Jones-Williams v. Missouri State

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ROZINA RHONDA JONES-WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 4:23-CV-947 SEP

)

MISSOURI STATE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is the motion of self-represented Plaintiff Rozina Rhonda Jones-

Williams, an inmate at the St. Louis County Justice Center, for leave to commence this civil

action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Doc. [2]. Having reviewed the motion and

its lengthy supplement, the Court grants the request and assesses an initial partial filing fee of

$1.00. Additionally, for the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action for failure to

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is

required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in her

prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an

initial partial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s

account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month

period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly

payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to her account. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward monthly payments to the

Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee

is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff did not submit an inmate account statement with her motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. On August 7, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to submit a certified copy of her

prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the

Complaint. Doc. [4]. In response, Plaintiff submitted a supplement to her motion indicating the

institution has refused to provide her with an account statement. Doc. [6]. Therefore, Plaintiff

will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00, an amount that is reasonable based on

the information before the Court. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997)

(When a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of a prison account

statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information

the court has about the prisoner’s finances.”). If Plaintiff cannot pay the initial partial filing fee,

she must submit a copy of her prison account statement in support of her claim.

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the St. Louis County Justice Center in Clayton,

Missouri. She initiated this civil action by filing a 54-page Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. [1]. The Complaint names 186 defendants in their official

and individual capacities. Id. Plaintiff names numerous federal and state entities and employees,

private citizens and businesses, unknown John and Jane Does, and groups of individuals. Id. at

1-23. For example, some of the defendants include St. Louis County and the “citizens of St.

Louis County;” the City of Clayton and the “people of the City of Clayton”; “medical staff Jane

and John Doe Jailer and Deputies”; Bank of New York Mellon Trust; St. Louis County Animal

Shelter; Dr. John Doe and Jane Doe; Georgia Department of Vital Statistics; Houston Child

Protective Services; Houston Texas Family Court; Atlanta, Georgia; all employees of the Fulton

County Jail; “Females Unknown”; the Social Security Administration; the Federal Reserve

Bank; the “Vatican Pope”; the “House of Lords”; “all staff and agents” of the Hague

Convention; Meadow Glen Apartments; the Securities and Exchange Commission; Channel 4

New; and the Ameristar Casino. Id.

In the Statement of Claim section of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the State of Missouri

and its employees “intentionally committed fraud” by forming a “technical trust” and forcing her

“into a court of equity.” Id. at 25. Plaintiff refers to an incident in July of 2021 in which she

claims defendant Officers Steven DeGeiner and Timothy Ware entered her land and stole her

“personal and real property,” including knives, trespassing signs, and animals. Id.

The Court takes judicial notice of an unlawful detainer action that was adjudicated in

state court, in which Plaintiff claimed she owned real property located at 319 Wild Horse

Canyon Drive through adverse possession.1 See Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Lipede,

et al., No. 21SL-AC05837 (21st Jud. Cir., St. Louis County). Judgment was entered for the State

and Plaintiff was ordered to vacate the property. Id. Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed on March

13, 2023. See MK Property Mgmt. v. Lipede, et al., No. ED110412 (Mo. Ct. App. 2023).

Plaintiff appears to be arguing here that those state court decisions were fraudulent and

erroneous.

Attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint are 20+ pages of notebook paper, in which she

complains of other unrelated incidents against some of the 186 defendants. Id. at 27-54. The

attachment consists of mostly conclusory allegations without factual support. For example,

Plaintiff alleges the “Atlanta City Detention Center staff employees deprived [her] of [her]

human right and legal right to access the Courts[,]” the “State of Georgia and Missouri violated

Plaintiff[’s] constitutional right by the ferae [sic] of suing Plaintiff for their debts[,]” and an

unidentified “Jail official denied Plaintiff the right to private calls[.]” Id.

For relief, among other requests that are not discernible, Plaintiff seeks “$1.44 septillion

dollars in increments of $100,000,000.00” as well as permanent emergency injunctive relief

against all defendants. Id. at 26. She also asks the “Supreme Court to correct the errors and the

miscarriages of justice and denial of due process in the appellate court.” Id. at 46.

On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a 30-page supplement to her Complaint, which she

titled “Motion for Rule 59(e) to correct and Add Supplemental Greetings.”2 Doc. [7]. The

document is difficult to decipher because it covers a variety of unrelated topics. Plaintiff begins

by asserting she is in “imminent danger of serious physical harm” and her “fingers have been

broken” due to an “unlawful kidnapping and for exercising [her] civil and constitutional rights to

religion and legal and medical[.]” Id. at 1. She does not identify who she claims has kidnapped

her or has violated her constitutional rights. Plaintiff refers to three state criminal cases and

appears to argue she is being unlawfully restrained. Id. at 1-2. She describes her incarceration as

an “insurance bond” and states she is “a bounty of war, to pay a debt that this government owes.”

Id. at 4. In the remainder of the supplement, Plaintiff appears to be advocating that she be

1 See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (district court may take judicial notice of public state

records); Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (courts “may take judicial notice of

judicial opinions and public records”).

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a court to correct mistakes in a judgment. As there has

been no judgment here, the Court construes Plaintiff’s filing as a supplement to her complaint.

granted in forma pauperis status and be permitted to adjudicate her claims of fraud and various

constitutional violations against the defendants.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim

for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal

conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.

Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept

as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court

should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered

within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must

“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d

1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to

“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have

formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be

“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” See McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

DISCUSSION

After carefully reviewing the Complaint and giving it the benefit of a liberal construction,

the Court concludes that it must be dismissed against all defendants.

As a federal district court, this Court is not an appellate court with jurisdiction to compel

a state judge to act in state court proceedings or to review or reverse decisions by state courts.

See Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996). Therefore,

to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking review of a Missouri state-court judgment regarding her

property rights or lack thereof, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear her claims. Federal review of

state court decisions may be had only in the United States Supreme Court. Id. Any review of a

state court decision by this Court would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which applies to

“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005). Thus, if Plaintiff is inviting this Court to review and reject state court judgments, the

Court lacks jurisdiction to do so. See Postma, 74 F.3d at 162.

While Plaintiff also appears to complain of various constitutional violations, she presents

no non-conclusory facts to show how each of the defendants personally participated in or were

directly responsible for specific violations of her constitutional rights. It is not enough for a

Plaintiff to allege that a defendant harmed her without more. “A federal complaint must contain

the ‘who, what, when and where’ of what happened, and each defendant must be linked to a

particular action.” Drummer v. Corizon Corr. Health Care, 2016 WL 3971399, at *1 (E.D. Mo.

July 25, 2016); see also Miles v. Corizon Healthcare, 2019 WL 2085998, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May

13, 2019) (general refusal to treat allegation, without any additional information, is nothing more

than a conclusory statement and cannot suffice to state a cause of action under the Eighth

Amendment).

The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and supplement are too vague and conclusory to

permit the inference that the multitude of named defendants violated her civil rights. The

Complaint includes 186 defendants, from federal agencies to local municipalities, state police

departments, banks, hospitals, news stations, and insurance companies, plus miscellaneous

individuals and groups associated with the institutions or entities. A majority of the putative

defendants have no connection to the text in the body of the complaint or the supplement. See

Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983

where Plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for

incidents that injured Plaintiff). Merely listing a defendant in the caption is not sufficient to state

a claim against that defendant. See Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App’x 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003)

(affirming dismissal of self-represented plaintiff's complaint against defendants who were merely

listed as defendants in the complaint where there were no allegations of constitutional harm

against them). Conclusory allegations that entire groups have violated a constitutional right are

not acceptable and will be dismissed. See e.g., Bice v. Jordan, 2010 WL 1187213, at *2 (E.D.

Mo. Mar. 29, 2010) (dismissing “Nursing Staff” as improper defendant).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Rule 20(a) provides:

All persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted

against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief arising out

of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences and if

any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s Complaint is over 50 pages long, not

including the 30-page supplement. It names 186 defendants and sets forth numerous claims that

are not related to a single transaction or occurrence. For example, some allegations relate to a

real estate dispute previously litigated in state court, while others relate to her treatment while

incarcerated. Some named defendants appear to be unrelated to either the real estate matter or

her treatment in prison, such as the Ameristar Casino, the Vatican, and Farmers Insurance.

Moreover, many of the defendants are entities that are either immune to suit or improper

defendants under § 1983. Plaintiff sues dozens of state and federal entities and their employees,

although “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’

under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see

also Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (§ 1983 suit

cannot be brought against state agency), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000). Similarly, the

federal government and its departments cannot be sued under § 1983 without consent. Iverson v.

United States, 973 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2020); see also Hinsley v. Standing Rock Child

Protective Services, 516 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2008) (“It is well settled that the United States

may not be sued without its consent.”). Plaintiff also attempts to sue a number of private entities,

which § 1983 does not permit. See Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975 (8th

Cir. 1993) (§ 1983 secures constitutional rights from government infringement, not infringement

by private parties). Plaintiff does not show that the private parties acted under color of state law.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require litigants to formulate their pleadings in an

organized and comprehensible manner. Even self-represented plaintiffs are required to set out

their claims and supporting facts simply, concisely, and directly. See McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Plaintiff's Complaint and supplement contain stream-of-conscious

narratives without coherent arguments, making it prohibitively difficult for the 186 defendants to

admit or deny her allegations. Her Complaint also lacks any factual basis for a valid legal claim,

and it fails to assert how the named defendants caused Plaintiff harm. Thus, it is dismissed for

failure to state a claim and frivolousness. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.

Finally, any argument Plaintiff purports to base on her self-proclaimed status as a

“sovereign citizen” or in her “sovereign immunity capacity,” Doc. [1] at 1, is rejected. Such

arguments “hav[e] no conceivable validity in American law.” United States v. Hardin, 489 Fed.

Appx. 984, 986 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th

Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Simonson, 563 Fed. Appx. 514 (8th Cir. 2014) (defendants’

argument that they were “special sovereign citizens” was frivolous). Thus, any claims based on

Plaintiff's alleged sovereign status are frivolous.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis Doc. [2], is GRANTED and the filing fee is waived.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $1.00

within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, making her remittance payable to “Clerk,

United States District Court,” and including on it: (1) her name; (2) her prison registration

number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith.

An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

“9nd [J j

Dated this day of November, 2023. rt, L L

SARAH E. PITLYK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE