Hubbard v. Missouri Department of Mental Health

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

CENTRAL DIVISION

MYRON HUBBARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:18-cv-04201-NKL

)

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF )

MENTAL HEALTH, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Pending before the Court are plaintiff Myron Hubbard’s motion to reconsider, disqualify

counsel, strike, and compel mediation, Doc. 16, and defendant Missouri Department of Mental

Health’s motion for sanctions, Doc. 21. For the following reasons, both motions are denied.

I. Introduction

Myron Hubbard worked as a psychiatric nurse for the Missouri Department of Mental

Health (the “Department”) until 2008, when he was denied leave and constructively discharged.

Thereafter, Mr. Hubbard brought Title VII discrimination and Family Medical Leave Act claims

against the Department and others pertaining to his discharge. See Hubbard v. St. Louis

Psychiatric Rehab. Ctr., No. 11-2082, 2013 WL 4052908 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2013) (Hubbard I).

Following the dismissal of his Complaint with prejudice in Hubbard I, Mr. Hubbard brought

another suit against the Department, this time alleging violation of Title VI for the same conduct.

His complaint was dismissed with prejudice based on res judicata. See Hubbard v. Missouri Dep’t

of Mental Health, No. 15-722, 2016 WL 593585 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2016) (Hubbard II).

On August 17, 2018, Mr. Hubbard, again proceeding pro se, filed a third complaint in in

the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, alleging that the Department 1) committed fraud on

the court in Hubbard I and II by misrepresenting whether it receives federal funds for the purpose

of providing employment, resulting in a denial of Mr. Hubbard’s due process rights, and 2) violated

Title VI, and continues to violate Title VI through the Missouri Attorney General’s Office and the

South Carolina Department of Mental Health’s retaliatory acts against him.

The Department removed the case, Doc. 1, and on December 19, 2018, the Court granted

the Department’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Mr. Hubbard’s discrimination and fraud

claims were barred by res judicata and that he failed to state a claim for retaliation by failing to

show that the Department took materially adverse employment action against him. Doc. 14.

II. Discussion

Mr. Hubbard now asks the Court to reconsider its ruling on the Department’s motion to

dismiss in addition to seeking to disqualify the Department’s counsel, strike their filings in this

case, and compel mediation. The Department in turn seeks sanctions against Mr. Hubbard.

A. Motion to Reconsider, Disqualify, Strike, and Compel Mediation

The Court construes Mr. Hubbard’s motion to reconsider as a motion to alter or amend

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d

818, 827 (8th Cir. 2000). Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting “manifest

errors of law or fact” or “present[ing] newly discovered evidence.” United States v. Metro St.

Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006). They “may not [however] be used to

relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior

to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, n.5 (2008) (quotations

omitted); see also Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 827 (affirming denial of motion to reconsider where

motion “merely restated” arguments made in opposition to summary judgment and “provided no

additional reasons why [the judgment] was inappropriate”).

Mr. Hubbard asks the Court to reconsider its ruling that Mr. Hubbard’s claims were barred

by res judicata by again arguing that the Department has “procured all its Judgements through

Fraud.” Doc. 16 (Motion for Reconsideration), ¶ 45. Specifically, Mr. Hubbard argues that in this

and prior cases, the Department “fraudulently failed to disclose relevant information regarding

material facts of Title IV,” id. at ¶¶ 10, “made false statements regarding jurisdiction,” id. at ¶¶

12–13, and “created fraud through false arguments or opinions,” id. at ¶ 17.

At the heart of his motion, Mr. Hubbard takes issue with, and labels as “fraud,” the legal

strategy and legal arguments advanced by the Department. However, “the assertion of a legal

position . . . [is] not . . . fraud or misstatement.” Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427

F.3d 129, 137 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original); see also Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, No. 10-

4452, 2012 WL 4129299, at *8 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2012), (“[A]n attorney’s good faith legal

arguments, especially meritorious arguments that are affirmed on appeal, do not constitute

fraud.”), aff’d, 746 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2014).

Further, Mr. Hubbard presents no new facts or evidence in support of reconsideration.

Instead, he reiterates arguments of fraud raised in response to the Department’s motion to dismiss,

Doc. 12, pp. 2, 8, 20, and previously adjudicated in Hubbard II, 2016 WL 593585, at *3–4.

Although Mr. Hubbard asserts that reconsideration is necessary in order to “avert violating

Missouri Laws 575.020,” Doc. 16, ¶ 46, section 575.020 addresses the crime of “concealing an

offense,” for which Mr. Hubbard lacks standing to assert a claim. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,

410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially

cognizable interest in the prosecution . . . of another.”); Jones v. Clinton, 206 F.3d 811, 812 (8th

Cir. 2000) (finding a private party has no standing to prosecute a criminal action). For these

reasons the Court denies Mr. Hubbard’s motion to reconsider. Because the Court finds it

inappropriate to revisit its final judgment dismissing Mr. Hubbard’s Complaint, it is also not in a

position to compel mediation.

Mr. Hubbard also asks the Court to disqualify the Missouri Attorney General and Eileen

Ruppe Krispin as counsel and strike their entries in this case because “they are necessary witnesses,

have been accused of criminal, civil and professional misconduct [by Mr. Hubbard], ha[ve]

personal interest and conflict of interest in the case.” Doc. 16, ¶¶ 58, 77. Such a motion is subject

to “particularly strict judicial scrutiny.” Harker v. Comm’r, 82 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1996)

(quotations omitted). Here, however, Mr. Hubbard has failed to allege conduct pertaining to the

entire Missouri Attorney General’s Office and has made only conclusory allegations of

wrongdoing against Ms. Krispin, which are entirely unsupported by evidence. Such conclusory

allegations are insufficient to support a motion to disqualify. See id. (declining to impute

disqualification to entire Office of District Counsel); Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. BASF

Corp., No. 04-3356, 2006 WL 2385363, at *11 (D. Neb., Aug. 17, 2006) (denying motion to

disqualify based on conclusory statements, which left accusations of impropriety up to mere

“possibility and conjecture”). Thus, Mr. Hubbard’s motion to disqualify and to strike the filings

of Ms. Krispin and the entire Attorney General’s Office are denied.

B. Motion for Sanctions

The Department asks the Court to sanction Mr. Hubbard for a pattern of filings, which

“serve no purpose other than to unduly harass the Department.” Doc. 21 (Motion for Sanctions),

p. 6. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), a party presenting a pleading in federal court

“certifies to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief” that the pleading is not

being presented for an “improper purpose,” like harassment; the claims are warranted by law; and

the factual contentions have evidentiary support, or are likely to have such support after further

investigation. A court may impose appropriate sanctions on a party who violates Rule 11(b). Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11(c). The purpose of this rule is to “deter baseless filings in the district court.” Cooter

& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). However, courts “traditionally afford pro

se parties some leeway under Rule 11,” Mousel v. Knutson Mortg. Corp., 823 F. Supp. 658, 663

(D. Minn. 1993) (citation omitted), and liberally construe pro se pleadings, Jackson v. Nixon, 747

F.3d 537, 544 (8th Cir. 2014).

In asking the Court to impose sanctions on Mr. Hubbard, the Department relies heavily

upon actions commenced by Mr. Hubbard in other courts, in Hubbard I and Hubbard II. However,

it is inappropriate for this Court to sanction Mr. Hubbard for actions filed in state court or in

another district; it is within the purview of those courts to impose whatever sanctions they deem

necessary. See, e.g., Mousel, 823 F. Supp. at 663–64 (concluding that it is inappropriate to impose

sanctions for a “pattern of abuse” where previous actions were all commenced in other courts).

Although the Court has concluded that Mr. Hubbard’s claims are bared by res judicata and that the

action must be dismissed, those conclusions do not in themselves justify an award of sanctions.

See id. Therefore, the Court denies the Department’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hubbard’s motion to reconsider, disqualify, strike, and

compel mediation, Doc. 16, and the Missouri Department of Mental Health’s motion for sanctions,

Doc. 21, are denied.

s/ Nanette K. Laughrey

NANETTE K. LAUGHREY

United States District Judge

Dated: March 12, 2019

Jefferson City, Missouri