Opinion

Ali v. Trans Lines, Inc.

Court
District Court, E.D. Missouri
Filed
Sep 27, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.2%

explaining that consideration of matters outside the pleadings or evidence in opposition to the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that consideration of matters outside the pleadings or evidence in opposition to the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ROOBIE ALI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:21CV214 HEA

)

VOLVO GROUP NORHT AMERICA, LLC, )

)

Defendant, )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Volvo’s Motion for Judgement

on the Pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, [Doc.

No. 217]. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the Motion. Defendants have filed a

reply thereto. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

Count II of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is brought for alleged

breach of implied warranties: implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for

ordinary purpose and fitness for a particular purpose. Defendant has filed its

answer and affirmative defenses to this Count and now moves for judgment on the

pleadings.

Standard of Review

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is given the same treatment as a

motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer,

Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009).

The applicable standard to survive a motion to dismiss or a judgment on the

pleadings requires that the complaint contain facts that, if accepted as true,

“state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). This Court accepts facts pleaded by the

nonmoving party as true and draws all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in

favor of that party. Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th

Cir. 2016). However, pleadings that contain “a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The legal conclusions

asserted in the complaint are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a district court

refrains from considering matters beyond the pleadings, other than certain public

records and “materials that do not contradict the complaint, or materials that are

necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838, 841

(8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Discussion

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is assessed under the

same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d

659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations

in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Gorog

v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to

“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The complaint must “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, “courts are not strictly limited to the four

corners of complaints,” when deciding Rule 12(c) motions but may consider other

matters, including “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items

subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the

record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is

unquestioned[ ] without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.”

Dittmer Props., L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotations

omitted); Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2017)

(explaining that consideration of matters outside the pleadings or evidence in

opposition to the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for

summary judgment). When a contract is the basis of the dispute, that contract is

“necessarily embraced” by the pleadings and may be considered. Zean, 858 F.3d at

526–27.

Here, Defendant Volvo relies on documents attached to its answer and

affirmative defenses, which may appropriately be considered by the Court in

analyzing the Motion. See, Fiecke-Stifter v. MidCountry Bank, No. 22-CV-3056

(ECT/DTS), 2023 WL 5844758, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2023.

Defendant argues that judgment should be entered in its favor because

Plaintiff does not fall within the categories of persons able to bring a breach of

implied warranty claim under North Carolina law.

Generally, a plaintiff must have contractual privity with a defendant to bring

a breach of warranty claim. Atl. Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty & Miller of

N.C., Inc., 175 N.C. App. 339, 345, 623 S.E.2d 334 (2006); Crews v. W.A. Brown

& Son, Inc., 106 N.C. App. 324, 332, 416 S.E.2d 924 (1992); Terry v. Double Cola

Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 2, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964); Thomason v. Ballard and

Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 4, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). However, North Carolina’s version

of the Uniform Commercial Code removes the privity requirement in personal

injury cases for express or implied warranties where the injured party is a “natural

person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home

if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by

the goods.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 25–2–318.

Section 99B-2(b) provides this exception:

A claimant who is a buyer, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, of

the product involved, or who is a member or a guest of a member of the

family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of the buyer may

bring a product liability action directly against the manufacturer of the

product involved for breach of implied warranty; and the lack of privity of

contract shall not be grounds for the dismissal of such action.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-2(b).

In other words, when the buyer is in privity of contract with the seller, any

express or implied warranties made to the buyer inure to the benefit of the buyer's

family or household guests.

Another statutory exception, under the North Carolina Products Liability

Act, removes the privity requirement for “a buyer, as defined in the Uniform

Commercial Code, of the product involved” where the buyer brings “a product

liability action directly against the manufacturer of the product involved for breach

of implied warranty.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 99B–2. Thus, a buyer who is not in

privity with the manufacturer can bring a breach of implied warranty claim,

notwithstanding the lack of privity. Under North Carolina's Uniform Commercial

Code, a buyer is “a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §

25-2-103(1)(a). “Goods” include “all things (including specially manufactured

goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.” Id.

§ 25-2. Johnson v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 3d 593, 598 (W.D.N.C.

2022).

Applying the law to the facts at hand, Plaintiff's warranty claims should be

dismissed. He does not claim he was the buyer of the truck and none of the

statutory exceptions apply. The pleadings establish that Volvo sold the truck to

CIT trucks, LLC. The truck was subsequently owned by Central Truck Leasing,

which in turn leased the truck to Trans Lines, Inc, which leased rented, or

otherwise provided the truck to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is neither the buyer of the truck, nor “in the family or household of

his buyer or ... a guest in his home” as required by N.C.G.S. § 25-2-318. As such,

he has no breach of implied warranty claims against Volvo.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s Count II of the Second Amended Complaint for breach of implied

warranties fails because he has not alleged he is the buyer of Volvo’s truck or that

he is a member of the buyer’s family, or guest of the buyer. As such, under North

Carolina law, Plaintiff cannot maintain a breach of implied warranty claim, and

judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Volvo’s Motion for Judgement

on the Pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, [Doc.

No. 217], is GRANTED.

Dated this 27" day of September 2023.

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.