Reid v. Garland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

TERRELL REID, ) □

Plaintiff, )

v. No..4:24-CV-261-JMB

MERRICK GARLAND,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is the motion of Terrell Reid for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in

this civil action. The Court has reviewed the motion, and has determined to grant it. The Court

has also reviewed the complaint, and has determined it fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. The Court will therefore dismiss this action at this time, without prejudice.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

This Court is required to review a complaint filed in forma pauperis, and must dismiss it

if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490

US. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcrofi v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although a

plaintiff need not allege facts in painstaking detail, the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This standard “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at

678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.

The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true

“(t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements.” Jd. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

District courts must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” courts

should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered

within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even pro se complaints

must allege facts that, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin vy. Aubuchon, 623

F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). District courts are not required to assume facts that are not

alleged, Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, or interpret procedural rules in a manner that excuses the

mistakes of those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993).

Related Case

According to publicly-available documents in the criminal matter United States v. Terrell

Reid, et al., No. 4:19-CR-00327-RWS-1 (E.D. Mo. 2019), Plaintiff met an undercover agent in a

hotel on April 16, 2019 to buy cocaine. Plaintiff gave the agent a Louis Vuitton bag containing

$86,800. Plaintiff was arrested, the bag and money were seized, and Plaintiff was charged by

superseding indictment with drug and firearms offenses. The government later dismissed the

charges, and Plaintiff filed motions seeking the return of the bag, money, and other items.

On July 19, 2022, following an evidentiary hearing, the Honorable Rodney W. Sippel

denied the motions. Judge Sippel noted that Plaintiff failed to present evidence that he was

lawfully entitled to possess the property. Judge Sippel noted that the record did not establish

Plaintiff's ownership, either, and in fact showed that he had lefi the hotel room to retrieve the

bag from someone else. Judge Sippel noted that even if Plaintiff had established ownership, the

government had established that he used the property to attempt to illegally purchase a controlled

substance. Judge Sippel wrote:

Furthermore, under the doctrine of in pari delicio, an individual in Reid’s position

cannot invoke the authority of the courts to recover money surrendered under an

illegal contract. See United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C. Cir.

1979) (concluding that Farrell could not recover the money he gave an undercover

officer to purchase heroin because “it is contrary to public policy to permit the

courts to be used by [a] wrongdoer...to obtain the property he voluntarily

surrendered as part of his attempt to violate the law”).[] The Eighth Circuit

applied the doctrine in United States v. Smith, 659 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1981),

holding that a defendant who gave $25,000 to an undercover DEA agent to

purchase hashish could not recover that money.

United States y. Terrell Reid, et al., No. 4:19-CR-00327-RWS-1, ECF. No. 271 at 5-6,

Judge Sippel rejected Plaintiff's assertions that he did not voluntarily surrender the

property and was a victim of entrapment, noting his testimony at a July 16, 2020 evidentiary

hearing in which he admitted he knew he had broken the law. Jd. at 8. Judge Sippel concluded

that even if Plaintiff had met his burden to show lawful entitlement to the property, he could not

recover it under the doctrine of in pari delicto and the derivative contraband theory. Plaintiff

filed a Notice of Appeal, and on September 2, 2022, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed Judge Sippel’s decision. This Court takes judicial notice of the foregoing public

;

records that are filed in this United States District Court, and relate to the case at bar. See United

States v. Jackson, 640 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir, 1981).

The Complaint

Plaintiff prepared the complaint using a court-provided form, as required by this Court’s

Local Rules. See E.D.Mo. L. R. 2.06(A) (“All actions brought by self-represented plaintiffs or

petitioners should be filed on Court-provided forms where applicable.”). Plaintiff filed the

complaint against Merrick B. Garland, the United States Attorney General. Plaintiff does not

specify whether he sues Attorney General Garland in his official or individual capacity, even

though the form complaint directs him to provide that information. The Court therefore

presumes that the Complaint includes only official capacity claims. See Egerdahl v. Hibbing

Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995) (“If a plaintiff's complaint is silent about

the capacity in which [he] is suing the defendant, [courts] interpret the complaint as including

only official-capacity claims.”’).

Plaintiff invokes this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, and writes:

Violation of Due Process of Law: Seizure of property without the due process of

law afforded by Constitution and/or Law. Malicious prosecution, the prosecution

did not end in a conviction, the defendant was released from all charges.

(ECF No. 1 at 3). In the section of the form complaint provided for Plaintiff to state whether the

suit is against the Federal Government, a federal official, or a federal agency, Plaintiff writes:

United States Attorney General, Merrick Garland, who is responsible for the

actions of those under him to include but not be limited to Prosecutors, [Federal]

and State Law Enforcement Officials.

id. In the section of the form complaint provided for Plaintiff to set forth his statement of claim,

he writes:

Law Enforcement Officials did entrap and arrest the Plaintiff, and did seize an

amount of money in excess of 87,000 dollars illegally, as well as other physical

property in ecess of 8,000 dollars. There was zero due process under the law for

either Criminal or Civil Forfeiture, and to date the Attorney General nor the

Courts have moved to return the property even after the Attorney General by and

through AUSA voluntarily dismissed the charges due to the CRIMINAL acts and

civil violations executed by LEOs in the case. (see memorandum of law for more

specifics) The case did not end in a conviction and the Defendant was released

with no further conditions, all due to the illegal and Unconstitutional activities

and actions by law enforcement officxials. (See Memorandum of law)

Id 5.’ As relief, Plaintiff seeks:

$95,000.00 in actual Damages

$375,000.00 in Compensatory Damages (loss of use/value}

$2.5 Million dollars in Punitive damages

at 4,

Plaintiff also filed a 19-page typewritten document titled “Memorandum of Law in

Support of Civil Rights Violation Suit.” (ECF No. 2). Plaintiff states he brings civil rights

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He describes his April 2019 arrest and indictment, and the

subsequent dismissal in United States v. Reid, infra, but does not specifically cite that case. He

alleges that his property was wrongfully taken, including $87,000 in cash, a Louis Vuitton bag,

and electronic devices. He states he filed motions seeking the return of the property, which the

government opposed. He claims the government is illegally holding his property and the

property should have been returned to him at the time the charges were dismissed, and he

contends the government did not follow proper procedure. He states he now “seeks redress from

this court in a suit to recover his property along with compensatory and punitive damages.” Jd.

at 2.

Discussion

Plaintiff states he brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was designed to

provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell vy. Department

The text is quoted verbatim without correction of errors.

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

plaintiff must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In this case, Plaintiff does not

allege that Attorney General Garland, or any other person, violated his federally-protected rights

while acting under color of state law. Plaintiff therefore lacks an essential element of a § 1983

claim.

The Court has considered whether the complaint states a valid claim under Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and concludes it

does not. The complaint does not present a cause of action that the Supreme Court has

previously recognized under Bivens, and expanding Bivens is “now a ‘disfavored’ judicial

activity.” Ziglar v Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 121 (2017) (quoting Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 675).

Congress, not this Court, is best suited to authorize a damages remedy for the claims Plaintiff

asserts. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 496 (2022), Even if this case was the type for which

a Bivens remedy was available, it would be dismissed. As noted above, Plaintiff sues Attorney

General Garland in his official capacity. An official capacity Bivens suit is treated as asserted

against the United States, and a Bivens action cannot be prosecuted against the United States due

to sovereign immunity. Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Laswell

Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Bivens and its progeny does not waive sovereign

immunity for actions against the United States; it implies a cause of action only against federal

officials”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted and will dismiss this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3

1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion seeking leave to commence this

action without prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A

separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith.

Dated this 24" day of May, 2024.

Ld

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE