explaining that consideration of matters outside the pleadings or evidence in opposition to the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment
How later courts described this case
- explaining that consideration of matters outside the pleadings or evidence in opposition to the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROOBIE ALI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:21CV214 HEA
)
VOLVO GROUP NORHT AMERICA, LLC, )
)
Defendant, )
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Volvo’s Motion for Judgement
on the Pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, [Doc.
No. 217]. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the Motion. Defendants have filed a
reply thereto. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
Count II of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is brought for alleged
breach of implied warranties: implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for
ordinary purpose and fitness for a particular purpose. Defendant has filed its
answer and affirmative defenses to this Count and now moves for judgment on the
pleadings.
Standard of Review
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is given the same treatment as a
motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer,
Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009).
The applicable standard to survive a motion to dismiss or a judgment on the
pleadings requires that the complaint contain facts that, if accepted as true,
“state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). This Court accepts facts pleaded by the
nonmoving party as true and draws all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in
favor of that party. Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th
Cir. 2016). However, pleadings that contain “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The legal conclusions
asserted in the complaint are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a district court
refrains from considering matters beyond the pleadings, other than certain public
records and “materials that do not contradict the complaint, or materials that are
necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838, 841
(8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Discussion
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is assessed under the
same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d
659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations
in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Gorog
v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The complaint must “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, “courts are not strictly limited to the four
corners of complaints,” when deciding Rule 12(c) motions but may consider other
matters, including “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items
subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the
record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is
unquestioned[ ] without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.”
Dittmer Props., L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotations
omitted); Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that consideration of matters outside the pleadings or evidence in
opposition to the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for
summary judgment). When a contract is the basis of the dispute, that contract is
“necessarily embraced” by the pleadings and may be considered. Zean, 858 F.3d at
526–27.
Here, Defendant Volvo relies on documents attached to its answer and
affirmative defenses, which may appropriately be considered by the Court in
analyzing the Motion. See, Fiecke-Stifter v. MidCountry Bank, No. 22-CV-3056
(ECT/DTS), 2023 WL 5844758, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2023.
Defendant argues that judgment should be entered in its favor because
Plaintiff does not fall within the categories of persons able to bring a breach of
implied warranty claim under North Carolina law.
Generally, a plaintiff must have contractual privity with a defendant to bring
a breach of warranty claim. Atl. Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty & Miller of
N.C., Inc., 175 N.C. App. 339, 345, 623 S.E.2d 334 (2006); Crews v. W.A. Brown
& Son, Inc., 106 N.C. App. 324, 332, 416 S.E.2d 924 (1992); Terry v. Double Cola
Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 2, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964); Thomason v. Ballard and
Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 4, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). However, North Carolina’s version
of the Uniform Commercial Code removes the privity requirement in personal
injury cases for express or implied warranties where the injured party is a “natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 25–2–318.
Section 99B-2(b) provides this exception:
A claimant who is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of
the product involved, or who is a member or a guest of a member of the
family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer may
bring a product liability action directly against the manufacturer of the
product involved for breach of implied warranty; and the lack of privity of
contract shall not be grounds for the dismissal of such action.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-2(b).
In other words, when the buyer is in privity of contract with the seller, any
express or implied warranties made to the buyer inure to the benefit of the buyer's
family or household guests.
Another statutory exception, under the North Carolina Products Liability
Act, removes the privity requirement for “a buyer, as defined in the Uniform
Commercial Code, of the product involved” where the buyer brings “a product
liability action directly against the manufacturer of the product involved for breach
of implied warranty.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 99B–2. Thus, a buyer who is not in
privity with the manufacturer can bring a breach of implied warranty claim,
notwithstanding the lack of privity. Under North Carolina's Uniform Commercial
Code, a buyer is “a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
25-2-103(1)(a). “Goods” include “all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.” Id.
§ 25-2. Johnson v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 3d 593, 598 (W.D.N.C.
2022).
Applying the law to the facts at hand, Plaintiff's warranty claims should be
dismissed. He does not claim he was the buyer of the truck and none of the
statutory exceptions apply. The pleadings establish that Volvo sold the truck to
CIT trucks, LLC. The truck was subsequently owned by Central Truck Leasing,
which in turn leased the truck to Trans Lines, Inc, which leased rented, or
otherwise provided the truck to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is neither the buyer of the truck, nor “in the family or household of
his buyer or ... a guest in his home” as required by N.C.G.S. § 25-2-318. As such,
he has no breach of implied warranty claims against Volvo.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Count II of the Second Amended Complaint for breach of implied
warranties fails because he has not alleged he is the buyer of Volvo’s truck or that
he is a member of the buyer’s family, or guest of the buyer. As such, under North
Carolina law, Plaintiff cannot maintain a breach of implied warranty claim, and
judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Volvo’s Motion for Judgement
on the Pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, [Doc.
No. 217], is GRANTED.
Dated this 27" day of September 2023.
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE