Emrit v. Jules

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD SATISH EMRIT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:23-cv-00908-MTS

)

SABINE AISHA JULES, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit for leave

to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2).

Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a

“mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as

true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir.

2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating

that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true

any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even

pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of

law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d

912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are

not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not

mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes

by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

Background

Plaintiff is a self-represented individual and an extremely prolific litigant in the federal

court system. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida has counted 338

lawsuits that he has filed. See Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-8-WS-MAF (N.D. Fla.). Meanwhile, the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana tallied 674 cases initiated by

plaintiff in the federal courts over the last ten years. See Emrit v. Jules, No. 1:23-cv-1197-RLY-

MKK (S.D. Ind.). When this Court searched for plaintiff on the government’s Public Access to

Court Electronic Records (PACER) website, the Court found plaintiff to have originated 420

federal civil cases all across the country. The Court will take judicial notice of these filings.1

Due to plaintiff’s history of abusive litigation, several United States District Courts have

barred him from filing new complaints, unless certain conditions are met. See Emrit v. University

of Miami School of Law, 2023 WL 2910903, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2023) (adding plaintiff to

restricted-filer list, and barring him “from initiating any lawsuits in the Southern District of Florida

unless he either (1) tenders the full filing fee required to initiate a lawsuit; (2) is represented by a

licensed attorney; or (3) is granted prior leave to proceed by a judge in this district”); Emrit v.

DeVos, 2020 WL 9078298, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020) (determining that plaintiff “is a

vexatious litigant” and prohibiting him from filing any new document in the Middle District of

Florida “without first obtaining prior written approval of the senior Magistrate Judge”); Emrit v.

Trump, 2019 WL 935028, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2019) (enjoining and prohibiting plaintiff

“from filing any additional complaints in the Southern District of Ohio which have not first been

certified to have been filed in the correct venue by an attorney in good standing,” or in which the

full filing fee is paid); Emrit v. Simon, 2017 WL 11483905, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2017)

(restricting plaintiff from filing new cases “unless he is represented by licensed counsel or receives

prior written authorization”); and Emrit v. Social Security Administration, 2015 WL 4597834, at

*1 (D. Nev. July 29, 2015) (finding plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant, and prohibiting him “from

1A federal district court may take judicial notice of public records and judicial opinions. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d

988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that district court may take judicial notice of public state records); Stutzka v.

McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts “may take judicial notice of judicial opinions

and public records”); Stahl v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 327 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The district court may

take judicial notice of public records and may consider them on a motion to dismiss”); Zerger & Mauer LLP v. City

of Greenwood, 751 F.3d 928, 935 n.7 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “federal courts may sua sponte take judicial

notice of proceedings in other courts if they relate directly to the matters at issue”); and Thompson v. R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co., 760 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A district court may properly take judicial notice of items in the

public record, such as judicial opinions”).

filing any complaint, petition, or other document in this court without first obtaining leave of this

court”).

Beginning in January 2023, plaintiff began filing lawsuits in various federal district courts

against defendant Sabine Aisha Jules. More specifically, the Court has found thirty separate

lawsuits, many of them nearly identical, all naming Jules – plaintiff’s ex-wife – as defendant, and

generally accusing her of tortious interference with family relations. Of these cases, two were

transferred,2 thirteen were dismissed prior to service,3 and fifteen are pending initial review.4

Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 17, 2023, by which point thirteen prior cases against

defendant Jules had already been dismissed on initial review by eleven different United States

District Courts. As noted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

there are 94 judicial districts in the United States of America, and plaintiff is clearly “making the

2 See Emrit v. Jules, No. 2:23-cv-1208-CJB-JUM (E.D. La. May 10, 2023) (transferring case to Southern District of

Florida); and Emrit v. Jules, No. 3:23-cv-1573-DCC (D. S.C. June 26, 2023) (transferring case to Southern District of

Florida).

3 See Emrit v. Jules, No. 0:23-cv-60014-RAR (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Emrit

v. Jules, No. 2:23-cv-3-RWS (N.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2023) (dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for frivolousness and

failure to state a claim); Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-8-WS-MAF (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2023) (dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A for frivolousness, failure to state a claim, and as an abuse of judicial process); Emrit v. Jules, No. 5:23-cv-

110-DCR (E.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2023) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Emrit v. Jules, No. 3:23-cv-16-

NKM (W.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2023) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Emrit v. Jules, No. 5:23-cv-179-

FL (E.D. N.C. May 2, 2023) (dismissed for failure to prosecute and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Emrit v.

Jules, No. 3:23-cv-101-MPM-RP (N.D. Miss. May 11, 2023) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Emrit

v. Jules, No. 0:23-cv-60708-AHS (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Emrit v. Jules, No.

1:23-cv-993-UNA (D. D.C. June 12, 2023) (denying motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing

case because plaintiff was a banned filer); Emrit v. Jules, No. 0:23-cv-61210-RS (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2023) (dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-278-CVE-MTS (N.D. Okla. July 11, 2023)

(dismissed for improper venue); Emrit v. Jules, No. 3:23-cv-50250 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2023) (dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction); and Emrit v. Jules, No. 1:23-cv-1197-RLY-MKK (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2023) (dismissed as

frivolous and abusive).

4 See Emrit v. Jules, No. 2:23-cv-453-RDP (N.D. Ala.) (filed Apr. 10, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 8:23-cv-978-DLB

(D. Md.) (filed Apr. 10, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-352-KGB (E.D. Ark.) (filed April 13, 2023); Emrit v. Jules,

No. 1:23-cv-49-CJW-KEM (N.D. Iowa) (filed July 6, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 2:23-cv-2305-JAR-TJJ (D. Kan.)

(filed July 7, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-3122-JFB-PRSE (D. Neb.) (filed July 7, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No.

4:23-cv-231-SMR-HCA (S.D. Iowa) (filed July 10, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 1:23-cv-733-HYJ-RSK (W.D. Mich.)

(filed July 10, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-697-Y (N.D. Tex.) (filed July 10, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 3:23-

cv-456-WMC (W.D. Wis.) (filed July 10, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 1:23-cv-1344-BMB (N.D. Ohio) (filed July 11,

2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 3:23-cv-3013-RAL (D. S.D.) (filed July 11, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-643-ALM-

KP (E.D. Tex.) (filed July 11, 2023); Emrit v. Jules, No. 6:23-cv-31 (S.D. Tex.) (filed July 12, 2023); and Emrit v.

Jules, No. 3:23-cv-131-ARS (D. N.D.) (filed July 13, 2023).

rounds” in an attempt to find one that will entertain his case. See Emrit v. Jules, No. 1:23-cv-1197-

RLY-MKK (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2023).

The Complaint

As noted above, plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who has filed a civil action against

Sabine Aisha Jules, who is identified as plaintiff’s ex-wife. The complaint is not on a Court-

provided form. Plaintiff states at the outset that he is looking “to obtain an injunction as an

equitable remedy in the form of an annulment regardless of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine or the

previous divorce granted in 2006” by Judge Susan Greenhawt in Broward County, Florida.

(Docket No. 1 at 1).

In the section of the complaint titled “Nature of the Case,” plaintiff asserts that “Supreme

Court Justice Clarence Thomas would agree that the plaintiff has a First Amendment freedom of

association to get married to a Caucasian woman from the Ukraine,” and to have that fundamental

right protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, “pursuant to a broad interpretation of the

stare decisis of Loving v. Virginia.”5 Docket [1] at 1-2. He further states that “Supreme Court

Justice Samuel Alito would agree that it is a form of witchcraft reminiscent of the Salem Witch

Trials…to deprive an American man of the opportunity to have one legally-recognized marriage

to a Caucasian woman from the Ukraine.” Id. Plaintiff contends “that the American family

structure is of the utmost important and that if an American man wants a Stepford wife from the

Ukraine to be his only legally recognized marriage, then this implied fundamental right is also

protected by” the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and

5 This is an apparent reference to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), which determined that “[t]he Fourteenth

Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations,” and

that “the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed

by the State.” The Court notes that Loving has absolutely no relevance to the instant case. That is, plaintiff does not

allege that the state has kept him from marrying another person on account of race. Rather, as best the Court can tell,

plaintiff is seeking to have a divorce changed to an annulment, so that he does not have to tell his future wife about

his past wife.

Fourteenth Amendments, and the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and indentured

servitude. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff blithely admits that he “is now forum shopping in several federal courts to obtain

an annulment of a previous marriage.” Id. Specifically, as noted above, he was divorced in 2006

pursuant to an order by Judge Greenhawt of the 17th Judicial Circuit of Broward County, Florida.

At that time, a $5,000 child support order was also entered, which he appealed. Eventually, in

2009, his parental rights were terminated, rendering the child support order “null and void as if the

plaintiff had given his daughter up for adoption.” Id. The termination of parental rights took place

in Deerfield Beach, Florida. Plaintiff also mentions litigating against a foster care agency in Utah

and Hawaii.

Despite getting married in Las Vegas, Nevada, on August 31, 2002, and getting divorced

in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 2006, “plaintiff argues that he can obtain an annulment anywhere

in the United States based on a theory of federal question of Equal Protection, Due Process,

Freedom of Association, Right to Privacy, Privileges and Immunities and/or diversity of

jurisdiction.” Docket [1] at 3.

In the section of the complaint titled “Parties to this Litigation,” plaintiff explains that he

“is an indigent, disabled, and unemployed resident of” both Florida and Maryland. He states that

he splits his time evenly between those two states, and that his current mailing address is Bowie,

Maryland. As to defendant, plaintiff “believes” that she “lives in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale

and/or Broward County,” but that he does not know where to serve process. Id. at 3. He therefore

suggests serving defendant via “publication in a local newspaper such as [the] Miami Daily

Herald.” Id.

In the section of the complaint titled “Jurisdiction and Venue,” plaintiff acknowledges that

this Court does not have “personal or subject matter jurisdiction over this issue.” Doc. [1] at 3-4.

Nevertheless, he insists that the Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,

“because there is complete diversity of jurisdiction between the plaintiff and the five defendants[,]

given that the plaintiff lives in Sarasota, Florida and no longer in Fort Worth, Texas.”6 Doc. [1] at

4. However, plaintiff acknowledges that there is no amount in controversy, as he is seeking “$0,”

which is – as he notes – “less than $75,000.” Id.

In addition, plaintiff contends that the Court has federal question jurisdiction, “because this

proceeding involves a discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [the] Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990, [the] Equal Protection Clause, [the] Due Process Clause, [the] Fourth

Amendment, and [the] Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Plaintiff also alleges that venue in this

district is proper, though he provides no support for this proposition.

In the “Statement of Facts” section of the complaint, plaintiff begins with a vague

recapitulation of some of his past litigation history. He notes that three separate cases he filed

against defendant in South Carolina, Tennessee, and Louisiana were all transferred to Florida. Doc.

[1] at 4-5. Plaintiff opines that “[i]f litigation were a chessboard, then the state of Tennessee would

be a bishop, the state of South Carolina would be a rook, and the state of Louisiana is shaped like

a knight, and it would be checkmate in the sense that Florida is a white or black king on the other

side of the chessboard.” Doc. [1] at 5. In other words, plaintiff suggests that his cases in South

Carolina, Tennessee, and Louisiana “are all necessary pieces on the chessboard to obtain an

annulment from” defendant, so that he can have a legal declaration that he “was never married” to

her. Id.

6 The Court notes that plaintiff refers to “five defendants,” though only one is listed in the complaint. This mistake

appears in other complaints plaintiff has filed in other districts, as well.

Plaintiff explains that getting an annulment from defendant is “extremely important” to

him because his “fiancé from the Ukraine does not know that he was married before to a Haitian-

American woman.” Id. at 5. He asserts that his “previous marriage to a woman that is not his type

is extremely embarrassing to” him, and that he “wants to re-write his life story to exclude his

previous marriage.” Id. Plaintiff further states that he “does not want a woman appearing out of

nowhere…claiming to be [his] daughter[,] which would interfere with [his] engagement to another

woman from the Ukraine.” Id. In other words, plaintiff believes that his former daughter and

former wife “might interfere with [his] future marriage to a woman from the Ukraine who is more

important to” him. Id.

Due to the possibility that he might have to get a liver transplant, plaintiff “believes that

time is of the essence” in obtaining an annulment. Doc. [1] at 5-6. He wants to “enjoy the rest of

his life with a future marriage to a woman from the Ukraine without any tortious interference with

family relations by” defendant or defendant’s daughter. Id.

In “Count One” of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant “committed the tortious

interference with family relations by interfering with his prior engagement to” a woman from

Cuba. Doc. [1] at 6. There are no facts to support this claim, though plaintiff contends that the

Court “should take judicial notice that the plaintiff only attended Saint Thomas University School

of Law in Miami Gardens, Florida to be in close proximity” to the relatives of his previous fiancé.

Doc. [1] at 6-7.

Plaintiff concludes his complaint with a “Prayer for Relief,” explaining that he “is seeking

the equitable remedy of an injunction” that will declare he “was never married to” defendant. Doc.

[1] at 7. He affirms that he “is not seeking punitive, compensatory, treble, actual, presumed, and

special damages for [defendant’s] commission of the aforementioned torts because [he]

appreciates that the sole defendant allowed him to terminate his parental rights.” Id.

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action against defendant seeking

to have a prior divorce changed to an annulment. Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the

Court has reviewed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the

reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to decide a certain class of cases.

LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006). “Federal courts are not courts of

general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution

and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,

475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). See also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“Federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”).

The presence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every

federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). See also

Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in every

federal case is jurisdiction and we have admonished the district court to be attentive to a

satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”). “Subject matter jurisdiction can never be

waived or forfeited.” Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 830, 838 (8th Cir. 2022).

Because jurisdiction is a threshold requirement, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may

be raised at any time, by any party or the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976,

982 (8th Cir. 2009). See also City of Kansas City, Mo. v. Yarco Co., Inc., 625 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th

Cir. 2010) (“Federal courts have an independent duty to determine subject matter jurisdiction, even

where the matter is raised for the first time on appeal and on the court’s own motion”). The burden

of proving subject matter jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P’ship v. Dep’t of Hous. &

Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Magee v. United States, 9 F.4th 675,

680 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction rests with

the party invoking federal jurisdiction”).

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over both federal question cases and

diversity of citizenship cases. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian

Reservation, 495 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking

if neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction applies); McLaurin v. Prater, 30

F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress has directed that district courts shall have

jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity cases). In this case, plaintiff has not

demonstrated that either form of jurisdiction is present.

i. Diversity Jurisdiction

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over civil

actions when the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, without considering interest and costs,

and when the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from the citizenship of each defendant.” Ryan

ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001). Subject matter

jurisdiction premised upon diversity of citizenship is measured by “the state of facts that existed

at the time of filing.” See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004).

With regard to the amount in controversy, a complaint making a good faith allegation of

the jurisdictional amount is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Universal Crop

Prot. All., LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 2010). However, a “complaint will be dismissed if it

appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id. See

also Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2002). “The legal certainty standard is met where

the legal impossibility of recovery is so certain as virtually to negative the plaintiff’s good faith in

asserting the claim.” Peterson v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2017).

As to diversity of the parties, “[c]omplete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant

holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” OnePoint Solutions, LLC

v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007). Diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be

citizens of different states, not merely residents. Sanders, 823 F.2d at 216. For purposes of

diversity, state citizenship “requires an individual’s physical presence in the state coupled with an

indefinite intention there to remain.” Blakemore v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 789 F.2d 616, 618 (8th

Cir. 1986). “Once an individual has established his state citizenship, he remains a citizen of that

state until he legally acquires a new state of citizenship.” Eckerberg v. Inter-State Studio &

Publishing Co., 860 F.3d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir. 2017).

In this case, it is unclear whether there is diversity between the parties. Plaintiff states that

he splits his time between Florida and Maryland, without asserting citizenship in either state. In

the meantime, plaintiff believes – but is not certain – that defendant is somewhere in Florida.

Ultimately, the diversity of the parties does not matter, because plaintiff freely

acknowledges that he is not seeking damages over $75,000. In fact, he stressed that he is seeking

“$0,” and wants only equitable relief. Since he has not alleged damages over the jurisdictional

threshold, there is no diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Moreover, even if plaintiff had requested damages, he cannot establish diversity

jurisdiction because his case falls within the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.

The domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over any action for

which the subject is a divorce, allowance of alimony, or child custody.” Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d

859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, when a cause of action is closely related to an action for

divorce, alimony, or child custody, federal courts generally abstain from exercising jurisdiction.

Id. Here, plaintiff seeks to have his Florida divorce somehow turned into an annulment. This

request fits squarely within the domestic relations exception.

For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing the existence of

diversity jurisdiction in this case.

ii. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Federal question jurisdiction gives district courts “original jurisdiction over civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids &

Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir. 2015). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a

claim arises under federal law is determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.” Great

Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC, 843 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2016).

The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

presented on the face of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d

748, 754 (8th Cir. 2017). See also Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938, 743 F.3d 1134, 1139

(8th Cir. 2014) (“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal question must exist on the face

of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint in order to establish federal question subject matter

jurisdiction”).

Plaintiff’s complaint must establish “either that federal law creates the cause of action or

that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of

federal law.” Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Northwest South

Dakota Production Credit Ass’n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[a] non-

frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal question

jurisdiction”). “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th

Cir. 2005).

In this case, plaintiff presents several potential federal questions he insists gives the Court

jurisdiction. None of them do.

First, plaintiff states that this case “involves a discussion of Title VII.” The purpose of Title

VII is to ensure a workplace environment free of discrimination. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,

580 (2009). The act prohibits “employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin, in hiring, firing, salary structure, promotion and the like.” Winfrey v. City of

Forrest City, Ark., 882 F.3d 757, 758 (8th Cir. 2018).

Nothing in the complaint implicates Title VII. It is not about discrimination in any way, let

alone workplace discrimination. Furthermore, defendant is not plaintiff’s employer, she is his ex-

wife. Title VII addresses only the conduct of “employers.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); and Powell

v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2006). As Title VII has no bearing on this

action, it does not provide a jurisdictional basis.

Second, plaintiff suggests the relevance of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Title I of the ADA “bars private employers from discriminating against a qualified individual on

the basis of disability.” Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 889 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir.

2018). Discrimination includes an employer not making a reasonable accommodation to the known

physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Kallail v.

Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2012). Under Title II of the ADA,

public entities are prohibited from discrimination based on disability in services, programs, or

activities. See I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Pub. Sch., 863 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir.

2017).

While plaintiff certainly mentions that he is disabled, he does not present any facts

regarding the nature of that disability. More importantly, as noted above, this case does not involve

discrimination in any form, much less disability discrimination. That is, plaintiff is not alleging

that his employer discriminated against him, that he suffered an adverse employment action on

account of his disability, or that a public entity has denied him access to programs or services due

to his disability. Rather, he is seeking to have his past divorce changed to an annulment, and for

some reason is suing his ex-wife in order to accomplish this. Defendant is neither an employer nor

a public entity. As such, the ADA has no bearing on this action, and therefore fails to provide a

jurisdictional basis for plaintiff’s complaint.

Third, plaintiff presents several possible constitutional violations under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Liberally construed, it seems that plaintiff is attempting to bring a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action, which would obviously present a federal question. See Convent Corp. v. City

of North Little Rock, Ark., 784 F.3d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a claim brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “arises under federal law and will support federal-question

jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331”).

The problem, though, is that none of plaintiff’s facts support a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege sufficient

facts to show (1) that the defendant(s) acted under color of state law, and (2) that the alleged

wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right.” Zutz v.

Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of either

element.

With regard to the first, plaintiff has not even remotely alleged that his ex-wife is a state

actor or took any action under color of state law. Instead, defendant appears to be a private citizen.

See Magee v. Trustees of Hamline Univ., Minn., 747 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that 42

U.S.C. § 1983 “imposes liability for certain actions taken under color of law that deprive a person

of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”); and Sanders v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 secures

constitutional rights from government infringement, not infringement by private parties). As to the

second element, not one fact in the complaint hints at an actual constitutional violation. Instead,

as already noted, plaintiff is seeking to have a Florida divorce turned into an annulment, so that he

is not faced with explaining that divorce to a future wife. This is insufficient to establish 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983’s bearing on this case, and thus, § 1983 does not provide a jurisdictional basis.

For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing the existence of

federal question jurisdiction in this case.

iii. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

In the first sentence of his complaint, plaintiff asserts that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

does not apply to his case. Having reviewed the case, it appears that it does.

“The Rooker-Feldman7 doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus

petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court

judgments.” Kvalvog v. Park Christian School, Inc., 66 F.4th 1147, 1152 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005)). As the Supreme Court has explained, the

7 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

doctrine bars federal courts from hearing cases brought by the losing party in state court

proceedings that allege “injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” See

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). See also Parker Law

Firm v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 985 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “inferior

federal courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings”).

Because “jurisdiction to review most state court judgments is vested exclusively in the

Supreme Court,” federal “district courts may not review state court decisions, even if those

challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d

546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003). That is, “[f]ederal courts are not courts of review even for federal claims

asserted in a state court proceeding.” Williams v. McKenzie, 834 F.2d 152, 153 (8th Cir. 1987)

(stating that federal court lacked jurisdiction to pass on merits of claim dismissed by state court,

even though it was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985). As a result, “a litigant

cannot circumvent Rooker-Feldman by recasting his or her lawsuit as a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action.”

See Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997).

For the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, the state and federal claims need not be

identical. In re Goetzman, 91 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir. 1996). Rather, a district court is prevented

from exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge if it is “inextricably intertwined with

claims asserted in a state court proceeding.” Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir.

1990). “[T]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal

claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Id. at

296-97. When federal relief can only be predicated on the conviction that the state court was

wrong, the claim is “a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.” Id. at 297.

Rooker-Feldman “is a narrow doctrine.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006). It is

confined to cases brought by the losing party in a state-court action, and does not bar actions filed

by nonparties to earlier state court judgments. See Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. Southern

Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2017).

In addition, the Rooker-Feldman “doctrine is limited in scope and does not bar jurisdiction

over actions alleging independent claims arising from conduct in underlying state proceedings.”

Hageman v. Barton, 817 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2016). See also MSK EyEs Ltd. v. Wells Fargo

Bank, Nat’l Assoc., 546 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The doctrine does not apply to cases that

raise independent issues”).

By way of example, “[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous

decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision,

Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.” Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d

952, 965 (8th Cir. 2008). See also Skit Intern., Ltd. v. DAC Technologies of Arkansas, Inc., 487

F.3d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 2007) (determining that Rooker-Feldman prevented jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claim because plaintiff sought redress “directly from the state court judgment itself

rather than from some separate injury caused by the defendant”).

On the other hand, if “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or

omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Riehm, 538 F.3d at 965

(determining that Rooker-Feldman did not apply where plaintiffs were not parties to ex parte

petition for emergency protective care, and did not seek to overturn the ex parte order, but sought

redress for an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment). See also Webb as next friend of

K.S. v. Smith, 936 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2019) (determining that Rooker-Feldman did not bar

plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against county and two county employees for taking their minor

children into emergency protective custody, because plaintiffs did “not appear to be seeking to get

out from under a state-court judgment,” but were “trying to obtain damages from state actors who

allegedly violated their rights”).

In this case, plaintiff names his ex-wife as the defendant, and vaguely accuses her of

tortious interference with his family relations. Despite this, the relief plaintiff is seeking has

nothing whatsoever to do with defendant. Specifically, plaintiff wants the Court to issue an

injunction declaring that he was never married. To do this, he must get out from under the 2006

state court judgment of the 17th Judicial District of Broward County that granted his divorce. The

Court does not have the authority to overturn that judgment. Therefore, for this reason as well, the

case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Even if the Court had jurisdiction over this matter, plaintiff has failed to state a claim. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (allowing district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any

time if the court determines plaintiff has not stated a claim).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While the Court must

accept factual allegations as true, it “is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions,

unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”

Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002). See also Braden v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that while “the court must take the

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,” this “tenet does not apply…to legal conclusions or formulaic

recitations of the elements of a cause of action,” and that “such allegations may properly be set

aside”). Furthermore, plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017).

In this case, plaintiff provides no facts demonstrating a right to relief against defendant.

The majority of the complaint has nothing to do with anything defendant did or did not do, but

instead focuses on plaintiff’s desire to overturn a 2006 divorce and transform it into an annulment

so that he can have “selective amnesia” and deny his prior relationship. There is no suggestion that

defendant has any authority over this request, and very little to indicate why plaintiff has named

his ex-wife as a defendant to this action.

The Court notes that at the end of the complaint, plaintiff alleges “tortious interference with

family relations.” In this solitary count, “plaintiff argues that the sole defendant… committed…

tortious interference with family relations by interfering with his prior engagement” to a woman

from Las Tunas, Cuba. Earlier in the complaint, plaintiff expressed his fear that defendant would

do so again. This is the extent of the allegations against defendant, and amounts to nothing more

than stating a cause of action and concluding that defendant is liable for it. Plaintiff’s pleading –

in which he contends that defendant committed tortious interference by interfering – consists of

no facts actually describing what defendant did, and certainly no facts demonstrating that

defendant is liable to plaintiff under any legal theory. The Court is not required to accept plaintiff’s

conclusory pleadings as true, and will not do so here. Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint is subject to

dismissal for failure to state a claim.

C. Maliciousness

Plaintiff’s complaint is also subject to dismissal for maliciousness. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (stating that a court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint at any time if

the court determines that the action is malicious). Dismissal based on maliciousness is appropriate

where the plaintiff knows the allegations to be false, or where the complaint is “plainly part of a

longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits.” Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212-13

(8th Cir. 1984). See also Carter v. Schafer, 273 Fed. Appx. 581 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming district

court dismissal for maliciousness where non-prisoner plaintiff “filed at least thirty separate

complaints” in a five-year period, with a number of those cases raising “issues that are the same

as or are substantially similar to those in the instant case, against the same defendants”); and

Cooper v. Wood, 111 F.3d 135 (8th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) (explaining that the Eighth

Circuit has “interpreted ‘malicious’ to apply to situations where the plaintiff knows the allegations

to be false…where the complaint is plainly part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious

lawsuits…and where the complaint contains disrespectful references or abusive language”).

Here, the instant case is “plainly part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious

lawsuits.” As noted above, plaintiff has filed hundreds of lawsuits in federal court, and is a banned

filer in several districts based on his abuse of the judicial process. More recently, he has filed at

least 30 cases against defendant in 28 different United States District Courts. This wave of filings

has come over the course of five months. Many of the complaints are nearly identical, and include

repeated mistakes, such as plaintiff’s reference to “five defendants” when there is only one. When

plaintiff’s cases are dismissed, he simply moves onto other districts and files more, casually

admitting that he is “forum shopping.” The Court finds that plaintiff’s targeting of defendant with

a large volume of meritless cases over a period of five months is malicious, and an abuse of the

judicial process. Therefore, plaintiff’s case is subject to dismissal for maliciousness.

D. Improper Venue

Even if the Court ignored everything else, this case would still be subject to dismissal on

the basis of improper venue. A civil action may be brought only in: (1) a judicial district where

any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a judicial district in which a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) a judicial district

in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be

brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In this case, despite plaintiff’s assertion that venue is proper, it appears that the parties

involved live elsewhere than the Eastern District of Missouri. Plaintiff states that he splits time

between Florida and Maryland, while defendant is somewhere in Florida. There is no indication

that either plaintiff or defendant has ever set foot in the Eastern District of Missouri. As to the

events described in the complaint, plaintiff mentions a marriage in Nevada, a divorce in Florida,

and litigation in Utah and Hawaii. At no point is there any reference to this district. To summarize,

defendant does not live in this district, and nothing in the complaint happened here. Perhaps this

is not surprising, as plaintiff admits he is “forum shopping,” and has filed 30 similar cases in 28

other United States District Courts. In any event, venue here is improper.

“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division

or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or

division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Here, dismissal is the proper

course. Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal on numerous grounds and thirteen other district

courts have already disposed of similar actions on initial review. The interests of justice would

clearly not be served by transferring this case to another district when it so obviously lacks

jurisdiction, fails to state a claim, and is malicious. Therefore, this case is subject to dismissal for

improper venue.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,

Doc. [2], is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). A separate order of

dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this order of dismissal would not be

taken in good faith.

Dated this 24th day of July, 2023. _

Mak Pe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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