United States v. Rupp

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:19-CV-02644-SEP

)

LOUIS A. RUPP, II, et al., )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendants. )

1

Before the Court is Defendant’s Rule 50 Motion to Set Aside the Punitive Damages

Award, or in the Alternative, Defendant’s Rule 59 Motion to Reduce the Amount of Punitive

Damages Awarded. Doc. 113. For FthAeC TrSe aAsNoDn Bs AsCeKt GfoRrOtUhN bDe low, the Motion is denied.

In 2016, Laura Erwin and Martin Teal applied to lease an apartment from Defendant.

Id.

Doc. 56 at 1. Defendant provided the Erwin-Teals with a lease that included the clause, “NO

Id.

CHILDREN.” The Erwin-Teals wrote on the application that their six-year-old son would

be living with them and returned it to Defendant. Defendant agreed to lease an apartment

Id.

to them for a term of one year but stated that the lease was “being entered on a trial basis in

consideration of the ‘NO CHILDREN’ clause[.]” Throughout the term, the Erwin-Teals

Id.

often paid their rent late, but the resulting notices threatened only the imposition of late fees,

Id.

which Plaintiffs paid. After the lease expired, they remained tenants on a periodic, month-

Id.

to-month basis. In May 2017, they accepted an offer from Defendant to renew their lease,

which purported to incorporate the terms of the original lease. Six weeks later, Defendant

sent them a notice to vacate the premises by July 31st, stating that they had underpaid their

Id.

last late fee by $15, and “more importantly,” he had learned that their son had been living in

the apartment full-time and that Ms. Erwin had recently given birth to a second child. at

1

This case originally included two defendants, Louis and Pauline Rupp, in their capacity as trustees

for the Louis A. Rupp II Revocable Trust. After judgment was entered, and prior to the filing of this

Id.

1-2. Defendant concluded that he had “no alternative” but to terminate their lease, due to

their “total disregard for the terms and conditions” of the contract. at 2.

The Erwin-Teals filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban

Development, which investigated the complaint and issued a Charge of Discrimination on

. Id.

July 11, 2019. Doc. 56 at 2. Defendant elected to resolve the complaint in federal court, and

the United States subsequently initiated this action

On§ May 2e 8t , s 2e 0q 2.

1, the Court ruled

that Defendant had violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 , by discriminating

against the Erwin-Teals and their two minor children based on familial status. Doc. 56 at 8.

A jury trial was held on the sole issue of damages in August 2021. Docs. 92, 94, 95. The

evidence included live witness testimony from Ms. Erwin, Mr. Teal, Mr. Rupp, the former

Missouri Commission on Human Rights investigator who investigated the Erwin-Teal’s HUD

complaint, and video deposition testimony of the Erwin-Teals’ former neighbors. Docs. 93,

117, 118. At both the close of the United States’ case and the close of evidence, Defendant

moved for judgment as a matter of law. The Court denied the motions, finding that the

inquiry depended “on credibility determinations that are in the proper domain of the jury,”

and declining to “substitute [its] credibility determination for theirs.” Doc. 117 at 250:3-20;

Doc. 118 at 106:12-107:5. The jury returned a verdict awarding $14,400 in compensatory

2 3

damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. Doc. 109.

Defendant now argues that the punitive damages award should be set aside under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) because there was not a legally sufficient basis for the

Court to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Doc. 113 at 1. In the alternative,

Defendant argues that the $40,000 in punitive damages awarded to the two children was

grossly excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and

Id.

that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the Court should reduce the award

from $40,000 to $5,000. at 3. The United States counters that there was sufficient

evidence to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury and that the resulting award of

punitive damages was not excessive. Doc. 120 at 2, 8.

2

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows a party to renew a motion for judgment

as a matter of law previously made under Rule 50(a). In ruling on the motion, a court may

allow judgment on the verdict, order a new trial, or direct the entry of judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(b)(1)–(3). “The law places a high standard on overturning a jury

Bavlsik v. General Motors, LLC

verdict because of the danger that the jury’s rightful province will be invaded when judgment

as a matter of law is misused.” , 870 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir.

2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate

Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Dixon

only when all of the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference

sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.” , 932 F.3d

696, 702 (8th Cir. 2019)(quotation marks and citation omitted). A court should review all

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

of the evidence in the record and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party.” , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citations

Id.

omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” (quotation

Bavlsik

marks and citation omitted). The court must “deny the motion if reasonable persons could

differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” , 870 F.3d at 805.

See

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a party to file a motion to alter or amend

a judgment on grounds that, among other th§ings, the damages award was excessive.

WRIGHT & MILLER, 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 2807 (3d ed.). “A Rule 59(e) motion ‘is not

Clemens v. Local One, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union

intended to routinely give litigants a second bite at the apple, but to afford an opportunity

Barnett v. Roper

for relief in extraordinary circumstances.’” , 2019

WL 5579584, at n.1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 2019) (quoting , 941 F. Supp. 2d 1099,

1104 (E.D. Mo. 2013)). “Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting manifest

Harris v. United States

errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence, and allow a court to correct its

Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T.

own mistakes in the time immediately following judgment.” , 2018 WL

Assocs. of the Black Hills

6305593, at * 1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2018) (citing

, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998)).

DISCUSSION

I. Submission of punitive damages to the jury was proper.

The FHA permits an award of punitive damages for victims of discriminatory housing

practices “‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent,

Badami v. Flood Smith v. Wade

or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of

Eighth Circuit

others.’” , 214 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting , 461 U.S.

Model Civil Jury Instructions

30, 56 (1983)). Jury Instruction No. 19—modeled on Instruction 5.72 of the

(2020)—provided that the jury could award punitive damages

against Defendant if they determined that he had “acted with malice or reckless indifference

to the rights” of the Erwin-Teals. Doc. 96 at 28-29. It further instructed the jury that “Mr.

Rupp acted with malice or reckless indifference” if “it has been proved that Mr. Rupp knew

his conduct was in violation of the law prohibiting discrimination against families with

children in housing, or acted with reckless disregard of that law.” Doc. 96 at 28.

Defendant argues that “the jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for

the claimants on their claim for punitive damages,” because “the record was devoid of any

e§vidence concerning Mr. Rupp’s knowledge of the Fair Housing Act and, specifically, 42 U.S.C.

3604 prohibiting discrimination against families with children.” Doc. 113n aot t3. Defendant

id.

claims that “the only evidence going to Mr. Rupp’s knowledge is that he was aware of the

prohibition,” at 2, though he neglects to cite any evidence. Notably, Defendant’s Motion

addresses only the character of the evidence related to his awareness of the FHA, and

specifically of its prohibition of discrimination against families with children; it does not

address whether Defendant might have “acted with reckless disregard of the law.” Doc. 96

at 28.

In response, the United States argues that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable

jury to conclude that Defendant knew discrimination on the basis of familial status was

unlawful, but also that a showing of actual knowledge was not necessary, because there was

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant acted with reckless

disregard of the law. Doc. 120 at 3-5.

or

As provided in Instruction No. 19, the jury was allowed to impose punitive damages

if it found that Defendant “knew his conduct was in violation of the law . . . acted with

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker

intentional or malicious, nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk of harming others, as

opposed to unheedful of it.” , 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008). Conduct

is reckless if the actor “had reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of harm

Id.

to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or

indifference to, that risk.” at 493-94 (cleaned up and quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965)). Thus, in the FHA context, the Eighth Circuit

Badami

has counseled that a defendant can be liable for punitive damages if he “discriminate[s] in

the face of a perceived risk that [his] actions will violate federal law . . . .” , 214 F.3d

at 997 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Based on Defendant’s own testimony, he has owned rental properties since the

1970s; he currently owns eight properties comprising 32 units; and he has had more than

100 tenants over his career as a landlord. Doc. 117 at 101:14-102:19, 108:22-109:5.

Defendant also testified that, at the time of his unlawful discrimination against the Erwin-

Id.

Teals, he knew that it was unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race, disability, sex, or

Id.

religion. at 122:20-123:20. Defendant has a mechanical engineering degree and worked

id.

as “Director of Packaging” at both Ralston Purina (for 26 years) and a construction firm.

id.

at 118:9-119:23. He testified that he consumes the news “profusely,” at 119:6-20; that he

is aware that “laws change over time,” 120:6-23; and that he has experience with legal

Id.

requirements related to rental property management, such as inspections, rent and late fees,

bookkeeping, taxes, maintenance, and eviction proceedings. at 112:22-118:8, 119:6-20,

120:6-23.

Notwithstanding all of the above, Defendant claimed to have been wholly unaware

Id.

that it was illegal to discriminate on the basis of familial status right up until he became

aware of the Erwin-Teals complaint to the Missouri Human Rights Commission. at

Id.

108:22-109:7. And he denied ever researching “housing discrimination” or “fair housing”

between 1990 and 2017. at 109:8-112:16.

Based on Defendant’s testimony, a reasonable jury could have concluded that he

discriminated against families with children in the face of a perceived risk that his actions

4

violated federal law. Given his admitted awareness of anti-discrimination law generally and

his evident familiarity with other laws governing landlord-tenant relationships, a reasonable

factfinder could have found that he “had reason to know” that the categorical exclusion of

Exxon Shipping Co.

applicants with children posed “a high degree of risk” of violating prospective tenants’ legal

rights, and that he acted in “conscious disregard” of that risk. , 554 U.S. at

493. That conclusion would have found support in evidence introduced by the United States

after id.

that Defendant included the illegal “NO CHILDREN” provision in a lease signed seven months

he learned of the Erwin-Teals’ FHAs eceo mplaint against him, at 92:10-93:7, which

5

arguably contradicted his own testimony, Doc. 118 at 23:17-24:1; 89:15-90:11.

Thus, based on the trial record, a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant

acted with reckless disregard of the law in discriminating against the Erwin-Teals on the

basis of their family status. Therefore, the Court’s decision to submit the issue of punitive

damages to the jury was justified. Because reasonable minds could differ as to the

Bavlsik

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, Defendant has not met the high standard

necessary to overturn a jury verdict. , 870 F.3d at 805. Defendant’s Rule 50(b) Motion

mII.u st thTehreef opruen bitei vdee ndiaemd. a g es award was not excessive.

Defendant argues in the alternative that the jury’s verdict should be altered under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to reduce the punitive damages awarded to the two

minor children from $20,000 per child to $2,500 per child. Doc. 113 at 3. Defendant claims

that the punitive damages award was grossly excessive in violation of due process. Doc. 113

at 3. Upon consideration of the facts of this case in light of the applicable legal standards, the

Court disagrees.

Ondrisek v. Hoffman

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits ‘grossly excessive’

civil punishment.” , 698 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations

4

Because this finding is sufficient to support its decision to send the quest ion of punitive damages

to the jury, the Court declines to consider whether a reasonable jury could have found that

D5 efendant acted with actual knowledge that his conduct violated the FHA.

Defendant’s counseSle ed iRde eelviceist testimony intended to reconcile the apparent contradiction, Doc.

118 at 94:16-95:2, and this Court does not presume to substitute its own credibSileitey determination

Id. Stogsdill v.

omitted). “[P]unitive damages are grossly excessive if they ‘shock the conscience . . . [or]

Healthmark Partners, LLC

demonstrate a passion or prejudice on the part of the trier of fact.’” (quoting

, 377 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2004)). The Supreme Court has

provided three “guideposts” to follow when determining whether a punitive damages award

was excess ive:

[1] the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct;

[2]the disparity between the actual or po tential harm suffered by the plaintiff

and the punitive damages award; and

[3]the difference between the punitive damages awarded by t he jury and the

State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell BMW of N. Am.,

civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.

Inc. v. Gore

, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (citing

, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).

Dean v. Olibas

“The Supreme Court has stated that ‘a judgment that is a product of fair procedures

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.

is entitled to a strong presumption of validity.’” , 129 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir.

1997) (cleaned up) (quoting , 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)).

Gore

Defendant does not dispute the fairness of the procedures employed at his trial. This Court

Dean

therefore begins its review of ’s three guideposts with a presumption that the punitive

damageAs. awReaprdr eish ceonnssibtiitluittiyo nal. , 129 F.3d at 1006.

Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.

The most important guidepost is the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s

Campbell Gore

conduct. , 394 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quoting , 538 U.S. at 419; , 517 U.S. at 575). The degree of reprehensibility of

a defendan t’s conduct is analyzed in light of five factors, including whether:

[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;

[2]the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of

the health or safety of others;

[3] the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;

[4] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and

[5]the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere

Campbell Gore

accident.

See e.g. Dean

Applied to this case, the first factor weighs in favor of finding Defendant’s conduct

reprehensible, because it did cause the Erwin-Teals noneconomic harm. , , , 129

F.3d at 1007 (finding “significant noneconomic harm” where the plaintiff had been removed

Campbell

from his home, detained against his will, and required to attend court hearings on two

different days); , 538 U.S. at 426 (fact that “harm arose from a transaction in the

economic realm, not from some physical assault or trauma [and] there were no physical

injuries” militated against reprehensibility). Most notably, the Erwin-Teals were required to

Dean

physically move out of their home. They were not forcibly removed from their home by the

Dean

police as in , but the Erwin-Teals—a family of 4, including a newborn—were

See, e.g.

permanently evicted, not just temporarily removed as in , and they had to quickly find

a new place to live and then pack and move their belongings. , Doc. 116 at 198:24-

199:9. In addition, Ms. Erwin testified that she had planned to take two-and-a-half months

off work to recover from her C-section and bond with both children, but because the family

needed proof of income to find a new apartment, she had to go back “about five weeks or so

after [the baby] was born.” Doc. 116 at 182:7-22; 197:9-198:17. Such noneconomic harms

support a finding of reprehensibility.

The second factor also favors reprehensibility. Evicting the Erwin-Teals shortly after

the arrival of their second child by C-section does evince indifference to or reckless disregard

for the health and safety of at least the recently delivered mother and the newborn, if not

also the firstborn child, who was still very young. And that conclusion is only bolstered by

Defendant’s admitted awareness of the Erwin-Teals’ financial vulnerability, which is the

6

third factor supporting reprehensibility. Doc. 113 at 5.

The fourth factor—whether “the conduct involved repeated actions or was an

isolated incident”—also supports finding Defendant’s conduct reprehensible. Defendant

admits to violating the FHA’s prohibition of discrimination against families with children

consistently for more than 30 years. Defendant points to the lack of evidence that he had

all

ever before been accused of violating the FHA. Doc. 113 at 5. But he also admitted to having

consistently used the “NO CHILDREN” clause in of his leases for more than four decades—

6

three decades of which post-dated the enactment of the FHA’s prohibition on familial status

discrimination. Doc. 117 at 103:20-104:1. There is no way to assess how many prospective

tenants were alienated by that practice. Moreover, Defendant’s claim that “once he was

informed that the conduct at issue was improper, [he] changed his leases to remove the

see supra

offending language,” Doc. 113 at 5-6, was called into question by his testimony on cross

examination. Doc. 118 at 90:14-93:7; at n. 5 and accompanying text. Thus,

although it is true that the United States introduced no evidence of previous complaints

Campbell

against Defendant, it is also undeniable that Defendant’s discriminatory conduct was not an

“isolated incident.” , 538 U.S. at 419.

The fifth factor does not weigh in favor of either party’s position. There is no evidence

that the harm was the result of malice, trickery, or deceit; however, there is likewise no

evidence that the harm was the result of mere accident. Therefore, the Court will not

consider this factor.

In sum, four of the five factors support reprehensibility, and no factor weighs against.

Because the degree of reprehensibility is the most important of the three guideposts, that

finding significantly reinforces the presumption that the jury’s award of punitive damages

was conBs.t itDuitsiponaaril.t y Between Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Gore

The second guidepost invites examination of “the disparity between the actual

Campbell Gore

or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff”—that is, compensatory damages—"and the

punitive damages award.” , 538 U.S. at 418 (citing , 517 U.S. at 575). The ratio

Gore

between the two is “perhaps [the] most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or

excessive punitive damages award.” , 517 U.S. at 580. Although the analysis primarily

potential harm

focuses on the disparity between compensatory and punitive damages, it is also appropriate

TXO

for the court “to consider the magnitude of the . . . to other victims that might

have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred.” , 509 U.S. at 460 (emphasis

in original). The Supreme Court has declined “to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive

Campbell

damages award cannot exceed”; however, “in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit

ratio . . . will satisfy due process.” , 538 U.S. at 425.

The jury awarded $20,000 in punitive damages and $1,000 in compensatory damages

See Quigley v. Winter

damages awarded to each minor child is excessive and should be reduced. Doc. 113 at 7-9.

Szwast v.

Defendant offers several cases to support reduction. , 598 F.3d 938,

Carlton Apts.

955-56 (8th Cir. 2010) (reduced an award from an 18-to-1 ratio down to 4-to-1);

Walsh

, 102 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (reduced a punitive damages award

v. National Computer Systems, Inc.

from $400,000 to $30,000, finding the issue of reprehensibility to be a “mixed bag”);

, 332 F.3d 1150, 1162 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming a 3-to-1

ratio).

The United States argues that, by analyzing each child’s award individually, rather

than the general damages award collectively, Defendant has improperly inflated the relevant

ratio. Doc. 120 at 10. According to the United States, the Erwin-Teals’ damages should first

Id.

be aggregated as a whole and only then should the Court compare the two types of damages.

general

The Court agrees. “[C]ourts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both

damages recovered Campbell

reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the

.” , 538 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added). Where a monetary

U.S. v. Veal

judgment will eventually be paid to multiple individuals, it is still appropriate to view the

see also U.S. v. Big D Enters., Inc.

punitive and compensatory damages collectively. , 365 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1040 n.3

(W.D. Mo. 2004); , 184 F.3d 924, 933 (8th Cir. 1999)

one

(aggregating damages among two defendants and three victims to form one determinable

Veal .

ratio). This is especially true when, as is the case here, “there is only plaintiff in [the]

case—the United States of America.” , 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 n.3 In the aggregate, the

damages awarded in this case were $60,000 in punitive damages and $14,400 in

7

compensatory damages. Thus, the correct ratio to scrutinize is approximately 4-to-1.

The 4-to-1 ratio of aggregate punitive to compensatory damages in this case does not

See Masters v. City of Independence

so clearly violate due process that it could justify this Court overturning the jury’s verdict. It

Campbell

is not a constitutionally suspect double-digit ratio. , 998

See,

F.3d 827, 841 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting , 538 U.S. at 425). Moreover, some courts

e.g. Veal

have upheld higher ratios where, as here, there is a relatively low compensatory award.

, , 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-40 (upholding $1,055,000 punitive award based on a 22-

to-1 ratio, “given the relatively low compensatory award [of $47,804], the reprehensibility

. . . and the fact that the harm was primarily noneconomic”).

Big D Enters. Pacific Mut. Life

Defendant’s degree of reprehensibility is not “weak,” such that “a 4 to 1 ratio would

Ins. Co. v. Haslip

test the outer limits of acceptability.” , 184 F.3d at 933 (citing

Id.

, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)). In fact, in a case where the other guideposts are

TXO

strong, the Eighth Circuit has indicated that a 526-to-1 ratio may be appropriate. (citing

, 509 U.S. at 443).

Big D Enters.

Additionally, “a defendant’s financial worth is traditionally admissible for the purpose

Campbell

of evaluating the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded,” , 184

Gore TXO

F.3d at 932, especially because one of the goals of punitive damages is deterrence. ,

538 U.S. at 419 (citing , 517 U.S. at 576-77); , 509 U.S. at 460. Given Defendant’s net

worth of more than $4 million and his long history of using the unlawful “NO CHILDREN”

clause, the jury could have intended the 4-to-1 ratio as a deterrent. Finally, Defendant

SeeQuigley McKee

himself cites several cases where ratios of 4-to-1 or higher were either upheld or imposed

v. Reuter Ogden v. Wax Works,

on reduction from an unacceptable award. , 598 F.3d at 955-56 (4-to-1);

Inc. Masters

, 2019 WL 6250845, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2016) (5-to-1);

, 214 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 2000) (6.5-to-1); , 998 F.3d at 842 (9-to-1).

TherefoCr.e , Cthoem Cpoaurrits foinnd tso tChiavti lt hPee 4n-atlot-i1e sr atio does not violate due process in this case.

Gore

The third and final guidepost directs a court to compare the punitive damages

award with the potential civil penalties authorized by statute in comparable cases. For the

purposes of that comparison, aggregating the punitive damages award—i.e., taking the

relevant number to be $60,000, rather than Defendant’s preferred per-child amount of

$20,000—works in favor of Defendant. Nonetheless, it does not decisively support reduction

of the damages award.

§ Defendant claims that the most comparable civil penalty is found at 42 U.S.C.

See

3612(g)(3)(A). Adjusted for inflation, that provision provides for a maximum penalty in a

comparable case of $20,111. Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalty Amounts for 2017,

82 Fed. Reg. 24,521, 24,523 (May 20, 2017§). The United State§s claims that the more

comparable civil penalty is found at 42 U.S.C. 3614 and 28 C.F.R. 85.5. Those provisions

The Court does not have to determine which civil penalty is more comparable to the

award in this case, because the choice of comparator does not affect its conclusion. Even

assuming that Defendant is correct that the $60,000 punitive damages award is three times

the $20,111 comparable civil penalty, that disparity would not outweigh the other two Gore

factors. The Gore factors are but “guideposts,” and should be evaluated “as a whole.” Gore,

517 U.S. at 574; Bid D Enters., 184 F.3d at 934. Gore did not make comparable civil penalties

a cap on punitive damages awards; rather, it stated that courts should afford “substantial

deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at

issue.” 517 U.S. at 574 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Later, in a case involving a

comparable civil penalty of $10,000, the Supreme Court observed that a punitive damages

award “at or near” $1 million likely would have been justified. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429. In

this case, in light of the other Gore factors, the Court finds that the punitive damages award

is justified even at three times the comparable civil penalty.

In light of the foregoing, the punitive damages awarded in this case were not grossly

excessive. The presumption of constitutionality owed to the jury’s decision is reinforced by

two of the three Gore guideposts, including the “most important” of the three. Boerner, 394

F.3d at 602 (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). Therefore, “evaluating

the Gore guidepost factors as a whole,” the Court concludes that the jury’s award does not

violate due process. Big D Enters., 184 F.3d at 934.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Rule 50 Motion to Set Aside the Punitive

Damages Award, or in the Alternative, Defendant’s Rule 59 Motion to Reduce the Amount of

Punitive Damages Awarded (Doc. [113]) is DENIED.

Dated this 315 day of January, 2022.

Chosck Li ig

SARAH E. PITL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12