Liggins v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

SHAWN LIGGINS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:21-cv-00603-SRC

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

Memorandum and Order

Petitioner Shawn Liggins, proceeding pro se, seeks to have his conviction vacated under

28 U.S.C. § 2255, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct.

2191 (2019) as support for his request. Doc. 1. Specifically, Liggins contends that the Court

must vacate his conviction because the United States failed to state the “knowledge element” in

the Indictment as required by Rehaif. Id. at p. 1. The United States argues that Liggins’s

argument fails both procedurally and on the merits. Doc. 3. The Court finds that the record

amply demonstrates that Liggins is not entitled to relief under section 2255, and therefore, denies

Liggins’s Motion, Doc. 1, without an evidentiary hearing.

I. Statement of Facts1

On November 14, 2019, officers with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

responded to a “Hold Up” alarm at a commercial establishment named CeCi’s located at 901

Washington Avenue in the City of St. Louis. When officers responded, the owner informed

them that a man and woman had entered the store. The man proceeded to the back of the store

1 The statement of facts substantially reflect the Statement of Facts contained in the Guilty Plea Agreement entered

into between the parties and accepted by the Court. See United States v. Liggins, Case No. 4:19-cr-00965-SRC,

Doc. 30.

and picked up a small rack of several watches. He concealed them in his coat and began to walk

toward the exit. The owner grabbed her firearm from behind the counter and approached the

man. She demanded that he return the watches. A tussle occurred between the two, during

which the man took the owner’s firearm from her and fled the store. Officers observed the

surveillance video, and it was consistent with what the owner had told them. Through further

investigation, law enforcement officers identified the man as Liggins.

At the time of the instant conduct, Liggins was on supervised release arising out of the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in cause number 4:17-cr-00591-CDP. In

that case, he was charged and convicted of three counts of forgery. Each count carried a

maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years. Therefore, at the time Liggins possessed the

firearm in this case, he had previously been convicted of a felony offense punishable by a term of

imprisonment exceeding one year. Further, at the time Liggins possessed the firearm, he knew

he had previously been convicted of a felony offense publishable by a term of imprisonment

exceeding one year.

The firearm was a Taurus make, PT111 Pro model, 9mm semi-automatic pistol bearing

serial number TCK54230. The firearm was operable, meaning it was capable of expelling a

projectile by the action of an explosive. The firearm was manufactured in Brazil and imported

by way of Miami, Florida. Therefore, the firearm necessarily traveled in interstate and foreign

commerce to be in defendant's possession on November 14, 2019.

II. Procedural History

Based on this conduct, on November 21, 2019, a federal grand jury indicted Liggins on

one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

See Case No. 4:19-cr-00965-SRC, Docs. 1–2. In the Indictment, the grand jury charged that:

On or about November 14, 2019, in St. Louis City, within the Eastern District of

Missouri,

SHAWN LIGGINS,

the Defendant herein, knowingly possessed a firearm, knowing he had previously

been convicted in a court of law of a felony, crime punishable by imprisonment for

a term exceeding one year, and the firearm traveled in interstate or foreign

commerce during or prior to being in Defendant's possession.

Id.

After initially pleading not guilty, Liggins voluntarily entered into a Guilty Plea

Agreement with the United States, and in accordance with the Plea Agreement, Liggins pleaded

guilty to the one-count indictment. See United States v. Liggins, Case No. 4:19-cr-00965-SRC,

Docs. 29–30. The Plea Agreement sets forth the elements of the offense, to which Liggins

admitted, as follows:

As to Count I, the [Liggins] admits to knowingly violating Title 18, United States

Code, Section 922(g)(1), and admits there is a factual basis for the plea and further

fully understands that the elements of the crime are:

a. The defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year;

b. The defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm;

c. The firearm was transported in interstate or foreign commerce at some time

during or before the defendant's possession of it; and

d. At the time defendant possessed the firearm, defendant knew he had been

convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year.

Id. at Doc. 30 at § 2.

On February 21, 2020, the Court held a change-of-plea hearing. Id. at Doc. 29. During

the hearing, the Court explained the elements of the charge. Liggins confirmed his

understanding of the elements. The United States then recited the facts in section four of the

Plea Agreement2. Id. at Doc. 30 at § 4. At the plea hearing, Liggins admitted under oath that he

committed each of the elements of the offense, including the Rehaif element that he knew he had

been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Liggins further confirmed at the plea hearing that the facts recited in section four of the

plea agreement were accurate, that the AUSA accurately stated on the record the facts to which

Liggins admitted, that the AUSA did not leave out any facts important to his criminal case, and

that he did in fact do everything both stated in section four and by the AUSA on the record.

After the discussing the agreed-upon facts, the Court discussed the waivers outlined in section

seven of the Plea Agreement. Liggins confirmed that he understood that by entering into the

Plea Agreement, he was waiving a variety of appeal rights and the right to seek post-conviction

review of any sentence or writ of habeas corpus. At the conclusion of the hearing, Liggins

confirmed that he wished to still plead guilty and entered a guilty plea.

Following the change-of-plea hearing, the United States Probation Office prepared a

presentence investigation report. Id. at Doc. 53. The PSR found Liggins’s base offense level to

be 20, as Liggins committed the instant offense subsequent to sustaining a crime of violence, that

being domestic assault second degree. Id. at ¶ 21; see also U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. The PSR added

two levels because the firearm was stolen and four levels because Liggins used or possessed the

firearm in connection with another felony offense (stealing-physically take). Id. at ¶¶ 2–23.

Allowing for a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Liggins’s total offense level

was 23. Id. at ¶¶ 29–31.

2 The facts recited by the United States substantially reflect the Statement of Facts contained in section I, above.

The PSR also determined that Liggins had 20 criminal history points, resulting in a

criminal history category of VI. Id. at ¶¶ 34–53. The PSR sets forth Liggins’s various

convictions, including the following felony convictions:

• February 2, 1995, conviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court for unlawful use of a

weapon, carried concealed, Docket No. 951-00429;

• June 3, 1999, conviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court for possession of a

controlled substance, heroin, Docket No. 99CR-4284;

• November 17, 1999, conviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court for stealing over

$750, Docket No. 00CR-3926;

• March 6, 2005, conviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court for burglary second

degree and stealing over $500, Docket No. 05CR-3120B;

• May 22, 2005, conviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court for tampering first

degree, Docket No. 051-1724;

• June 9, 2009, conviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court for domestic assault

second degree and resisting arrest, Docket No. 09SL-CR04618-01;

• August 20, 2010, conviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court for stealing over $500,

Docket No. 10SL-CR07493-01;

• April 3, 2017, conviction in St. Charles County Circuit Court for forgery, Docket No.

1711-CR02436-01; and

• February 8, 2018, conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri for three counts of uttering counterfeit securities, Docket No.

4:17-cr-00591.

Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37–38, 42–43, 46–49. The PSR ultimately concluded that a total offense level of 23,

coupled with a criminal history category of VI, resulted in a guidelines range of 92 to 115

months imprisonment. Id. at ¶¶ 89–90.

On December 9, 2020, Liggins appeared before the Court for sentencing. During the

hearing, Liggins confirmed that he reviewed the PSR and that he had no disputes or objections to

what’s in the PSR. See Id. at Doc. 35. The Court then sentenced Liggins to a slightly-below-

guidelines sentence of 91 months imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised

release for his conviction. Id. at Docs. 57–58. Liggins did not appeal his sentence, and his

conviction became final on December 23, 2020. On May 25, 2021, Liggins filed the instant

motion for post-conviction relief. Doc. 1.

III. Standard of Review

A federal prisoner who seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on grounds “the sentence was

imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was

without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which

imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To

obtain relief under section 2255, the Petitioner must establish a constitutional or federal statutory

violation constituting “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage

of justice.” United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.

Boone, 869 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989)).

Claims brought under section 2255 may be limited by procedural default. A Petitioner

“cannot raise a nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional issue in a § 2255 motion if the issue could

have been raised on direct appeal but was not.” Anderson v. United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th

Cir. 1994). Claims, including those concerning constitutional and jurisdictional issues, that a

defendant does not raise on direct appeal cannot subsequently be raised in a 2255 motion unless

the petitioner establishes: “(1) cause for the default and actual prejudice or (2) actual innocence.”

United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523

U.S. 614, 621–22 (1998)).

However, ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be raised for the first time in a

section 2255 motion even if they could have been raised on direct appeal. Massaro v. United

States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). This exception is in place to prevent petitioners from being

forced “to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop the factual

predicate for the claim.” Id. Additionally, a petitioner’s attorney may serve as counsel for both

the trial and appellate case, and it is unlikely that the attorney would raise a claim of his own

ineffective assistance on appeal. See United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir.

2003).

If the petitioner’s claims are not procedurally barred, the Court must hold an evidentiary

hearing to consider the claims “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also

Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994). A Petitioner is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing “when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief.”

Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). However, a court

may dismiss a claim without a hearing “if the claim is inadequate on its face or if the record

affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based.” Shaw, 24 F.3d at 1043.

IV. Discussion

Liggins argues that his conviction should be vacated pursuant to the U.S. Supreme

Court’s decision in Rehaif. Doc. 1. Specifically, Liggins contends that the Court should vacate

his conviction because the United States failed to state the “knowledge element” in the

indictment as required by Rehaif. Id. at p. 1. The United States asserts that Liggins’s argument

for vacating his conviction fails both procedurally and on the merits. Doc. 3. Procedurally, the

United States claims that Liggins’s argument fails because he did not raise the issue on direct

appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and he did not assert a claim of actual innocence.

Id. at pp. 5–6. On the merits, the United States claims that Liggins’s fails because his

indictment and subsequent conviction fully complied with the principles set forth in Rehaif. Id.

at pp. 6–7. The Court agrees.

In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that the knowledge requirement in 18 U.S.C. §

924(a)(2) applies not only to the defendant’s possession of a firearm or ammunition, but also to

his prohibited status. Id. at 2191. Specifically, according to Rehaif, in prosecutions under

section 922(g)(1), the United States must prove, in addition to knowing possession, that at the

time of that possession, the defendant knew he previously had been convicted of a crime

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Id. Rehaif, however, does not

demand proof the defendant specifically knew he was legally prohibited from possessing a

firearm. Id.

A. Liggins’s claim is procedurally defaulted.

As a general rule, claims not raised at trial or on direct appeal “may not be raised on

collateral review[.]” Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85–86

(1977) (claim defaulted when no contemporaneous objection was lodged at trial); Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490–492 (1986) (claim not raised on direct appeal is procedurally

defaulted). Here, Liggins failed to preserve a knowledge-of-prohibited-status objection in his

direct proceedings or on appeal, and as a result, Liggins’s Rehaif claim is subject to procedural

default.

To overcome procedural default, Liggins must either show both “cause” for the default

and “actual prejudice” from the asserted Rehaif error, or that he is actually innocent. Bousley,

523 U.S. at 622. Here, Liggins has not alleged, much less established, the requisite showing of

“cause.” Moreover, Liggins can’t show “cause” or “actual prejudice.” Not only did the U.S.

Supreme Court decide Rehaif five months before the grand jury returned the Indictment against

Liggins, but the indictment and subsequent conviction comply with Rehaif in that the indictment

charges and Liggins admitted all Rehaif elements. Even if Liggins somehow could show cause

for his procedural default, Liggins cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that but-for the

error he would not have entered the plea because the indictment charges and he admitted all of

the Rehaif elements.

Because Liggins cannot satisfy the “cause and prejudice” showing, he must make a

threshold showing of “actual innocence.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986). The

“actual innocence” exception requires Liggins to show that it was “more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him[.]” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327–28 (1995).

“[A]ctual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S.

at 623. “[A] petitioner must demonstrate actual factual innocence” of the offense of conviction,

in other words, a petitioner must demonstrate that he did not commit the crime for which he was

convicted; this standard is not satisfied by a showing that a petitioner is legally, but not factually,

innocent. Brown v. United States, No.: 4:19CV1891 HEA, 2020 WL 7181315 at * 3 (E.D. Mo.

Dec. 7, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 21-1201, 2021 WL 3175809 (8th Cir. Apr. 16, 2021). In

analyzing a claim of actual innocence, “[t]he habeas court must make its determination

concerning the petitioner’s innocence in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have

been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably

claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial.” Schlup,

513 U.S at 328.

Here, Liggins does not assert a claim of actual innocence and the facts admitted by

Liggins in the Plea Agreement, on the record at the plea hearing, and in the PSR do not support a

claim of actual innocence. Thus, the Court finds that Liggins cannot show that, in light of all the

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28.

B. Liggins’s claim fails on the merits.

Liggins alleges one ground for relief under Rehaif—that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. §

922 (g)(1) is unconstitutional. Liggins’s argument fails because his indictment charges and he

admitted all of the Rehaif elements.

C. Liggins’s waived his right to bring this claim.

The Court further notes that in the Plea Agreement, Liggins explicitly waived “all rights

to contest the conviction or sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including one pursuant

to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, except for claims of prosecutorial misconduct or

ineffective assistance of counsel” when he entered into the Plea Agreement. See United States v.

Liggins, Case No. 4:19-cr-00965-SRC, Doc. 30 at § 7(b). A defendant may waive his section

2255 rights as part of a plea agreement, so long as the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily,

and its enforcement does not result in a “miscarriage of justice.” See DeRoo v. United States,

223 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2003).

“[A] waiver of appellate rights does not prohibit the appeal of an illegal sentence or a sentence in

violation of the terms of an agreement, or a claim asserting ineffective assistance of counse[l.]”

Andis, 333 F.3d at 891 (citing DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923). Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit has

cautioned that “waivers are contractual agreements between a defendant and the [United States]

and should not be easily voided by the courts.” Id. Here, Liggins contractually waived his right

to appeal his conviction in a post-conviction proceeding, knowingly and voluntarily, and the

Court finds that Liggins has not established a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred to

circumvent his knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal his conviction in a post-

conviction proceeding.

V. Conclusion

The Court finds that the record conclusively establishes that Liggins is not entitled to

relief. Therefore, the Court, denies without an evidentiary hearing, Liggins’s [1] Motion to

Vacate Conviction.

Certificate of Appealability

The Court further finds that Liggins has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right, as is required before a certificate of appealability will issue. See Cox v.

Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining a substantial showing is a showing the

issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the

issues deserve further proceedings). Therefore, the Court does not issue a certificate of

appealability.

Dated this 14th day of October 2021.

spent le CK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1]