stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
How later courts described this case
- stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- stating that § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights”
- explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”
- recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT E. WALLACE, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:21-CV-01099-JAR
)
ALEX DOWNEY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Robert E. Wallace, Jr. for
leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2).
Having reviewed the motion, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay
the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will direct plaintiff to file an amended
complaint.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her
prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial
partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s
account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month
period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly
payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00,
until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has not submitted a prison account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2). Nevertheless, having reviewed the information contained in the motion, the Court will
require plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481,
484 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a prisoner is unable to provide the court with a certified
copy of his inmate account statement, the court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based
on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”). If plaintiff is unable to pay
the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his prison account statement in support of his
claim.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The
court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820
F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not
required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should
construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even
pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of
law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are
not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not
mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The Complaint
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Potosi
Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri. He has brought a civil action construed as arising
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Correctional Officers Alex Downey and Caelan Upton as
defendants. (Docket No. 1 at 2-3). Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which defendants are
sued. The complaint contains allegations regarding two separate incidents of excessive force.
In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that on June 19, 2021, Officer Downey “used
excessive force” by slamming plaintiff’s face against the wall and floor, chipping his tooth.
(Docket No. 1 at 6). On June 27, 2021, plaintiff alleges that Officer Upton engaged in the
“excessive use of force” by slamming his hand in the food port, causing minor bleeding and
lacerations on his right forearm. Based on these incidents, plaintiff seeks unspecified “punitive
monetary damages” and unspecified “injunctive relief.”
Discussion
Plaintiff brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Officer Downey
and Officer Upton of using excessive force against him. Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and
for the reasons discussed below, the Court has determined that his complaint is subject to dismissal.
Rather than dismissing outright, however, plaintiff will be given an opportunity to file an amended
complaint.
A. Deficiencies in Complaint
Plaintiff has not indicated the capacity in which he is suing Officer Downey and Officer
Upton. If a complaint is silent as to the capacity in which a defendant is sued, it is interpreted as
including official capacity claims only. See Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2007). In
an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the governmental
entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit against a
public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.”
Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999).
In this case, defendants are alleged to be employed by the Missouri Department of
Corrections. As such, the official capacity claims against them are treated as being made against
the state itself, their employer. The claims fail for two reasons.
First, to the extent that plaintiff seeks money damages, the State of Missouri is not a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 “person.” See Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining
that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”).
Furthermore, “[a] claim for damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred
under the Eleventh Amendment.” Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir.
1999).
Second, to the extent that plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief, he has not
demonstrated the state’s liability for violating his constitutional rights. That is, he has not presented
facts regarding an unconstitutional State of Missouri policy, custom, or failure to train. See Marsh
v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an
unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an
extension of the same”).
Even if the Court were to assume that plaintiff intended to sue Officers Downey and Upton
in their individual capacities, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged excessive force. When a prison
official is accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the
core judicial inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d 969, 974
(8th Cir. 2017). See also Ward v. Smith, 844 F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Because the use of
force is sometimes required in prison settings, guards are liable only if they are completely
unjustified in using force, i.e., they are using it maliciously and sadistically”). Here, however,
plaintiff has provided no facts demonstrating the context in which the force was used. In other
words, there are no facts showing that defendants were not acting to maintain or restore discipline,
leaving the Court to speculate as to what actually occurred.
For all these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint is deficient and subject to dismissal. Because he
is a self-represented litigant, the Court will give him the opportunity to file an amended complaint,
according to the instructions set forth below. Plaintiff must follow these instructions in amending
his complaint.
B. Amendment Instructions
Plaintiff should type or neatly print his amended complaint on the Court’s civil rights form,
which will be provided to him. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A) (“All actions brought by self-
represented plaintiffs or petitioners should be filed on Court-provided forms”). The Court notes
that plaintiff’s handwriting can be difficult to read. Thus, if the amended complaint is handwritten,
the writing must be legible.
In the “Caption” section of the Court-provided form, plaintiff should clearly name each
and every party he is intending to sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must
name all the parties”). If there is not enough room in the caption, plaintiff may add additional
sheets of paper. However, all the defendants must be clearly listed.
Plaintiff should fill out the prisoner civil rights complaint form in its entirety, and ensure
that it is signed.
In the “Statement of Claim” section, plaintiff should provide a short and plain statement of
the factual allegations supporting his claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should put each
claim into a numbered paragraph, and each paragraph should be “limited as far as practicable to a
single set of circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
In structuring his amended complaint, plaintiff should begin by writing the defendant’s
name. In separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, plaintiff should write a short and plain
statement of the factual allegations supporting his claim against that specific defendant. If plaintiff
is suing more than one defendant, he should follow the same procedure for each defendant.
Plaintiff must specify whether he intends to sue each defendant in an official capacity, an
individual capacity, or both. The failure to sue a defendant in his or her individual capacity may
result in the dismissal of that defendant.
If plaintiff is suing a defendant in an individual capacity, he is required to allege facts
demonstrating the personal responsibility of the defendant for harming him. See Madewell v.
Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that § 1983 liability “requires a causal link
to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights”). Furthermore, the Court emphasizes
that the “Statement of Claim” requires more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action.” See Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir.
2017). The Court notes that if plaintiff intends to bring an excessive force claim under the Eighth
Amendment, he must present facts showing that the force deployed against him was done
sadistically or maliciously for the purpose of causing harm, rather than to maintain or restore
discipline.
If plaintiff is suing multiple defendants, it is important that he establish the responsibility
of each separate defendant for harming him. That is, for each defendant, plaintiff must allege facts
showing how that particular defendant’s acts or omissions violated his constitutional rights. It is
not enough for plaintiff to make general allegations against all the defendants as a group. Rather,
plaintiff needs to provide the role of each named defendant in this case, in order that each specific
defendant can receive notice of what he or she is accused of doing. See Topchian v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that the essential function of a
complaint “is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim”).
The Court observes that plaintiff has brought two different excessive force claims
occurring at different times and involving different defendants. The amended complaint should
only include claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. In other words,
plaintiff should only include claims that are related to each other. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
Alternatively, plaintiff may choose a single defendant and set forth as many claims as he has
against that defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has unrelated claims, he should file
them in a separate action.
Plaintiff is warned that the filing of an amended complaint completely replaces the
original complaint. This means that claims that are not re-alleged in the amended complaint will
be deemed abandoned. See In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928
(8th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that an amended complaint supercedes an original complaint
and renders the original complaint without legal effect”).
After receiving the amended complaint, the Court will review it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915. Plaintiff’s failure to make specific factual allegations against a defendant will result in the
dismissal of that defendant. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on a Court-provided
form within thirty (30) days in accordance with the instructions set forth herein, the Court will
dismiss this action without prejudice and without further notice to plaintiff.
C. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Docket No. 3). In civil cases, a pro se
litigant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. Ward v. Smith, 721
F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 2013). Rather, a district court may appoint counsel in a civil case if the
court is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim…and where the
nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the assistance of
counsel.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018). When determining whether to
appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors such as the complexity
of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting
testimony, and the ability of the pro se litigant to present his or her claim. Phillips v. Jasper Cty.
Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006).
After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not
warranted at this time. As discussed above, the Court is ordering plaintiff to file an amended
complaint, as his allegations are insufficient to state a claim. The Court will entertain a future
motion for appointment of counsel as the case progresses, if appropriate.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00
within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket
No. 3) is DENIED at this time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send to plaintiff a copy of the
Court’s prisoner civil rights complaint form.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on the Court-
provided form within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, in accordance with the instructions
set forth above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on the
Court-provided form in accordance with the instructions set forth above within thirty (30) days
of the date of this order, this action will be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt of plaintiff's amended complaint, the
Court will review it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Dated this Sth day of January, 2022.
/ f OHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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