Pearson v. City of St. Louis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM MALIK PEARSON, JR., )

Plaintiff,

V. No. 4:22-cv-00806-ACL

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff William Malik Pearson, Jr.

for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No.

2). Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has

determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial

partial filing fee of $59.35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed

below, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is

required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her

prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial

partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s

account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month

period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly

payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00,

until the filing fee is fully paid. /d.

In support of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff has submitted a

copy of his inmate account statement. (Docket No. 5). The account statement shows an average

monthly deposit of $296.75. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $59.35,

which is 20 percent of plaintiffs average monthly deposit.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,

which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. /d. at 679. The

court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820

F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73

(8" Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not

required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8'" Cir. 2015). However, even

pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of

law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d

912, 914-15 (8 Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are

not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint’). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not

mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes

by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the St. Louis City

Justice Center in St. Louis, Missouri. He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

naming the City of St. Louis, the State of Missouri, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

(SLMPD) Homicide Division, Circuit Attorney Kimberly M. Gardner, Detective Daniel Sweeney,

Detective Jimmy Hyatt, and Circuit Attorney Investigator Tom Mauzy as defendants. (Docket No.

1 at 1-5). Circuit Attorney Gardner, Detective Sweeney, Detective Hyatt, and Investigator Mauzy

are sued in their individual capacities only. (Docket No. | at 3-4). The allegations in the complaint

concern plaintiffs contention that the criminal investigation against him for first-degree murder

violated his constitutional rights.

In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that the City of St. Louis “slandered [his]

name, life, character and future job and life opportunities.” (Docket No. 1 at 6). By way of

explanation, he states that “Fox News posted [his] name on television,” and that “local newspaper

organization[s] like [the] St. Louis Post Dispatch aired [his] named to the public.” Meanwhile, “St.

Louis public and private companies posted [him] on several social media websites for the world

to see, review, share and comment.” All of these posts were “saying [he] was charged with the

murder of James Scales,” and that he “sat incarcerated for 4’ years with no bail.” Plaintiff also

claims that “SLMPD officers violated [his] 4", 5", 6", 8" and 14" amendment [rights],” and also

“harassed [him] and [his] family.”

With regard to the State of Missouri, plaintiff contends that he “went to trial with no

evidence for the murder of James Scales (1922-CR01459) and was found not guilty/acquitted of

all charges.”! He states that he has state law claims, including false arrest, false imprisonment,

malicious prosecution, spoliation of evidence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of

process, defamation, willful misconduct, conspiracy, negligence, malicious prosecution, the “use

of unreliable and [fraudulent] investigatory techniques,” the “procurement of unreliable and

fabricated evidence,” and the violation of policies and procedures. (Docket No. | at 6-7). Plaintiff

further asserts that he was “acquitted of all charges” on April 12, 2022, and that he blames “the

state for continuing to let the City of St. Louis prosecute [him] to the full extent with no witnesses

of the crime[,] nor evidence proving [his] guilt.” (Docket No. 1 at 7). He states that he “was held

without bail,” and that he is “emotionally traumatized by the experience and most likely will need

[therapy]...to get over this.”

As to Circuit Attorney Gardner, plaintiff complains that Gardner “insisted that the

prosecutors proceed with trial with no evidence against [him] to prove [his] guilt.” (Docket No. 1

| As plaintiff was acquitted, the Court could not find Case No. 1922-CR01459 on Case.net, Missouri’s online case

management system. The Court notes, however, that plaintiff remains incarcerated due to three other cases. First, in

State of Missouri v. Pearson, No. 1822-CR00456-01 (22"4 Jud. Cir., St. Louis City), he is charged with possession of

controlled substance. Second, in State of Missouri v. Pearson, No. 1822-CR03536-01 (22"4 Jud. Cir., St. Louis City),

plaintiff is charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action. Finally, in

State of Missouri v. Pearson, No. 1922-CR01462 Jud. Cir., St. Louis City), he has been indicted by a grand jury

for first-degree murder, two counts of armed criminal action, first-degree assault, and two counts of tampering with

physical evidence. Case No. 1822-CR03536-01 has been set for trial on November 7, 2022. The two other cases

remain pending and are set for a status conference on October 14, 2022.

at 8). He is upset that on March 14, 2018, Gardner “let a jury of 16 people decide [his] fate” when

“she presented phone calls to a grand jury and indicted [him] on charges of” first-degree murder,

first-degree assault, armed criminal action, conspiracy to commit murder, tampering with a

witness, and conspiracy to tamper with a witness. Plaintiff alleges that Gardner “[n]ever considered

looking into the investigation the detectives and investigators did to even consider [him] innocent.”

He adds that after “2 weeks of pretrial and trial in April 2022,” he “was acquitted by a jury of all

charges.” Plaintiff “feel[s]” that Gardner “didn’t do a good job as the circuit attorney or as a human

being,” suggesting that Gardner “knew the inadmissible evidence she had against [him]” violated

his right to due process, and caused him to be rebooked “several times,” thereby stretching “out

[his] time in city jail.” (Docket No. 1 at 8-9). In short, plaintiff states that Gardner “tarnished [his]

- name and legacy for [his] future kids and grandkids.” (Docket No. | at 9).

Concerning Detective Sweeney, plaintiff asserts that Sweeney “violated [him] as a human,

violated [his] constitutional rights[,] and now make[s] [him] look a[t] SLMPD officers

different[ly].” (Docket No. 1 at 10). He states that Sweeney did “not identify [him] in trial after

being detained for 4% years for a crime [Sweeney] and his co-workers assumed so highly that

[plaintiff] committed.” Plaintiff accuses Sweeney of a “lack of passion or empathy” and for a “lack

of properly investigating this cause.” He states that he “will be scarred for life because [of

Sweeney’s] lack of police work and improper investigation.” As to Detective Hyatt, plaintiff

claims that Hyatt “assisted Detective D. Sweeney and traumatized [him] as much as [Sweeney].”

He states that he “can never forget their name or faces for what they put [him] through.” (Docket

No. | at 10-11). Plaintiff thus holds both Sweeney and Hyatt responsible. (Docket No. | at 11).

Finally, regarding Investigator Mauzy, plaintiff identifies Mauzy as “the investigator of the

circuit attorney who assisted the SLMPD Homicide Unit to build a murder case on [him].” He

alleges that from the time of the death of James Scales, “Mauzy used Crimatrix and other illegal

and home made investigating tactics to convince the judge and grand jury to indict [him] on

Scales[’] murder.” According to plaintiff, everything that Mauzy “used was inadmissible in [his]

trial because of the lack of professionalism and real police work.” Mauzy’s “investigation” and

“assumptions” have allegedly “caused [plaintiff] so much pain and suffering” that he “will need

[therapy ].”

Based on these facts, plaintiff states that he suffers from “mental, physical and emotional

distress [from] being framed for murder.” (Docket No. 1 at 12). He seeks $10 million in damages.

(Docket No. 1 at 13).

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, accusing defendants of constitutional violations that resulted in him being charged with first-

degree murder, a charge of which he was eventually acquitted. Because he is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and

for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

A. Claim Against the City of St. Louis

Plaintiff claims that the City of St. Louis “slandered [his] name” when he was charged with

murdering James Scales. A local governing body such as St. Louis may be sued under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To

prevail on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish the governmental entity’s liability for the

alleged conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8" Cir. 2016). Such liability

may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an

unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,

883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8" Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8" Cir.

2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a

theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same’’). Thus, there are three ways in

which plaintiff can prove the liability of St. Louis.

First, plaintiff can show the existence of an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to

“official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal

official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829

F.3d 695, 700 (8" Cir. 2016). For a policy that is unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no

other evidence than a statement of the policy and its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, Minn.,

486 F.3d 385, 389 (8" Cir. 2007). However, when “a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is

asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its

employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the

inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by the policymakers.” at 390.

“A policy may be either a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted

and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body.” Angarita v. St. Louis Cty., 981 F.2d 1537,

1546 (8" Cir. 1992).

Second, plaintiff can establish a claim of liability based on an unconstitutional “custom.”

In order to do so, plaintiff must demonstrate:

1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of

unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s

employees;

2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct

by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice

to the officials of that misconduct; and

3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental

entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind

the constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8" Cir. 2013).

Finally, plaintiff can assert a municipal liability claim by establishing a deliberately

indifferent failure to train or supervise. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989) (explaining that inadequate training may serve as the basis for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability

only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference”). To show deliberate

indifference, a plaintiff must prove that the municipality “had notice that its procedures were

inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights.” See Jennings v. Wentzville

R-IV Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1118, 1122 (8" Cir. 2005). Ordinarily, this is done by a plaintiff alleging

a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” See S.M. v. Lincoln □□□□□

874 F.3d 581, 585 (8"" Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or

custom. See Crumpley-Patterson vy. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8" Cir. 2004).

However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an

unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d

605, 614 (8 Cir. 2003). In this case, plaintiff has not presented any facts supporting the

proposition that his rights were violated due to an unconstitutional City of St. Louis policy or

custom, or that the city was deliberately indifferent in training or supervising its employees.

First, regarding policy, plaintiff points to no “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or

decision officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body” as being at

issue in this case. Certainly, he has not alleged that he was arrested due to “a deliberate choice of

a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding

such matters.” Instead, plaintiff complains that Fox News, local newspapers, and unidentified local

companies posted about his case on social media websites. None of these actions — all undertaken

by unrelated third-parties — has been shown to be attributable to an official decision by the City of

St. Louis.

Second, as to custom, plaintiff has not established the “existence of a continuing,

widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by [City of St. Louis] employees,”

much less that city policymaking officials were deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized

such misconduct. To the contrary, as noted above, the entirety of plaintiff's claim against the city

consists of accusations regarding third-party media entities which purportedly posted things about

him online. Thus, rather than showing a pattern of municipally-accepted misconduct, plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate even a single instance that can be attributed to St. Louis itself.

Third, and similarly, plaintiff has not shown that the City of St. Louis was deliberately

indifferent in failing to train or supervise its employees. To show deliberate indifference, plaintiff

must present facts that the city “had notice that its procedures were inadequate and likely to result

in a violation of constitutional rights.” Typically, this is done by a plaintiff alleging a “pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” As previously explained, plaintiff has

not developed the existence of any such pattern.

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold the City of St. Louis liable for “SLMPD

officers [who] violated” his constitutional rights, the Court notes that a municipality cannot be held

liable merely because it employs a tortfeasor. See A.H. v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 891 F.3d 721, 728

(8 Cir. 2018) (“In an action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a municipality...cannot be liable on a

respondeat superior theory”). See also Andrews v. Fowler, 93 F.3d 1069, 1074 (8" Cir. 1996) (“A

local government may not be sued under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents on a theory of respondeat superior’).

For all these reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the City of St. Louis.

Therefore, this claim must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8" Cir.

2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his

complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the alleged

deprivation of plaintiffs rights).

B. Claim Against the State of Missouri

Plaintiff accuses the State of Missouri of “continuing to let the City of St. Louis prosecute

[him] to the full extent with no witnesses of the crime nor evidence proving [his] guilt.” The claim

fails for two reasons.

First, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under

color of law, of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8" Cir. 2008). See

also Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8" Cir. 1986) (stating that □□□□

1983 provides a cause of action against persons only”). However, “neither a State nor its officials

acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8" Cir. 2017) (explaining

that a “State is not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8" Cir.

2016) (explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under §

1983”). Because the State of Missouri is not a § 1983 “person” for purposes of plaintiff's claim

for money damages, he is missing an essential element of a cause of action. Therefore, the claim

must be dismissed.

10

Second, plaintiff's claim against the State of Missouri is barred by the doctrine of sovereign

immunity. “Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its

consent.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh

Amendment has been held to confer sovereign immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits

brought in federal court by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman vy.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8"

Cir. 2018) (“The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from

suit in federal court”); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8 Cir. 1995)

(“The Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from suing a state in federal court”); and Egerdahl

v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618-19 (8" Cir. 1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent

a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is

proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment”). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or

its agencies for any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages. Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ.,

495 F.3d 591, 594 (8" Cir. 2007) (stating that district court erred in allowing plaintiff to proceed

against state university for injunctive relief, and remanding matter to district court for dismissal).

There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the

Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8" Cir. 1992). “The first

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such

immunity by clear and unmistakable language.” /d. The second exception is when a state waives

its immunity to suit in federal court. /d. at 65. A state will be found to have waived its immunity

“only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the

text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways

& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). Neither exception is applicable in this case.

11

The first exception does not apply because the Supreme Court has determined that 42

U.S.C. § 1983 — under which this case arises — does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity from suit in federal court. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude that § 1983

was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its

consent’); and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to

believe...that Congress intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional

sovereign immunity of the States”). The second exception is inapplicable because the State of

Missouri has not waived its immunity in this type of case. See RSMo § 537.600 (explaining that

sovereign immunity is “in effect,” and providing exceptions relating to the “negligent acts or □

omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles...within the course

of their employment,” and regarding “[i]njuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s

property”).

In this case, sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs claim against the State of Missouri for any

type of relief, be it monetary or injunctive. Furthermore, no exception to sovereign immunity is

present here. Therefore, for this reason as well, plaintiff's claim against the state must be

dismissed.

C. SLMPD Homicide Division

In the caption of the complaint, plaintiff names the SLMPD Homicide Division as a

defendant. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, a police department is a department or subdivision

of local government, and not a juridical entity capable of being sued. Ketchum v. City of West

Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8'" Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of West Memphis Police

Department and West Memphis Paramedic Services because they were “not juridical entities

suable as such”). See also Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8™ Cir. 2003) (stating

12

that “county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit”); and De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail,

18 Fed. Appx. 436, 437 (8" Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriffs

department as parties because they are not suable entities). Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff is

attempting to sue the SLMPD Homicide Division, the claim must be dismissed.

D. Claim Against Circuit Attorney Kimberly Gardner

Plaintiff states that Circuit Attorney Gardner “insisted that the prosecutors proceed with

trial with no evidence,” presented evidence to a grand jury, and had him indicted on various

charges, including first-degree murder. As a prosecutor, though, Gardner is immune from suit.

Prosecutors are immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability so long as the actions complained

of appear to be within the scope of prosecutorial duties. Price v. Moody, 677 F.2d 676, 677 (8"

Cir. 1982). See also Keating v. Martin, 638 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8" Cir. 1980). The immunity enjoyed

by prosecutors from § 1983 actions can be either absolute or qualified. Brodnicki v. City of Omaha,

75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8" Cir. 1996). A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity if he or she is

acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution. /d. On the other hand, a prosecutor is

entitled to only qualified immunity when he or she pursues actions in an “investigatory” or

“administrative” capacity. Id.

“Absolute immunity protects prosecutors against claims arising from their initiation of a

prosecution and presenting a criminal case insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.” Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8"" Cir.

2016). For instance, “[t]he acts of preparing, signing, and filing a criminal complaint constitute

prosecutorial functions, as they are advocacy on behalf of the government.” Schenk v. Chavis, 461

F.3d 1043, 1046 (8" Cir. 2006).

13

Prosecutorial immunity depends on the functional nature of the prosecutor’s activities;

therefore, immunity is not defeated by “allegations of improper motive in the performance of

prosecutorial functions.” Sample, 836 F.3d at 916. Absolute immunity still applies even when there

are allegations of malice, vindictiveness, or self-interest. Reasonover v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 447

F.3d 569, 580 (8 Cir. 2006). Absolute immunity also “covers actions taken to initiate a

prosecution, even if those actions are patently improper.” Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838,

842 (8 Cir. 2013). See also Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8" Cir. 2018)

(explaining “that a prosecutor is immune from suit even if he knowingly presented false,

misleading, or perjured testimony or withheld or suppressed exculpatory evidence’).

In this case, plaintiff's facts — such as they are — indicate that he is upset about Circuit

Attorney Gardner’s performance as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution. That is, his

vague and conclusory claim rests squarely on Gardner’s decision to prosecute him, to present

evidence to a grand jury, and to indict him. These are actions “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process,” and entitle her to absolute immunity. See Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (explaining that prosecutorial acts entitled to absolute

immunity “include the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and

appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek

an indictment has been made”).

Even if Circuit Attorney Gardner was not immune, plaintiff has failed to state an individual

capacity claim against her. Liability ina 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. Frederick v. Motsinger,

873 F.3d 641, 646 (8" Cir. 2017). In other words, “[gJovernment officials are personally liable

only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8'" Cir. 2015). As such, §

1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”

14

Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8" Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d

1203, 1208 (8" Cir. 1990)). See also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8" Cir. 1993) (dismissing

plaintiff's excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiff's bail, and therefore,

“there can be no causal connection between any action on the part of the defendants and any

alleged deprivation” of plaintiff's rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the

defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8" Cir. 2019).

There are no facts in the complaint indicating that Circuit Attorney Gardner personally

took an action that resulted in the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. At most, he has

shown that Gardner lost the criminal case she brought against him, but this alone does not

demonstrate a constitutional violation. In other words, her decision to prosecute him, her

presentation to the grand jury, and her knowledge that the evidence she had against him was

“inadmissible,” all fail to describe an unconstitutional act. Without a causal connection between

an action on Gardner’s part, and a deprivation of plaintiffs rights, there can be no 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim. Therefore, for this reason as well, the individual capacity claim against Gardner must

be dismissed.

E. Claims Against Detective Sweeney, Detective Hyatt, and Investigator Mauzy

Plaintiff alleges that Detective Sweeney “violated [plaintiff's] constitutional rights,” that

Sweeney did “not identify [plaintiff] in trial after being detained for years,” that Sweeney lacks

“passion or empathy,” and that Sweeney did not properly do his work or investigate plaintiff's

case. As to Detective Hyatt, he states that Hyatt “assisted” Sweeney. With regard to Investigator

Mauzy, plaintiff argues that “Mauzy used Crimatrix and other illegal and home made investigating

tactics to convince the judge and grand jury to indict [him],” and that everything that Mauzy “used

15

was inadmissible in [his] trial because of the lack of professionalism and real police work.” None

of these unsupported conclusions is sufficient to state a claim.

As set forth above, to survive initial review, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim

for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.

That is, plaintiff's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8" Cir. 2017). “While the court must

accept allegations of fact as true...the court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported

conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8" Cir. 2002). Furthermore, a

pleading is insufficient if it offers only “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”

Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8"" Cir. 2017).

Here, plaintiff does not actually present any factual allegations against these three

defendants. Instead, he simply concludes — without any underpinning — that they violated his rights,

used illegal tactics, and improperly investigated his case. While he recites various causes of action,

there is not a single fact to back any of them up, leaving the Court to speculate as to what each

defendant actually did or did not do to harm him. This is not sufficient to state a claim. Therefore,

the individual capacity claims against defendants Sweeney, Hyatt, and Mauzy must be dismissed.

F. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Docket No. 3). The motion will

be denied as moot as this action is being dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $59.35

within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance

payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison

registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original

proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel (Docket

No. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this order of dismissal would not be

taken in good faith.

Dated this (?/¢day of Sep 7 ey 7 , 2022.

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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