Allen v. Waters

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

RONNIE ALLEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:22-CV-150-PLC

)

JASON WATERS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon review of an amended complaint filed by plaintiff

Ronnie Allen, an inmate at the South Central Correctional Center (SCCC) who is proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis. For the reasons explained below, the Court will dismiss defendant

Unknown Linton from this case, and will direct the Clerk to effect service of process upon

defendants Jason Waters, Unknown Tarrant, and Unknown Dixon.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

This Court is required to review a complaint filed in forma pauperis, and must dismiss it

if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S at 556). Although a

plaintiff need not allege facts in painstaking detail, the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This standard “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.

The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

This Court liberally construes complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976). “Liberal construction” means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,”

the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be

considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.

2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even pro se

complaints must allege facts that, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.

Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts

that are not alleged, Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules

so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508

U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Amended Complaint

Plaintiff filed the amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Investigator

Jason Waters, Correctional Officers Unknown Tarrant1 and Unknown Dixon, and Case Worker

Unknown Linton. Plaintiff names the defendants in their individual capacities, and identifies

1 Plaintiff alternately spells this defendant’s surname as “Tarrant” and “Tarrent.” In this Memorandum

and Order, the Court will use the spelling “Tarrant,” which is the spelling Plaintiff uses in the caption of

the amended complaint.

them as Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) employees. He avers the events giving

rise to his claims occurred when he was incarcerated at the Missouri Eastern Correctional Center

(“MECC”).

Plaintiff begins his statement of claim by stating he previously sued MDOC officials in a

prior lawsuit identified as “case # 1:16-CV-00026-SNLJ.”2 (ECF No. 15 at 4). In this

Memorandum and Order, the Court will refer to that prior lawsuit as “Allen I.” Plaintiff sets

forth a myriad of allegations against the four defendants. For purposes of clarity, the Court has

organized Plaintiff’s allegations for each of the four defendants. Plaintiff alleges as follows.

1. Defendant Jason Waters

In November of 2019, Waters approached Plaintiff, demanded he strip naked, placed a

flashlight inside his mouth, said “Ill [sic] teach you,” and started choking him. Id. In January of

2020, Waters refused to test a substance Tarrant found in Plaintiff’s cell, even though he knew it

was fruit punch. In April of 2020, Waters “falsified a state document” that resulted in Plaintiff

serving time in administrative segregation, and “lied” about conducting a field test. Id. at 5.

On June 16, 2020, Waters threatened Plaintiff that he “would continue to pay for lawsuit”

unless he gave Waters unspecified information. Id. Later, after Plaintiff refused to provide

unspecified information, Waters “wrote a violation for Plaintiff that placed” him back in

Administrative Segregation. Id. at 6. At an unspecified time, Waters “falsified a Missouri State

2 Independent review of the publicly-available records in that matter, Allen v. Mills, et al., No. 1:16-CV-

26-SNLJ (E.D. Mo. 2019) (hereafter “Allen 1”), shows that Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint against

more than twenty MDOC employees to assert claims related to events that occurred when he was

incarcerated in the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center (“ERDCC”). After frivolity

review, the claims before the Court were claims for failure to protect, excessive force, and inhumane

conditions of confinement involving three separate incidents. The parties participated in Alternative

Dispute Resolution, and on January 3, 2020, the Court was advised that the parties had achieved a

settlement. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal on January 31, 2020, and on that same date,

the Court ordered the matter dismissed. This Court takes judicial notice of the foregoing prior litigation,

the records of which are public records filed in this United States District Court. See United States v.

Jackson, 640 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1981).

document and said on paper ‘September 2020’ that Missouri Highway Patrol had tested

documents and those documents came back positive.” Id.

In December of 2020, Waters “falsified a violation” when he issued Plaintiff a conduct

violation “for escape assesory [sic] due to a inmate [sic] taking [Plaintiff’s] clothes off the floor,”

and “violated Missouri DOC Policy and Procedure” by omitting the inmate’s name from the

violation. Id.

2. Defendant Unknown Tarrant

On December 25, 2019, Tarrant searched Plaintiff’s cell “and then wrote a falsified

violation and sent the Plaintiff to Administrative Segregation.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff can be

understood to allege he did not commit a violation. After Plaintiff was released from

segregation, Tarrant told him he “should of [sic] never filed that law suit, now you [sic] going to

pay. Waters told me what you did.” Id.

3. Defendant Unknown Linton

In April of 2020, Linton refused to give Plaintiff a grievance, told Plaintiff “this is your

last warning stop filing paperwork and lawsuits on staff.” Id. “Linton then falsified Plaintiff

Missouri D.O.C. Informal Resolution Request form by forging my initials and marked resolved

by discussion/withdrawn, and refused to allow me to go into the grievance stage.” Id. Linton

also violated MDOC policy and procedure by finding Plaintiff guilty of a violation and lying by

saying that Plaintiff admitted to possession. Plaintiff also alleges that “caseworker” (presumably

a reference to Linton) told him that test results did not exist. Id. at 6.

4. Defendant Unknown Dixon

On October 28, 2020, Dixon searched Plaintiff’s cell, and said: “Waters told me what you

did and [I’m going to] make sure you don’t file another lawsuit.” Id. Dixon then searched

Plaintiff’s cell and found nothing, and “then went somewhere and came back with a brown bag.

When Plaintiff ask [sic] Dixon what was in the bag Dixon said it was a surpri[s]e, and Dixon

entered Plaintiff cell.” Id. Dixon then claimed he found dangerous contraband in Plaintiff’s cell,

and issued a major violation. The violation was later “dropped down to a minor violation for not

having desposition [sic] of evidence.” Id.

5. Other Allegations

Plaintiff avers he filed a grievance and a grievance appeal concerning the facts relating to

the amended complaint, but was denied relief. Plaintiff left blank the section of the form

amended complaint provided for him to explain any reasons he did not file a grievance.

Provided with the amended complaint is a copy of a February 7, 2020 Offender Grievance

Appeal filed by plaintiff and marked “Reprisal.” Id. at 15. In the document, Plaintiff stated he

previously filed a lawsuit, and was being “treated differently” by “M.E.C.C. staff” and “certain

staff members at M.E.C.C.” Id.

Plaintiff describes his injuries as depression, “anxiety attacks, Cluster B, R/O paranoid

personality” and mental anguish. Id. at 8. He states he was prescribed mental health medication.

He seeks monetary relief.

Discussion

1. Defendant Jason Waters

Accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations that Waters choked him with a flashlight after

demanding he strip naked and stating “I’ll teach you,” the Court concludes that Plaintiff has

adequately alleged a plausible excessive force claim against Waters. See Ward v. Smith, 844

F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Because the use of force is sometimes required in prison settings,

guards are liable only if they are completely unjustified in using force, i.e., they are using it

maliciously and sadistically”). The Court will require Waters to respond to the amended

complaint as to this claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that on June 16, 2020, Waters threatened to retaliate against him for

filing Allen I, and later acted upon that threat by disciplining him. Having liberally construed

Plaintiff’s allegations and presumed their veracity, the Court finds they sufficiently state a

plausible retaliatory discipline claim against Waters. See Meuir v. Greene Cty. Jail Emps., 487

F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2007) (Under the Eighth Amendment, a “prima facie case of

retaliatory discipline requires a showing that: (1) the prisoner exercised a constitutionally

protected right; (2) prison officials disciplined the prisoner; and (3) exercising the right was the

motivation for the discipline.”). The Court will require Waters to respond to the amended

complaint as to this claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that on different occasions, Waters refused to test a substance that

was found in his cell, “falsified” vaguely identified documents, and “lied” about conducting a

field test. While it appears Plaintiff intends these allegations to assert stand-alone claims against

Waters, he offers no factual support or enhancement for them, nor does he link the alleged

misconduct with a deprivation of his federally-protected rights. The Court finds that these

allegations are no more than the “the defendant unlawfully harmed me” accusations that the

Supreme Court has found deficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and that this Court is not required to

presume true. See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017). The Court previously

explained to Plaintiff the importance of alleging facts in support of his claims for relief, and will

not now assume facts he has not alleged. See Stone, 364 F.3d at 914.

Plaintiff also alleges that in December of 2020, Waters “falsified a violation” by issuing

him a conduct violation for accessory to an escape because another inmate took Plaintiff’s

clothes off the floor. These allegations also fail to state a plausible claim for relief. It is apparent

that Plaintiff believes Waters is liable to him because the violation was undeserved, not because

it was issued in retaliation for Allen I. However, simply filing false or mistaken disciplinary

report does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. See Glick v. Sargent, 696 F.2d 413, 414

(8th Cir. 1983) (It is well settled that a charging officer’s mere filing of a disciplinary report does

not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action).

Plaintiff also alleges that Waters violated MDOC policy and procedure when he failed to

include the inmate’s name on the disciplinary report. This assertion also fails to state a

cognizable claim for relief, because the failure to follow prison policy or procedure does not give

rise to a § 1983 cause of action. See Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997).

2. Defendant Unknown Tarrant

Plaintiff alleges that on December 25, 2019, Tarrant wrote a false conduct violation, and

later revealed he did so in order to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing Allen I. Having liberally

construed Plaintiff’s allegations and presumed their veracity, the Court finds they sufficiently

state a plausible retaliatory discipline claim against Tarrant. See Meuir, 487 F.3d at 1119 (noting

the elements of a prima facie case of retaliatory discipline). The Court will require Tarrant to

respond to the amended complaint as to this claim.

3. Defendant Unknown Linton

Plaintiff alleges that Linton warned him against filing complaints about staff, altered a

grievance document to indicate a resolution, “refused to allow” him to “go into the grievance

stage,” and “lied.” Plaintiff also alleges that “caseworker” told him test results did not exist.

However, Plaintiff alleges no facts permitting the inference that Linton actually prevented

Plaintiff from using the institution’s grievance procedure, or chilled his use of it. To the

contrary, Plaintiff avers he filed a grievance and a grievance appeal concerning the facts relating

to the amended complaint, and he provides a copy of a grievance appeal he filed to complain

about differential treatment by prison staff in general. Significantly, Plaintiff makes no attempt

to allege he was ever actually prevented from using the institution’s grievance procedure, and in

fact left blank the section of the amended complaint provided for him to explain any reasons he

did not file a grievance.

Plaintiff simply fails to allege facts permitting the inference that Linton engaged in any

conduct that deprived him of a federally-protected right, as necessary to state a cognizable §

1983 claim. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (describing the elements of a § 1983

claim). Instead, he again offers the sort of conclusory “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me”

accusations that the Supreme Court has found deficient, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and that this

Court is not required to presume true. See Torti, 868 F.3d at 671. To the extent Plaintiff can be

understood to claim Linton is liable to him for making a threatening statement, such allegations,

standing alone, fail to state a cognizable claim. See Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374,

1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Generally, mere verbal threats made by a state-actor do not constitute a §

1983 claim”); see also McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Verbal threats

and name calling usually are not actionable under § 1983”).

Plaintiff also alleges that Linton violated MDOC policy and procedure by finding him

guilty despite a lack of evidence. This allegation fails to state a cognizable claim for relief

because the failure to follow prison policy or procedure does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of

action. See Gardner, 109 F.3d at 430. For these reasons, Defendant Linton will be dismissed

from this action.

4. Defendant Unknown Dixon

Plaintiff alleges that on October 28, 2020, Dixon threatened to retaliate against him for

filing Allen I, then planted contraband in his cell and issued a major violation. Having liberally

construed Plaintiff’s allegations and presumed their veracity, the Court finds they sufficiently

state a plausible retaliatory discipline claim against Dixon. See Meuir, 487 F.3d at 1119 (noting

the elements of a prima facie case of retaliatory discipline). The Court will require Dixon to

respond to the amended complaint as to this claim.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue

upon the amended complaint, pursuant to the service agreement the Court maintains with the

Missouri Attorney General’s Office, as to Jason Waters, Correctional Officer Unknown Tarrant,

and Correctional Officer Unknown Dixon.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Unknown Linton is DISMISSED from

this action, without prejudice. A separate order of partial dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this partial dismissal would not be

taken in good faith.

Dated this 2nd day of December, 2022.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton

JEAN C. HAMILTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE