Wallace v. Crouch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT E. WALLACE, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:21-CV-1036 RLW

)

TAMRA CROUCH, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on review of plaintiff Robert E. Wallace’s second amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed

below, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue process on defendant Tamra Crouch in her

individual capacity on plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,

which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The

court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820

F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73

(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not

required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even

pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of

law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d

912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are

not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not

mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes

by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

Background

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Potosi

Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri. On August 19, 2021, he filed a civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Tamra Crouch and Corizon Health Care as defendants.

(Docket No. 1). Nurse Practitioner Crouch was sued in both an individual and official capacity.

Along with the complaint, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

(Docket No. 2). The Court granted the motion and assessed an initial partial filing fee on January

3, 2022. (Docket No. 9). Because plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court reviewed

his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, the Court determined that plaintiff’s

complaint was subject to dismissal. In particular, the Court noted that plaintiff had not filled out

the “Statement of Claim,” “Injuries,” or “Relief” sections of his form complaint.

Instead of dismissing the complaint outright, plaintiff was ordered to file an amended

complaint. The Court’s order included instructions on how to properly amend. Plaintiff was given

thirty days in which to comply.

On January 31, 2022, the Court received plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Docket No. 10).

As before, he named Nurse Practitioner Tamra Crouch and Corizon Health Care as defendants.

(Docket No. 10 at 2-3). Nurse Practitioner Crouch was sued in her individual capacity.

The allegations in the amended complaint concern deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s

medical needs. In particular, he stated that he swallowed two pieces of metal on January 26, 2021,

while in administrative segregation. (Docket No. 10 at 3). He alleged that Nurse Practitioner

Crouch “denied [him] proper medical treatment (per policy),” and did not allow him to receive

outside medical treatment after his second x-ray. As a result of swallowing the metal, plaintiff

stated he suffered anal bleeding, and sought “outside medical treatment to remove [the] metal”

through surgery. He requested $2.2 million in damages. (Docket No. 10 at 5).

The Court reviewed the amended complaint (Docket No. 13) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and

determined it was deficient. Specifically, the Court found plaintiff had not stated a claim against

Defendant Corizon, because he had not alleged “that there was a policy, custom, or official action

that inflicted an actionable injury.” Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006). The

Court further determined that plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that Nurse Practitioner Crouch

disregarded his serious medical need. Rather than dismissing the case, however, the Court ordered

plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, and included instructions on how to do so.

On February 22, 2022, the Court received plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (Docket

No. 14).

The Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and names

Nurse Practitioner Tamra Crouch as the sole defendant. (Docket No. 14 at 2). Nurse Practitioner

Crouch is sued in her individual capacity only. As in the amended complaint, the second amended

complaint contains allegations that Nurse Practitioner Crouch was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical needs.

In his “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that on January 26, 2021, he tried to commit

suicide by swallowing two “pieces of solid steel metal.” (Docket No. 14 at 3). After a period of

five days, x-rays showed that the metal was still inside his stomach. Plaintiff states that the metal

caused anal bleeding and stomach cramps. According to plaintiff, Nurse Practitioner Crouch knew

he had two “metal objects still in [his] stomach.” (Docket No. 14 at 3-4). Nevertheless, Nurse

Practitioner Crouch refused to take any more x-rays. (Docket No. 14 at 3). Plaintiff also states that

Nurse Practitioner Crouch refused to provide any further medical treatment. Specifically, he

asserts that Nurse Practitioner Crouch has not allowed him to have surgery to remove the metal

objects from his stomach. (Docket No. 14 at 3, 5).

As a result of this incident, plaintiff states that he has suffered anal bleeding, stomach pain,

and emotional distress, which he attributes to Nurse Practitioner Crouch’s failure to provide

medical treatment. (Docket No. 14 at 5-6). He seeks $2.2 million in damages, as well as the cost

of surgery to remove the objects. (Docket No. 14 at 7).

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, accusing Nurse Practitioner Crouch of deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his second amended complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will

direct the Clerk of Court to issue process on Nurse Practitioner Crouch in her individual capacity.

Under the Eighth Amendment, the government has an obligation to provide medical care

to those whom it is punishing by incarceration. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). To

demonstrate constitutionally inadequate medical care, the inmate must show that a prison official’s

conduct amounted to deliberate indifference. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237-38 (8th

Cir. 1997).

In order to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove that he suffered from an

objectively serious medical need, and that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded that

need. Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2019). See also Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d

1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2019). A plaintiff attempting to claim deliberate indifference must establish

both the objective and subjective components. See Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir.

2013).

“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring

treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997). Deliberate indifference

can include the intentional denial or delay of access to medical care, or the intentional interference

with treatment or prescribed medication. Vaughn v. Lacey, 49 F.3d 1344, 1346 (8th Cir. 1995). See

also Davis v. Buchanan County, Missouri, 11 F.4th 604, 624 (8th Cir. 2021).

To prevail under this standard, an inmate must demonstrate that a prison health care

provider’s actions were “so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to

provide essential care.” Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 2014). As such,

“deliberate indifference requires a highly culpable state of mind approaching actual intent.” Kulkay

v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2017). See also Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir.

2018) (explaining that “plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal recklessness:

disregarding a known risk to the arrestee’s health”). Thus, a showing of deliberate indifference

requires more than a mere disagreement with treatment decisions and is greater than gross

negligence. Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2006).

In this case, plaintiff has alleged that he swallowed two pieces of “solid steel metal,” which

subsequently caused anal bleeding, stomach cramps, and stomach pain. According to x-rays taken

by Nurse Practitioner Crouch, the metal remains in his stomach. Despite this, plaintiff alleges that

Nurse Practitioner Crouch refuses to take any more x-rays, or to provide any further treatment,

such as surgery. As a result, he states that the metal continues to cause him harm, for which Nurse

Practitioner Crouch is not doing anything.

The Court must accept these allegations as true, and make all reasonable inferences in

plaintiff’s favor. See Jones v. Douglas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 915 F.3d 498, 499 (8th Cir. 2019).

Additionally, when evaluating whether a self-represented plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to

state a claim, a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, is held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014).

Bearing this in mind, the Court has determined that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient for

purposes of initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Therefore, the Court will direct the Clerk of

Court to issue process on Nurse Practitioner Crouch in her individual capacity as to plaintiff's

deliberate indifference claim.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process

to issue on defendant Tamra Crouch in her individual capacity as to plaintiffs claim of deliberate

indifference to his medical needs. Defendant Crouch shall be served in accordance with the service

agreement this Court maintains with Corizon.

Dated this 25th day of February, 2022.

ONNIE L. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE