Clark-El v. Missouri Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL A. CLARK-EL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:21-cv-01379-SRC

)

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT )

OF CORRECTIONS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Memorandum and Order

This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff Michael A. Clark-El’s amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed

below, the Court dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

Background

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Jefferson City

Correctional Center in Jefferson City, Missouri. On November 22, 2021, the Court received a

complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Doc. 1. The complaint was

typewritten and thirty-three pages long, with an additional thirty-two pages of exhibits. Plaintiff

named over eighty defendants from at least eight different prisons, with claims spanning thirty

years. The complaint was not accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,

or the full filing fee.

On February 7, 2022, the Court directed plaintiff to either file a motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis or pay the entire filing fee. Doc. 5. He was given thirty days to

comply. On March 8, 2022, the Court received plaintiff’s civil filing fee. The following day, he

submitted an amended complaint, Doc. 7, which became the operative pleading. See In re

Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-

established that an amended complaint supercedes [sic] an original complaint and renders the

original complaint without legal effect.” (citation omitted)).

The Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 7. It is on a

Court-provided form, but most of the allegations are contained within a typewritten complaint

that is attached to the form complaint. The attachment is similar to his original complaint, and

nearly identical to a previously filed complaint in state court. The amended complaint is forty-

three pages long, and encompasses allegations spanning thirty years at nine correctional

institutions: (1) Missouri Eastern Correctional Center (MECC); (2) Crossroads Correctional

Center (CRCC); (3) Old Jefferson City Correctional Center (Old JCCC); (4) Potosi Correctional

Center (PCC); (5) South Central Correctional Center (SCCC); (6) Farmington Correctional

Center (FCC); (7) Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center (ERDCC); (8) New

Jefferson City Correctional Center (New JCCC); and (9) Moberly Correctional Center (MCC).

In the amended complaint, plaintiff names a total of eighty-six defendants:1 (1)

Correctional Officer Kevin Lawton, at the MECC; (2) the Missouri Department of Corrections

(MODOC); (3) Functional Unit Manager (FUM) Staci Smith, at the CRCC; (4) Terri Paige,

Assistant Warden at CRCC; (5) Anne Precythe, Director of MODOC; (6) COI Cavanaugh, at the

Old JCCC; (7) COI Kemna, at the Old JCCC; (8) Steve Long, Assistant Director of MODOC;

(9) Don Roper, Superintendent of the PCC; (10) Michael Groose, Superintendent of the Old

JCCC; (11) Gerald Bommel, Assistant Superintendent of the Old JCCC; (12) Gene Stubblefield,

Superintendent of the MECC; (13) Michael Bowersox, Superintendent of the SCCC; (14) James

1 Defendants Precythe and Dormire are listed twice. Other defendants, such as Crocker and Theime, are listed

multiple times, but these appear to be references to different defendants with the same last name.

Purkett, Superintendent of the FCC and ERDCC; (15) Kate Klein, at PCC; (16) Kim Klein, at

PCC; (17) Princess Fahnestock, Correctional Caseworker (CCW) at SCCC; (18) Sergeant

Warren, at PCC; (19) COI Warren, at PCC; (20) Sergeant Frank Sancegraw, at PCC; (21) COI

Richards, at PCC; (22) Correctional Classification Assistant (CCA) Richards, at PCC; (23)

Sergeant Danny Browers, at Old JCCC; (24) Baretta Browers, at PCC; (25) John Harper, at PCC;

(26) Jeff Harper, at PCC; (27) COI Dicus, at PCC; (28) Gary Kempker, Director of MODOC;

(29) Dewayne Kempker, Superintendent at the Old JCCC; (30) Ronald Hamby, at SCCC; (31)

Jason Arthur, at SCCC; (32) Sergeant Hale, at SCCC; (33) Captain Fred Arflack, at MECC; (34)

Melody Haney, at PCC; (35) CCA Short, at PCC; (36) COI John F. Gilliam, at Old JCCC; (37)

CCA Richard White, at ERDCC; (38) COI Tim Pickett, at PCC; (39) Brenda Secoy, at ERDCC;

(40) Stan Payne, at ERDCC; (41) Terry Crocker, at ERDCC; (42) COI Crocker #1, at PCC; (43)

COI Crocker #2, at PCC; (44) Susan Jackson, at MECC; (45) COI Jackson, at MECC; (46) Pat

Mantle, at Old JCCC; (47) Danetta Henderson, at ERDCC; (48) Dave Dormire, Superintendent

at the Old JCCC; (49) Loretta Moss, at ERDCC; (50) FUM Daniels, at MECC; (51) COI

Wiseman, at MECC; (52) Sharon Sansouchie, at PCC; (53) Mary McGinley, at CRCC; (54)

Linda Carr, at CRCC; (55) Robert Baker, Central Transfer Supervisor; (56) Theresa Thornburg,

Superintendent of the Moberly Correctional Center (MCC); (57) Brian Allen, at PCC; (58)

Charlie James, at ERDCC; (59) Karen Stuchell, at ERDCC; (60) COI Best, at CRCC; (61) COI

Kelley, at CRCC; (62) Kimberly Ross, at CRCC; (63) Wilem Wykert, at CRCC; (64) Tanya

Young, at CRCC; (65) Michael Weber, at CRCC; (66) George Lombardi, Director of MODOC;

(67) Jeffrey Taul, at CRCC; (68) COI Theime #1, at CRCC; (69) COI Theime #2, at CRCC; (70)

COI Jundy, at CRCC; (71) COI Benton, at CRCC; (72) COI Moss, at CRCC; (73) COI Butler, at

CRCC; (74) Sergeant Cox, at CRCC; (75) Warden Eileen Ramey, at the New JCCC; (76)

Assistant Warden Raina Martin, at the New JCCC; (77) COI Isaac Quainoo, at New JCCC; (78)

COI Joyce Bales, at New JCCC; (79) Parole Officer Donna Welke; (80) Board of Probation and

Parole Chairman Cranston Mitchell; (81) Food Service Manager Lillie Moore, at CRCC; (82)

COI Shamarra Etzler, at CRCC; (83) COI Alan Woodcock, at CRCC; (84) FUM Benjamin

Brooke, at CRCC; (85) COI Julius Sanni, at New JCCC; and (86) COI Lamb, at New JCCC.

Doc. 7 at pp. 7–13. Clark-El sues the individual defendants in both their official and individual

capacities.

The “Statement of the Facts” section in plaintiff’s amended complaint runs for twenty

pages. Confusingly, he presents his claims out of chronological order, jumping back and forth

between different years and different penal institutions. He also mentions “defendants” who are

not properly identified as defendants in either the caption or the “Statement of the Parties”

section of the amended complaint. Rather than attempting to reorder plaintiff’s facts into

sequence, the Court will proceed through the allegations as plaintiff has presented them.

Plaintiff begins by accusing MODOC, through its “policies and customs,” of violating his

right to petition for grievances and right of access to the courts. Doc. 7 at p. 13. In particular, he

alleges that on June 13, 1990, defendant Lawton took his Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15

postconviction motion during a “shakedown exercise at MECC.” When plaintiff asked for its

return, defendant Arflack sprayed him with mace. The draft motion was not returned, and

plaintiff states that he missed the filing deadline, leading to a procedural bar that has kept him

“stranded in a constitutional [and] statutory no man[’]s land.”

Plaintiff next states that MODOC failed to provide him any postconviction remedy. Doc.

7 at p. 14. Specifically, he claims that he was transferred to the Old JCCC, and that he needed a

typewriter because his hand was deformed. However, plaintiff asserts that in 1990, there was no

typewriter in the law library, that the “library stayed closed most of the time,” that there were

only three typewriters for two thousand inmates, and that two of the typewriters did not have

ribbons. He claims that this kept him from timely filing his Rule 29.15 motion.

Between August 14, 1990, and September 5, 1990, plaintiff alleges that defendants COI

Cavanaugh and COI Kemna harassed him, used racial slurs, and took his passes to go to the law

library, adding to his inability to timely file for postconviction relief. Doc. 7 at p. 15.

In 1992, while at the Old JCCC, plaintiff received a “false conduct violation report” for

dangerous contraband found in the chapel. He alleges that it was issued by defendant Mantle, a

prison investigator, on the order of Superintendent Groose. Based on this violation, plaintiff was

placed into “super max,” where he was unable to work on a federal court case he had filed. The

case was “kicked out” for a “failure to litigate,” at which point plaintiff was released and the

conduct violation removed.

On February 27, 1998, while in the MECC, plaintiff states that defendant Susan Jackson

placed him in administrative segregation “for dangerous contraband.” Doc. 7 at p. 16.

Thereafter, he claims he was left in “lockdown” for ninety days without an investigation being

conducted, even though an investigation is only supposed to last thirty days. Plaintiff asserts that

the investigation was a “sham,” and that Superintendent Stubblefield, FUM Daniels, and

Director Long failed to provide him with any review, or allow him to access grievances or legal

materials. Further, plaintiff alleges that these defendants issued him a false conduct violation,

which COI Wiseman refused to write, “because it never happened.” Plaintiff alleges FUM

Daniels “violated” his “due process rights” by denying him a fair and impartial fact finder, and

by “finding him guilty based on [an] officer[’]s statement,” which plaintiff insists constitutes a

finding of guilt “without any evidence.”

Between February 1998 and May 1998, plaintiff states that “the defendants,” including

MODOC, forced him into a one-man cell with three inmates. Doc. 7 at p. 17. He states that he

slept on the floor next to “the filthy toilet, with roaches, rats, and spiders [crawling] all over

him.” Plaintiff contends that “defendants” (not identifying any defendant by name) refused to

move him, despite his requests.

On October 18, 2003, while at the PCC, plaintiff was issued a “false conduct report” by

COI Pickett for “interfering with the count.” He denies engaging in “any of these types of

childish games,” and asserts that it was related to his filing of a grievance against Kim Klein. At

plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, Kim Klein was his hearing officer, and failed to recuse herself.

In addition, Kim Klein heard the violation beyond the seven-day limit, found him guilty without

any evidence other than an officer’s statement, and “refused to allow him to submit documentary

evidence.” Plaintiff further contends that Kim Klein “disappeared” his enemies list from the

computer, meaning that he was “fed his meals by those named enemies,” resulting in “diseased

and unfit food for human consumption.” Plaintiff alleges that this led to eight “months of

starvation, weight loss, and torture.”

On November 20, 2014, while at the CRCC, plaintiff states that he was issued a conduct

violation that “was not heard until” December 4, 2014, beyond the seven-day limit. Doc. 7 at p.

18. He insists that hearing officer Staci Smith had “no justification for proceeding beyond the 7

day statute of limitations,” and therefore violated his right to due process. Plaintiff also contends

that he was found guilty “without any evidence” other than the officer’s statement and the

written report.

Additionally, plaintiff asserts that Staci Smith retaliated against him by feeding him

“diseased and unfit food.” He states that “he ate so much twisted[,] tainted food that he suffered

nutritional deficiency, weight loss, involuntary drug consumption, sleep deprivation, and other

forms of torture.” By way of example, plaintiff claims that on February 29, 2015, “he took a

large bite from a piece of cake” and almost “swallowed a fish hook.” He also asserts that

Assistant Superintendent Terry Paige “failed to redress these constitutional violations.” The

Court notes that plaintiff does not present a single fact establishing that Staci Smith placed a

fishhook in his cake or otherwise did anything to his food.

Between August 19, 2003 and August 4, 2005, while at the PCC, plaintiff states that

Sergeant Frank Sancegraw, COI Warren, and Sergeant Warren “targeted and destroyed his legal

materials and personal property while he was in” administrative segregation. Doc. 7 at p. 19. In

particular, they allegedly took his typewriter from the property room, broke his Walkman radio

and beard trimmer, and threw away “his legal books.” When plaintiff got out of administrative

segregation on November 9, 2004, he states that property room staff began approaching him,

“trying to blame each other.” Further, he asserts that his grievances “began to disappear,” and

“continued to vanish even after his transfer” to the ERDCC. Plaintiff attributes this to a

“campaign of harassment and tricks” by Caseworker Secoy and Stan Payne.

While still at the PCC, plaintiff asserts that defendant Sancegraw created a dangerous

condition by giving another inmate plaintiff’s property, and then telling that inmate that plaintiff

had “told on him.” Later, defendants Brian Allen, Melody Haney, and Sergeant Warren

“arranged for” both plaintiff and this other inmate “to be assigned to the same job.” Without

explanation, plaintiff states that on November 16, 2004, he “refused to play gladiator,” and that

Sergeant Warren “flew into a racial vent” and “assaulted him by slapping on the handcuffs so

violently it broke the skin.”

On June 10, 1994, when plaintiff was incarcerated at the Old JCCC, he states that

Superintendent Groose, COI Gilliam, and Sergeant Browers all “targeted” his “legal work for the

purpose of confiscation and distruction [sic] . . . .” Doc. 7 at p. 20. More specifically, he states

that “his legal work was meticulously catalogued and taken,” and that “he was issued a false

conduct violation report for” having contraband. Plaintiff notes that he was found guilty, but

objects because the contraband was “his own property.”

On January 1, 2004, while in the administrative segregation unit of the PCC, plaintiff

asserts that Baretta Browers issued him “a false conduct violation” for assaulting a staff member.

Specifically, plaintiff was accused of striking Browers “with a milk carton,” which he denies.

He states that this major conduct violation “was used to justify placing plaintiff on death row.”

At the hearing, plaintiff insists that the hearing officer had made a finding of guilt when he

“walked up to the door,” before it had begun. He claims that he was wrongfully found guilty,

and states—by way of defense—that he does not drink milk, and thus could not have thrown a

milk carton at Browers.

In December 1999, plaintiff was transferred from the Old JCCC to the PCC. Doc. 7 at p.

21. During this transfer, his “legal work was purposefully left at the prior institution,” for which

he blames CCA Short and Melody Haney, among others, because they refused to provide him

with “meaningful” administrative segregation review.

Between 2001 and 2002, plaintiff states that he was “repeatedly transferred” between the

MCC and the CRCC, an “abuse called marathon sessions.” He asserts that Theresa Thornburg,

Mike Kemna, and Robert Baker were responsible for his transfers.

Between August 2003 and August 2005, while at the PCC, plaintiff alleges that Sergeant

Sancegraw “repeatedly refused to take [him] to the property room to inventory his legal materials

and try to update his current cases.” Further, he states that Director Long, Melody Haney, and

other staff were part of “the ongoing campaign of denial and harassment.”

Throughout his period of incarceration, plaintiff states that MODOC staff has “repeatedly

opened his legal mail” outside of his presence. Doc. 7 at p. 22. He provides a list of such

incidents, stating that defendant Sharon Sansouchie opened his legal mail at the PCC on

February 8, 2000, and May 12, 2000; that Loretta Moss opened his legal mail at the ERDCC on

April 4, 2006; that Terry Crocker opened his legal mail at the ERDCC on October 16, 2006 and

November 2, 2006; that COI Dicus opened his legal mail at the PCC on July 27, 2005; that CCA

Dunn opened his legal mail at the PCC on July 28, 2004; that Michael Weber opened his legal

mail at the CRCC on November 12, 2014; and that COI Sandridge2 opened his legal mail at the

CRCC on August 25, 2010. Doc. 7 at pp. 22–23.

On September 24, 2020, while incarcerated at the New JCCC, plaintiff states that

defendant Isaac Quainoo gave him his St. Louis American newspaper, which was dated August

27, 2020. Doc. 7 at p. 23. He states that this was “thirty days later,” and suggests that Quainoo

did this intentionally, vaguely asserting that Quainoo and Julius Sanni have been “giving his mail

to the wrong inmates and harassing [him] for too many years now.” On August 25, 2020,

plaintiff received a “new password” from J-Pay, but strenuously states that he does not have a J-

Pay account, and “maybe never will.” Plaintiff apparently believes this occurred because “a few

years back” his “vital information” was “compromised.” He asked Assistant Warden Raina

Martin “to tell them to stop all this and leave him alone,” but alleges that “she failed.” Plaintiff

also notes that Warden Eileen Ramey and Director Anne Precythe did not seem to care about this

2 Plaintiff refers to both CCA Dunn and COI Sandridge as defendants, but neither are properly identified as

defendants in the caption or the section of the form complaint for naming the parties.

“wire fraud.” The Court notes that plaintiff has not presented any facts indicating a

“compromise” of his vital information or that fraud has occurred.

On December 28, 2005, while at the ERDCC, plaintiff states that he went to the property

room to pick up his legal mail where he “found that Richard White . . . had purposefully lost or

destroyed it.” Doc. 7 at p. 24. He alleges that White “took steps to cover it up by” telling other

staff members, such as defendants “Secoy, Vance, Moss, Roper, etc., to make sure [his]

grievances would not get any traction.” As a result, plaintiff asserts that his grievances “were

always lost and Stan Payne the grievance officer kept sending them back.” On May 9, 2006,

defendant White “told him to his face that he had no legal materials in the property room,” and

denied his grievance request. Plaintiff claims that FUM Danetta Henderson and Stan Payne tried

to help White “cover his tracks.” However, on August 30, 2006, defendant James Purkett

“admitted that [plaintiff’s] legal material was lost or destroyed by the staff and tried to credit his

inmate account with ten dollars.”

In “early 2014 at the CRCC,” plaintiff states that “property room staff COI Kelley and

COI Best gave his tennis shoes to another inmate as part of an ongoing campaign of racist

harassment.” Despite filing a grievance, “nothing was ever really done that rectified the

situation.” Later, on February 3, 2015, plaintiff asserts that Kelley and Best “lost or destroyed”

the legal materials he had in storage, claiming “it was eaten up and destroyed by rodents.” He

“repeated the grievance process,” but “again nothing was ever really done to make [him] whole.”

On June 7, 1994, while at the Old JCCC, plaintiff states that Superintendent Michael

Groose and Assistant Superintendent Gerald Bommel denied him a visit with his fiancé. Doc. 7

at p. 25. He filed a civil action, and “defendants placed her on [his] visitors list forthwith.”

Thereafter, plaintiff dismissed his case. However, in January 1995, he claims that “the

defendants retaliated by issuing a false conduct violation.” Eventually, plaintiff “was found

guilty based on the officer[’]s statement without any evidence.” He states that this was a reprisal

for his civil action, and that it destroyed his relationship.

On April 15, 2015, while at the CRCC, plaintiff states that Wilem Wykert “targeted [his]

broken hand and slammed on handcuffs, for no other reason but to cause him pain.” He also

states that Wykert gave him a false conduct violation for a minor assault.

On May 15, 1998, plaintiff made “an official request for final disposition of charges,” but

states that he was not tried or convicted for another twenty-six months. Doc. 7 at p. 26. He

believes that MODOC is liable because they “should never have released plaintiff into the

custody of the St. Louis County Sheriff transport officers because he was entitled to a dismissal

of the charges by the Director of [MODOC].” He alleges this happened again when he requested

final disposition of charges on August 24, 1999, but the charges were not disposed of until April

26, 2000, and also when he requested disposition of charges on June 28, 1989, but was not

brought to trial until August 6, 1990.

Between June 2014 and September 2014, while at the CRCC, plaintiff states he was

threatened with administrative segregation if he did not “sign an enemy waiver form” with his

cellmate. Doc. 7 at p. 27. According to plaintiff, “he had no problem with his cellmate because

he didn’t know what was going on in his sleep or behind his back.” However, unknown to

plaintiff, his cellmate was allegedly “putting brown [recluse] spiders in his bed,” “playing

homosexual games with plaintiff in his sleep,” putting “medications in his eyes[,] nose and

mouth so he couldn’t wake up,” as well as attempting to induce a heart attack and sticking

plaintiff’s toes “with needles.” On September 4, 2014, plaintiff got into a fight with his cellmate,

resulting in a broken hand. Plaintiff claims that defendants Mary McGinley and Sergeant Cox

either “encouraged [the] fight between plaintiff and his cellmate” or “failed to protect” him from

his cellmate.

On September 14, 2014, plaintiff states that he was being escorted to medical for his

broken hand when COI Benton “slammed on the handcuffs to cause him pain” and “smashed his

broken hand into the chuck hole for no reason.” On September 16, 2014, while returning from

treatment for his broken hand, he claims that COI Jundy dropped “what he was doing and ran

across the room and began pushing[,] pulling and twisting violently on the handcuffs[,] simply to

cause him pain.” Meanwhile, he alleges “Mary McGinley and Staci Smith took turns teasing

him” about his grievances, though he states “it could have been COI Butler.”

On September 19, 2014, while at the CRCC, plaintiff states he filed a complaint against

defendants Etzler and Woodcock for “sexual assault (verbal and physical).” Doc. 7 at p. 28. He

explains that “as he was going to and from the shower, while in handcuffs and on his knees, they

would take turns brushing up against his behind and making harassing statements trying to

provoke him so they could have reason to create a major incident and use excessive force.”

On December 4, 2014, on his way to a disciplinary hearing, plaintiff states that “COI

Benton and COI Jundy took turns slamming on the handcuff[s]” and “violently” pushing,

pulling, and twisting “them to simply cause pain.” At the hearing, plaintiff alleges that defendant

Staci Smith “laughed herself teary eyed” and then “left the hearing to make a phone call.” He

states that he got dizzy and lost consciousness, at which point a sergeant ordered his handcuffs to

be loosened.

On January 14, 2015, plaintiff alleges that COI Taul “sexually assaulted [him] for a

second time” by “brushing [Taul’s] shoulder and entire length of his arm against plaintiff[’]s

behind.” Plaintiff next alleges that defendant Etzler “slammed on the handcuffs targeting his

broken hand to cause pain.” He states this occurred “in reprisal” for filing a complaint against

Etzler on September 19, 2014. On April 2, 2015, plaintiff states that COI Moss “retaliated

against plaintiff” for an earlier complaint by “violently” slamming handcuffs onto him, causing

his hand to smash into the chuckhole.

In June 2009, plaintiff asserts that COI Jones stuck “his crotch area in plaintiff[’]s face

while plaintiff was eating chow.” He demanded to see COI Jones’s supervisor, Lieutenant Jones.

Lieutenant Jones told him to make a complaint, which “disappeared.” Plaintiff notes that

Lieutenant Jones was COI Jones’s brother. The Court observes that plaintiff has not properly

identified either COI Jones or Lieutenant Jones as defendants, nor has he established where this

took place.

Between May 12, 2004 and July 2004, while at the PCC, plaintiff states that “he was

being served his meals by his documented enemies in shifts.” Doc. 7 at p. 29. These “enemies”

had been assigned that job by staff members who allegedly included—among others—CCA

Richards, COI Richards, Superintendent Roper, Assistant Director Long, COI Crocker #1, and

COI Crocker #2. Plaintiff makes no effort to describe what each individual actually did or did

not do, or why being served meals by his “enemies” resulted in “nutritional deficiency and

weight loss.”

On June 11, 2003, at the SCCC, plaintiff states that Sergeant Hale and COI Hamby

opened his cell “while he was at chow,” allowing “two or three racist inmates to go into his cell

and steal his legal work.” Plaintiff states that he “caught them in the act and ran them off,”

warning Hale and Hamby “that if they did it again he would file a civil action against him.” In

response, plaintiff received “a false” conduct violation “for threats,” and was put “into the hole.”

Princess Fahnestock “found him guilty based on the officer[’]s statement,” which plaintiff insists

is “without evidence.” On July 2, 2003, Jason Arthur issued plaintiff “a false major” conduct

violation for “organized disobedience.” As before, he was found guilty. Plaintiff states that

Superintendent Gary Kempker “tacitly approved of these multifaceted constitutional violations

by rejecting his letters and denying his grievances.”

Plaintiff generally accuses MODOC of violating the constitution by promulgating and

implementing policies regarding “nepotism.” Doc. 7 at p. 30. Specifically, he complains that

there are “too many relatives within the first, second, and third sanguianity [sic]” who have

“conspire[ed] against him, both on and off the job.” Plaintiff also broadly asserts that MODOC’s

“grievance policy is unconstitutional” and “no more than an exercise in futility.” With regard to

MODOC policies regarding property rights, plaintiff asserts that the fifteen-day period to file

complaints is unconstitutional, since it did not give him enough time to know something “was

wrong with his property.” Doc. 7 at p. 31.

On April 24, 2018, at the New JCCC, plaintiff states that “defendant Joyce Bales refused

to allow [him] into the property room to inspect/exchange his legal property.” Bales apparently

claimed that plaintiff’s name was not on the list, while plaintiff insists that he saw the list in her

hand and that “his name and number were on it.” Plaintiff states that this “was the last straw and

[he] filed [a] grievance,” which did “no good.”

Plaintiff claims that MODOC violated his constitutional rights when he was a pretrial

detainee because he did not receive a “fast and speedy trial” and was not allowed to remain on

parole, like his codefendant. Doc. 7 at p. 32. In particular, he alleges that on November 12,

1988, defendant Donna Welke placed a parole hold on him without probable cause after he was

arrested, and that Cranston Mitchell revoked his parole on May 17, 1989. Plaintiff contends the

actions of Welke and Mitchell constituted punishment while he was “on pretrial detainee status.”

On April 30, 2021, while at the New JCCC, plaintiff states that Julius Sanni “gave his

mail to the wrong inmate on purpose,” which plaintiff somehow knows because he “was looking

right at defendant as it happen[ed].” Then, on May 5, 2021, Sanni “gave plaintiff someone

else[’]s mail in an attempt to add insult to injury.” Plaintiff notes that he once “had a suspicious

fire at a relative[’]s address after this type of mail fraud.”

Finally, on April 29, 2021, plaintiff states that he “mailed out this very complaint . . . to

the Clerk of this Court.” Doc. 7 at p. 33. Because it was too large to fit into the mail slot,

plaintiff handed the complaint to COI Lamb. According to plaintiff, COI Lamb made “sure that

COI defendant Quainoo wound up with it and passed it out to the wrong inmate.”

Based on these facts, plaintiff presents eight different causes of action. Doc. 7 at pp. 34–

35. First, he alleges that he was denied his right to petition for grievances and to access the

courts by defendants Lawton, Arflack, Kemna, Cavanaugh, MODOC, Mantle, Groose,

Sancegraw, COI Warren, Sergeant Warren, Sergeant Browers, Gilliam, Sansouchie, White,

Purkett, Bommel, Sandridge, Dicus, Weber, Kelley, Best, Moss, and Dunn. Doc. 7 at p. 34.

Second, plaintiff alleges that MODOC violated his constitutional rights by releasing him

into the custody of “county transportation officers where there was no jurisdiction.”

Third, plaintiff claims he was not protected against retaliation for filing grievances and

civil actions by defendants Groose, Bommel, Susan Jackson, Lawton, Arflack, Daniels,

Stubblefield, and Long.

Fourth, plaintiff contends that MODOC, Welke, and Mitchell violated his constitutional

rights by punishing him when he was a pretrial detainee.

Fifth, plaintiff asserts that MODOC’s policies regarding nepotism led to him being

subjected to “unfettered abuses, reprisals, etc.”

Sixth, plaintiff states that MODOC, Lawton, Arflack, Sanni, Martin, Quainoo, Precythe,

and Lamb denied him the right to prove his innocence during disciplinary hearings. Doc. 7 at p.

35.

Seventh, regarding conduct violations, plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were

violated by Staci Smith, Terri Paige, MODOC, Daniels, and Long “by exceeding the 7 day

statute of limitations and finding him guilty in clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Eighth, plaintiff accuses defendants MODOC, Sergeant Warren, COI Warren,

Sancegraw, Groose, Sergeant Browers, Gilliam, Best, Kelley, White, Paige, Staci Smith,

McGinley, and Lombardi of violating his rights by confiscating, destroying, losing, or breaking

his property while it was in their care and control.

As a result, plaintiff seeks unspecified injunctive relief, compensatory damages of

$50,000 per defendant and one dollar a day for the sixty days he spent sleeping on the floor in

administrative segregation at the MECC, and punitive damages of $150,000 per defendant, along

with $1,000 a day for every day he slept on the floor in administrative segregation at the MECC.

Doc. 7 at pp. 36, 38.

Attached to the amended complaint are thirty-three pages of exhibits, including court

orders, conduct violation reports, a J-Pay letter, informal resolution requests, grievances,

grievance appeals, grievance appeal responses, warden responses, invoices, affidavits, and

letters. The Court treats these attachments as part of the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all

purposes.”); see also Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that “while

ordinarily, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered in determining whether it states

a claim, materials attached to the complaint as exhibits may be considered in construing the

sufficiency of the complaint”); Pratt v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 124 F. App’x 465, 466 (8th Cir.

2005) (explaining that “the district court was required to consider the allegations not only in

[plaintiff’s] pro se complaint, but also in his motion to amend, his response to defendants’

motion to dismiss, and the attachments to those pleadings”).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to review a civil complaint “in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental

entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The term “prisoner” is defined as “any person incarcerated or

detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent

for, violations of criminal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). Pursuant to this section, the Court must

dismiss a complaint if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted,” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Here, plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner who is suing employees of a

governmental entity. Therefore, his amended complaint is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

screening.

To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more

than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.

The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber,

820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371,

372–73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true,

but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However,

even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a

matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v.

Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914–15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to

“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have

formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal

construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted

so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging numerous constitutional violations against eighty-six separate defendants over

the course of more than thirty years.3 Because he is a prisoner suing state employees, the Court

has reviewed his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Based on that review, and for

the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses this action with prejudice.

3 Plaintiff’s earliest claim arises on November 12, 1988. Plaintiff signed his original complaint on April 29, 2021,

approximately thirty-two years and five months later.

I. Res Judicata

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata,

which encompasses the concepts of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, has been applied

to dismiss the complaints of plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See

Pointer v. Parents for Fair Share, 87 F. App’x 12 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on the basis of res judicata); Henderson v. Engstrom,

No. CIV 14-4116, 2014 WL 4678262, at *2 (D.S.D. Sept. 18, 2014) (stating that “[w]here res

judicata applies to an IFP plaintiff’s complaint, courts have dismissed the complaint under §

1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim or for being frivolous”). Likewise, res judicata has been

applied to cases reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Skipper v. Jefferson City Corr. Ctr.,

No. 09-4004-CV-C-SOW, 2009 WL 2044657, at *1 (W.D. Mo. July 10, 2009) (dismissing

amended complaint on res judicata grounds, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Gross v.

Hutchinson, No. 19CV00933, 2020 WL 4557938, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 16, 2020), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 19CV00933, 2020 WL 4555721 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 6, 2020)

(determining that complaint should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A “as barred by res

judicata”).

Res judicata has also been applied to complaints brought in federal court pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 after those complaints were previously litigated in state court. See Kruger v.

Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “the doctrines of issue and claim

preclusion, as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1738, apply to the issues in a § 1983 case which have been

fully litigated in the state court” (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.

75, 82–83 (1984))). In determining whether res judicata applies, the Court looks to state

preclusion law. See Stephens v. Jessup, 793 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that “[u]nder

the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give the same preclusive

effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State

from which the judgments emerged”).

A. Missouri preclusion law

In Missouri, where plaintiff’s earlier case was decided, the “doctrine of res judicata

precludes relitigation of a claim formerly made.” Chesterfield Vill., Inc. v. City of Chesterfield,

64 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Mo. 2002). Res judicata “applies not only to points and issues upon which

the court was required by the pleadings and proof to form an opinion and pronounce judgment,

but to every point properly belonging to the subject matter of litigation and which the parties,

exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.” King Gen.

Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495,

501 (Mo. 1991). Res judicata is also known as claim preclusion. Olofson v. Olofson, 625

S.W.3d 419, 427 (Mo. 2021).

For res judicata to apply, “four identities must occur: 1) identity of the thing sued for; 2)

identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and 4) identity

of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made.” King General Contractors,

Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 501. “To determine whether a claim is barred by a former judgment, the

question is whether the claim arises out of the same act, contract, or transaction.” Chesterfield

Village, Inc., 64 S.W.3d at 318–19. In other words, as “long as the underlying facts are the

same, res judicata bars re-litigation of the matter whether upon the same or different cause of

action, claim, demand, ground or theory.” Roy v. MBW Constr., Inc., 489 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Mo.

Ct. App. 2016).

B. Plaintiff’s earlier state court action

Before filing the instant action, plaintiff filed a similar—and in many respects,

identical—case in Missouri state court. See Clark v. Missouri Department of Corrections, et al.,

No. 21SL-CC02269 (21st Jud. Cir., St. Louis County).4 All the defendants named in the

amended complaint in this Court were named in the prior action, with the exception of COI

Lamb. The allegations there, as here, spanned thirty years, occurred at nine different correctional

institutions, and encompassed claims regarding grievances, access to the courts, mail, lost or

damaged property, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, false conduct violations,

unconstitutional disciplinary hearings, a failure to protect him from other inmates, denial of visits

from his fiancé, speedy trial violations, excessive force, and sexual assault.5

Plaintiff’s state court complaint is thirty-one pages long, which is shorter than the present

amended complaint. Some of that difference is due to the fact that plaintiff attached a

typewritten complaint to the Court’s prisoner civil rights complaint form. The Court observes,

however, that there are some additional allegations in the amended complaint that do not appear

in the earlier state complaint. Specifically, the allegations in the state complaint spanned

paragraphs sixty-five to ninety-four, while the allegations in the amended complaint stretch from

paragraphs sixty-five to ninety-seven. The three additional paragraphs concern defendants

Welke and Mitchell revoking his parole; defendant Sanni giving his mail to the wrong inmate;

and COI Lamb being handed plaintiff’s federal complaint for mailing. Defendants Welke,

4 Plaintiff’s state court case was reviewed on Case.net, Missouri’s online case management system. The Court takes

judicial notice of this public record. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that district

courts may take judicial notice of public state records); Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005)

(stating that courts “may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records”).

5 In its order of dismissal, the circuit court references eighty-one defendants, but review of the actual complaint

shows that plaintiff identifies eighty-five separate individuals, with COI Lamb being the only defendant added to the

amended complaint in this Court. The Court also notes that the circuit court references eight correctional

institutions, but appears to forget to count the ERDCC.

Mitchell, and Sanni were all identified as defendants in state court, but Welke and Mitchell had

no factual allegations asserted against them, while Sanni was targeted with fewer allegations. As

already noted, COI Lamb did not appear at all in the state complaint.

Plaintiff has also made some changes to his “causes of action.” Both his state complaint

and amended complaint contain eight separate causes of action, but the amended complaint has

been slightly reworded. The first cause of action in both complaints relates to the right to

petition for grievances and to access the courts. In the amended complaint, however, plaintiff

has added the names of the defendants he apparently believes responsible.

With regard to the second cause of action, the state complaint asserts a violation of

plaintiff’s speedy trial rights, while the amended complaint accuses MODOC of unlawfully

releasing him into county custody for transportation to criminal court, thereby “infringing on his

right to a fast and speedy trial.”

As to the third cause of action, both the state complaint and the federal amended

complaint assert a reprisal and retaliation claim. The only difference is that in the amended

complaint, plaintiff has added the names of individual defendants.

Concerning the fourth cause of action, despite slightly different wording, both the state

complaint and amended complaint assert that plaintiff was unconstitutionally punished as a

pretrial detainee. Likewise, the fifth cause of action in both the state complaint and federal

amended complaint focus on plaintiff’s contention that MODOC has unconstitutional nepotism

policies.

Regarding the sixth cause of action, there is different wording between the state

complaint and amended complaint, but both allege that plaintiff was denied his right to produce

documentary evidence during disciplinary hearings. Similarly, in the seventh cause of action in

both the state and federal complaint, plaintiff contends that his due process rights were violated

when he was punished following disciplinary hearings held beyond “the 7 day statute of

limitations.”

Finally, in the eighth cause of action in both the state complaint and federal amended

complaint, plaintiff asserts the violation of his rights due to the loss, damage, or destruction of

his property. The chief difference between the two pleadings is that in the amended complaint,

plaintiff appends the name of individual defendants.

For the most part, however, the state complaint and the federal amended complaint are

the same. Indeed, they are mostly indistinguishable as to substance, and much of the amended

complaint appears to be a copy of the state complaint, including identical phrasings, errors, and

even smudges.

The state circuit court received plaintiff’s complaint on April 30, 2021. The circuit court

reviewed the case under the Missouri Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. Based on that review, the

circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice on December 14, 2021. Plaintiff did

not appeal.

C. Application of res judicata

As noted above, in Missouri, res judicata requires four identities: “1) identity of the thing

sued for; 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of the persons and parties to the action;

and 4) identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made.” King

General Contractors, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 501. Those four identities are present between

plaintiff’s earlier state complaint and the instant action.

With regard to the first two identities, “the thing sued for” and “the cause of action,”

these two identities are defined as “the facts that form or could form the basis of the previous

adjudication.” Kesler v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 516 S.W.3d 884, 890–91 (Mo. Ct. App.

2017). “The facts that form the basis of the previous adjudication are the same and, therefore,

the identities of the thing sued for and the cause of action are the same, if the claim arises out of

the same act, contract or transaction as the previous adjudication.” Id. at 891.

Here, “the facts that form or could form the basis of the previous adjudication” are almost

exactly the same. Both the state complaint and the amended complaint arise from plaintiff’s

thirty-plus years of incarceration at nine different prisons, encompassing claims regarding

grievances, access to the courts, mail, lost or damaged property, unconstitutional conditions of

confinement, false conduct violations, unconstitutional disciplinary hearings, a failure to protect

him from other inmates, denial of visits from his fiancé, speedy trial violations, excessive force,

and sexual assault. Aside from the addition of three paragraphs in the amended complaint, the

factual allegations are nearly identical. More to the point, major portions of the amended

complaint appear to have come from the complaint previously filed in state court. Therefore, the

first two identities are present.

As to the third identity, a “party is identical, for purposes of res judicata, when it is the

same party that litigated the prior suit or when the new party was in privity with the party that

litigated the prior suit.” Suppes v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 613 S.W.3d 836, 849 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2020). Here, plaintiff is the same person who filed both the first complaint in state court

and the subsequent amended complaint in this Court. Therefore, the third identity is present.

Regarding the fourth identity of res judicata, the “identity of the quality or status of the

person for or against whom the claim is made,” a court looks “not only to the caption of the prior

litigation, but also to the substance of the petition in the prior litigation.” Lauber-Clayton, LLC

v. Novus Props. Co., 407 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). “The phrase quality of the

person apparently refers to the status in which he sues or is sued.” Fleming v. Mercantile Bank

& Tr. Co., 796 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). However, while the designation of the

defendants might be different in each case, “the scope of res judicata transcends such nominal

difference where the subject matters of both disputes are essentially the same.” Mullen v.

Roberts & Roberts Real Est., Inc., 550 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). “Where a party in

an individual or representative capacity is asserting or protecting the same rights or interests he

later seeks to assert or protect in a different representative capacity, he is in effect the same party,

or at least in one capacity he is in privity with his other capacity.” Smith v. Preis, 396 S.W.2d

636, 640 (Mo. 1965).

In this case, eighty-five of the defendants individually identified in the amended

complaint are also named as defendants in the prior state court action. Further, all the defendants

in both cases are named in both their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff added one

additional defendant to the amended complaint that was not in the state action; however, that

defendant, COI Lamb, is not alleged to have committed a constitutional violation, as his only

role in the case was to receive a complaint for mailing. Thus, the substance of both the prior

litigation and the instant case remain the same. Because the defendants in both cases are almost

entirely identical, and sued in the same capacities, the Court concludes that the fourth identity

exists as well.

Res judicata operates to prevent relitigation of a previously adjudicated claim in a

subsequently filed action. See Steinbach, 637 S.W.3d at 501. As discussed above, plaintiff filed

a nearly identical prior action in state court on April 30, 2021. The circuit court dismissed the

case with prejudice on December 14, 2021, and plaintiff did not file an appeal. Instead, plaintiff

initiated an action in this Court, submitting an amended complaint the Court received on

February 7, 2022. For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff is precluded from relitigating claims

that were previously decided on the merits. The Court dismisses plaintiff’s complaint with

prejudice for this reason.

II. Statute of limitations

Even if this case were not subject to dismissal on the basis of res judicata, the Court notes

that the vast majority of plaintiff’s claims are clearly barred by the statute of limitations. While

there is no statute of limitations contained within 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself, the Supreme Court

“has held that § 1983 claims accruing within a particular state should be governed by that state’s

statute of limitations governing personal-injury claims.” Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1205

(8th Cir. 2011). Thus, for cases arising in Missouri, the five-year statute of limitations for

personal injury actions found in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) applies to § 1983 actions. Sulik v.

Taney County, 393 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2005). In Missouri, the statute of limitations for

personal injury actions begins when the damage is capable of becoming known, not when the

injury is actually discovered. See Powel v. Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576,

580 (Mo. 2006), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 22, 2006); Chemical Workers Basic Union,

Local No. 1744 v. Arnold Sav. Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159, 163–64 (Mo. 1966).

While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may properly

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 when it is apparent the statute of

limitations has expired. Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Morris v.

Hewitt, No. 20-CV-05175, 2020 WL 6140451, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 19, 2020) (dismissing case

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as barred by the statute of limitations).

Here, plaintiff signed his original complaint on April 29, 2021. Doc. 1 at p. 32.

Missouri’s five year statute of limitations would thus encompass claims occurring within the five

previous years. In this case, that means that only claims arising on or after April 29, 2016 are

timely. Plaintiff’s own allegations demonstrate that most of his claims were capable of being

known far before that. Specifically, plaintiff’s “Statement of the Facts” consists of fifty-one

separate paragraphs and subparagraphs, numbered 65 through 97. Of those fifty-one paragraphs

and subparagraphs, forty contain claims that are clearly time-barred.6 In other words, plaintiff

has clearly indicated in those forty claims that the incident occurred—and the damage was

capable of being known—before April 29, 2016, putting the claims outside the five-year

limitations period.

III. Non time-barred claims

There are eleven paragraphs or subparagraphs in plaintiff’s “Statement of the Facts” that

are either not time-barred or do not contain a date. One of these paragraphs consists only of the

allegation that all defendants acted under color of state law. Doc. 7 at p. 30, ¶ 94. Of the

remaining ten claims, six are against the Missouri Department of Corrections, and four are

directed against individual defendants.

6 Those claims—and the corresponding dates—are as follows: (1) ¶ 65, June 13, 1990; (2) ¶ 66, January to August

1990; (3) ¶ 67(b), August 14, 1990 and September 5, 1990; (4) ¶ 67(c), August 1990 and September 1990; (5) ¶ 68,

August 14, 1990 to September 5, 1990; (6) ¶ 69, August 10, 1992; (7) ¶ 70, February 27, 1998; (8) ¶ 71, 1998; (9) ¶

72, February 1998 to May 1998; (10) ¶ 73, October 18, 2003, August 19, 2003, and April 29, 2004; (11) ¶ 74,

November 20, 2014 and December 4, 2014; (12) ¶ 75, February 29, 2015; (13) ¶ 76, August 19, 2003 to August 4,

2005, November 9, 2004, and February 15, 2006; (14) ¶ 77, November 16, 2004; (15) ¶ 78, June 10, 1994; (16) ¶ 79,

January 1, 2004; (17) ¶ 80, December 1999; (18) ¶ 81, between 2001 and 2002; (19) ¶ 82, between August 2003 and

August 2005; (20) ¶ 83(a), February 28, 2000; (21) ¶ 83(b), May 12, 2000; (22) ¶ 83(c), April 4, 2006; (23) ¶ 84(d),

October 16, 2006 and November 2, 2006; (24) ¶ 83(e), July 27, 2005; (25) ¶ 83(f), July 28, 2004; (26) ¶ 83(g),

November 12, 2014; (27) ¶ 83(h), August 25, 2010; (28) ¶ 85, December 28, 2005 and August 30, 2006; (29) ¶ 86,

early 2014, February 3, 2015; (30) ¶ 87, June 7, 1994 and January 1995; (31) ¶ 87(b), April 15, 2015; (32) ¶ 88, May

15, 1998 and November 15, 1998; (33) ¶ 88(a), August 24, 1999 and April 26, 2000; (34) ¶ 88(b), June 28, 1989 and

August 6, 1990; (35) ¶ 89, June 2014 to September 2014, and September 4, 2014; (36) ¶ 90, September 5, 2014,

September 16, 2014, September 19, 2014, December 4, 2014, January 14, 2015, March 18, 2015, April 2, 2015, and

June 2009; (37) ¶ 91, May 12, 2004 to July 2004; (38) ¶ 92, June 11, 2003 and July 2, 2003; (39) ¶ 94(c), April 30,

2015 and June 3, 2015; and (40) ¶ 95, December 12, 1988 and May 17, 1989.

A. Claims against MODOC

As noted above, plaintiff has made six claims against MODOC that do not include a date,

meaning the Court cannot precisely determine whether they are time-barred. In particular,

plaintiff alleges that: MODOC deprived him of an adequate postconviction remedy; that

MODOC lost his medical paperwork; that MODOC deprived him of an adequate postconviction

remedy by not providing enough typewriters, causing him to be unable to file a timely Rule

29.15 motion; that MODOC violated his right to petition for grievances and to access the courts;

that MODOC has an unconstitutional policy regarding nepotism; and that MODOC has an

unconstitutional grievance policy. Doc. 7 at p. 14, ¶ 67, ¶ 67(a), and ¶ 67(d); Doc. 7 at p. 22,

¶ 83; Doc. 7 at p. 30, ¶ 93 and ¶ 94(b).

Regardless of their timeliness, these claims are subject to dismissal based on the doctrine

of sovereign immunity. “Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued

without its consent.” Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The

Eleventh Amendment has been held to confer sovereign immunity on an un-consenting state

from lawsuits brought in federal court by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974); see also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d

483, 485 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms

and instrumentalities from suit in federal court”); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615,

618–19 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[g]enerally, in the absence of consent a suit in which the

State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the

Eleventh Amendment”). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for

any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages. Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594

(8th Cir. 2007) (finding the district court erred in allowing plaintiff to proceed against state

university for injunctive relief, and remanding matter to district court for dismissal).

There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the

Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1992). “The first exception

to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such immunity

by clear and unmistakable language.” Id. The second exception is when a state waives its

immunity to suit in federal court. Id. at 65. A state will be found to have waived its immunity

“only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the

text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of

Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). Neither exception is applicable in this

case.

The first section is inapplicable because 42 U.S.C. § 1983—under which this case

arises—does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (stating that “[w]e cannot conclude

that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued

without its consent”); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (stating that “we simply are

unwilling to believe . . . that Congress intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the

traditional sovereign immunity of the States”).

The second exception is also inapplicable, because the State of Missouri has not waived

its immunity in this type of case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600 (explaining that sovereign

immunity is “in effect,” and providing exceptions relating to the “negligent acts or omissions by

public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles . . . within the course of their

employment,” and regarding “[i]njuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s property”).

Here, MODOC is a department of the State of Missouri. As such, any claim against it is

barred by the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment. This immunity

protects a state from suit for any type of relief, be it monetary or injunctive. Furthermore,

plaintiff has not demonstrated that any exceptions to sovereign immunity are present in this case.

Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff’s claims against MODOC are not untimely, they are barred

by sovereign immunity.

B. Official-capacity claims against Defendants Quainoo, Sanni, Martin, Ramey,

Precythe, Bales, and Lamb

Plaintiff has made four claims that do not appear to be time-barred, as they occurred after

April 29, 2016. The defendants implicated by these claims are Isaac Quainoo, Julius Sanni,

Assistant Warden Raina Martin, Warden Eileen Ramey, Director Anne Precythe, Joyce Bales,

and COI Lamb. Plaintiff has sued these defendants in their official capacities.

In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the

governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a

“suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public

employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999); see also

Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit

against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly v. City of

Omaha, 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees

in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”); Elder-Keep v.

Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that a “suit against a public official in his

official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent”).

Here, each of these defendants is alleged to be employed by the State of Missouri. As

such, the official capacity claims against them are claims against the state itself. These claims

fail for two reasons.

First, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under

color of law, of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008);

see also Deretich v. Off. of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (“Section

1983 provides a cause of action against ‘person[s]’ only”). However, “neither a State nor its

officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71; see

also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a “State is not a

person under § 1983”); Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that

“a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”).

In this case, plaintiff is suing for money damages.7 The State of Missouri is not a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 “person” for the purposes of such claims. As he is missing an essential element of

a § 1983 action, the official capacity claims must be dismissed.

Second, as explained above, sovereign immunity prevents plaintiff from suing the State

of Missouri. See Webb, 889 F.3d at 485 (stating that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment protects States

and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court”). The protection of the Eleventh

Amendment extends to claims for money damages against state officials in their official

capacities. See Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating

that “[a] claim for damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred under the

7 The Court notes that in his request for relief, plaintiff seeks unspecified injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not stated

what he wants enjoined, and he certainly provides no indication that he is seeking an injunction against these

specific defendants. The Court further notes that even if plaintiff was seeking prospective injunctive relief, he has

not alleged that these particular defendants carried out any official policy or custom attributable to MODOC or the

State of Missouri.

Eleventh Amendment”). As plaintiff is seeking money damages, his official capacity claims are

barred by sovereign immunity.

C. Individual-capacity claims against Defendants Quainoo, Sanni, Martin,

Ramey, Precythe, Bales, and Lamb

Individual liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. Frederick v. Motsinger, 873

F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017). In other words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only

for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). As such, §

1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”

Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909

F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)). See also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8th Cir. 1993)

(dismissing plaintiff’s excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiff’s bail,

and therefore, “there can be no causal connection between any action on the part of the

defendants and any alleged deprivation” of plaintiff’s rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege

facts connecting the defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716,

717 (8th Cir. 2019).

Here, as laid out below, plaintiff has asserted a number of claims against Quainoo, Sanni,

Martin, Ramey, Precythe, Bales, and Lamb relating to his mail and his access to his property.

None of the claims demonstrate the violation of one of his constitutional rights.

First, plaintiff alleges that on September 24, 2020, he received a copy of his St. Louis

American newspaper from Isaac Quainoo, which was dated August 27, 2020. Doc. 7 at p. 19,

¶ 84. According to plaintiff, this delay of “thirty days” constitutes harassment, which he

complains has been going on “for too many years now.”

This allegation does not state a constitutional violation. There is no factual support for

the proposition that a onetime delay in receiving a newspaper violates plaintiff’s rights in and of

itself. Furthermore, there is no indication that this delay implicated other rights. For example,

plaintiff does not allege that he was delayed in receiving religious or privileged legal materials.

The Court also notes that there are no facts showing that Isaac Quainoo intentionally held onto

the newspaper for thirty days before delivering it. That is, lacking any facts showing intent or

responsibility, it is just as likely that plaintiff’s delayed mail arose from reasons not attributable

to Quainoo; likewise, plaintiff’s allegation that the “harassment” has been going on “for too

many years now[]” lacks any factual support. Without more, plaintiff’s unsupported conclusion

is not entitled to the presumption of truth. See Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717

(8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a court “need not accept as true a plaintiff’s conclusory

allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts”). Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state an

individual capacity claim against Quainoo.

Second, plaintiff asserts that on August 25, 2020, he received a J-Pay email

communication telling him he had a new password. Doc. 7 at p. 19, ¶ 84. However, he insists

that he never had a J-Pay account, and this email proves his “vital information had been

compromised.” Plaintiff blames Assistant Warden Martin, Warden Ramey, and Director

Precythe for this “fraud” and “vital information compromise.”

Here, plaintiff’s allegation that receiving a new-password email is undeniable proof of

fraud or the “compromise” of his “vital information” is entirely unsupported by any facts. It

certainly does not indicate the violation of a constitutional right. More to the point, however,

there are no facts directed at Martin, Ramey, or Precythe demonstrating that they did—or failed

to do—anything to harm him. Plaintiff’s contention that these defendants do not seem “to even

care” is not sufficient to establish a causal link between them and a constitutional violation.

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state individual capacity claims against Martin, Ramey, or

Precythe.

Third, plaintiff states that on April 24, 2018, Joyce Bales “refused to allow [him] into the

property room to inspect/exchange his legal property,” advising him he was not on the list. Doc.

7 at p. 31, ¶ 94(d). Plaintiff argues that his “name and number were on” the list because “he saw

it in her hand.” He vaguely adds that “the exact same thing played out again” on May 18, 2018

and October 2, 2018. However, in an exhibit plaintiff has attached to the amended complaint,

the warden notes that plaintiff’s “name did not appear on the pass list for the Property Room on

April 24, 2018,” but that a pass would be sent to him so that he could look over his legal

documents. Doc. 7-1 at p. 19.

Here, plaintiff directly alleges that defendant Bales kept him from going to the property

room on a single occasion. He has presented conflicting allegations as to whether his name was

actually on the pass list to view his property. In any event, plaintiff has not demonstrated that

Bales’s actions on April 24, 2018 deprived him of his constitutional rights. That is, he has not

shown that his inability to view or exchange his legal material on that day kept him from

accessing the courts. To make such a showing, plaintiff must allege that he was frustrated or

impeded in making a nonfrivolous legal claim. See White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th

Cir. 2007). None of his broad and conclusory allegations touch on this issue. Therefore,

plaintiff has failed to state an individual capacity claim against Bales.

Fourth, plaintiff states that on April 30, 2021, Julius Sanni “gave his mail to the wrong

inmate on purpose,” which he claims to know because he “was looking right at [Sanni] as it

happen[ed].” Doc. 7 at p. 32, ¶ 96. Then, on May 5, 2021, Sanni gave plaintiff another inmate’s

mail, purportedly “in an attempt to add insult to injury.” Plaintiff then adds—without

elaboration—that one of his relatives once “had a suspicious fire” after “this type of mail fraud.”

With regard to this allegation, plaintiff has not shown that this single instance of Sanni

giving his mail to the wrong person violated his constitutional rights. He presents no facts, aside

from his unsupported declaration, to show that Sanni did this intentionally. To the contrary,

based on his own allegations, this appears to be a mistake. Furthermore, he has not alleged that

the mail was in any way privileged, and that his inability to receive it harmed him. The

suggestion that Sanni somehow committed mail fraud, or that this incident was related to a fire at

the address of one of plaintiff’s relatives, lacks factual support and is as frivolous as it is fanciful.

Therefore, the individual-capacity claim against Sanni must be dismissed.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that on April 29, 2021, he “mailed out this very complaint.”

Doc. 7 at p. 33, ¶ 97. Because it was “too large to fit into the mail box slot,” he “handed it over

to defendant COI Lamb thru [sic] the bubble portal.” Then, confusingly, plaintiff states that “he

disappeared legal mail again—making sure that COI defendant Quainoo wound up with it/and

passed it out to the wrong inmate.”

It is unclear, exactly, what plaintiff is alleging COI Lamb did or did not do. Other than

receive plaintiff’s complaint for mailing, there are no further facts detailing his actions.

Certainly, plaintiff does not contend that his federal complaint was not mailed, or that this Court

did not receive it. To state a claim, plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017).

Here, he has not done this. Instead, his vague allegations require speculation, as well as the

acceptance of unsupported conclusions and inferences, which is not sufficient. See Wiles v.

Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[w]hile the court must

accept allegations of fact as true . . . the court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported

conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations”). Therefore, the individual capacity claim against COI Lamb must be dismissed.

For all the reasons discussed above, even if plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against

Isaac Quainoo, Julius Sanni, Assistant Warden Raina Martin, Warden Eileen Ramey, Director

Anne Precythe, Joyce Bales, and COI Lamb were not barred by res judicata, the Court dismisses

these individual capacity claims for failure to state a claim..

IV. Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

Aside from his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, plaintiff purports to bring his amended

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging a widespread conspiracy against him. To establish a

civil conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that the defendants conspired,

(2) with the intent to deprive him of equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and

immunities under the laws, (3) that one or more of the conspirators did, or caused to be done, any

act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, and (4) that he was injured or deprived of

having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Mendoza v. U.S.

Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 849 F.3d 408, 421 (8th Cir. 2017).

The first element requires the plaintiff to “allege with particularity and specifically

demonstrate with material facts that the defendants reached an agreement.” Johnson v. Perdue,

862 F.3d 712, 717–18 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Crutcher-Sanchez v. County of Dakota, 687 F.3d

979, 987 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that “[a] conspiracy claim requires evidence of specific facts

that show a meeting of the minds among conspirators”). Conjecture and speculation are

insufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy. Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1206

(8th Cir. 1999). Further, unless a constitutional violation occurs, there is no actionable

conspiracy claim. Robbins v. Becker, 794 F.3d 988, 997 (8th Cir. 2015).

In this case, plaintiff has not properly alleged that defendants reached an agreement

among themselves to violate his constitutional rights. Indeed, the notion stretches the bounds of

credulity. Plaintiff’s amended complaint spans thirty years, nine prisons, and eighty-six

defendants. At no point in his lengthy pleadings does he make any attempt to factually

demonstrate that any of these eighty-six men and women reached an agreement among

themselves to deprive him of his rights under the constitution. Plaintiff’s repeated assertions that

a conspiracy existed is—like much else in his amended complaint—an unsupported conclusion

that is insufficient to state a claim. See Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir.

2017) (stating that “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do”). Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff is suing under

42 U.S.C. § 1985, such claim must be dismissed.

V. Summary dismissal

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must dismiss a complaint filed by a prisoner if it “is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” or if it “seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Here, plaintiff has filed an amended complaint that appears to be an attempt to

encompass every perceived wrong he has experienced in over thirty years of incarceration.

However, as discussed above, before submitting his amended complaint, he filed a similar—and

in many respects identical—action in state court. The state court dismissed his prior complaint

with prejudice, meaning that the instant action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Even if res judicata did not apply, forty of plaintiffs claims are time-barred, because they

occurred outside his five-year limitations period. Indeed, his earliest claim is thirty-two years

and five months old. As to the balance of his claims, most of them are directed at MODOC,

which is protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment. With regard to the non-time-barred

claims against individual defendants, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate each defendant’s

responsibility for violating his constitutional rights. He has also failed to adequately allege the

existence of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. For all these reasons, the Court dismisses this

action with prejudice.

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court orders that plaintiff's motions for appointment of counsel, Docs.

8 and 10, are denied as moot. The Court further orders that this action is dismissed with

prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in

good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). A separate order of dismissal accompanies this

memorandum and order.

Dated this 26th day of May 2022.

su CS

STEPHEN R. CLARK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

38