Bonner v. TransUnion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

LAMONT BONNER, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:21-cv-01237-HEA

)

TRANSUNION, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff LaMont Bonner, Jr. for leave

to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2).

Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue

process on defendant TransUnion.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere

possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as

true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir.

2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating

that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true

any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even

pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of

law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d

912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are

not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not

mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes

by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq, naming TransUnion as the defendant. (Docket

No. 1 at 2-3). He asserts that on July 9, 2021, he filed a complaint with TransUnion, which was

assigned an investigation number. (Docket No. 1 at 5). The investigation apparently began on July

16, 2021, and was supposed to be done within thirty days. However, when plaintiff received a

copy of his report, he states that he saw “no changes.” Plaintiff again sent a complaint to

TransUnion, which was received on August 11, 2021. In the complaint, he told TransUnion to

“remove a list of accounts from [his] credit file.” Though it is unclear, plaintiff seems to assert that

forty-two accounts were erroneously listed. (Docket No. 1 at 6). In any event, TransUnion replied

that they had already done an investigation, and they refused to remove the accounts, even after

plaintiff explained to TransUnion why the accounts should be removed. (Docket No. 1 at 5).

Based on TransUnion’s refusal to correct his credit report, plaintiff is seeking total damages

in the amount of $52,000. (Docket No. 1 at 4, 6).

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to the FCRA.

Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court has determined that

plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient for purposes of initial review, and will direct the Clerk of Court

to issue process on defendant TransUnion.

Congress enacted the FCRA “to address a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies

exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s

right to privacy.” McIvor v. Credit Control Services, Inc., 773 F.3d 909, 915 (8th Cir. 2014). See

also Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that

the FCRA “was enacted in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in

the banking system, and protect consumer privacy”); and Hauser v. Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811,

914 (8th Cir. 1979) (explaining that the FCRA is not meant to provide comprehensive regulation

of the consumer reporting industry, but instead establishes a broad minimum standard of

reasonable procedures that must be adopted by reporting agencies).

The FCRA places responsibilities on both consumer reporting agencies and those that

furnish them with information. McIvor, 773 F.3d at 915. It “has several mechanisms to protect

consumer credit information, some of which apply to credit reporting agencies while others apply

to users of the information provided by those agencies.” Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1096. Furthermore, the

FCRA “provides for recovery by a consumer upon a showing of willful or negligent failure to

follow reasonable procedures.” Hauser, 602 F.2d at 914. To make out a prima facie violation of

the FCRA, a consumer must present facts showing that a credit reporting agency prepared a report

that contained inaccurate information. Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance, Corp., 936 F.2d

1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1991).

In this case, plaintiff has alleged that TransUnion has included inaccurate information on

his credit report, that he has communicated with TransUnion about this inaccurate information,

that he has provided TransUnion with the reasons why the information is inaccurate, and that

TransUnion nevertheless refuses to remove forty-two erroneous accounts from his file. For

purposes of initial review, the Court must accept these allegations as true, and make all reasonable

inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See Jones v. Douglas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 915 F.3d 498, 499 (8th

Cir. 2019). Furthermore, when evaluating whether a self-represented plaintiff has asserted

sufficient facts to state a claim, a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, is held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541

(8th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the Clerk of Court will be directed to issue process on defendant

TransUnion as to plaintiff’s FCRA claim.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process

to issue on defendant TransUnion, by serving its registered agent: The Prentice Hall Corporation,

221 Bolivar Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101.

Dated this 20 day of January, 2022.

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE