Martin v. Division of Family Services, Department of Social Services, The Children's Division

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

KIERRA MARTIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-169-HEA

)

DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of self-represented plaintiff Kierra

Martin for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. ECF

No. 2. Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action for

lack of jurisdiction, and alternatively, for failure to state a claim.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere

possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as

true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir.

2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating

that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true

any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a self-represented complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even

self-represented complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a

matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry,

364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts

that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”). In addition, affording a self-represented complaint the benefit of a liberal construction

does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse

mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff Kierra Martin, a self-represented litigant, initiated this action by filing a typed

complaint titled, “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule

91, et seq.”1 ECF No. 1. The caption of the complaint is styled for the “Circuit of St. Louis City

1 Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91 allows for a state habeas corpus petition to be filed in a circuit court, the Missouri

Supreme Court, or the Missouri Court of Appeals. Mo. S. Ct. R. 91.01(a).

Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff brings this action against the Division of Family

Services, the Department of Social Services, and the Children’s Division.

Within the Petition, plaintiff alleges her minor child was “wrongfully taken from his

mother’s custody due to false/fraudulent evidence being represented in a Termination of Parental

Rights Proceeding and used to take [her] rights away.” Id. at 1. Through that proceeding, plaintiff

states her child was placed in a foster home by defendant Division of Family Services. For relief,

plaintiff asks this Court to review the state family court’s proceedings, determine the termination

of parental rights was incorrect, and enter an order granting her custody of the child. Id. at 4.

Discussion

Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds the allegations brought

against the Division of Family Services, the Department of Social Services, and the Children’s

Division are subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure

to state a claim.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. McAdams v. McCord, 533 F.3d 924, 927

(8th Cir. 2008). The existence of jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in

every federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990); see

also Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in

every federal case is jurisdiction and we have admonished the district court to be attentive to a

satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”). The issue of the existence of jurisdiction

may be raised at any time, by any party or by the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d

976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear cases involving the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and to hear cases where diversity jurisdiction exists under

28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 over cases where

the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from the citizenship of each defendant, and where the

amount in controversy is more than $75,000. Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc.,

263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001). The Court must dismiss any action over which it determines

that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Upon review of plaintiff’s

complaint, the Court finds no basis for federal jurisdiction.

Here, diversity jurisdiction does not appear to exist because plaintiff and defendants are

not alleged to be citizens of different states and she does not seek monetary relief. Additionally,

federal question jurisdiction is not present on the face of plaintiff’s complaint. To the extent

plaintiff is contesting a state-court custody-related decision regarding her child or attempting to do

an end-run around Missouri family court, such an action does not arise under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States.

Moreover, this Court lacks jurisdiction over cases involving child custody under the

domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. In general, federal courts have no

jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703

(1992). Rather, state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over these matters. Id. at 703-04. “The

whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws

of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.” Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94

(1890); see also Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The domestic relations exception

… divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over any action for which the subject is a divorce,

allowance of alimony, or child custody.”) (internal citations omitted); Firestone v. Cleveland Tr.

Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981) (“Even when brought under the guise of a federal

question action, a suit whose substance is domestic relations generally will not be entertained in a

federal court.”).

The federal district court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review

of state court decisions. Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir.

1996). Federal review of state court decisions may be had only in the United States Supreme Court.

Id. Any review of a state court decision by this Court would most likely violate the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, which applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It appears that plaintiff’s claims here can only succeed if

this Court decides that a state-court decision regarding her minor children was wrongly decided.

As such, plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment and this Court

lacks jurisdiction to review them under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Postma, 74 F.3d at 162.

Lastly, plaintiff has given no indication that her instant habeas action could not have

received a full and fair determination in state court, and it would appear that the state court, where

the custody and child support proceedings were held, would be better equipped to handle the issues

that have arisen in the course of plaintiff’s interactions with defendants. See Overman v. United

States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1977) (“There is, and ought to be, a continuing federal policy

to avoid handling domestic relations cases in federal court in the absence of important concerns of

a constitutional dimension. Such cases touch state law and policy in a deep and sensitive manner,

and as a matter of policy and comity, these local problems should be decided in state courts.”)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). In fact, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91(a) requires a

state habeas corpus petition to be filed in a circuit court, the Missouri Supreme Court, or the

Missouri Court of Appeals.

For all of the aforementioned reasons, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and alternatively,

for failure to state a claim, is appropriate here.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

[ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack

of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this

Memorandum and Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith.

Dated this 2"4 day of February, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE