The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT EUGENE WOODSON, )
)
Plaintiff(s), )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:21-cv-00192-SRC
)
JACOB CASE, )
)
Defendant(s). )
Memorandum and Order
Robert Woodson claims Jacob Case violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Case
slammed Woodson’s hands “in the chuckhole” of his cell door. However, Woodson filed this
lawsuit before completing the prison grievance process—that is, before exhausting the
administrative remedies available to him. Because the law requires Woodson to exhaust these
remedies before suing over Case’s alleged conduct, the Court dismisses his complaint without
prejudice.
I. Background
On January 12, 2021, while incarcerated at Missouri’s Eastern Reception, Diagnostic &
Correctional Center, Woodson claims that Corrections Officer Case slammed his hands “in the
chuckhole more than once” while Woodson held his food tray, and Case squeezed Woodson’s
hands and wrists between “the door and chuckhole . . . crushing them with all his strength.”
Doc. 1 at pp. 2–4. As a result, Woodson says that he has suffered various injuries. Id. at p. 4.
Woodson asserts he did nothing to instigate the assault, and that the Department of Corrections
transferred him to the Farmington Correctional Center the next day. Id. at pp. 4, 7.
Woodson filed this lawsuit in February 2021 and confirmed that he filed a grievance
regarding the incident; however, Woodson stated that he received “no response” to his grievance
and thus had not taken any steps to appeal. Id. at pp. 6–7, 10. Records submitted by Case
indicate that the Department of Corrections received Woodson’s initial grievance in early
February. Doc. 33-3 at p. 2. These records show that the superintendent denied Woodson’s
grievance in April 2021 and that Woodson appealed the decision. Id. at pp. 2–3. Neither party
has indicated whether or how the Department of Corrections resolved Woodson’s appeal.
II. Standard
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the underlying facts. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). The
moving party bears the initial burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In response to the proponent's showing, the opponent's burden is to “come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Self-serving,
conclusory statements without support are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Armour
and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993). Rule 56(c) “mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
III. Discussion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act mandates that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Under the plain language of
section 1997e(a), an inmate must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal
court. . . . If exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing, dismissal is mandatory.”
Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003).
“An inmate satisfies § 1997e(a) by pursuing ‘the prison grievance process to its final
stage’ to ‘an adverse decision on the merits.’” Porter v. Sturm, 781 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir.
2015) (quoting Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014)). In Missouri prisons, the
inmate has exhausted the grievance process upon receiving the grievance appeal response. See
Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2012); Doc. 33-2 at p. 18. Section 1997e(a)’s
“exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some
other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Woodson filed this lawsuit in February 2021 and filed his initial grievance at about the
same time. Doc. 1; Doc. 33-3 at p. 2. The superintendent’s response to the initial grievance did
not come until April 2021, and Woodson appealed from that decision. Doc. 33-3 at pp. 2–3.
Woodson does not dispute that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit.
Doc. 38. Instead, he points the Court to Patsy v. Board of Regents and contends that “an
individual is not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to instituting an action under §
1983.” Doc. 38 at p. 1; see Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). He further argues that
the Court should excuse his failure to exhaust because he had difficulty obtaining grievance
forms and frequently moved to different prison houses. Doc. 38 at pp. 1–2. Neither argument
excuses Woodson’s failure to exhaust.
Patsy held that non-prisoners need not exhaust available administrative remedies before
filing a section 1983 lawsuit and expressly relied on the exhaustion requirement in section 1997e
in reaching that result. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 507–12, 516. The Court reasoned that “[s]ection
1997e and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not
generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to carve out only a narrow exception to
this rule. A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement [on non-prisoners] would be inconsistent
with Congress’ decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy judgments that Congress has
reserved for itself.” Id. at 508. The holding in Patsy has no applicability to this case because
Georgia Patsy was not a prisoner, while Congress requires “prisoner[s]” to exhaust available
administrative remedies. § 1997e. Indeed, since Patsy, Congress has only made the exhaustion
rules for prisoners further reaching. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 7, 110 Stat. 1321–73.
Woodson’s allegations of difficulty securing grievance forms likewise fall flat. While
Woodson alleges that various prison officials denied him access to grievance forms, even
“unjustified” delay in responding to a prisoner’s request for grievance procedures does not
excuse the prisoner’s failure to exhaust when the prisoner in fact eventually files a grievance and
receives a response. Porter, 781 F.3d at 452; but cf. Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.
2001) (finding remedies not “available” where prison officials failed for months to respond to
inmate’s requests for grievance forms). Despite alleged difficulty, the uncontested evidence
shows that Woodson filed a grievance within weeks of the alleged assault and received a
response from the superintendent. Moreover, prison officials “did not prevent him from utilizing
grievance procedures” because Woodson “was able to file a grievance.” Porter, 781 F.3d at 452;
Doc. 33-3.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, Woodson failed to exhaust available administrative remedies at the time he filed
this lawsuit and no grounds exist to excuse this failure. Thus, “dismissal is mandatory.”
Johnson, 340 F.3d at 627. The Court grants Case’s [33] motion for summary judgment and
dismisses Woodson’s complaint without prejudice. A separate judgment accompanies this order.
So Ordered this 16th day of February 2022.
alles
meee CE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE