Doe T.L.J. v. University of Central Missouri

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE T.L.J., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:20-00714-CV-RK

)

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL MISSOURI, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 4)

and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 7.) The motions are fully

briefed. (Docs. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14.) After careful consideration, the motion to dismiss

(Doc. 4) is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to amend is DENIED as moot. The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are REMANDED to

the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri.

Background1

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in state court on July 8, 2020, asserting seven counts:

negligent supervision (Count I and II); negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count III);

violations of Title IX (Count IV); general negligence (Count V); breach of contract (Count VI);

and attorney’s fees (Count VII). Plaintiff alleges that while participating in a study abroad program

in Thailand through Defendant, University of Central Missouri, a fellow student, Alex Braud,

sexually assaulted and raped Plaintiff. Following the assault, Plaintiff contacted Dr. Lubaroof, an

employee of Defendant and a chaperone for the program, who then contacted Defendant. Upon

Plaintiff’s return to the United States, she participated in a Title IX investigation where Plaintiff

alleges Defendant acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff, which created a hostile

educational environment and caused Plaintiff to transfer to another university.

Legal Standard

Federal pleading rules provide that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of

1 The following allegations are taken from the Complaint (Doc. 1-1) and accepted as true for

purposes of this motion.

the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8’s pleading

standard must be read in conjunction with Rule 12(b)(6), which tests a pleading’s legal sufficiency.

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim is facially plausible where the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Wilson v. Ark. Dept. of Human Serv., 850 F.3d 368, 371 (8th Cir.

2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While a complaint does not need to include

detailed factual allegations, the complaint must allege more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant acted unlawfully to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 371 (citation omitted). When

considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the well-pled allegations in the

complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996).

Discussion

Under Title IX, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that: (1)

Title IX does not apply extraterritorially to the alleged assault which occurred in Thailand; (2)

Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege the elements of a Title IX claim. The Court will address each

in turn.2

I. Title IX

Title IX, codified under 20 U.S.C. § 1681, states “[n]o person in the United States shall,

on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected

to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex for individuals participating in

federally funded educational programs and provides protections against sexual harassment or

sexual discrimination. The question for this Court is the extraterritorial applicability of Title IX

and whether the elements of the Title IX claim have been sufficiently pleaded.

A. Title IX Does Not Apply Outside of the United States

The plain language of Title IX states, “[n]o person in the United States. . . .” 20 U.S.C.

2 The Court notes that Defendant makes additional arguments to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.

However, because the remaining claims will be remanded, the Court will not address them.

§ 1681(a). Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to meet jurisdictional requirements under Title IX as

the acts in question occurred outside of the United States and the express language of the statute

confines its application to persons in the United States.

In her opposition, Plaintiff relies on King v. Board of Control of Michigan University,

where the Eastern District of Michigan held that Title IX can apply extraterritorially. 221 F. Supp.

2d 783 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The King court stated, “Title IX in broad language, not limited by any

exception for study abroad programs, sweeps within its scope every single university education

program.” Id. at 788. However, King predates Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., where

the Supreme Court held “legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to

apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).

Two other district court decisions after King, Phillips v. St. George’s University, No. 07-

CV-1555 (NGG), 2007 WL 3407728 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2007) and Archut v. Ross University

School of Veterinary Medicine, No. 10–1681 (MLC), 2012 WL 5867148 (D. N.J. Nov. 19, 2012),

held that the federal law in question shall not have extraterritorial application. Phillips, also

predating Morrison, held that Congress did not intend for Title IX to apply extraterritorially.

Phillips, 2007 WL 3407728 at *4-5. Archut, relying on Morrison and affirmed by the Third

Circuit, held that the Rehabilitation Act (RHA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

did not apply extraterritorially because neither the plain text of the statutes nor any outside sources

show an affirmative intention by Congress for the federal laws to have extraterritorial effect. 2012

WL 5867148 at *5-11. This Court finds Archut and Phillips more persuasive, especially in light

of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison. See also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in

Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 FR 30026-01 (“[B]y

its plain text, the Title IX statute does not have extraterritorial application.”). As such, the Court

finds Title IX does not apply extraterritorially. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim under Title IX arising

from events which occurred in Thailand fails.

B. Plaintiff has Not Otherwise Stated a Claim Under Title IX3

Plaintiff alleges additional violations of Title IX surrounding the investigation by the

Defendant when she returned to the United States. For reasons below, these claims also fail.

Pursuant to K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., a defendant may be held liable for damages based on

plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment “only where it is (1) deliberately indifferent (2) to known

acts of discrimination (3) which occur under its control.” 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir., 2017).

Further, “the discrimination must be ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be

said to deprive the victim[] of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the

school.’” Id. (quoting Davis Next Friend La Shonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.

629, 650 (1999).

“A school is deliberately indifferent when its ‘response to the harassment or lack thereof

is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.’” Maher v. Iowa State Univ., 915

F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2763, 204 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (2019) (quoting

Davis, 526 U.S. at 648). “This clearly unreasonable standard is intended to afford flexibility to

school administrators.” Id. (citation omitted). “Victims of peer harassment do not have a Title IX

right to make particular remedial demands.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff alleges Defendant

exercised deliberate indifference in handling the investigation stage of Plaintiff’s claim, which

took place in the United States. Upon her return to the United States, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant failed to remain impartial in its investigation, inferring she had falsified her allegations,

which led to her emotional distress and a negative effect on her body and mind, standing in her

community, reputation, and relationships, ultimately subjecting her to a hostile educational

environment. Plaintiff also alleges that the assailant was only placed on academic probation and

was allowed to remain on campus in the fall. Finally, Plaintiff pleads Defendant failed to properly

investigate Plaintiff’s claims, remain impartial in the investigation, and inferred that Plaintiff

falsified her allegations. The Court is convinced these allegations sufficiently plead deliberate

3 Because the Defendant cannot be liable under Title IX for any actions occurring in Thailand, the

Court now considers whether the Plaintiff has stated a valid Title IX claim concerning the Defendant’s

response to Plaintiff’s allegations. See Doe v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 3d 543, 569 (E.D.

Tenn. 2018) (“When a case is based on a sexual attack, liability for deliberate indifference can flow from

two time periods. Title IX liability can arise from either: (a) when a school exhibits deliberate indifference

before a harassing attack on a student ... in a way that makes the student more vulnerable to the attack itself;

or (b) when a school exhibits deliberate indifference after an attack, that causes a student to endure

additional harassment.”) (cleaned up)).

indifference. However, for the reasons below, the claim still fails.4

As noted above, Plaintiff must allege and prove the discrimination was severe, pervasive,

and objectively offensive. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d at 1059. “In theory, a single instance

of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment could be said to have such an effect, but we

think it unlikely that Congress would have thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in

light of the amount of litigation that would be invited by entertaining claims of official indifference

to a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Williams v. Bd. of

Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[D]iscrimination must

be more widespread than a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). As Plaintiff’s Complaint is limited to a single incident of sexual assault, she

cannot maintain a claim under Title IX and that claim will be dismissed. Id.

II. Jurisdiction

A review of the notice of removal reveals that the Title IX claim was the only basis of

federal jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court may decline jurisdiction over

supplemental claims if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . . .”

Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc., 306 F.3d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). A

“district court maintains discretion to either remand the state law claims or keep them in federal

court.” Id. In Lindsey, the Eighth Circuit held “[u]pon dismissal of the federal claim, the district

court did not err in remanding the supplemental claims to the state court.” In considering whether

to remand remaining claims, the Court considers things such as “judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity.” Swigert v. Royal Liquors, Inc., No. 07-0618-CV-W-HFS, 2007 WL

3376880, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2007) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

350 n. 7 (1988)). “Normally, though not mandatory, when the federal claims are disposed of

before trial, these factors will lead a court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claims.” Id.

Here, the Court is dismissing the Title IX claim. No other federal law claims exist, and the

Court finds it appropriate to remand the remaining state-law claims based on the factors outlined

4 The Court notes an actual knowledge requirement still exists for a Title IX claim alleging

inadequate response. The Court believes that a report of sexual assault to an appropriate person at the

school would satisfy such a requirement. However, the parties did not brief this specific issue, and the

Court is unclear whether Culver-Stockton Coll. is directly applicable in this scenario. As such, and because

further discussion is not required, the Court declines to provide more detailed analysis on this element.

above. The Court further notes that there are remaining issues in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

As those issues involve questions of state law, the Court declines to rule on them.

Conclusion

Accordingly, and after careful consideration, the motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) is GRANTED

in part. Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is

DENIED as moot. The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are REMANDED to the Circuit Court of

Johnson County, Missouri.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: December 28, 2020