Goforth v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH GOFORTH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 4:23-CV-1157 SRW

)

BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT )

AGENCY OF THE MISSOURI- )

ILLINOIS METROPOLITAN )

DISTRICT, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Bi-State Development Agency of the

Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for More

Definite Statement (ECF No. 7) and Defendant Kevin Scott’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the

Alternative, for More Definite Statement (ECF No. 16). The motions are fully briefed and ready

for disposition. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the following reasons, Defendants’

Motions will be granted, in part, and denied, in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2023, Plaintiff Joseph Goforth filed this employment discrimination action

against Defendants in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City alleging Defendants discriminated,

harassed, and retaliated against him while he was employed at Defendant Bi-State. Plaintiff

asserts four counts against Defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) Termination – Retaliation; (2)

Improper Termination Based on Race; (3) Hostile Work Environment; and (4) Race Based

Unlawful Deprivation of Federally Protected Rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. The first three counts are under Title VII and the fourth is under § 1983.

In September, Defendant Bi-State removed the matter to this Court. Defendants now seek

dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition, asserting Plaintiff fails to state a claim and failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing this action.

The Court accepts the following facts as alleged in the petition as true:

Plaintiff Joseph Goforth, an African American, began working for Bi-State in July 2015

as a public safety officer. Over the next five years, he was promoted to various positions and did

well, receiving good evaluations and numerous bonuses for the quality of his work. He did not

receive any negative evaluations. Eventually, he was promoted to Transit Security Specialist

Team Leader, and he worked the second shift. In 2019, Mr. Scott, who is white, became Mr.

Goforth’s boss.

In November 2020, Mr. Goforth approached Steven Berry, the general manager of Public

Safety, in the parking lot at the “main shop.” Mr. Goforth told Mr. Berry that, compared to white

officers, all of the black officers were being unfairly fired without warnings, write-ups, or

progressive discipline. Mr. Goforth advised Mr. Berry that black officers were held to a different

standard and given harsher and more extreme punishments compared to white officers. Mr.

Berry asserted Mr. Scott wants to fire everyone, black or white. This was an attempt on the part

of Mr. Berry to protect Mr. Scott.

Bi-State is well aware of the systemic racism problem. In June 2020, Taulby Roach,

President and Chief Executive Officer of Bi-State, sent out a company-wide email wherein he

acknowledged bias, institutional racism, and prejudice still exist within the community.

On March 1, 2021, Mr. Goforth became aware of a problem from Transit Security

Specialist (“TSS”) Sadie Tull. She told Mr. Goforth TSS Richard Tate was sexually harassing

her by constantly making explicit sexual comments to her that made her feel uncomfortable. TSS

Tull also stated that TSS Tate made several inappropriate racial comments about the fact that she

was dating African Americans. She also reported that TSS Tate made threats towards her

because she was not complicit and receptive to his advances. There is evidence of these

inappropriate advances and threats from TSS Tate to TSS Tull. This includes text messages,

voice mail, and a log. Mr. Goforth did not have knowledge of the evidence before that time.

After TSS Tull informed Mr. Goforth of TSS Tate’s actions, he told TSS Tull she was

cleared to contact TSS Field Supervisor Tony Smoote, which she apparently did. Mr. Goforth

also contacted Supervisor Smoote, who instructed Mr. Goforth to submit a memorandum on the

matter. Mr. Goforth did so that same day. The following day, March 2, TSS Tull submitted her

memorandum on the matter to Mr. Goforth as well. On March 3, TSS Tull sent an email to

Supervisor Smoote about sexual advances from TSS Tate including asking her out to eat and

drink, and trying to date her. TSS Tull firmly stated no on several occasions, but TSS Tate would

not let up. While TSS Oerter1 was not as explicit as TSS Tate, TSS Tull still felt uncomfortable

being around him.

Amie Weber, Bi-State’s EEO Investigator, investigated both of these complaints from

TSS Tull. Mr. Goforth met with Ms. Weber in March 2021, at the Central Facility at 3330

Spruce Street, known as the “main shop.” Ms. Weber asked for permission to record the

interview, and Mr. Goforth consented to being recorded. Mr. Goforth responded to Ms. Weber’s

1 In the petition, Plaintiff alleges TSS Oerter was not as explicit, even though the prior sentences refer to TSS Tate.

The Court does not know if all of the allegations in this paragraph should be about TSS Oerter, or if this one

sentence is a typo. It is unclear what Plaintiff intended in this paragraph.

questions and told Ms. Weber he first learned about the incident from TSS Tull on March 1. Ms.

Weber asked if he was aware of any inappropriate or explicit sexual discussions that occurred

during roll calls, to which Mr. Goforth responded he was not aware of it.

Mr. Goforth told Ms. Weber there were other issues within the Public Safety Department.

He told her morale was low because Mr. Scott engaged in discriminatory behavior toward

African American employees compared to white employees. He also reported to her that Mr.

Scott engaged in deceitful conduct and was able to get away with it because of his political

connections, race, and position as general manager. Mr. Goforth described the special privileges

Mr. Scott gave only to white officers including special parking on the main parking lot, being

able to take home company vehicles, having locked office doors, having windows covered for

absolute privacy, and being assigned personal computers.

Mr. Goforth also reported to Ms. Weber that black officers were kicked out of their

original offices and moved to a small, eight-by-twenty-feet office that four officers had to share

with only one computer. The black officers were not allowed to have a key to this office even

though it contained sensitive and classified documents. Mr. Goforth and other black officers felt

disheartened and were stressed to experience this discrimination where white officers were given

better opportunities and advantages because of their race. This had a detrimental effect on Mr.

Goforth’s health.

Before being kicked out of the original office, Mr. Scott walked into the office and told

Gerald Abernathy that he did not want any doors locked. Two months later, the Special

Operations Unit (all white officers) moved in. Immediately, they were allowed to keep their door

closed and locked, even during business hours. As opposed to the black officers who had used

the office before, the white officers were allowed to cover up the glass windows with newspaper

for privacy.

When Mr. Goforth spoke with Ms. Weber, he told her Mr. Scott would retaliate against

him for speaking to her by having him fired. Ms. Weber stated that Bi-State does not tolerate or

allow retaliation because it is against company policy. In April of 2021, Mr. Goforth met with

Ms. Weber again. This time she requested that TSS Team Lead Matthew Meinen join the

meeting. Like the first time, Ms. Weber asked both Mr. Goforth and Mr. Meinen if they

consented to her recording the interview. In this interview, Mr. Goforth repeated what he told

Ms. Weber in the first interview. Ms. Weber told Mr. Goforth and Mr. Meinen that, as

supervisors, they needed to be more careful of their subordinates and how they conducted

themselves.

At the meeting, Ms. Weber also raised another incident involving Mr. Meinen and TSS

Williams that involved inappropriate conversations and physical contact between the two. Mr.

Goforth stated he had no knowledge of the incident and had not been informed of it. This should

have been reported to him, but was not. Mr. Meinen also told Ms. Weber that Mr. Goforth and he

would be “whistle-blowers” on Mr. Scott. He stated that Mr. Scott wanted to terminate half of

the transit security specialists that were all black. Mr. Goforth reiterated this point to Ms. Weber.

Mr. Goforth told Ms. Weber that seven to eight months prior, Mr. Scott wanted to terminate the

following black transit security specialists: M. Mosley (who was fired), M. Weaver (who was

fired), Mr. Goforth (who was fired), L. Brown (who resigned), S. Dorsey, and L. Lowman.

Later, Mr. Meinen and Mr. Goforth were in Supervisor Smoote’s office when Mr.

Goforth was told he should be worried because Mr. Scott told Vernon Summers, the Director of

Field Security, that he wanted to fire half of the specialists. Mr. Scott was informed he could not

do that. At the meeting with Ms. Weber, Mr. Goforth told her that in January 2021, he spoke

with a representative from a labor union who had approached each TSS as they walked into the

building. This was to get protection from Mr. Scott because word had gotten out that Mr. Scott

wanted to fire everyone who agreed to unionize the Public Safety Department.

Mr. Goforth also told Ms. Weber that Mr. Scott had disarmed all of the contract security

officers and the specialists who were either police officers or ex-police officers with Missouri

“P.O.S.T.” training. Mr. Scott wrongfully asserted they were not authorized to carry firearms

under the Bi-State Development Compact. Mr. Scott knew this was wrong because he allowed

St. Louis City Sheriff’s deputies to carry firearms even though they are not commissioned

officers and have no academy training. In St. Clair County, by contrast, the correctional officers

and jailers are allowed to be armed on Metro’s system.

Mr. Goforth reported to Ms. Weber that Mr. Scott does whatever he wants knowing there

are no consequences for him. This is why he acts superior and condescending to the black

officers. Mr. Goforth stated that Mr. Scott gives false information that is detrimental to officers

leading to them being unjustly fired. Mr. Goforth informed Ms. Weber about TSS James Cook,

who was killed in the line of duty at the Delmar Metro Link station in January 2021. Mr. Cook

was not armed and tried to defend himself with a can of mace. Mr. Goforth told Ms. Weber that

Mr. Scott was directly responsible for Mr. Cook’s death.

Ms. Weber advised Mr. Goforth she was going to recommend TSS Oerter be moved to

another shift from TSS Tull and take classes on sexual harassment. She also stated she could not

confirm if the allegations against TSS Tate were true, but she suspected the other officers were

protecting him and imposing a code of silence that kept Mr. Goforth from knowing about the

situation. She did say she had spoken with TSS Tate on a consistent basis about this problem.

On May 11, 2021, Mr. Goforth was terminated by a letter which referenced an EEO

investigation about his alleged misconduct. The letter stated it confirmed Bi-State’s decision to

terminate him because it found credible allegations he engaged in or permitted sexually explicit

behavior or conversations during roll call and failed to properly supervise subordinates in

accordance with Bi-State’s expectations. Mr. Goforth did not engage in any sexually explicit

behavior at any time or during roll call, he did not know about it occurring during roll call, and

he did not fail to properly supervise his subordinates.

II. STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007), a complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A plaintiff need not provide specific facts in support of

his allegations, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam), but must include

sufficient factual information to provide the “grounds” on which the claim rests, and “to raise a

right to relief above a speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3. See also Schaaf v.

Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). This obligation requires a plaintiff

to plead “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint “must contain either direct or

inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562 (quotation omitted). On a motion to dismiss, the Court

accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, and reviews the

complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at

555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s petition for several reasons. First,

Defendants assert the Court must dismiss count one for retaliation because Plaintiff fails to allege

sufficient facts to demonstrate a causal connection between his participation in the EEO

investigation and his termination. Second, Defendants argue the Court should dismiss count two

for racial discrimination because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient factual circumstances giving

rise to an inference of discrimination. Third, Defendants contend Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim, count three, fails because Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts severe or

pervasive enough to give rise to an inference of racial harassment. Fourth, Defendants assert the

Court must dismiss count four, the § 1983 claim, because Plaintiff fails to set forth specific

allegations establishing Defendants’ conduct caused a constitutional violation. Fifth, Defendants

argue the Court must dismiss counts two and three because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to these counts. Finally, Defendant Scott asks the Court to dismiss

counts one, two, and three against him because he is an individual and under Title VII,

supervisors and employees cannot be individually liable. If the Court denies Defendants’

motions to dismiss, Defendants ask the Court to order a more definite statement.

A. Individual Claims Against Defendant Scott

Defendant Scott asserts the Court must dismiss counts one, two, and three against him

because Title VII does not allow for individual liability against a supervisor or employee.

Plaintiff concedes there is no liability against Defendant Scott under Title VII. Therefore, the

Court will dismiss counts one, two, and three against Defendant Scott.

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue the Court should dismiss counts two and three for race discrimination

and hostile work environment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

when he listed retaliation, but not race discrimination or a hostile work environment, as the basis

for discrimination in his EEOC charge. Plaintiff asserts the Court should read the EEOC charge

liberally and not so technically.

To exhaust administrative remedies, an individual must timely file a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC setting forth the facts and nature of the charge. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e– 5(b), (c), (e). “Exhaustion requires a claimant to give notice of all claims of

discrimination in the administrative complaint, but administrative complaints are interpreted

liberally.” Price v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Operating Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921 (E.D.

Mo. Aug. 21, 2000) (citing Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988)). The general

rule in the Eighth Circuit is that “[a] plaintiff will be deemed to have exhausted administrative

remedies as to allegations contained in a judicial complaint that are like or reasonably related to

the substance of charges timely brought before the EEOC.” Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 153

F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218,

222 (8th Cir. 1994)). “To determine whether the allegations of a complaint are reasonably related

to claims of discrimination in an administrative charge, courts customarily look to the substance

of the administrative charge.” Almoghrabi v. GoJet Airlines, LLC, 2015 WL 1061118, at *4

(E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2015).

In Ford v. Delta Airlines, the plaintiff asserted claims for race discrimination and

retaliation. 2013 WL 5651384 at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2013). However, on his EEOC charge

form, he only checked the box for “retaliation.” Id. at *2. In his EEOC charge, he stated he filed

a complaint with his human resources department about race discrimination and a hostile work

environment and then he was suspended without pay. Id. The Court found that the plaintiff’s

complaint was not reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in his EEOC charge

because his EEOC charge did not mention any alleged racial discriminatory conduct. Id. The

Court stated, “Although plaintiff asserted in the charge that the protected activity for which he

was allegedly retaliated against was based on a previous complaint of race discrimination,

plaintiff made no allegations indicative of race discrimination in his EEOC charge.” Id. at *3.

This same analysis applies to the EEOC charge and petition in this case. In his EEOC

charge, Plaintiff stated the discrimination was based on retaliation and included the following

description:

In 7/2015 I was hired by the above-named employer as a Transit Security

Specialist Team Lead. Tony Smoot, Transit Security Specialist Supervisor, was my

immediate supervisor. I made a race-based complaint and subsequently, I was

discharged in retaliation. In 4/2021, I made two race-based complaints to Amy

Webber EEO Officer about Kevin Scott, GM of Field Security and his treatment of

African American workers. This treatment included harsh disciplinary procedures

and less favorable working conditions than that of our Caucasian co-workers. Both

complaints were recorded for the record. Subsequently, I was discharged on

5/11/2021. For the above stated reasons, I believe that I was retaliated against, after

engaging in protective activity under the statute, in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

ECF No. 8-1, at 2. Plaintiff’s EEOC charge does not include facts indicating he experienced race

discrimination or a hostile work environment. Although he references the content of the

complaints he made to the EEO officer, the substance of his charge is about the retaliation he

faced, not any race discrimination or a hostile work environment he faced before the retaliation.

Thus, his race discrimination and hostile work environment claims are not reasonably related to

the retaliation charge. See, e.g., Williams, 21 F.3d at 222 (8th Cir.1994) (noting that plaintiff's

EEOC charge left the “race” box empty and failed to “allege any facts in the narrative section of

her charge which raise the issue of race discrimination”); Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc.,

371 F.3d, 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004) abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. Rochester,

643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting plaintiff's EEOC charge left the “sex” box empty and

“charges of sexual harassment generally are not like or reasonably related to retaliation charges

for complaining about antecedent harassment”).

Because Plaintiff’s race discrimination and hostile work environment claims are not

reasonably related to his EEOC charge, Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies as

to those claims. Therefore, the Court must dismiss counts two and three for failure to exhaust.

C. Retaliation Claim Against Defendant Bi-State

Defendant Bi-State asserts the Court must dismiss Count one for retaliation because

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a causal connection between Plaintiff’s

participation in the EEO investigation and his termination.

To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege “he engaged in

statutorily protected conduct, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that the

protected conduct was a but-for cause of the adverse action.” Bennett v. Riceland Foods, Inc.,

721 F.3d 546, 552 (8th Cir. 2013). “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to

retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.

v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013). In Wilson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, the

Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a claim for retaliation when she alleged

she complained about discrimination based on race and was terminated. 850 F.3d 368, 373 (8th

Cir. 2017). The court found that her allegation stating she was a “victim of . . . retaliation, after

having complained” sufficiently alleges but-for causation. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendant Bi-State retaliated against him for

cooperating with the EEO investigation and making a verbal complaint against Defendant Scott.

Although Plaintiff mistakenly states his complaints about Defendant Scott were a motivating

factor, rather than but-for causation, of his termination, the factual allegations he included in his

complaint sufficiently establish a causal connection. Plaintiff alleged he met with the EEO

officer multiple times and during these meetings, he described Defendant Scott’s discriminatory

conduct and also stated his belief that Defendant Scott would retaliate against him for speaking

to her. After speaking with the EEO officer in March and April 2021, Defendant Bi-State

terminated Plaintiff on May 11, 2021. See Wilson, 850 F.3d at 373 (“the six-week period

between the EEOC charge and the termination plausibly alleges a but-for causal connection.”).

Plaintiff specifically alleges that the reasons Defendant Bi-State gave for his termination were

false and a pretext.

Although Plaintiff’s petition appears to reference the incorrect causation standard, his

factual allegations sufficiently plead a plausible claim for retaliation. Wilson, 850 F.3d at 372

(“The plaintiff’s burden at the prima facie case state of the analysis is not onerous.”). Therefore,

the Court will not dismiss count one against Defendant Bi-State.

D. Section 1983 Claim

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails because he did not set forth specific

allegations establishing Defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct caused a constitutional

deprivation. Defendants assert that the petition does not state what Defendants did, or failed to

do, that caused a violation of Plaintiff’s rights.

In his petition, Plaintiff asserts a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause confers on an

individual a right to be free of racial discrimination in public employment. Henley v. Brown, 686

F.3d 634, 641 (8th Cir. 2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts that

establish the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused the constitutional deprivation.

Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that Defendants’ allegedly racially discriminatory

conduct caused his termination, which he asserts is the Equal Protection violation. Throughout

his petition, Plaintiff alleges he participated in an EEO investigation about several issues, one of

which was Defendant Scott’s racially discriminatory behavior towards black employees. While

Plaintiff alleges he told the EEO investigator Defendant Scott wanted to fire him because he was

black, his allegations do not establish this was the reason he was actually fired. Instead, the

allegations show Plaintiff was fired for participating in the EEO investigation. The petition does

not state a claim for relief under § 1983 against Defendants that is plausible on its face. For this

reason, the Court must dismiss count four.

E. Motion for a More Definite Statement

Defendants ask the Court to order a more definite statement if the Court does not grant

their motions to dismiss in their entirety. Rule 12(e) governs motions for a more definite

statement and provides:

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a

responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party

cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a

responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details

desired.

A motion for more definite statement is proper when a party is unable to determine the

issues, or where a material ambiguity or omission in the complaint renders it unanswerable.

Morgan v. Midwest Neurosurgeons, LLC, 2011 WL 2728334, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2011).

Such motions are designed to remedy unintelligibility, rather than a lack of detail. Id. Given

liberal notice pleading standards and the availability of discovery, motions for a more definite

statement are generally denied. /d. A motion for a more definite statement is not to be used to

test an opponent's case or to substitute for discovery. /d.

The Court does not believe a more definite statement 1s needed in this case. The petition

does not include a material ambiguity or omission that makes it unanswerable. The Court will

deny Defendants’ motions for a more definite statement.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Bi-State Development Agency of the Ilinois-Missouri

Metropolitan District’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for More Definite Statement

(ECF No. 7) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Counts two, three, and four are

DISMISSED, without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Kevin Scott’s Motion to Dismiss, or in

the Alternative, for More Definite Statement (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED. All claims against

Defendant Scott are DISMISSED, without prejudice.

So Ordered this 5th day of January, 2024.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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