Bella Villa, it is undisputed that the City of Parkville is a fourth-class city

under state law. As a fourth-class city, Missouri law provides “[t]he mayor and board of aldermen

. . . shall have power to enact and ordain any and all ordinances . . . such as they shall deem

expedient for the good government of the city, [and] the preservation of peace and good order.”

§ 79.110. State law also provides that the mayor of a fourth-class city (with consent of the majority

of the board of aldermen) “shall have power to appoint a . . . city attorney . . . and such other

officers as he may be authorized by ordinance to appoint.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 79.230. The Parkville

City Ordinances contemplate the appointment of “a City Attorney and City Prosecutor,” with the

latter designated by ordinance to “prosecute cases before the Municipal Court and any appeals

therefrom.” Parkville Ords., §§ 125.010, 125.020. Moreover, state law provides: “It shall be the

duty of an attorney designated by the municipality to prosecute the violations of the municipality’s

ordinances before the municipal judges or before the associate circuit judges hearing the violations

of that municipality’s ordinances.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 479.120.

The Court agrees with the City to the extent Plaintiff argues Officer Sollars (or a sergeant

with whom Officer Sollars spoke after placing Plaintiff in his patrol car) are final policymakers as

to the resisting arrest charge and detention to support Monell liability under § 1983. See also

Copeland, 613 F.3d at 882. On the other hand, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim relies on the decision

by the city prosecutor to charge and/or prosecute her for resisting arrest, Copeland does not aid

the City. Although no Missouri cases appear on point5 the Court finds the City is not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on this argument. While the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of

Parkville hold the power to appoint a city prosecutor (as provided under the city’s ordinances),

state law provides that such appointed attorney has the “duty . . . to prosecute the violations of the

municipality’s ordinances.” “Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses

final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.’” Davis v. City of

Minneapolis, Minn., 490 F.3d 648, 659 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)). Under Missouri law, a city prosecutor is the final decisionmaker

regarding prosecutorial decisions.6 Moreover, the Mayor and City Counsel, by city ordinance,

delegated to the city prosecutor authority to “prosecute cases before the Municipal Court and any

appeals therefrom.” The City’s argument that the city prosecutor is not the final policymaker

regarding Plaintiff’s claim for Monell liability concerning her prosecution for resisting arrest is

without merit. Because this is the only argument the City sets forth in its motion for summary

judgment regarding this claim, the City’s motion for summary judgment as to Count IV is

DENIED as to Plaintiff’s assertion of Monell liability for wrongful prosecution by the city

prosecutor and is GRANTED in all other respects.

III. Count V – Substantive Due Process

In Count V of her petition, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim based on the violation of her

substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff acknowledges in her

summary judgment response, however, that she pled Count V as an alternative to her Fourth

Amendment excessive force and wrongful arrest/prosecution claims.

5 Determining who is a final policymaker is a matter of state law. See Copeland, 613 F.3d at 882.

“When there is no state supreme court case directly on point, [the Court’s] role is to predict how the state

supreme court would rule if faced with the same issue before [the Court].” Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc.,

601 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

6 While there appears to be no caselaw that considers §§ 79.110, 79.230, and 479.120, and very

limited caselaw construing each statute on its own, it appears the Missouri Supreme Court, were it faced

with this question, would rely on “the doctrine of in pari materia . . . [wherein] statutes relating to the same

subject matter should be read together, but where one statute deals with the subject in general terms and the

other deals in a specific way, to the extent they conflict, the specific statute prevails over the general

statute.” State ex rel. Taylor v. Russell, 449 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Mo. banc 2014) (citation and quotation

marks omitted). Here, § 479.120 is the specific statute and §§ 79.110 and 79.230 are, if there is any conflict

at all, the general statutes.

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “‘if a constitutional claim is covered

by a specific constitutional provision, . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard

appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.’” Cty. of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,

272 n.7 (1997)). Plainly, “where Plaintiff’s allegations can be addressed under the Fourth

Amendment, those claims are not also cognizable as violations of substantive due process.” Riley

v. Hessenflow, No. 11-04253-CV-C-NKL, 2013 WL 139650, at *3 (W.D. Mo. 2013). Plaintiff

acknowledges, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force in Count III is

governed by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)

(holding that “excessive force claim[s] aris[ing] in the context of an arrest or an investigatory stop

of a free citizen . . . [are] most properly characterized as . . . invoking the protections of the Fourth

Amendment”); Kasiah v. Crowd Sys., Inc., 915 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying the

Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard to a claim of excessive force in arresting defendant).

The same is true for Count IV’s claim for unlawful arrest/prosecution. Johnson v.

McCarver, 942 F.3d 405, 410-11 (8th Cir. 2019) (claim of arrest without probable cause is

governed by the Fourth Amendment); Hoffert v. Westendorf, 854 F. App’x 93, 96 (8th Cir. 2021)

(claim of “right to be free from prosecution absent probable cause” is “only cognizable under the

Fourth Amendment”); Stewart v. Wagner, 836 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that a

§ 1983 claim for “arrest[] or prosecut[ion] without probable cause . . . ‘must be judged’ under the

Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process”; quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270-

71 & n.4 (1994) (plurality op. joined by seven Justices on this issue)); Johnson v City of

Minneapolis, 901 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2018) (analyzing § 1983 wrongful arrest claim under the

Fourth Amendment).

Plaintiff concedes Counts III and IV are governed by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore,

the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count V, and the City’s motion for summary

judgment as to Count V is GRANTED.

Conclusion

After careful consideration and for the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 65) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is denied

as to Count IV, Plaintiff’s claim of wrongful prosecution for resisting arrest to the extent Monell

liability rests on a decision by the city prosecutor to charge (and detain) her with resisting arrest.

The motion for summary judgment is granted in all other respects and Plaintiff’s claims against

the Parkville Police Department are DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: December 1, 2021