Wade v. State of Missouri

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

BRADLEY B. WADE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 1:23-CV-41 SNLJ

)

STATE OF MISSOURI, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff Bradley B. Wade’s complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action

for failure to state a claim.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to review a civil complaint “in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental

entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This applies even if plaintiff has paid the filing fee. See Mack v.

Crawford, 2009 WL 398089, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 17, 2009). The term “prisoner” is defined as

“any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for,

or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). Pursuant to this

section, the Court must dismiss a complaint if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted,” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Here, plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner who is suing

the State of Missouri. Therefore, his complaint is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A screening. See

Bittick v. Nixon, 2009 WL 5214908, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 29, 2009), aff'd, 380 F. App'x 559 (8th

Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2)).

than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The

court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820

F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-

73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not

required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

The Complaint

Plaintiff, an inmate housed at the Southeast Correctional Center (“SECC”), brings this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Missouri only. He separates his allegations

into three claims, as follows:

Claim 1: Medical Neglect

Refusal of Mental Health Assistance. The neglect happened in 2016 and

2020. At Southeast Correctional Center. The Institutional Mental Health

Team failed to properly place me in Mental Health Unit when I fitted [sic]

criteria of policy two times.

Claim 2: Insufficient Counsel

Failed to effectively pursue the N.G.R.I. defense in my criminal case. In St.

Louis of 2008 I was forced to plead to 30 years for a murder.

Claim 3: Denial of Mental Illness to be a Disability

Filed for S.S.I. Social Security Income at Downtown Social Security Office

on Delmar in 2002 and 2004. Denied both times at Social Security Office

on Delmar Blvd. in downtown St. Louis

Plaintiff left the “Injuries ” section of his form complaint blank. See id. at 4. For relief, he

seeks “at least $150,000” in social security income benefits. Id. at 8.

Discussion

Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, the Court has determined this action

against the State of Missouri must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. “Section 1983 provides

for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law, of another’s civil

rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Deretich v. Office of

Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides a cause of

action against persons only”). “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are

‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see

also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (a “State is not a person

under § 1983”); Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (“a state is not a person

for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”).

Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind

of relief, not merely monetary damages. Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th

Cir. 2007). “Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its

consent.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh

Amendment has been held to confer immunity on a nonconsenting State from lawsuits brought in

federal court by a State’s own citizens or the citizens of another State. Edelman v. Jordan, 415

U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 2018 WL 2070564, at *1 (8th Cir.

2018) (“The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit

in federal court”); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The

Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from suing a state in federal court”); Egerdahl v.

suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed

by the Eleventh Amendment”).

There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the

Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1992). “The first

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such

immunity by clear and unmistakable language.” Id. The second exception is when a State waives

its immunity to suit in federal court. Id. at 65. A State will be found to have waived its immunity

“only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the

text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways

& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987).

Neither exception applies in this case. First, there is no congressional abrogation of

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to § 1983. The United States

Supreme Court has determined that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not revoke the States’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude

that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued

without its consent”); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to

believe . . . that Congress intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional

sovereign immunity of the States”). Second, the State of Missouri has not consented to the suit.

Specifically, the State’s statutory waiver of immunity does not include the type of claims made by

plaintiff in this case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600.

Thus, because a state is not a “person” for the purposes of § 1983 and a suit against the

state is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, plaintiff’s claim against the State of Missouri will be

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

individual, his claims would still fail. First, as to the “medical neglect” claim, it is limited to

plaintiff’s allegation that the mental health team at SECC “failed to properly place [him] in [a]

Mental Health Unit when [he] fit[] [the] criteria of policy two times.” Disagreements with

treatment decisions, however, do not constitute deliberate indifference. See Cejvanovic v. Ludwick,

923 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 2019) (stating that a “mere disagreement with treatment decisions . . .

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”); and Meuir v. Greene Cty. Jail Emps., 487

F.3d 1115, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A prisoner’s mere difference of opinion over matters of

expert medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fails to rise to the level of a constitutional

violation”). Moreover, even if an individual at the SECC was not following the institution’s

“policy” regarding treatment, there is no violation of § 1983 for failing to follow prison policy.

See Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

Second, to the extent plaintiff intended to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

against his public defender from his underlying state criminal action, such a claim is legally

frivolous pursuant to § 1983. Public defenders performing lawyers’ traditional functions do not act

under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

Third, it is inappropriate to bring a claim pursuant to § 1983 to complain about a denial of

Social Security Administration benefits. See Thibeaux v. Stradtman, 2017 WL 227967, at *1 (E.D.

Mo. Jan. 19, 2017) (“Plaintiff may not attempt to bring a § 1983 action in order to review his

dispensation of social security benefits. Such matters must be left to the Social Security

Administration and its proper administrative review process.”).

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion for the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 2. “A pro se litigant

has no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case.” Stevens v.

Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir.

2013) (“In civil cases, there is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel . . . Rather

a court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel”). Plaintiff's

motion will be denied as moot, given the fact that plaintiff's claims are being dismissed pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF

No. 2] is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith.

An Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 28™ day of April, 2023.

LE q Lf

f Lfine ft 7. J.

STEPHENN.LIMBAUGHIR.

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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