The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA L. MAYNARD, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:20-cv-00169-AGF
)
WILLIAM STANGE, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the pro se petition of Missouri state prisoner
Joshua L. Maynard for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner
was convicted by a jury of one count of attempted manufacture of a controlled substance,
one count of first-degree arson, and two counts of second-degree felony murder.
Petitioner was sentenced to four life sentences, consisting of two concurrent sets to run
consecutively.
In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, as well as two claims of trial court error. For the reasons set forth
below, habeas relief will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Trial
The charges against Petitioner stemmed from a fire that erupted in the home of
Petitioner’s then-girlfriend, Joni Stinnett, on December 1, 2012. At the time, Ronda
Ashlock and her two infant children were living with Stinnett. Neither child escaped the
fire, and both died of smoke inhalation.
The evidence at trial showed the following, as summarized by the Missouri Court
of Appeals in Petitioner’s direct appeal:
Maynard was Stinnett’s boyfriend at the time of the fire. Two days
before the fire, on November 29, 2012, Maynard was at Stinnett’s house. A
witness overheard a discussion between Maynard and Allen Glasgow
(“Glasgow”), Stinnett’s brother. Maynard told Glasgow that he could put a
meth lab in Stinnett’s closet. Glasgow did not disagree with the idea.
Another witness testified that the two were talking about “planting” a meth
lab in Stinnett’s closet. A third witness testified that she overheard another
conversation between Maynard and Glasgow discussing a meth lab in
Stinnett’s house.
That night, Maynard, Stinnett, Glasgow, and Tosha Lee (“Lee”) drove
to Arkansas where they bought and used meth. No one in the group slept
that night because they were “all high on meth.” On the way home the next
morning (November 30, 2012), the group stopped in a field to retrieve a bag.
The bag contained lye and ice packs, both of which are used in the production
of meth. The group later stopped at a convenience store to purchase lighter
fluid and glass pipes, followed by a pharmacy, where Maynard gave Lee fifty
dollars to purchase Sudafed pills. The law limited the amount of Sudafed
one could purchase, and purchasers were required to sign for each purchase.
Lee agreed to sign for the purchase in exchange for “some of the meth that
came out of [the cook].”
Back in Missouri, the group went to a camper in the woods to cook
meth. Maynard admitted to stripping the lithium from batteries using wire
cutters. Maynard gave the lithium to Glasgow and Lee, who cooked the meth
inside the camper. Maynard also admitted to blowing through a straw, which
was required to get a necessary chemical reaction started. Maynard
described the cooking process as the “shake and bake” method of producing
meth. During the cook, a vessel caught fire and the cook failed. Lee testified
that the group still wanted meth because they were not “done partying.”
At some time, Maynard and Stinnett began fighting. Mad at Maynard,
Stinnett called a friend to take her home. Maynard, Glasgow, Lee, and
another friend continued on to the Old Tram Bar in Ellington. Lee testified
that while at the bar she sold fake meth for Maynard and Glasgow; this
testimony was admitted over defense counsel’s timely objection at trial.
When Stinnett arrived at her home, a group of mostly children was
present. Two older children were babysitting several younger children,
including the two Victims. Around 11:30 P.M., Stinnett’s mother told the
older children to sleep at the next-door neighbor’s house because Stinnett
and her mom needed to talk. A few of the children, including the Victims,
remained at Stinnett’s home.
Ashlock, who was at Stinnett’s home, went to the Old Tram Bar to
pick up Lee. Ashlock told Lee that Stinnett was telling her mother about the
meth lab in the camper. Maynard, Glasgow, Lee, and two others then went
back to the camper to clean up the evidence. The group’s truck stopped a
five-minute walk from the camper. Maynard said that the truck was “stuck”
and that he would have to get another truck to pull it out. Maynard instructed
Glasgow, Lee, and the others to walk to the camper and wait while he got
another truck. Lee heard the truck start, but Maynard never returned.
One of the older children, who was sleeping at Stinnett’s next-door
neighbor’s house, woke up to use the bathroom. The child saw Maynard,
and a second individual she could not identify, outside with Stinnett.
Another child [Lee’s daughter, Autumn Lee,] also woke up to use the
bathroom. She saw a dark truck pull up on the side of Stinnett’s home, and
saw Maynard and another man get out. As she returned from the bathroom,
the child saw Stinnett run out of her home. The child said it looked like
Stinnett’s hands were on fire. According to the child, Stinnett was able to
pat the fire out on her basketball shorts.
Stinnett’s home was soon engulfed in flames. Stinnett and others in
the home ran toward the next-door neighbor’s house. Stinnett yelled that two
children were still in the house; Stinnett’s next-door neighbor attempted to
rescue the children but was unsuccessful.
Firefighters and investigators soon arrived on the scene. A fire
marshal opined that the fire originated inside the home, because all the circuit
breakers were tripped, which would not have happened if the fire had
originated outside the home. A deputy sheriff testified that there was more
fire toward the rear right corner of the home. Stinnett’s bedroom was in the
rear right corner. Investigators found numerous pieces of evidence
associated with the “shake and bake” method of producing meth in Stinnett’s
home. Lithium batteries with an end removed were found; an expert testified
that he had never encountered a situation where batteries were cut up outside
of meth production. Cut-up instant cold packs were also found at the scene.
The expert testified that meth cooks cut into these packs to remove the
ammonium nitrate needed to produce meth. Cold packs are used for treating
inflammation on the body. The packs are discarded after regular use and are
not cut open. Investigators also found, among other items, a partially-used
can of acetone underneath a burn barrel. The expert testified that the acetone
was often used as a combustible solvent in meth production and burn barrels
are commonly used to destroy evidence.
Lee, who had been waiting for Maynard to return to the camper, left
when she received a phone call about a fire. Lee joined up with Glasgow and
the two of them found Maynard sitting in his truck off the highway. At some
point, Glasgow and Maynard left without Lee. Lee testified at trial that
“there was a note . . . and it said don’t try to get a hold of me and [Maynard
and Glasgow] were nowhere to be found.” Maynard was later arrested in
Arkansas, south of Little Rock.
Resp. Ex. F at 4-7.
As noted above, Petitioner was charged with attempt to manufacture a controlled
substance, first-degree arson, and two counts of felony murder for the two infant victims
who died in the fire. A jury convicted Petitioner of all four counts.
Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, Petitioner, through appointed counsel, argued that (1) there was
insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the arson count and on the related
felony murder counts because those counts were predicated on the underlying arson, and
(2) the trial court erred in overruling Petitioner’s objection to Lee’s testimony that she
sold “fake meth” for Petitioner at a bar on the night before the fire. Resp. Ex. C at 12-13.
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. As to the first argument,
the appellate court held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to convict Petitioner of first-degree arson and the related felony murder
counts. The appellate court noted that, based on the jury instructions and the statutes at
issue, a guilty verdict on the arson count required only that the jury conclude that
someone attempted to produce methamphetamine in Stinnett’s home; that the attempt to
produce methamphetamine actually caused the fire in the home; and that Petitioner either
attempted to produce methamphetamine himself or, under accomplice liability, acted
together with, aided, or encouraged another to do so with the purpose of promoting or
furthering the attempt to produce methamphetamine. Resp. Ex. F at 10. The appellate
court held that a jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from the
physical evidence, expert testimony, and witness testimony that all of the above-noted
elements were met here. Resp. Ex. F at 10-16.
The appellate court also rejected Petitioner’s second argument, regarding Lee’s
testimony. The court held that in light of the other evidence against Petitioner, Petitioner
could not show prejudice resulting from admission of the testimony that Lee also sold
“fake meth” on Petitioner’s behalf on the night in question. Resp. Ex. F at 16-18.
State Post-Conviction Proceedings
In his pro se motion for post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserted a variety of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Resp. Ex. I at 11-28. In his amended motion for
post-conviction relief, filed with the assistance of counsel, Petitioner expanded upon and
added to these claims. Petitioner’s amended claims were that trial counsel was
ineffective for: (1) failing to adduce evidence of the timeline and distances between the
relevant locations and events in this case, so as to show that Petitioner could not have
been at Stinnett’s house at the time the fire started; (2) failing to call as a witness Aaron
Stevens, who was present with the group during some of the events in question, or to
cross-examine Lee about the events that occurred after the group left the Old Tram Bar,
so as to show that Petitioner could not have returned to the Stinnett residence in time to
start the fire; (3) failing to call Tony Lee, with whom Autumn Lee lived at one point, to
testify that Autumn recanted her statement that she saw Petitioner at Stinnett’s home
shortly before the fire began or to question Autumn as to this issue; (4) failing to obtain
and present at trial an insurance investigation report by an investigator named Kevin
Dunkin, showing that the origin of the fire was the stove-top range and not the bedroom,
as the State had suggested at trial;1 (5) failing to elicit evidence that the children who
escaped the fire told responding EMTs that they noticed a hot water heater smoking and
wires melting in Stinnett’s home on the day before the fire; (6) failing to adduce evidence
of inconsistencies in the State’s evidence, such as the color of Petitioner’s truck (white)
versus the color of the truck seen outside of Stinnett’s residence (dark-colored), the drug-
induced state of Stinnett on the night in question, and the fact that police informed the
media that the fire was caused by a methamphetamine lab before they had completed
their investigation. The amended motion also incorporated by reference all of the claims
set forth in Petitioner’s pro se motion. Resp. Ex. I at 32-74.
The motion court held an evidentiary hearing, at which Petitioner, Petitioner’s trial
counsel, insurance investigator Dunkin, and Lee all testified, either in person or by
1 At the time of trial, neither the State nor the defense was aware that the insurance
investigation report existed; the report’s existence was not discovered until the case was
on direct appeal.
deposition. On October 16, 2017, the motion court denied Petitioner’s motion for post-
conviction relief.
As to Petitioner’s first and second claims (regarding timeline and distance
evidence), the motion court credited trial counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing
that counsel considered the so-called timeline defense but rejected it because almost all of
the necessary witnesses were under the influence of drugs at the time and were otherwise
not credible. The motion court held that trial counsel reasonably rejected the timeline
and distance defenses because Petitioner had no credible evidence of the route the group
traveled during the time in question. The motion court also concluded that no evidence
suggested that Stevens would have been willing to testify at trial or that he would have
provided favorable timeline or distance evidence. The motion court noted that Stevens
did not testify at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing and that Stevens had pending
criminal charges at the time of trial and would have been subject to cross-examination if
he testified as a defense witness.
As to Petitioner’s third claim (regarding Tony Lee), the motion court found that
Petitioner presented no evidence that Tony Lee would have been willing and available to
testify at trial about any alleged recantation by Autumn Lee. The motion court credited
trial counsel’s testimony that he attempted to secure Tony Lee as a witness and was
unable to do so, and the motion court further noted that Petitioner could not secure Tony
Lee’s appearance at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing either. Likewise, the motion
court credited and found reasonable trial counsel’s testimony that he chose not to cross-
examine Autumn Lee about the alleged recantation because of the risk that she would
deny recanting her statement.
As to Petitioner’ fourth claim (regarding the insurance investigation), the motion
court described the evidentiary hearing testimony of the insurance investigator, Dunkin,
that he concluded the fire was in fact caused by methamphetamine production and started
near the right, rear corner of the house, where both the kitchen and bedroom were
located. The motion court noted that Dunkin believed that the fire started at the kitchen
stove rather than the bedroom and that a heat source for the fire was the stove, rather than
just the chemicals involved in the “shake and bake” form of methamphetamine
production, as the State’s theory suggested. However, the motion court held that
Dunkin’s conclusions would not have affected the outcome of trial because his overall
testimony that the fire was in fact caused by methamphetamine production that occurred
near the right, rear corner of the house would have only bolstered the State’s case.
Therefore, the motion court held that Petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s
failure to discover or present evidence of the insurance investigation.
As to Petitioner’s fifth claim (regarding the report to EMTs of the smoking hot
water heater and melting wires), the motion court found that trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to introduce such evidence because the evidence was hearsay; the
children who reported the information to the EMT did not testify at the evidentiary
hearing, so there was no way to determine what they would have said at trial; the children
also could have provided unfavorable testimony as there was evidence they reported to
EMTs that Petitioner “liked to burn things”; and Petitioner was not prejudiced because
trial counsel adduced other evidence during the trial of the allegedly defective wiring and
water heater issues in Stinnett’s home.2 Resp. Ex. I at 191-92.
As to Petitioner’s sixth claim (regarding alleged inconsistencies in evidence), the
motion court found that any inconsistencies or weaknesses not explored by trial counsel
were a matter of reasonable trial strategy and in any event would not have changed the
outcome of trial.
The motion court also rejected each of Petitioner’s pro se claims, to the extent they
differed from the amended claims, because Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
in support of them. Resp. Ex. I at 175-96.
On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner, through appointed
counsel, pursued only his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover
and call insurance investigator Dunkin as a witness. Petitioner did not pursue any of his
other post-conviction claims on appeal.
In affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that Dunkin’s testimony and the insurance investigation report would not have
provided a viable defense to Petitioner and, therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for
failing to discover and present such evidence. The appellate court noted that “there was
still overwhelming evidence that the ‘shake and bake’ method had been at least attempted
and [Petitioner] had been seen by multiple witnesses at the scene of the house fire.”
Resp. Ex. K at 7. The court reasoned that evidence regarding the insurance investigation
2 The State’s experts rebutted the suggestion that such electrical issues could have
caused the fire.
may have, at most, demonstrated that Petitioner “had first attempted the ‘shake and bake’
method before failing and resorting to use of the stove, which caused the explosion,” but
that such fact would not have changed the State’s case or provided Petitioner with a
viable defense. Resp. Ex. K at 7.
Federal Habeas Petition
Petitioner now raises eight grounds for federal habeas relief. Petitioner asserts
that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to discover and call insurance investigator
Dunkin as a witness at trial; (2) failing to adequately investigate the timeline of events on
the night in question; (3) failing to call Stevens as a witness or to cross-examine Lee
about the timeline of events; (4) failing to call Tony Lee as a witness; (5) failing to call as
witnesses the children who reported to the EMT that they saw a water heater smoking
and wires melting in Stinnett’s home on the day before the fire; and (6) failing to address
inconsistencies in particular pieces of evidence. Petitioner also asserts that (7) the
evidence was insufficient to support the arson and related felony murder charges; and (8)
the trial court erred in overruling Petitioner’s objection to Lee’s testimony that she sold
“fake meth” for Petitioner at a bar on the night before the fire.
Respondent argues that Grounds 2 through 6 have been procedurally defaulted,
and that all of the claims are without merit.
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
Federal habeas relief is available to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides that habeas
relief cannot be granted unless the state court’s adjudication:
1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to
show ineffective assistance of counsel, “a [petitioner] must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient,” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced [his]
defense.” Id. at 687. When “[c]onsidering an attorney’s performance, [the court] must
indulge a strong presumption that the conduct was reasonable, and the [petitioner] must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Paulson v. Newton Corr. Facility, 773 F.3d 901, 904
(8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In other words, the petitioner must show that “counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted). In order to show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that “there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 753 (citations omitted).
Procedurally Defaulted Claims (Grounds 2 through 6)
Under the doctrine of procedural default, a federal habeas court is barred from
considering the merits of a claim not fairly presented to the state courts, absent a showing
by the petitioner of cause for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom, or that he is
actually innocent, such that a miscarriage of justice would result by failing to consider the
claim. E.g., Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 848-49 (8th Cir. 2011). The Court agrees
with Respondent that Petitioner’s Grounds 2 through 6 were procedurally defaulted in
state court.
Although Petitioner raised all of these claims in his amended motion for post-
conviction relief, he did not pursue them on appeal from the denial of that motion. In
Missouri, “a claim [must] be presented ‘at each step of the judicial process’ in order to
avoid default.” Jolly v. Gammon, 28 F.3d 51, 53 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Benson v.
State, 611 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). “Failure to raise a claim on appeal
from the denial of a post-conviction motion erects a procedural bar to federal habeas
review.” Id.
Petitioner has not shown cause to excuse the default3 or shown that a miscarriage
of justice will result if his defaulted claims are not considered. See Abdi v. Hatch, 450
F.3d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a petitioner must present new evidence that
3 Petitioner has not alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction appellate
counsel, and in any event, such an allegation has not been recognized as cause to excuse a
procedural default in the habeas context. See Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1087
(8th Cir. 2012).
affirmatively demonstrates that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted in order to fit within the miscarriage of justice exception). The Court’s review
of Grounds 2 through 6 is therefore barred, and those grounds cannot support a grant of
federal habeas relief.
Remaining Claims (Grounds 1, 7, and 8)
As to the grounds which were not defaulted, the Court concludes that each is without
merit. When addressing claims that were addressed by state courts, “[t]aken together,
AEDPA and Strickland establish a doubly deferential standard of review.” Williams v.
Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). It is not sufficient for a
petitioner to “show that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were being
analyzed in the first instance.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002). “Rather, he
must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively
unreasonable manner.” Id. at 699.
Ground 1: Failure to Discover and Call Insurance Investigator Dunkin
The state appellate court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel based on the failure to discover and call Dunkin as a witness
did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law or that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial and the post-conviction hearing. The
state court reasonably found that the second prong of the Strickland analysis was not
satisfied.
Specifically, the state court reasonably concluded that there was no reasonable
probability that, but for trial counsel’s failure to discover and call Dunkin as a witness,
the result of trial would have been different. The evidence at trial, including physical
evidence, expert testimony, and testimony from multiple witnesses, established that the
“shake and bake” method of methamphetamine production had at least been attempted at
Stinnett’s home, that the fire was caused by attempted methamphetamine production, that
Petitioner was present at the scene of the fire, and that Petitioner attempted to flee
following the fire. Dunkin’s testimony would not have undermined any of these facts
and would instead have only bolstered the State’s theory that the fire was caused by the
attempted production of methamphetamine near the right, rear corner of Stinnett’s house.
In short, the Missouri Court of Appeals based its rejection of Petitioner’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on the correct legal principles and a fair reading of the
record. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s first ground for habeas relief.
Ground 7: Sufficiency of the Evidence
The Due Process Clause prohibits the conviction of an accused “except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In the § 2254 setting, the federal
court must consider “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)
(emphasis in original); see also Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2004).
The scope of habeas review of such a claim is “extremely limited.” Skillicorn v.
Luebbers, 475 F.3d 965, 977 (8th Cir. 2007). This means that when “a reviewing court
[is] ‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences [the
reviewing court] must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—
that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must
defer to that resolution.’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133 (2010) (per curiam)
(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326)).
This Court may grant federal habeas relief only if the Missouri Court of Appeals’
determination that the evidence satisfied the sufficiency of evidence standard was “both
incorrect and unreasonable” under Jackson. Garrison v. Burt, 637 F.3d 849, 855 (8th
Cir. 2011); see also Webb v. Steele, No. 4:10 CV 758 RWS; 2014 WL 684006, at *13
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2014).
As noted above, the state court reasonably determined that, viewing the physical
evidence, expert testimony, and witness testimony in the light most favorable to the
verdict, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction of
the arson and the felony murder counts based on the arson. The jury heard evidence that
Petitioner previously discussed plans to put a methamphetamine lab in Stinnett’s house;
that Petitioner purchased supplies for production of methamphetamine; that Petitioner
attempted the “shake and bake” method of production and thereby caused another fire
shortly before the fire at issue; that Petitioner and his associates thereafter wished to
secure more methamphetamine; that Petitioner was thereafter seen at Stinnett’s residence
just before the fire erupted; that the fire was caused by the attempted production of
methamphetamine; that a “shake and bake” method of such production had been
attempted at the residence; and that, after the fire, Petitioner and his associate fled the
state and left a note stating “don’t try to get a hold of me.” This is enough evidence for a
rational jury to infer that Petitioner either directly or as an accomplice attempted to
produce methamphetamine at Stinnett’s home, which caused the fire and killed the two
child victims.4 The Missouri Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply the Jackson
standard in disposing of this claim. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner’s seventh
ground for federal habeas relief.
Ground 8: Evidentiary Ruling
“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a
conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” and it is not
within “the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on
state-law questions,” such as the admissibility of evidence at trial. Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (citations omitted); see also Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F.3d
1010, 1018 (8th Cir. 2006). “A federal issue is raised only where trial errors infringe on a
specific constitutional protection or are so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of due
process.” Bucklew, 436 F.3d at 1018. A habeas petitioner must show that alleged errors
in the admission of evidence rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, such that there is a
reasonable probability that error affected the outcome of trial. Carter v. Armontrout, 929
F.2d 1294, 1296 (8th Cir. 1991).
4 Petitioner does not dispute that the state courts correctly interpreted Missouri law
regarding the elements of the arson and felony-murder convictions; nor does he dispute
that the jury was properly instructed as to these elements.
Here, as the state court reasonably held, in light of the other evidence against
Petitioner, any evidentiary error in admitting Lee’s testimony regarding her sale of “fake
meth” on behalf of Petitioner was not so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of due
process. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s eighth ground for habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. The
Court does not believe that reasonable jurists might find the Court’s assessment of the
procedural or substantive issues presented in this case debatable or wrong, for purposes
of issuing a Certificate of Appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Buck v.
Davis, 137 8. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (standard for issuing a Certificate of Appealability)
(citing Miller—El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of Joshua L. Maynard for a writ of
habeas corpus relief is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability shall not be
issued.
A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of January, 2023.
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