The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JANET SAHM, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:23-cv-00200-AGF
)
AVCO CORPORATION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motions of Defendants Avco Corporation
(“Avco”), Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (“Bell”), and Textron Aviation, Inc. (“Textron”)
(collectively, the “Defendants”) to dismiss this case. ECF Nos. 59–64. Plaintiffs have
timely filed responses [ECF Nos. 65–67], and the Defendants have filed replies [ECF
Nos. 68–70]. For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions
to dismiss.
Background
Plaintiffs first filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on January 13,
2023, raising claims of wrongful death under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080. ECF No. 5 at 2.
Plaintiffs brought this case against thirteen defendants, including Avco, Bell, and
Textron. Defendant Raytheon Technologies Corporation timely removed this case under
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) on federal officer jurisdiction grounds. ECF No. 1 at 3.
The following facts are taken from the Petition. Plaintiffs are the surviving heirs
of decedent Gustave Sahm, who Plaintiffs allege died from lung cancer due to his
exposure to asbestos-containing products. See ECF No. 5 at 6, 8–10. According to
Plaintiffs, from 1956 to 2020, Mr. Sahm was exposed to asbestos-containing products
while serving in the Navy and working various jobs. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs allege that Mr.
Sahm served in the U.S. Navy from 1956 to 1958. Id. They further allege that he worked
as a driver at Schuetten Berg & Sahm Water Hauling from 1958 to 1959, as an electrical
mechanic at McDonnell Douglas Corporation from 1959 to 1960, as a truck driver for
Landvatte Ready Mix in 1960, as a truck driver for St. Louis County Title from 1960 to
1962, as a police officer for St. Louis County from 1962 to 1991, as a salesman at Lou
Fusz Motor Company from 1991 to 2001, as a salesman at Marshall Ford from 2001 to
2003, as a salesman at Broadway Truck Center from 2003 to 2006, as a driver at Lou
Fusz Motor Company from 2006 to 2016, and as a customer service representative at
Autozone from 2016 to 2020. Id. Plaintiffs allege, in general terms, that during Mr.
Sahm’s employment he was exposed to asbestos-containing products that were
manufactured, sold, distributed, and/or installed by Defendants. Id. at 3. They also
allege that Mr. Sahm’s “exposure to the materials, products, equipment, activates [sic]
and conditions attributable to the various Defendants occurred at different times as to
each and not necessarily throughout [Mr. Sahm’s] entire career or life as to any particular
Defendant.” Id. at 5.
Plaintiffs bring four counts against all Defendants: (i) Count I – Strict Liability,
(ii) Count II – Negligence, (iii) Count III – Willful and Wanton Misconduct and
Aggravated Circumstances, and (iv) Count IV – Loss of Consortium. ECF No. 5. In
Count I, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants and each of them manufactured, sold and
distributed the asbestos-containing products to which [Mr. Sahm] was exposed,” and that
the products “were in a defective condition and were unreasonably dangerous” in that
they contained asbestos fibers without a proper warning. Id. at 6. In Count II, they allege
that “Defendants and each of them failed to exercise ordinary care or caution for [Mr.
Sahm’s] safety” by negligently including asbestos in products to which Mr. Sahm was
exposed. Id. at 8. In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants and each of them” are
guilty of willful and wanton misconduct by intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
Mr. Sahm, including asbestos in products to which Mr. Sahm was exposed. Id. at 9–10.
Finally, in Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that, “as a direct and proximate result of the
foregoing acts or omissions of the Defendants,” Plaintiff Janet Sahm and “other family
members” have been deprived of the companionship, society, and services of her late
husband, Mr. Sahm. Id. at 11.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
when it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Pleadings must include
sufficient factual information to provide notice and the grounds on which the claim rests
and “to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Id. at 555; see also Schaaf v.
Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). This obligation requires a
plaintiff to plead “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint
“must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562 (citation
omitted). On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations
contained in the complaint and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations
show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Petition fails to state a claim against each of them
on each Count. See ECF Nos. 59–64. Specifically, the Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
fail to “allege which [of Defendants’] product[s] Mr. Sahm was allegedly exposed to”
and fail to allege “when, where, or how [Mr. Sahm] was allegedly exposed” such that
“Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead their claims against” Defendants. ECF Nos. 60 at 2,
62 at 2, and 64 at 2. The Court agrees.
Each of Plaintiffs’ claims sounds in products liability,1 and therefore each claim
requires an allegation identifying which of Defendants’ products are at issue. See
Sullivan v. Medtronic, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2020) (claims of strict
liability for defective design require Plaintiff to establish: (1) the defendant sold a product
1 Plaintiffs’ Count III for willful and wanton misconduct is interpreted as a request
for punitive damages, which does not constitute an independent cause of action in
Missouri. See SEMO Servs., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 660 S.W.3d 430, 444 (Mo. Ct. App.
2022). Similarly, Plaintiff Janet Sahm’s claim for loss of consortium (Count IV) is
contingent upon Mr. Sahm having a valid claim for strict liability for product defect
and/or negligent manufacture. See Thompson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
207 S.W.3d 76, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
in the course of its business; (2) the product was then in a defective condition,
unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use; (3) the product was
used in a manner reasonably anticipated; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged as a direct
result of such defective condition as existed when the product was sold); see also id. at
1115 n.4 (“[I]n order to recover on a claim for negligent manufacture, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant failed to use ordinary care to manufacture the product to be
reasonably safe.”) (citing Redd v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1270–
71 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (cleaned up). But Plaintiffs do not identify any specific products
manufactured, sold, or distributed by Defendants. Plaintiffs’ formulaic recitation of the
elements of each claim—without specifying any products that Defendants are to have
manufactured, sold, or distributed—fails to provide Defendants with notice of the
grounds on which Plaintiffs’ claims rest. Therefore, all claims against the Defendants
must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Avco’s, Bell’s, and Textron’s motions to
dismiss are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims against these Defendants only will be
DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 59, 61, and 63. The Court will enter a separate Order of Dismissal
as to these Defendants.
Dated this Sth day of July, 2023.
Gong FH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE