Opinion

Raimo v. Washington University in St. Louis

Court: District Court, E.D. Missouri
Filed: Mar 16, 2022
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 24.2%

Courts “have refused to become the overseers of both the day-to-day operation of the educational process as well as the formulation of its governing policies.”

How later courts described this case

Courts “have refused to become the overseers of both the day-to-day operation of the educational process as well as the formulation of its governing policies.”
“[T]he provisions of the specific, discrete promises Collected Rules and Regulations, Faculty Bylaws, and the class schedule upon which Appellant relies do not constitute sufficient to form the basis for a breach of contract claim[.]”
explaining that New York courts have suggested that when “a student enrolls at a university, an implied contract arises”
finding unjust enrichment claim sufficiently pled under Missouri law

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

individually and on behalf of all others

sAiLmEilXaArlNyD siEtRua RteAdIMO, )

)

, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:20-cv-00634-SEP

)

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN )

ST. LOUIS, )

)

Defendant. MEMORANDU M) AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Washington University in St. Louis’s Motion to Dismiss

the Amended Complaint. Doc. 25. The Motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For

the reasons set forth below, the MotFiAoCnT iSs A gNrDa nBtAeCdK. GROUND

Plaintiff Alexander Raimo is an undergraduate student at Defendant Washington

University in St. Louis. In response to the spread of COVID-19, on March 11, 2020, the

University temporarily canceled in-person classes and transitioned to remote learning. While

expected to be only temporary at first, the University announced on March 31, 2020, that the

remainder of the semester would be conducted online. Doc. 23¶ 56. Students were instructed

Id.

to complete their coursework at their permanent residences and were required to leave the

University’s residence halls and apartments. ¶¶ 55, 62. The University noted that it was

Id.

“working hard to finalize and process refunds related to residential life housing, dining,

parking, and a partial refund of the student health fee.”

Raimo was registered for classes for the Spring 2020 semester. His Spring 2020

semester expenses consisted of: (1) $27,125.00 for tuition; (2) $6,474.00 for housing; (3) a

maximum of $3,319.50 for a meal plan; (4) $250.00 for a student health and wellness fee; and

1 Neitzke v. Williams,

For the purpose of this Motion, the Court assumes that the factual allegations in the Amended

Id.

(5) $271.00 for an undergraduate activities fee. Doc. 23 ¶ 38. The University agreed to prorate

housing, student parking fees, and a portion of the student health and wellness fee. ¶ 72.

Id.

The University also issued refunds on a student-by-student basis for meal plan balances and

lost wages for students in work study programs.

The Complaint thus focuses on tuition for full-time students, which the University

classifies as any student who takes between 12 and 18 credit hours. Because the University

charged a flat tuition rate for all full-time students, the dollar-to-credit ratio varied between

$1,506 and $2,260 per credit, depending on how many hours the student was enrolled in.

Id.

Raimo claims that, either way, the amount was “significantly higher” than the cost of the

Id.

University’s online-only programs. ¶¶ 39-41. He argues that his tuition paid for the

benefits, services, opportunities, and facilities that come along with “on-campus courses.”

¶ 43. When the University was forced to close its facilities due to the COVID-19 pandemic in

Id.

March 2020, it did not refund any tuition, explaining that students would still be able to

complete coursework and receive full credit toward their degree programs. ¶¶ 73-74.

Raimo brings this action seeking monetary relief under the Class Action Fairness Act

on behalf of himself and a purported class of Washington University students. Raimo claims

that moving classes online deprived him and the purported class of:

in-person learning from their peers and school faculty . . . . , access to the

facilities, materials, and opportunities only offered on [the University’s]

physical campus, including laboratory and research experience, use of campus

facilities, such as the gym and libraries, and use of on-campus services and

events such as sporting events, end-of-year programs, lectures, and various

Id. student services.

¶ 62C. o Tuhnet A Imended Complaint brings four counts:

Count II

Count I:I I Breach of Contract

Count IV: Breach of Implied Contract

: Unjust Enrichment

See

: Conversion

Doc. 23 at 23, 24, 26, 28. For the reLaEsGoAnLs SsTeAt NfoDrAtRhD b elow, all four counts are dismissed.

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is

to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

See Neitzke, Braden v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc.

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 490 U.S. at 326-27;

, 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To survive a motion to dismiss, the

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

complaint must allege facts supporting each element of the plaintiff’s claims and must rest on

more than mere speculation. , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Specifically, the complaint “must allege more than ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

K.T. v. Culver-

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements’” and instead must “allege sufficient

Stockton Coll., Ashcroft v. Iqbal

facts that, taken as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting , 556 U.S. 662, 678

Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc.

(2009)). The Court “need not accept as true plaintiff’s conclusory allegations or legal

conclusions drawn from the facts.” , 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir.

See

2019). The issue in considering such a motion is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately

Twombly,

prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of the claim.

550 U.S. at 556. DISCUSSION

The University argues that all of Raimo’s claims are barred by Missouri’s educational

malpractice doctrine. The University also argues that each count is independently deficient

fIo. r failuErdeu tcoa sttiaotnea al cMlaaimlp.r aTchteic Ceo Durotc atrdidnree sses each argument in turn.

Lucero v.

Curators of Univ. of Mo. Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v.

It is not a court’s role to “micromanage a university’s daily operations.”

FlightSafety Int’l, Inc.

, 400 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo. App. 2013) (citing

, 277 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo. App. 2008) (Courts “have refused to become

the overseers of both the day-to-day operation of the educational process as well as the

formulation of its governing policies.”)). “Generally, courts have refrained from recognizing

Id.

educational malpractice claims, either in tort or contract, on the premise that ‘[u]niversities

Miller v. Loyola Univ. of New Orleans

must be allowed the flexibility to manage themselves and correct their own mistakes.’”

(quoting , 829 So. 2d 1057, 1061 (La. Ct. App. 2002)). The

Eighth Circuit recently summarized Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine:

In educational malpractice cases, a plaintiff sues his or her academic

negligence claim raises questions concerning the reasonableness of the

educator’s conduct in providing educational services, then the claim is one of

educational malpractice. Similarly, if the claim requires an analysis of the

quality of education received and in making that analysis the fact-finder must

consider principles of duty, standards of care, and the reasonableness of the

defendant’s conduct, then the claim is one of educational malpractice. If the

duty alleged to have been breached is the duty to educate effectively, the claim

is one of educational malpractice. A claim that educational services provided

were inadequate, substandard, or ineffective constitutes a claim of educational

malpractice. Where the court is asked to evaluate the course of instruction or

the soundness of the method of teaching that has been adopted by an

Soueida en d uv. c S at t. i oL no au li s in U sn tii tv u.

tion, the claim is one of educational malpractice.

Dallas Airmotive

, 926 F.3d 1029, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting ,

Soueidan

277 S.W.3d at 700).

See Lucero

Although expressly mentioned tort claims, Missouri’s educational malpractice

doctrine bars certain contract claims as well. , 400 S.W.3d at 8 (“whether identified

as one for breach of contract as [plaintiff] argues, or perhaps more accurately as one sounding

in tort, [plaintiff’s claim] ‘raises questions concerning the reasonableness of the educator’s

conduct in providing educational services’ and, as such, ‘is one of educational malpractice,’

See e.g. Blake v. Career Educ. Corp.

which Missouri courts have recognized as a non-cognizable claim”). But it does not foreclose

all causes of action between students and universities. , , ,

2009 WL 2567011, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 2009) (noting that “courts have recognized claims

specifically promised educational

by students for breach of contract, fraud, or other intentional wrongdoing that allege a private

services Alsides v. Brown Institute Ltd.

or public educational institution has failed to provide

”) (quoting , 592 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. Minn. 1999)

(emphasis in original)). Although it is possible for a contract claim to elude the educational

malpractice doctrine, the student must allege the existence of “specific promises [the

Id. Alsides

university] made to the student and the claim [must] not involve an inquiry into the nuances

of educational processes and theories.” (quoting , 592 N.W.2d at 473).

In states that recognize the educational malpractice doctrine, courts have generally

cited four public policy grounds for doing so:

(1) the lack of a satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an educator;

(2) the inherent uncertainties about causation and the nature of damages in

light of such intervening factors as a student’s attitude, motivation,

temperament, past experience, and home environment; (3) the potential for a

flood of litigation against schools; and (4) the possibility that such claims will

Dallas A “eir mm bo rt oi v ile the courts into overseeing the dP aa yg -e t ov -. dK al ye i on p T eo rao tl is o, nIn sc o.

f schools.”

, 277 S.W.3d at 701 (quoting , 601 N.W.2d 900, 903

(Mich. 2000).

Here, because none of Raimo’s claims involves a standard of care, the first policy

see Keveney v. Mo. Military

rationale for the educational malpractice doctrine is not implicated. The other three certainly

Academy

are. A breach of contract claim requires a showing of damages,

, 304 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Mo. banc 2010), with all of the “inherent uncertainties” noted

See, infra,

by the Missouri Court of Appeals. The potential for a flood of litigation is substantial, as

indicated by the wave of similar cases filed in courts across the country. n. 3. And

given the complexity of the challenge of delivering comprehensive higher education during a

worldwide pandemic, there is a substantial possibility that entertaining such claims will

embroil the courts in a task for which they are ill-suited: second-guessing the day-to-day

operational decisions of universities.

Nevertheless, other courts faced with the same question in similar cases have largely

concluded that the educational malpractice doctrine does not bar these claims. For example,

See Martin v. Lindenwood Univ.

a court in this district recently ruled against a defendant-university that raised similar

Lindenwood

arguments on a motion to dismiss. , 2021 WL 3077665, at *8

(E.D. Mo. July 21, 2021). In , the student-plaintiff alleged that Lindenwood

Id.

University charged more for “full-time undergraduate in-person tuition” than for “online

tuition.” at *2. The court held that, despite Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine, the

student’s claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment could survive a motion to

dismiss, because the court found that the student’s primary allegation was that “he was

Id.

promised an in-person college experience . . . but was afforded an online experience that

Lindenwood itself valued less.” at *4. Such a claim, the court held, “does not necessarily

require” a court to “examine Lindenwood’s pedagogical practices and instruction,” and “at this

Id.

early stage . . . Martin’s allegations that he received an entirely different educational experience

are sufficient.”

2 Id. Boswell v. Panera Bread Co.

The court dismissed the claim for conversion, finding that “[c]onversion is not the appropriate action

when the claim is solely for the recovery of money.” at *7 (quoting , 91

Numerous other courts have been confronted with similar COVID-19 tuition

reimbursement claims. Of those courts that have reached the educational malpractice issue,

See Shak v. Adelphi Univ.

, 549 F. Supp. 3d 267, 271-74 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2021) (rejected applicability

of educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed tuition-based breach of contract claim, unjust

Flatscher v. Manhattan Sch. of Music

enrichment claim, and conversion claim; declined to dismiss fee-based breach of contract claim);

, 2021 WL 3077500, at *7, 9, 10, n.13 (S.D.N.Y July 20, 2021)

(rejected applicability of educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed conversion claim; declined to

Amable v. New Sch.

dismiss claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment);

, 2021 WL 3173739, at *4, 5, 13 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2021) (rejected applicability of

Warner v. Wartburg College

educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims);

, 2021 WL 3276375, at *4-5, 10 (N.D. Iowa July 30, 2021) (rejected

applicability of the educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed unjust enrichment claim; declined to

Wnorowski v. Univ. of New Haven

dismiss breach of contract claim);

, WL 2021 3374737, at *4, 6, 7 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2021) (rejected

applicability of educational malpractice doctrine; declined to dismiss breach of contract and unjust

Pinzon v. Pepperdine Univ.

enrichment claims);

, 2021 WL 3560782, at *5-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2021) (rejected applicability of

educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed breach of contract, implied contract, unjust enrichment,

In re Univ. of So. Cal. Tuition and Fees COVID-19 Refund Litig.

and conversion claims brought by parent of student);

, 2021 WL 3560783, at *3, 7-9 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 6, 2021) (rejected applicability of educational malpractice doctrine; declined to dismiss breach of

Fedele v. Marist College

contract claim; dismissed unjust enrichment and conversion claims);

, 2021 WL 3540432, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2021) (rejected applicability of

educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion

Figueroa v. Point Park Univ.

claims);

, 2021 WL 3549327, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2021) (rejected applicability of

educational malpractice doctrine; declined to dismiss breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims;

Brittain v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York

dismissed conversion claim);

, 2021 WL 3539664, at *3-4, 9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.

11, 2021) (rejected applicability of educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed unjust enrichment

Dean v. Chamberlain Univ., LLC

claim; declined to dismiss breach of contract claim);

, 2021 WL 3617471, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2021) (dismissed breach

Ninivaggi v. Univ. of Del.

of contract and unjust enrichment claims);

, 2021 WL 3709765, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2021) (declined to dismiss breach of

Polley v. Northwestern Univ.

implied contract and unjust enrichment claims; dismissed conversion claim);

, 2021 WL4192076, at *7-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2021) (rejected applicability

of educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed breach of contract, implied contract, and unjust

enrichm ent claims);

See

Lindner v. Occidental College Gociman v.

at least four have held that the educational malpractice doctrine barred a student’s claim.

Loyola Univ. of Chicago Jones v. Administrators of

, 2020 WL 7350212, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020);

Tulane Educ. Fund De Leon v. New York Univ.

, 515 F. Supp. 3d 861, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2021);

, 2021 WL 5097769, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2021); ,

2022 WL 179812, at *13 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 20, 2022).

Despite the majority of courts having held that similar claims were not barred by the

educational malpractice doctrine, the University urges this Court to hold that all of Raimo’s

claims are barred by Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine. Doc. 26 at 4. The University

Id.

argues that the Complaint boils down to one main claim: “the purported difference in some

undefined value between instruction provided in person and instruction provided online.”

This, the University contends, would require the Court to “determine whether and how the

Id.

quality of education the University provided fell short of what Plaintiff alleges it was obligated

Soueidan inadequate

to provide, and then to assign a financial value to the difference.” The University points to

, which provides that, “[a] claim that educational services provided were ,

Mooers v. Middlebury College

, 2021 WL 4225659, at *5, 7, 9-10 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2021) (rejected

applicability of educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed breach of contract and conversion claims;

Delisle v. McKendree Univ.

declined to dismiss unjust enrichment claim);

, 2021 WL 4402474, at *1-3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021) (rejected application of

Jones v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund

educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims);

, 2021 WL 5097769, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2021) (finding

that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim “essentially morph[ed] into an educational malpractice

Fiore v. Univ. of Tampa

claim,” and dismissed the breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion claims);

, 2021 WL 4925562, at *17-20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2021) (dismissed fee-based

breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion claims; declined to dismiss tuition-based breach

Hutchinson v. Univ. of St. Joseph

of contract and unjust enrichment claims);

, 2022 WL 19339, at *4-6 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2022) (dismissed breach of

De Leon v. New York Univ.

contract, unjust enrichment, and state-specific unfair trade practices claims);

, 2022 WL 179812, at *10, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 20, 2022) (dismissed tuition-

based breach of contract claim; dismissed unjust enrichment claim as barred by the education

Moore v. Long Island Univ.

malpractice doctrine);

, 2022 WL 203988, at *3-5, 7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2022) (rejected applicability

of the educational malpractice doctrine; dismissed tuition-based breach of contract and conversion

Pranger v. Oregon State Univ.

claims);

, 2022 WL 214629, at *4-6 (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2022) (rejected applicability of

substandard ineffective

course of instruction soundness of the method

, or constitutes a claim of educational malpractice,” and “[w]here the

court is asked to evaluate the or the of teaching

Dallas Airmotive

that has been adopted by an educational institution, the claim is one of educational

malpractice.” 926 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis added) (quoting , 277 S.W.3d at

700). In the University’s view, to resolve Raimo’s claim—that his online experience was

“something far less” than an in-person experience—would require the Court to wade into

see Soueidan

exactly the kinds of disputes involving uncertain damages that Missouri courts have routinely

and purposefully avoided. Doc. 26 at 7 (quoting Doc. 23 ¶ 2); , 926 F.3d at 1036

(“If we waded into the issue of how closely SLU operated within the constructs of the

aspirational Handbook and Catalog provisions cited by Soueidan”—including analysis of

“whether SLU breached its contract by failing to award Soueidan a Ph.D. degree he was

promised”—”we would be forced to engage—with complete disregard for Missouri law—in

Gillis v. Principia Corp. aff’d

an educational malpractice analysis rife with practical and policy concerns.”) (cleaned up)

(quoting , 111 F. Supp. 3d 978, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2015), , 832 F.3d 865

(8th Cir. 2016)).

Raimo counters that he “is not asking the Court to evaluate the quality of education at

the University, but assess whether the promised in-person classes were provided at all.” Doc.

29 at 3 (citing Doc. 23 ¶¶ 11-15, 32-44).

at all

Raimo’s response is unpersuasive. He cannot claim that he received no instruction or

credits toward a degree . He earned the same credits, toward the same degree, as he

would have in person. Raimo attempts to reframe his alleged contractual relationship with

the University as an all-or-nothing deal for in-person courses in an effort to avoid the obvious

at all See e.g. Gociman

conclusion that his injury, if any, is based on a perceived decrease in the value of instruction,

not the lack of instruction . , , , 515 F. Supp. 3d at 867 (where the plaintiffs

argued that “they [were] not challenging the quality of their education, but rather alleging that

defendant failed to perform the educational service ‘at all,’” but the complaint “state[d] that

Plaintiffs received online instruction and course credits, and repeatedly claim[ed] that the

online instruction was ‘worth less’ than the traditional in-person instruction”). The point is

made by a simple counterfactual: Had the University shut more than its physical doors and

provided no classes, online or otherwise, then Raimo would be able to claim that he received

at all

no instruction . In fact, he received online instruction, which is manifestly not the same

as no instruction at all.

Raimo further argues that the nature and causation of damages in this case are

straightforward and “objectively quantifiable based on the University’s own tuition

differential for in-person and online education.” Doc. 29 (citing Doc. 23 ¶¶ 38, 41). He

proposes comparing the average price of tuition per credit hour at Washington University in

St. Louis ($2,260 per credit) with the average price of tuition per credit hour at University

College, the University’s “professional and continuing education division” ($665 per credit).

Doc. 23 ¶¶ 38, 41. But comparing those rates does not provide a straightforward valuation of

Raimo’s damages. University College is different from the program Raimo was enrolled in. It

is the University’s continuing education school. Its courses are largely taught by adjunct

professors and are open to any student who meets basic qualification criteria, including

5 the same .

students not pursuing degrees. Moreover, “where University College offers a particular class

both in person and online, tuition is regardless of the method of instruction.” Doc 31

at 5 (emphasis in original). Raimo does not allege that University College, which requires

In choosing the high end of Raimo’s alleged price range for in-person instruction Naneidt ztkhee, low end of

the alleged price range for on-line instruction, the Court is construing the facts in the light most

favorable to Raimo, as it is required to do on consideration of a motion to dismiss. 490 U.S. at

See Washington Univ. in St. Louis Univ. Coll. available at

326-27.

Registrar’s Office, ,

https://ucollege.wustl.edu/course-registration/registrar (accessed MaWrcahs h1in4g, to2n0 2U2n)i v.( “iUn nSitv. eLrosuitiys

UConlilve. gCeo hlla.sa avna iolapbelne caotu rse registration policy. Students with a high school diploma or the equivalent

may register in most University College courses.”); Faculty Handbook,

, https://ucollege.wustl.edu/resources/faculty-staff/handbook#anchor-group-

1023 (accessed March 14, 2022). These materials are cognizable bSeecea use Raimo citeSse eU gneivneerrsailtlyy

PCoodllreagzea’s vw. eWbhsiittein gand references the college’s status as a “professional and continuing education

division,” its course offerings, and its tuition rates in his Complaint. Doc. 23 ¶ 41.

, 790 F.3d 828, 833 (8th Cir. 2015T) e(l“laWbes, Ianlsco. v .c Monaskiodre rIs s‘outehs e&r Rsioguhrtcse, Ls tdco. urts

ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference[.]’”) (citing , 551

Washington Univ. in St. Louis Univ. Coll.

U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

6 available at

The University cites Course Catalog, (accessed September 14,

2020), https://acadinfo.wustl.edu/ucollege/?term=SP2020 (introductory course in

Analytical Writing, No. U11 EComp 111, charged $1,995 in tuition for both in-person and online

versions of class). University College’s course catalog is cognizable bSeecea use Raimo cites to University

College’ s website, which contains the catalog, and Raimo attached the University’s course catalog to his

Complaint, which specifically references University College therein. Doc. 23 ¶¶ 33, 35–36, 38, 43,

only basic qualifications to attend, offers the same courses—or courses that are equally

valuable—as his program at the University, which is a highly selective, world-renowned

educational institution. Nor does he allege that courses in his program have comparable online

versions, the tuition for which might have provided a relevant comparator for his in-person

tuition. Instead, Raimo would have the Court compare his program’s “in-person” tuition with

an entirely different program’s online tuition, even though that other program charges the

same amount for online and in-person instruction. The Court is not persuaded.

In the absence of a comparable online program to whose tuition the Court could

compare Raimo’s tuition, Raimo’s claim does ask this Court “to evaluate the course of

instruction or the soundness of the method of teaching that has been adopted by an

Soueidan

educational institution” in order to determine whether the “educational services provided

were inadequate, substandard, or ineffective.” , 926 F.3d at 1034. Although Raimo

attempts to avoid acknowledging that his claim rests entirely on an allegation that the

education he received was of diminished value relative to that he allegedly contracted for, that

conclusion is unavoidable. If he claims that the online instruction he received was not inferior

to the in-person instruction he allegedly bargained for, then he has no injury of which to

complain. Raimo thus finds himself on the horns of a dilemma: He can either predicate his

claim on the breach of a promise that caused him no cognizable injury, which would result in

a lack of standing; or he can claim that the education he received was of diminished value and

demand that the Court quantify that difference in value—something the educational

malpractice doctrine forecloses. Either way, his claims cannot succeed and thus merit

dismissal.

Notwithstanding the above, several courts have held that, “‘because [the plaintiff’s]

allegations primarily would impact the damages element of the plaintiff’s contract claim,’ they

Amable see also In re

do not ‘form the essence of the complaint, such that the plaintiff’s claims should be barred

Columbia Tuition Refund Action

entirely at the motion to dismiss stage.’” , 2021 WL 3173739, at *4;

, 523 F. Supp. 3d 414, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“The [c]ourt . . . joins

the majority of district courts around the country that have declined to hold, at least on a

See generally Podraza

91–92, 102; Doc. 23 at 33. , 790 F.3d at 833 (when reviewing a motion to dismiss,

motion to dismiss (or judgment on the pleadings), that claims arising from universities’

adoption of online instruction in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are barred under the

educational malpractice doctrine.”) (collecting cases). The predominant theory among those

courts finding that claims like Raimo’s are not barred seems to be that these are breach of

See, e.g.

contract claims where the difference in value between online and in-person instruction relates

Amable Warner

only to the damages calculation and does not form the “essence” of the complaint. ,

Hassan v. Fordham Univ

, 2021 WL 3173739, at *3; , 2021 WL 3276375, at *4-5.

Hassan

The first court to advance that theory appears to have been .,

515 F. Supp. 3d 77, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). Applying New York law, stated:

essence of the complaint

New York’s public policy . . . precludes lawsuits that are predicated on claims

of educational malpractice, when the is that the school

breached its agreement to provide an effective education, or if a court is asked

to evaluate the course of instruction or review the soundness of the method of

Id. teaching that has been adopted by an educational institution. Ansari v. New York

Univ.

(emphasis added) (cleaned up and quotation marks omitted) (quoting

, 1997 WL 257473, at *3 (S.D.N.Y May 16, 1997)). When faced with a question similar to

Hassan

that facing this Court—i.e., evaluating the quality of educational services provided by remote

Id.

learning— concluded that that question primarily impacted the damages element of

Hassan

the plaintiff’s contract claim, and thus did not form the essence of the plaintiff’s complaint.

at 86. Still, even the Court acknowledged that such claims would be barred by New

York’s educational malpractice doctrine if the court were asked to “evaluate the course of

Id.

instruction or review the soundness of the method of teaching” to determine whether the

school provided “an effective education.”

This Court respectfully disagrees that the damages calculation necessitated by Raimo’s

claim—which requires comparing two methods of instruction in an effort to determine

whether, and to what extent, one was worth less than the other—is not essential to his

Complaint. That Raimo allegedly received something that was worth less than what he

contracted for is the gravamen of his Complaint. Allowing a claim requiring a damages

calculation that this Court cannot perform without violating Missouri’s educational

See Twombly

malpractice doctrine to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss would subject the parties to

unnecessary expense to further litigate a claim that is not viable on its face. , 550

Hassan

Raimo has not cited, and the Court has not found, any version of ’s “essence of

the complaint” exception in Missouri caselaw. Rather, Missouri caselaw regarding the

Lucero

educational malpractice doctrine holds the following: (1) the doctrine applies to contract

Dallas Airmotive

claims, , 400 S.W.3d at 8; (2) courts should not micromanage a university’s daily

operations, , 277 S.W.3d at 700; (3) courts should refuse to become overseers

Soueidan

of a university’s governing policies, .; (4) courts should not engage in an analysis of the

id.

quality of education received, , 926 F.3d at 1034; (5) courts should not hear claims

that educational services provided were inadequate, substandard, or ineffective, at 1034-

id.

35; (6) courts should not evaluate the course of instruction or the soundness of the method of

teaching that has been adopted by the educational institution, at 1035; and (7) courts

Blake

should not hear claims that require an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes and

theories, , 2009 WL 2567011, at *2. One of the bases for adopting the educational

Dallas Airmotive

malpractice doctrine in Missouri was “the inherent uncertainties about causation and the

nature of damages.” , 277 S.W.3d at 701. For Raimo to ultimately prove

damages, the Court would be required to compare different methods of instruction, inquire

into the nuances of educational processes, and analyze the quality of education he received—

precisely the kinds of analysis Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine forecloses.

Therefore, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint is barred by that doctrine.

Lindenwood

The Court’s conclusion finds support even from courts that have held otherwise. For

example, in , the court acknowledged that “Martin’s damages may be intertwined

thread the

with the determination of whether the remote education . . . was equivalent to the in-person

needle Lindenwood

instruction,” however, “[a]t this early stage of litigation . . . Martin’s allegations

and state a claim.” , 2021 WL 3077665, at *4 (emphasis added). Another

court that held similar claims were not barred by its state’s educational malpractice doctrine

nonetheless acknowledged the futility of claims like Raimo’s: “[I]f Plaintiffs seek to prove

damages for their contract claims by assessing and comparing the educational quality of in-

Barkhordar v. President & Fellows of Harvard

person and remote instruction, the educational malpractice doctrine may be implicated, and

College Barkhordar

Plaintiffs’ contract claims may be foreclosed.”

, 544 F. Supp. 3d 203, 210 (D. Mass. 2021). Unlike here, the court was

See id.

satisfied that the plaintiffs’ allegations had demonstrated that Harvard offered online classes

where Plaintiffs claim that Harvard offers online classes at a lower cost than Plaintiffs were

charged, and where the court is not being asked to assess the educational quality of online

versus in person education, Plaintiffs claims are not barred under the educational malpractice

doctrine.”). Raimo has not made such a showing here. Contrary to his assertion, as previously

explained, he has not successfully alleged that the courses provided by Washington University

and those offered by University College are comparable.

See Lindner

Moreover, this Court is not alone in holding that a COVID-19 tuition reimbursement

Gociman Jones De Leon

claim is foreclosed by the educational malpractice doctrine. , 2020 WL 7350212,

Lindner

at *6; , 515 F. Supp. 3d at 867; , 2021 WL 5097769, at *4; , 2022 WL

179812, at *13. In , a student at Occidental College alleged that she entered into a

contract with the college for in-person classes and that the terms of the contract were set forth

in the college’s publications and course catalog. 2020 WL 7350212, at *1. Similar to Raimo,

Id.

she brought claims for breach of contract, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and

conversion. at *3. The court concluded that underlying her claims was the theory that the

online education she received was worth less than the in-person education she claims was

promised, and that “the resolution of [her] claims would require the Court to make judgments

Id.

about the quality and value of the education that Occidental provided in the Spring 2020

semester.” at *7. Based on that conclusion, the court dismissed all of her claims, explaining

Id.

that they were “the type of educational malpractice claims that California courts, and courts

Gociman

throughout the country, have rejected.”

In , students at Loyola University in Chicago alleged that Loyola’s “website,

brochures, course catalogs, and online registration portal established a contractual promise to

provide in-person instruction and access to facilities and resources,” and sought damages

Gociman

“representing the difference in value between in-person classes and access to facilities, and

the online education they received.” 515 F. Supp. at 865. The court found that:

[T]he theory underlying all of plaintiffs’ claims is that the education plaintiffs

received once defendant transitioned to remote instruction in response to the

COVID-19 pandemic was worth significantly less than the value of live classes.

Thus, resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims would require the Court to make

judgments about the quality and value of the education [the university]

provided in the Spring 2020 semester . . . Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this flaw

by arguing that they are not challenging the quality of their education, but

Plaintiffs’ argument is contradicted by [the complaint], which states that

plaintiffs received online instruction and course credits, and repeatedly claims

that the online instruction was “worth less” than the traditional in-person

instruction. . . . Consequently, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims are the

type of educational malpractice claims that Illinois courts, and courts

Id. throughout the country, have rejected. Lindner

Lindner Gociman

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting , 2020 WL 7350212, at *7).

Similar to and , Raimo alleges that the University was contractually

obligated to provide in-person classes based on an array of promotional language taken from

id.

the University’s website, Doc. 23 ¶¶ 24, 25, 27, 29, 30; the University’s Spring 2020 course

id.

listings showing classes with associated building numbers, ¶ 33, Ex. A; and the University’s

usual and customary practice of providing on-campus instruction, ¶ 34. As previously

discussed, however, the theory underlying each of Raimo’s claims is that he was promised in-

person classes and received something less valuable. That is made plain by his claim to have

See

suffered damages in the amount of the difference in value between online and in-person

courses. Doc. 29 at 4. Resolving his claims would require the Court to make judgments

See Lucero Dallas

about the quality and value of the education that the University provided during the Spring

Airmotive Soueidan Blake

2020 semester, a task foreclosed by Missouri law. , 400 S.W.3d at 8;

, 277 S.W.3d at 700; , 926 F.3d at 1034-35; , 2009 WL 2567011, at *2.

Thus, Raimo’s claims are barred by Missouri’s educational malpractice doctrine and

must be dismissed on that basis. Given the lack of unanimity among district courts on that

issue, however, the Court will also address the University’s other arguments for dismissal of

each claim.

See

Doc. 23 ¶i 2d .(“while students enrolled and paid Defendant for a comprehensive in-person academic

experience, Defendant instead offers Plaintiff and Class Miedm. bers something far less: a limited online

experience”); ¶ 6 (“students have paid WUSTL for in-person instruction that is no longer available

to themi d. .. The result is an enormous windfall to WUSTL”); ¶ 7 (“Defendant’s actions havied f.inancially

damaged Plaintiff and Class Members . . . because [they] did not receive the full value of the services

paid”); ¶ 39, 41 (claiming that online classes are less valuable than in-person classes); ¶¶ 60-6id1.

(“Plaintiff and Class Members have been provided with an online substitute” that is “vastly different”

and should entitled Plaintiff and Claisds. Members to “prorated reimbursements of tuition and fees”);

¶ 66 (citing an article quoting that universities’ “tuition and fees do not accurately reflect the value lost

by switching to online education”); ¶ 96 (“The online classes provided by Defendant are objectively

II. Counts I & II: Breach of Contract

A. Breach of Contract

To plead a claim for breach of contract under Missouri law, a plaintiff must allege

sufficient facts to establish: “(1) the existence and terms of a contract; (2) that the plaintiff

Keveney

performed or tendered performance pursuant to the contract; (3) breach of the contract by

the defendant; and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff.” , 304 S.W.3d at 104. The

C. Am. Health Sciences Univ., Belize Med. College v. Norouzian

plaintiff must also establish “the rights of plaintiff and obligations of defendant under the

contract.” , 236 S.W.3d 69, 84 (Mo.

Lucero

App. 2007). Missouri law thus requires Raimo to identify which rights or obligations the

University breached under the contract in order to establish his claim. , 400 S.W.3d at

Nickel

“[I]n order to assert a breach of contract claim against a university, a student plaintiff

v. Stephens College Lucero

must ‘point to an identifiable contractual promise that the university failed to honor.’”

, 480 S.W.3d 390, 397 (Mo. App. 2015) (quoting , 400 S.W.3d at 5).

Although other jurisdictions have determined otherwise, there is no “case law in Missouri that

Lucero

expressly finds the existence of a contractual relationship between a student and a university.”

, 400 S.W.3d at 4-5. A contractual relationship may be found, however, if the student

establishes a “specific promise or obligation” that the university has failed to uphold. . at 5.

specifically promised Blake

Therefore, a student alleging breach of contract against a university must establish that the