Corley v. Blair

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

JERROD CORLEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00250-SRC

)

PAUL BLAIR, )

)

Respondent. )

Memorandum and Order

Petitioner Jerrod Corley, proceeding pro se, seeks to have his sentence vacated under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Corley asserts four ineffective-assistance claims against trial counsel: 1) counsel

advised Corley not to testify at trial, 2) counsel allegedly failed to investigate potential witnesses,

3) counsel allegedly failed to investigate one of Corley’s codefendants, and 4) counsel did not

request a mistrial after a juror hesitated when the judge polled the jury. Additionally, Corley

says that appellate counsel failed to argue that the State presented insufficient evidence to

convict Corley. The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected these arguments on postconviction

review, and the Court finds that the Missouri Court of Appeals’ holdings did not contradict or

unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent and that the state court adjudicated the facts

reasonably. Accordingly, § 2254(d) does not entitle Corley to relief.

I. Statement of facts

The Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the relevant facts as follows:

The following facts adduced at trial are presented in the light most favorable to the

verdict. In the underlying incident, Corley was driving a stolen vehicle on Interstate

270[,] while his three passengers (collectively, “Co-defendants”) shot four victims,

killing one (collectively, “Victims”). Co-defendant John Stith (“Stith”) initially sat

in the driver’s seat of the stolen vehicle but switched places with Corley who then

drove. Trial testimony indicated Corley maneuvered the vehicle alongside Victims’

Jeep so that Co-defendants could fire on Victims, and that Corley knew Co-

defendants planned to shoot the targeted victim, who was believed to have been

involved in the death of one of the Co-defendant’s cousins. During the incident,

Co-defendants Stith and Tony Bailey (“Bailey”) fired weapons at Victims. Bailey

testified that earlier in the evening, he had a .380 caliber gun, Leroy Coleman

(“Coleman”) had a nine-millimeter gun, and Stith had a .40 caliber gun. Bailey

testified that he placed the guns in Jamie McCloud’s (“McCloud”) truck prior to

the shooting. Bailey also testified that he and Stith shot Victims, specifically noting

that he fired the nine-millimeter gun and Stith fired the .40 caliber gun. Trial

evidence further showed that as he drove away[,] Corley said that it appeared the

intended victim had been hit. When the stolen vehicle was recovered, evidence of

Corley’s DNA was found on the key fob and interior door handle.

The State charged Corley under accomplice-liability theory with murder in the first

degree, three counts of assault in the first degree, five counts of armed criminal

action, and unlawful use of a weapon. The State tried Corley jointly with Coleman.

At trial, Corley did not testify in his own defense. The trial court asked Corley if he

understood his right to testify and if his decision not to testify was his own free and

voluntary decision. Corley answered that he understood and was choosing to waive

his right to testify.

When the jury returned to render its verdicts and was individually polled, one juror

(“Juror”) stated she needed a moment, which the trial court gave her. Juror took

approximately four minutes to render her verdicts, ultimately confirming that the

guilty verdicts were unanimous. Co-defendant Coleman sought a mistrial on the

basis of the Juror’s apparent reluctance to acknowledge the guilty verdicts and

whether it meant the verdicts were not unanimous. The trial court declined to grant

a mistrial.

The trial court sentenced Corley to life imprisonment without the possibility of

probation or parole for first-degree murder and concurrent sentences of life

imprisonment and fifteen years on the other charges. Corley directly appealed his

guilty verdicts. Appellate counsel did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

for accomplice liability on direct appeal. This Court affirmed Corley’s judgment

and sentence in State v. Corley, 563 S.W.3d. 855 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).

Subsequently, Corley moved for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15.

Doc. 13-10 at pp. 4–6. Both the postconviction motion court and the Missouri Court of Appeals

denied Corley’s requests for postconviction relief. Id. Corley now requests relief from this

Court. Doc. 1.

II. Standard of review

Section 28 U.S.C. § 2254 creates the statutory basis for habeas petitions from state-court

convictions. A state prisoner who seeks relief under § 2254 must prove that he is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). To

obtain relief under § 2254, a petitioner must establish that the state court proceedings:

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

To warrant relief, a state court’s decision must be “more than incorrect or erroneous,” but

“must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). A petitioner

must also show that equitable considerations favor relief. “[E]ven a petitioner who prevails

under AEDPA must still today persuade a federal habeas court that ‘law and justice require’

relief.” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022) (citations omitted); see also 28

U.S.C.A. § 2243 (“A court, justice, or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas

corpus . . . shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and

justice require.”). Historically, “the States’ ‘powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the

guilty,’” stands as the most important of these equitable considerations. Id. at 1523; see also

Crawford v. Cain, 55 F.4th 981, 994 (5th Cir. 2023) (“Law and justice do not require habeas

relief—and hence a federal court can exercise its discretion not to grant it—when the prisoner is

factually guilty.”).

In each ground for relief, Corley alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed on

an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that “counsel’s

performance was deficient” and that “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy

task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). Counsel should be “strongly presumed to

have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. For federal courts reviewing

state proceedings, “the pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland

standard was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). “This is different

from asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Id. To

grant relief, a federal habeas court cannot simply disagree with a state court but must find the

state court’s adjudication objectively unreasonable. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. Review is thus

“doubly deferential,” requiring a “highly deferential look at counsel’s performance through

deferential lens of § 2254(d).” Cullen, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).

To prevail on Strickland’s performance prong, a petitioner must overcome the ‘“strong

presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable

professional assistance” and must establish that counsel’s performance “amounted to

incompetence.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104—05 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688—89).

Further, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S at 690–91.

To prevail on Strickland’s prejudice prong, a petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. For a petitioner to succeed on the prejudice prong, counsel’s errors

must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “[T]he difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a

more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case.” Dorsey v.

Vandergriff, 30 F.4th 752, 757 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111–12 (citation

omitted)).

III. Discussion

A. Ground One: Ineffective assistance for advising petitioner not to testify

In his first ground for relief, Corley says that his counsel rendered him ineffective

assistance by advising him not to testify on his own behalf. Doc. 1 at p. 5. Corley claims his

counsel stated Corley was “winning at trial and his testimony was unnecessary” and but for this

advice “the outcome of his trial would have been different.” Doc. 1 at p. 5. However, his

argument fails.

The Missouri Court of Appeals denied this claim, holding that trial counsel advised

Corley reasonably and “the record conclusively refutes Corley’s claim that counsel was

ineffective for advising him not to testify at trial.” Doc. 13-10 at p. 7. First, the Missouri Court

of Appeals noted that Corley knowingly and voluntarily decided not to take the stand. Id. at p. 8.

Because Corley made this decision himself, he cannot demonstrate that prejudice resulted from

his attorney’s conduct. Id. Second, Corley’s own briefing states that counsel gave “strategic

advice against taking the stand.” Id. (emphasis added). Third, “given that Corley was not

disputing that he was driving the vehicle during the shooting and ample testimony at trial refuted

his claim that he was unaware Co-defendants intended to shoot at Victims, Corley fails to

overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable.” Id. So, the Missouri

Court of Appeals rejected Corley’s argument.

To this, Corley gives nothing beyond a conclusory argument that he should have taken

the stand, his attorney advised him not to, and his trial ended in conviction. Doc. 1 at p. 5. His

argument does not show that the Missouri Court of Appeals contradicted or misapplied Supreme

Court precedent or that it unreasonably adjudicated the facts. See § 2254(d). The state court’s

three reasons for rejecting Corley’s argument stand. First, Corley offers no reason to think that,

but for his attorney’s advice, he was reasonably likely to testify. See Doc. 1 at p. 5; Doc. 13-7 at

pp. 23–32. Without this, he cannot demonstrate prejudice. Second, counsel made a strategic

decision, meriting a high level of deference. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Third, because

Corley’s testimony would not have undermined the State’s case and would have resulted in his

impeachment, counsel had good reason to advise Corley not to testify. The Court deems

reasonable the Missouri Court of Appeals’ adjudication of the issue. See § 2254(d).

Further, Corley has not convinced the Court that law and justice require habeas relief.

See § 2243. Corley’s argument does not subvert the reliability of the jury’s deliberations or the

Missouri criminal justice system. The jury found that Corley acted as an accomplice to murder

under Missouri law, and this Court sees no reason why the federal government should “intrude[]

on state sovereignty” by granting habeas to a guilty party. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1523. Thus,

the equities do not weigh in favor of relief. The Court denies ground one.

B. Ground Two: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate

potential witnesses

In his second claim, Corley states counsel unreasonably failed to “investigate and

subpoena material witnesses Ms. Jamie (Thorpe) McCloud and Ms. Daisha Houston. According

to Corley’s Argument to the Missouri Court of Appeals:

Ms. McCloud and Ms. Houston would have testified that on the night of February

21, 2016, before the shooting that resulted in Emma Wallace’s death, Mr. Tony

Bailey placed his guns, a .40 caliber and a .380 caliber, in Ms. McCloud’s vehicle

for safe keeping before he entered Jay’s Classic Bar and Grill []. This testimony

was necessary to impeach Mr. Bailey’s testimony that he never possessed a .40

caliber weapon but John Stith did, and he only had a .380 caliber weapon and was

handed a .9mm [sic] weapon that he used to fire shots. . . . Specifically, had the jury

heard testimony from Ms. McCloud and Ms. Houston, it may have disbelieved Mr.

Bailey’s trial testimony that he fired a .9mm [sic] weapon from the front passenger

seat of the car, and instead, believed he fired the .40 caliber gun.

Doc. 13-7 at pp. 36–37. At trial, Bailey said that he and his compatriots stole a car and

found three guns inside: a 9mm, a .380 caliber, and a .40 caliber. Doc. 13-1 at p. 805.

Bailey, Stith, and Coleman divided the guns among themselves, Bailey taking the .380

caliber. Id. at p. 806. Bailey says they placed the guns in a car and then retrieved them

before the shooting. Id. at p. 806. Corley did not explain to the Missouri Court of

Appeals where the conflict lies between Houston and McCloud’s statements and Bailey’s

own account of these events. Id. at pp. 33–39. Further, Corley did not explain how this

supposed conflict bears any relation to his conviction. Id.

The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected this argument:

The record at trial unambiguously shows that McCloud and Houston’s

testimonies would have been merely cumulative to Bailey’s own testimony that he

put the .40 and .380 caliber guns in McCloud’s truck prior to the shooting. . . .

Moreover, McCloud and Houston’s testimonies could not have impeached Bailey’s

account of what happened during the shooting incident because neither witness was

present at the scene, and their testimonies would not have offered the jury any

evidence bearing on Corley’s role in the shooting incident. . . . Corley fails to

explain how disagreement about whether Bailey or Stith fired which gun has any

impact on Corley’s guilt under accomplice-liability theory as the driver of the

vehicle from which Co-defendants shot Victims.

Doc. 13-10 at pp. 10–11.

The Court finds this adjudication of the facts reasonable. Even if the jury took

McCloud and Houston’s testimony to prove that Bailey used a 9mm weapon rather than a

.40 caliber—and the Court cannot see how their testimony could prove this—the question

of which gun Bailey used has no relation to Corley’s guilt. Because this testimony could

not have contributed to Corley’s defense, his counsel’s decision not to present this

testimony cannot qualify as unreasonable or incompetent. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.

Additionally, Corley has not shown that law and justice favor habeas relief. See § 2243.

Law and justice counsel in favor of habeas relief where the petitioner is innocent. See Crawford,

55 F.4th at 994. Whether Bailey fired a 9mm weapon or a .40 caliber weapon makes no

difference to whether Corley drove the car to assist Bailey and Stith commit murder. Thus, the

equities do not weigh in favor of relief. The Court denies ground two.

C. Ground Three: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate

codefendant

In his third claim for relief, Corley asserts trial counsel unreasonably “fail[ed] to

interview, properly investigate and subpoena codefendant John Stith.” Doc. 1 at p. 8. The

Missouri Court of Appeals found that Corley failed “to show that Stith’s potential impeachment

of portions of other witness testimony would have provided Corley with a viable defense.” Doc.

13-10 at p. 11. The decision not to call codefendants is a matter of trial strategy, which is

‘“virtually unchallengeable’ even if that decision later proves unwise.” Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d

1547, 1556 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690) (collecting cases). Even if trial

counsel’s decision not to call a codefendant to testify falls below the standard for reasonable

performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that this decision prejudiced his or her trial. Id. If

“the record is replete with evidence that [the petitioner] was involved in the crime” and a

codefendant’s testimony would not clearly negate this evidence, a petitioner cannot show

counsel’s decision unfairly prejudiced his or her trial. Id.

The Missouri Court of Appeals found that the record was replete with evidence of

Corley’s guilt:

[E]ven if Stith’s testimony would have impeached Bailey’s testimony that Corley

specifically said he would drive the car in a way to allow Bailey to shoot Victims,

Corley still would not have a viable defense to any of the elements supporting the

charged offenses under accomplice-liability theory. See id. As the motion court

noted, the overall strength of the testimony adduced at trial aptly demonstrated

Corley’s role in driving the vehicle from which the shooting occurred, showing he

drove it in a manner that brought it alongside the Victim’s Jeep and enabled Co-

defendants to shoot victims, and he commended upon driving away that the

intended victim had been hit.

Doc. 13-10 at p. 11. This analysis demonstrates that the Missouri Court of Appeals reasonably

concluded that counsel’s decision not to call Stith did not prejudice Corley. The Court defers to

this reasonable finding of fact. See § 2254(d).

Again, law and justice do not favor relief. See § 2243. Because Corley cannot support an

argument for his actual innocence, and Corley is factually guilty, hence law and justice do not

require habeas relief. Crawford, 55 F.4th at 994. So, Corley satisfies neither § 2254(d) nor

§ 2243, and the Court denies ground three.

D. Ground Four: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to request a

mistrial

Corley’s fourth claim asserts that trial counsel incompetently failed to request a mistrial

after a juror hesitated in stating her decision when the judge polled the jury. Doc. 1 at p. 9. The

Missouri Court of Appeals held that such a request would have been denied, noting that the trial

court denied the same request from one of Corley’s codefendants. Doc. 13-10 at p. 13. Thus,

Corley suffered no prejudice. Id. Turning to the performance prong of Strickland, the Missouri

Court of Appeals found that counsel reasonably chose not to make a request identical to the

request the trial court had just denied. Id.

The Missouri Court of Appeals reasonably determined that a request for a mistrial could

not have succeeded and that counsel knew this. Id. Further, the state court did not contradict or

unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent when it judged that counsel reasonably decided not

to make a meritless request. See Sittner v. Bowersox, 969 F.3d 846, 853 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Failure

to raise a meritless objection cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance.”). Pursuant to

§ 2254(d), this Court must accept the Missouri Court of Appeals’ reasonable adjudication of this

claim.

As with Corley’s previous arguments, law and justice do not support relief. See § 2243.

Corley does not impugn the reliability of the jury’s guilty verdict. See Crawford, 55 F.4th at

994. The Court denies ground four.

E. Ground Five: Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

In his fifth and final ground for relief, Corley claims that appellate counsel unreasonably

failed to argue that the State presented “insufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror

could find he acted with others to commit the charged crimes.” Doc. 1 at p. 9. The Missouri

Court of Appeals dismissed this claim, finding Corley’s argument “is merely conclusory and

fails to offer any argument or legal authority to support his claim.” Doc. 13 at p. 40.

Because Corley presented only a conclusory argument, see Doc. 13-7 at p. 59, the

Missouri Court of Appeals had no reason to find that Corley’s appellate counsel gave up a key

argument for the defense. According to the United States Supreme Court: “Effective appellate

counsel should not raise every nonfrivolous argument on appeal, but rather only those arguments

most likely to succeed. Declining to raise a claim on appeal, therefore, is not deficient

performance unless that claim was plainly stronger than those actually presented to the appellate

court.” Davila v. Davis, 584 U.S. 521, 533 (2017) (internal citations omitted).

Reviewing, Corley’s argument to the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Court agrees

that Corley offered no argument or authority to support the notion that counsel performed

deficiently or that the evidence against Corley had too little substance to persuade a

reasonable juror. See Doc. 13-7 at pp. 54-60. Since Corley could not articulate an

argument to the Missouri Court of Appeals in support of this ground for relief, the state

court had no reason to find that this argument presented a plainly stronger claim than the

case actually presented on appellate review. See Davila, 584 U.S. at 533. Therefore, the

Missouri Court of Appeals did not contradict or unreasonably apply federal law and did

not unreasonably adjudicate the facts. § 2254(d). Further, for the same reasons Corley’s

previous arguments failed to show that law and justice require habeas relief, this ground

for relief also fails. See § 2243. The Court denies ground five.

F. Certificate of appealability

The Court finds that Corley has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253. Therefore, the Court does not issue a certificate of

appealability as to any of Corley’s claims in his § 2254 petition.

IV. Conclusion

The Court denies Corley’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus

and dismisses the Petition with prejudice. The Court does not issue a certificate of appealability.

So Ordered this 29th day of June 2023.

sur. CL

STEPHENR.CLARK ts”

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1]